R. D. v. G. D.

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R. D. v. G. D.

R. D. v. G. D.
(AC 47576)
Alvord, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving his mar-
riage to the plaintiff and granting certain other relief. He claimed, inter
alia, that the court erred in awarding the plaintiff sole physical and legal
custody of the parties’ minor children without granting him visitation. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the plaintiff sole physi-
cal and legal custody of the parties’ children without granting the defendant
visitation, as the court expressly determined that a grant of visitation to the
defendant would not be in the children’s best interests and made detailed
findings concerning the defendant’s unfitness as a parent and the physical
and psychological danger he posed to the children.

The defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly awarded the plaintiff
alimony on the basis of the defendants’ postseparation increase in income was
foreclosed by this court’s decision in Panganiban v. Panganiban (54 Conn.
App. 634), and, even if the defendant were correct that it was improper for
the trial court to rely on a postseparation, but predissolution, increase in
income when entering an initial alimony award, the record did not support
his claim that the court’s alimony award was based solely on his postsepara-
tion increase in income because the court properly considered the factors
required by the statute (§ 46b-82) governing alimony awards.

The trial court did not err in awarding pendente lite alimony to the plaintiff
at the time of dissolution, as the applicable statute (§ 46b-83 (a)) expressly
permitted the court to award pendente lite alimony from the date of the
plaintiff’s initial application for alimony, and this court’s decision in Hal-
lock v. Hallock (228 Conn. App. 81) established that the trial court had
authority to decide the pendente lite alimony motion at the time of the
dissolution judgment.

The trial court did not err in determining that mandatory distributions
that the plaintiff received from an inherited individual retirement account
(IRA) should not be considered when calculating her income for child support
purposes, as an inherited IRA does not function as a retirement account, but
is more akin to a savings account from which the beneficiary can withdraw
funds at her discretion, and withdrawals from an inherited IRA do not qualify
as income within the plain meaning of that term.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant to
maintain a $700,000 life insurance policy as security for his child support
obligations, as the defendant did not provide any analysis or point to any
evidence in the record to support his claim that the life insurance order
was excessive when certain elements of his child support obligations were
R. D. v. G. D.

considered and in light of the strong presumption of correctness that this
court affords a trial court’s financial orders.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that the trial court
erred in ordering him to pay $20,000 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, as
the defendant failed to provide this court with a complete transcript of the
proceedings and the defendant failed to articulate his objection to the fee
award before the trial court.

Argued November 17, 2025—officially released February 17, 2026

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Middlesex and tried to the court, Albis, J.;
judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain
other relief, from which the defendant appealed to this
court. Affirmed.
Brandon B. Fontaine, with whom, on the brief, was
Meaