Sequeiro v. Torrington

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Sequeiro v. Torrington

LUIS A. MONTIJO SEQUEIRO v. CITY OF
TORRINGTON ET AL.
(AC 48208)
Moll, Westbrook and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment granting the defen-
dants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground of governmental immu-
nity. The plaintiff had been detained in the defendant town of Winchester by
the defendant W, a police officer with the Winchester Police Department, at
the request of a neighboring police department. The plaintiff was thereafter
transferred to the custody of police officers from the neighboring police
department and placed in a jail cell, where he was later injured when he
attempted suicide. He claimed, inter alia, that genuine issues of material
fact existed that precluded summary judgment. Held:

The plaintiff’s claim that genuine issues of material fact existed concern-
ing whether he was under the influence of drugs and whether he told the
police officers at the time of the transfer that he was suicidal was unavail-
ing, as these issues were immaterial to whether policies of the Winchester
Police Department gave rise to discretionary duties to which governmental
immunity applied.

The trial court properly rendered summary judgment on the defendants’
claims of governmental immunity, as the police department policies that
the plaintiff claimed gave rise to ministerial duties were discretionary, W’s
actions were not actionable because they bore no demonstrable relation to
the plaintiff’s injuries, and the court correctly determined that the plaintiff
had failed to prove that the imminent harm to identifiable persons exception
to governmental immunity applied.

Argued October 8, 2025—officially released March 17, 2026

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-
dants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain,
where Justin Waltzer was substituted as a defendant;
thereafter, the court, Welch, J., granted the motion
for summary judgment filed by the defendant town of
Winchester et al. and rendered judgment thereon, from
which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Noah J. Kores, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Sequeiro v. Torrington

Kristan M. Jakiela, with whom, on the brief, was
Katherine E. Rule, for the appellees (defendant town
of Winchester et al.).

Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The plaintiff, Luis A. Montijo Sequeiro,
appeals from the summary judgment rendered by the trial
court in favor of the defendant town of Winchester and
one of its police officers, the defendant Justin Waltzer.1
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that (1) genuine issues of
material fact exist precluding summary judgment and
(2) the court improperly determined that the counts of
the complaint against the defendants were barred by
governmental immunity. We affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
The following undisputed facts, as detailed by the trial
court in its memorandum of decision, are relevant. On the
morning of December 6, 2019, Torrington police officers
were dispatched to the plaintiff’s home in response to
a report of domestic violence. When Torrington police
officers arrived, the plaintiff’s wife informed them that
the plaintiff was traveling by taxi to Winsted to purchase
drugs and he intended to overdose. The Torrington Police
Department then notified the Winchester Police Depart-
ment that the plaintiff was a suspect in a domestic inci-
dent and intended to purchase enough drugs to overdose.
1
The city of Torrington and Anthony Pietrafesa, Michael Giordano,
Willie Quarles, William Bernabucci, Daniel Cyr, and John P. Joseph,
members of the Torrington Police Department, were also named in the
complaint as defendants (Torrington defendants). The original complaint
also named John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 as defendants, but the causes
of action against them were not included in the operative amended
complaint, as it was discovered that John Doe #1 was duplicative of
another individual already named as one of the Torrington defendants
and Waltzer was substituted for John Doe #2. The Torrington defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment as to the counts against them. The
court denied summary judgment in part (as to Bernabucci, Quarles, and
Joseph) and granted summary judgment in part (as to Cyr, Pietrafesa,
and Giordano). The Torrington defendants did not file an appeal from
the court’s partial grant of summary judgment as to the counts against
them. In this opinion, we refer to the town of Winchester and Waltzer
as the defendants.
Sequeiro v. Torrington

Winchester police officers, including Waltzer, located
the plaintiff at a house in Winsted and detained him. At
that time, the plaintiff did not possess drugs or drug
paraphernalia. He did not present to Waltzer in a man-
ner indicating that he had just taken drugs. The parties
dispute whether the plaintiff told Waltzer that he was
suicidal. Waltzer transported the plaintiff to another
location in Winchester where custody of the plaintiff
was transferred to Torrington police officers.
The plaintiff was transported to the Torrington Police
Department where he was processed and placed in a
jail cell that was equipped with a combination sink/toi-
let unit. That afternoon, the plaintiff climbed up the
combination sink/toilet and jumped headfirst toward
the floor. As a result of this act, the plaintiff sustained
serious injuries, including incomplete quadriplegia and
paralysis.
In 2021, the plaintiff commenced an action against
the defendants. In the operative July 6, 2023 complaint,
he alleged, inter alia, negligence against Waltzer in his
capacity as a Winchester police officer (count eight) and
indemnification against the town of Winchester, pur-
suant to General Statutes § 7-4652 (count nine).3 Both
counts stemmed from the plaintiff’s December 6, 2019
suicide attempt at the Torrington Police Department.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Waltzer breached
his duty of ordinary care in failing to identify the plain-
tiff as suicidal, to ensure that he was provided with a
psychological assessment or other necessary medical
2
General Statutes § 7-465 (a) provides in relevant part: “Any town . . .
shall pay on behalf of any employee of such municipality . . . all sums
which such employee becomes obligated to pay by reason of the liability
imposed upon such employee by law for damages awarded . . . for physical
damages to person . . . if the employee, at the time of the occurrence,
accident, physical injury or damages complained of, was acting in the
performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and
if such occurrence, accident, physical injury or damage was not the
result of any wilful or wanton act of such employee in the discharge
of such duty. . . .”
3
Counts one through seven alleged negligence against the city of Tor-
rington and several of its police officers. See footnote 1 of this opinion.
Sequeiro v. Torrington

care and to ensure that the Torrington Police Depart-
ment was going to provide the necessary care for a sui-
cidal inmate. The defendants filed an answer and special
defense, asserting the special defense of governmental
immunity.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
as to the eighth and ninth counts of the complaint, argu-
ing that those counts were barred by the doctrine of
governmental immunity. Appended to that motion were,
inter alia, the transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition, the
transcript of Waltzer’s deposition, and two policies of
the Winchester Police Department concerning respond-
ing to a person experiencing a mental health crisis. The
plaintiff filed an opposition, arguing that genuine issues
of material fact exist precluding summary judgment and
that the defendants were not entitled to governmen-
tal immunity. Appended to the plaintiff’s opposition
were, inter alia, Waltzer’s incident report as noted in a
computer aided dispatch system (incident report), and
Waltzer’s and the plaintiff’s depositions.
In a November 4, 2024 memorandum of decision, the
trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that the policies, procedures and/or practices of the Win-
chester Police Department regarding persons in custody
who are at risk of suicide gave rise to ministerial duties
for which no governmental immunity applies, concluding
instead that Waltzer was performing discretionary acts
for which he was entitled to governmental immunity.
This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth
as necessary.
We begin with the standard of review regarding a trial
court’s decision to grant summary judgment. “Practice
Book § [17-49] provides that summary judgment shall
be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and
any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In decid-
ing a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
Sequeiro v. Torrington

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. . . . The party seeking summary
judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any
genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable
principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment
as a matter of law . . . and [if the movant satisfies his
burden] the party opposing such a motion must provide
an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence
of a genuine issue of material fact. . . . [I]ssue-finding,
rather than issue-determination, is the key to the pro-
cedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of
fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. .
. . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact,
but rather to determine whether any such issues exist. .
. . Our review of the decision to grant a motion for sum-
mary judgment is plenary. . . . We therefore must decide
whether the court’s conclusions were legally and logically
correct and find support in the record.” (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn.
App. 216, 221–22, 131 A.3d 771 (2016).
We next turn to the well settled law regarding the
liability of municipalities. “The [common-law] doctrines
that determine the tort liability of municipal employees
are well established. . . . Generally, a municipal employee
is liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts, but
has a qualified immunity in the performance of govern-
mental acts. . . . Governmental acts are performed wholly
for the direct benefit of the public and are supervisory
or discretionary in nature. . . . The hallmark of a discre-
tionary act is that it requires the exercise of judgment. .
. . In contrast, [a ministerial act] refers to a duty which
is to be performed in a prescribed manner without the
exercise of judgment or discretion. . . .
“Municipal officials are immunized from liability for
negligence arising out of their discretionary acts in part
because of the danger that a more expansive exposure to
liability would cramp the exercise of official discretion
beyond the limits desirable in our society. . . . Discretion-
ary act immunity reflects a value judgment that—despite
Sequeiro v. Torrington

injury to a member of the public—the broader interest in
having government officers and employees free to exer-
cise judgment and discretion in their official functions,
unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory
lawsuits, outweighs the benefits to be had from impos-
ing liability for that injury. . . . In contrast, municipal
officers are not immune from liability for negligence
arising out of their ministerial acts, defined as acts to be
performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise
of judgment or discretion. . . . This is because society has
no analogous interest in permitting municipal officers
to exercise judgment in the performance of ministerial
acts. . . .
“The tort liability of a municipality has been codified in
§ 52-557n. Section 52-557n (a) (1) provides that [e]xcept
as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of
the state shall be liable for damages to person or property
caused by: (A) The negligent acts or omissions of such
political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent
thereof acting within the scope of his employment or offi-
cial duties. . . . Section 52-557n (a) (2) (B) extends, how-
ever, the same discretionary act immunity that applies
to municipal officials to the municipalities themselves
by providing that they will not be liable for damages
caused by negligent acts or omissions which require the
exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function
of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Borelli v. Renaldi,
336 Conn. 1, 10–11, 243 A.3d 1064 (2020).
“For purposes of determining whether a duty is dis-
cretionary or ministerial, this court has recognized that
[t]here is a difference between laws that impose general
duties on officials and those that mandate a particular
response to specific conditions. . . . A ministerial act is
one which a person performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment [or discretion] upon the propriety of the
act being done. . . . In contrast, when an official has a
Sequeiro v. Torrington

general duty to perform a certain act, but there is no city
charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule, policy, or
any other directive [requiring the government official
to act in a] prescribed manner, the duty is deemed dis-
cretionary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe
v. Madison, 340 Conn. 1, 19–20, 262 A.3d 752 (2021).
With these general principles in mind, we turn to the
plaintiff’s claims on appeal.
I
The plaintiff first claims that summary judgment is
improper because genuine issues of material fact exist
concerning whether he was under the influence of drugs
and whether he told officers at the prisoner exchange
that he was suicidal. We are not persuaded.
“A material fact is a fact that will make a difference
in the result of the case.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Hassiem v. O & G Industries, Inc., 197 Conn.
App. 631, 636, 232 A.3d 1139, cert. denied, 335 Conn.
928, 235 A.3d 525 (2020). Although the issues raised
by the plaintiff may be material to the resolution of his
underlying negligence claims against the defendants,
the question before us is not whether Waltzer properly
exercised his duty of care but, rather, whether policies of
the Winchester Police Department gave rise to discretion-
ary duties to which governmental immunity applies or
whether the policies created ministerial duties to which
such immunity is inapplicable. With those questions in
mind, we turn to the plaintiff’s next claim.
II
The plaintiff next claims that the court improperly
rendered summary judgment because two policies of the
Winchester Police Department gave rise to ministerial
duties to which governmental immunity does not apply.
We are not persuaded.
“[I]t is firmly established that the operation of a police
department is a governmental function, and that acts
or omissions in connection therewith ordinarily do not
Sequeiro v. Torrington

give rise to liability on the part of the municipality. .
. . Indeed, this court has long recognized that it is not
in the public’s interest to [allow] a jury of laymen with
the benefit of 20/20 hindsight to second-guess the exer-
cise of a policeman’s discretionary professional duty.
Such discretion is no discretion at all. . . . [O]ur case
law underscores the considerable discretion inherent
in law enforcement’s response to an infinite array of
situations implicating public safety on a daily basis . .
. . Thus, as a general rule, [p]olice officers are protected
by discretionary act immunity when they perform the
typical functions of a police officer. . . .
“In accordance with these principles, our courts con-
sistently have held that to demonstrate the existence
of a ministerial duty on the part of a municipality and
its agents, a plaintiff ordinarily must point to some
statute, city charter provision, ordinance, regulation,
rule, policy, or other directive that, by its clear language,
compels a municipal employee to act in a prescribed man-
ner, without the exercise of judgment or discretion. . . .
Because the construction of any such provision, including
a municipal rule or regulation, presents a question of law
for the court . . . whether the provision creates a minis-
terial duty gives rise to a legal issue subject to plenary
review on appeal. Thus . . . [t]he ultimate determination
of whether . . . immunity applies is ordinarily a question
of law for the court . . . [unless] there are unresolved
factual issues material to the applicability of the defense
. . . [in which case] resolution of those factual issues is
properly left to the jury.” (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ventura v. East Haven, 330
Conn. 613, 630–32, 199 A.3d 1 (2019).
A
The first policy at issue is Winchester Police Depart-
ment General Order # 1.3.17, effective August 19, 2019
(order). The stated purpose of the order is “to provide
guidance to Winchester Police officers when responding
to or encountering persons experiencing a mental health
crisis.” Winchester Police Department, General Order #
Sequeiro v. Torrington

1.3.17 (August 19, 2019) p. 1. The order states that “[i]t
is the policy of the Winchester Police Department that
officers determine whether a person’s behavior is indica-
tive of a mental health crisis” and provides officers “with
guidance, techniques, response options, and resources
so that the situation may be resolved in as constructive,
safe, and humane a manner as possible.” Id. The order
provides details to assist officers in recognizing atypical
behavior and assessing risk, while noting that respond-
ing to situations involving persons reasonably believed
to be in crisis “necessitates an officer to make difficult
judgments about the mental state and intent of the indi-
vidual”; id.; and that “[c]ontext is crucial in the accurate
assessment of behavior. Officers should take into account
the totality of circumstances requiring their presence
and overall need for intervention.” Id., p. 3. The order
describes several courses of action that an officer may
take when responding to a person in crisis, including
providing mental health referral information, admission
to a mental health facility voluntarily or involuntarily, or
making an arrest. Id., pp. 3–5. The final part of the order,
concerning documentation, states in relevant part that
“[o]fficers will: 1. Document the incident with a report
narrative, regardless of whether or not the individual is
taken into custody. Where the individual is taken into
custody or referred to other agencies, officers should
detail the reasons why. . . .” Id., 5.
1
We first conclude that the order is discretionary. The
allegations in the complaint against Waltzer focus on
the manner in which Waltzer exercised his discretion,
arguing that he did so in a negligent manner. Specifi-
cally, the crux of the negligence count against Waltzer
alleges that he “was careless and negligent for: a. failing
to exercise a duty of ordinary care to identify that the
plaintiff was suicidal and to bring him to the hospital
for a psychological assessment or otherwise provide the
necessary medical care; b. transferring custody of [the
plaintiff] without ensuring the policy was followed and
Sequeiro v. Torrington

without ensuring that the Torrington Police Department
was going to provide the necessary care for a suicidal
inmate; and/or c. failing to obtain emergency psychiatric
treatment for [the plaintiff], a suicidal person, and this
placed the plaintiff in danger of imminent harm.”
The order provided Waltzer with discretion concerning
the assessment of suicide risk and possible responses to
persons in crisis. See Mills v. Solution, LLC, 138 Conn.
App. 40, 49, 50 A.3d 381 (summary judgment was proper
where defendants’ allegedly negligent acts or omissions
necessarily involved exercise of judgment, and, thus,
necessarily were discretionary in nature), cert. denied,
307 Conn. 928, 55 A.3d 570 (2012). The order states that
responding to situations involving persons in crisis neces-
sitates that officers “make difficult judgments about the
mental state and intent of the individual”; General Order
# 1.3.17, supra, p. 1; and states that officers should “take
into account the totality of the circumstances” when
assessing the need for intervention. Id., p. 3. The order
then provides multiple potential responses, including
arrest. The terms of the order expressly state that its
purpose is to “provide guidance” to officers responding
to persons experiencing a mental health crisis. Id., p.
1; see Doe v. Madison, supra, 340 Conn. 32 (“descrip-
tions of general practices or expectations that guide an
employee’s exercise of discretion do not create a ministe-
rial duty”). In sum, the order requires officers to exercise
judgment, which is “the hallmark of a discretionary act . .
. .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Borelli v. Ren-
aldi, supra, 336 Conn. 10; see also Gordon v. Bridgeport
Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 179, 544 A.2d 1185
(1988) (“[t]he great weight of authority [holds] that
the operation of a police department is a discretionary
governmental function”).
2
The plaintiff argues that the portion of the order
concerning documentation gives rise to a ministerial
duty. By way of background, we note the following.
Waltzer’s incident report stated that the Torrington
Sequeiro v. Torrington

Police Department requested the Winchester Police
Department to make contact with the plaintiff, who was
a domestic violence suspect, and that the plaintiff had
made statements that he was going to “a drug dealer’s
place to get drugs to overdose,” that when the plaintiff
was detained he did not have any contraband or weap-
ons in his possession, and that the Winchester Police
Department detained him and turned him over to the
Torrington Police Department.
Although the order directs officers to document cer-
tain incidents in a particular manner, there is a more
fundamental question to be answered: whether a duty
exists at all in relation to such documentary require-
ments. Whether a duty4 exists is a question of law for
the court and the threshold inquiry is whether the spe-
cific harm alleged by the plaintiff was foreseeable to the
defendants.5 See Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315
4
The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are a duty,
a breach of that duty, causation, and actual injury. See, e.g., Jagger
v. Mohawk Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 269 Conn. 672, 687 n.13, 849
A.2d 813 (2004).
Because there was no actual causation, there is no proximate causa-
tion. See, e.g., Malloy v. Colchester, 85 Conn. App. 627, 633, 858 A.2d
813 (“[b]ecause actual causation, in theory, is virtually limitless, the
legal construct of proximate cause serves to establish how far down the
causal continuum tortfeasors will be held liable for the consequences of
their actions” (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 272
Conn. 907, 863 A.2d 698 (2004).
We, nonetheless, note that “[t]he question of proximate causation
generally belongs to the trier of fact because causation is essentially a
factual issue [and it] becomes a conclusion of law only when the mind of
a fair and reasonable [person] could reach only one conclusion; if there is
room for a reasonable disagreement the question is one to be determined
by the trier as a matter of fact.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kumah v. Brown, 130 Conn. App. 343, 349, 23 A.3d 758 (2011). The
present case presents the rare circumstance wherein there is no room
for reasonable disagreement that Waltzer’s alleged failure to properly
include a narrative report of the incident in the computer database of
the Winchester Police Department, was not, as a matter of law, a sub-
stantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s attempted suicide when he was
in the custody of the Torrington Police Department.
5
The test for the existence of a legal duty is (1) whether an ordinary
person in the defendant’s position, knowing what the defendant knew
or should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature
Sequeiro v. Torrington

Conn. 320, 328, 107 A.3d 381 (2015). Foreseeability is
determined in the context of causation, which consists of
causation in fact (whether an injury would have occurred
but for an actor’s conduct) and proximate cause (whether
a defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in produc-
ing a plaintiff’s injury, or, in other words, whether the
harm that occurred was of the same general nature as the
foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence).
See id., 328–29.
As a matter of law, there is no causal connection
between the plaintiff’s attempted suicide at the Tor-
rington Police Department and Waltzer’s alleged failure
to write a narrative incident report in the electronic
database of the Winchester Police Department. There
were no allegations in the complaint that Torrington
police officers were privy to the contents of Waltzer’s
incident report or that Torrington police officers based
any of their actions or inactions on December 6, 2019,
concerning the plaintiff, on the contents of Waltzer’s
incident report. Moreover, it is undisputed that the
information contained in the incident report concerning
the alleged domestic incident and the plaintiff’s subse-
quent flight to Winsted to overdose was relayed by the
Torrington Police Department to the Winchester Police
Department. Because, as a matter of law, Waltzer’s
allegedly improper documentation of the incident bears
no demonstrable relation to the plaintiff’s injuries, it is
not actionable. See Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809,
833–34, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015) (if negligent act bears
no demonstrable relation to injury, it is not actionable).
3
Additionally, the plaintiff argues that Waltzer’s
alleged failure to follow the documentation require-
ment implies that he failed to follow any discretionary
of that suffered was likely to result and (2) whether, on the basis of a
public policy analysis, the defendant’s responsibility for its negligent
conduct should extend to the particular consequences or particular
plaintiff in the case. Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC, 315 Conn. 320,
328–29, 107 A.3d 381 (2015).
Sequeiro v. Torrington

components of the order in any way. First, such an infer-
ence is purely speculative and, as such, is not sufficient
to overcome summary judgment. See Walker v. Hous-
ing Authority, 148 Conn. App. 591, 597, 85 A.3d 1230
(2014) (although inferences may be drawn on summary
judgment from underlying facts, nonmoving party may
not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to true
nature of facts to overcome summary judgment). Second,
whether Waltzer was negligent in the exercise of his
discretion under the order is not at issue. See Ventura v.
East Haven, supra, 330 Conn. 630–31 (it is not in pub-
lic’s interest to allow jury of laypersons to second-guess
exercise of police officer’s discretionary professional
duty). The proper inquiry is whether the order is dis-
cretionary in nature, and we have determined that it is.
4
The plaintiff further argues that, assuming the order
gave rise to discretionary duties, the court improperly
determined that the imminent harm to identifiable per-
sons exception to governmental immunity did not apply.
We disagree.
“[Our Supreme Court] has recognized an exception
to discretionary act immunity that allows for liability
when the circumstances make it apparent to the public
officer that his or her failure to act would be likely to
subject an identifiable person to imminent harm. . . . This
identifiable person-imminent harm exception has three
requirements: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable
victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent
that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim to
that harm. . . . All three must be proven in order for the
exception to apply. . . . [T]he ultimate determination of
whether [governmental] immunity applies is ordinar-
ily a question of law for the court . . . [unless] there are
unresolved factual issues material to the applicability of
the defense . . . [where] resolution of those factual issues
is properly left to the jury.” (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Haynes v. Middletown, 314
Conn. 303, 312–13, 101 A.3d 249 (2014). The imminent
Sequeiro v. Torrington

harm exception is very limited. See Brooks v. Powers,
328 Conn. 256, 265, 178 A.3d 366 (2018).
The court rested its conclusion that the imminent harm
requirement of the exception was not met on its deter-
mination that, at the time the plaintiff was in Waltzer’s
custody and transferred to a Torrington police officer,
Willie Quarles, he was not in imminent harm. The court
reasoned that it is undisputed that the plaintiff had not
overdosed at that time or even consumed narcotics, and
that, notwithstanding anything the plaintiff may have
said regarding a prior intent to self-harm, he was not in
a position of imminent harm while handcuffed and in
the immediate supervision of Waltzer or the Torrington
police officer to whom Waltzer transferred him.
The plaintiff challenges these determinations of the
trial court. He argues that he was in imminent harm
because “[i]t was, in fact, disputed that he consumed
narcotics. [The plaintiff] testified that he did. The officers
testified that they did not observe any signs of intoxica-
tion. Further, he was in imminent harm because he was
suicidal and he took steps to act on his suicidal ideations.
He said he would overdose on drugs and die, and he went
to a drug den and consumed drugs.”
The plaintiff testified at his deposition that he pur-
chased “around $100” of crack cocaine and “smoke[d] a
little bit” of the crack cocaine and that the amount he
had consumed was less than the amount he ordinarily
used to get high. This is not inconsistent with Waltzer’s
deposition testimony that the plaintiff “[d]id not appear
to be under the influence of narcotics or any sort of drug
at the time,” that he “was not presenting as someone
who had taken anything,” and that he did not have any
drugs or drug paraphernalia on him. In fact, the plaintiff
stated in his deposition that, during his interactions with
Winchester police officers, he did not slur his speech
and he did not have difficulty with balance, although he
assumed that his pupils might have been dilated.
Sequeiro v. Torrington

When asked whether there was a concern that the
plaintiff should be evaluated by a mental health profes-
sional, Waltzer stated, “There was no concern. I mean,
it would be concerning to release him back to the drug
house, you know, if we were able to at least get him back
home. I don’t think he would be concerning based on the
conversation I had with him and based on the fact that he
wasn’t presenting as high or had drugs on his person.”
The plaintiff stated in his deposition that, while wait-
ing for the Torrington Police Department to arrive, he
smoked five or six cigarettes and did not attempt to harm
himself. The plaintiff confirmed in his deposition testi-
mony that, if Winchester police officers had not detained
him, he would have done more crack cocaine in order to
“get higher” because “[t]hat’s the point of doing crack.”
Waltzer stated in his deposition that he believed that the
plaintiff was “in good hands” with the Torrington Police
Department, which initially had notified the Winchester
Police Department of the plaintiff’s situation.
Even though the plaintiff made statements to his wife
concerning an intent to overdose, when he was found by
Winchester police officers, he had not overdosed and he
did not attempt to harm himself. He did not appear to be
under the influence of narcotics, only having consumed,
according to the plaintiff himself, “a little bit” of crack
cocaine, which was less than the amount he typically
consumed. Under these circumstances there may be a
question as to whether harm may reasonably be antici-
pated at some unspecified time in the future, but that is
not the proper standard for evaluating imminent harm.
“For purposes of determining whether a plaintiff was
subject to imminent harm, [i]mminent does not simply
mean a foreseeable event at some unspecified point in
the not too distant future. . . . Rather, the proper stan-
dard for determining whether a harm was imminent is
whether it was apparent to the municipal defendant that
the dangerous condition was so likely to cause harm that
the defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act
immediately to prevent the harm.” (Citations omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Sequeiro v. Torrington

Doe v. New Haven, 214 Conn. App. 553, 580–81, 281
A.3d 480 (2022); see also Haynes v. Middletown, supra,
314 Conn. 314–15 n.6 (“[I]t is not enough to establish
that a harm may reasonably be anticipated. . . . Rather,
the risk of harm must be so great that the municipal
defendant had a clear and unequivocal duty to act imme-
diately to prevent it.” (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.)). “For the harm to be deemed
imminent, the potential for harm must be sufficiently
immediate. . . . The risk of harm must be temporary and
of short duration. . . . Imminent harm excludes risks that
might occur, if at all, at some unspecified time in the
future.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Silberstein v. 54 Hillcrest Park Associates,
LLC, 135 Conn. App. 262, 275, 41 A.3d 1147 (2012).
At the time the plaintiff was handcuffed and handed
over to Torrington police officers, he had not overdosed,
and when he was transferred to the custody of the police
department that had initially notified the Winchester
Police Department of the plaintiff’s situation, he was
not at a risk of harm so great that Waltzer had a clear
and unequivocal duty to act immediately to prevent it.
Because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, as a matter
of law, that he was in imminent harm, we conclude that
the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff had
failed to prove that the imminent harm to identifiable
persons exception to governmental immunity applied.
B
The second policy at issue is an interoffice memoran-
dum sent via email from Sergeant Kevin Kinahan, to
“all officers,” dated November 17, 2010, concerning
“Attempted Suicides, Emotionally Disturbed Persons.”6
The memorandum states in relevant part that “[a]ll calls
for suicidal persons or persons who have made some
attempt at suicide, or have by word or action, suggested
that they want to commit some suicidal or other harmful
6
Although not evident from the terms of the email itself, it is undis-
puted that Kinahan was a sergeant with the Winchester Police Depart-
ment.
Sequeiro v. Torrington

act against themselves, or emotionally disturbed person
who requires our intervention, regardless of whether . . .
such person is taken into protective custody, voluntarily
brought to the hospital, or examined in the field by the
Northwest Mental Health Mobile Crisis Unit, need to be
cleared with an [a]ction 1. All details regarding state-
ments made by the suicidal or emotionally disturbed
person, conditions suggesting the potential for a sui-
cidal act . . . i.e. pills/drugs . . . found where the person
is treated or discovered, need to be documented. . . .”
(Footnote omitted.)
It is undisputed that Waltzer cleared the plaintiff
with an action 5, which is a rendered assistance report,
and not with an action 1. As reflected in his deposition
transcript, which was appended to the plaintiff’s opposi-
tion, Joshua Blass, a police officer with the Winchester
Police Department, explained that “[a]n action 1 is an
incident report” that includes “[n]ame, date, time, what
was discussed, whatever the circumstances were on the
case. What the action was at the end, what kind of action
did the officer take, witness statements, offender state-
ments.” Waltzer stated in his deposition that an action
1 is “an arrest or incident report. We prompt the officer
to report.” He further explained that an action 5 is to
“render assistance.” The deposition testimony of Blass
and Waltzer concerning the descriptions of action 1 and
action 5 responses is not disputed.
The court determined that the memorandum, which
was dated nine years prior to the order, conflicts with
the order, which is an official policy of the Winchester
Police Department and therefore supersedes the memo-
randum, which is not an official policy of the Winchester
Police Department. The court further determined that
the Winchester Police Department was called by the Tor-
rington Police Department to assist in finding, detaining,
and transferring the plaintiff to the Torrington Police
Department and was not called for a suicidal person
and, thus, even if the memorandum were a policy of the
Winchester Police Department that was not in conflict
Sequeiro v. Torrington

with or superseded by the order, the memorandum did
not apply such that Waltzer was required to clear the
plaintiff with an action 1 instead of an action 5.
The plaintiff argues that the court improperly deter-
mined that the order superseded the memorandum. He
also argues that the court improperly determined that,
even if the memorandum was not superseded, it did not
apply because Waltzer was assisting another agency.
Finally, he contends that the portion of the memorandum
requiring certain incidents to be cleared as an action 1
gave rise to a ministerial duty.
Even if we assume, when viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that the
memorandum is not superseded and that it applies, the
plaintiff cannot prevail on his argument for reasons simi-
lar to those stated in part I A 2 of this opinion. Simply
put, as a matter of law, there is no duty, or in other words,
no foreseeable causal connection between the plaintiff’s
attempted suicide at the Torrington Police Department
and Waltzer’s alleged failure to document the incident
as an action 1. Because, as a matter of law, Waltzer’s
allegedly improper documentation of the incident bears
no demonstrable relation to the plaintiff’s injuries, it is
not actionable. See Stuart v. Freiberg, supra, 316 Conn.
833–34.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial
court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.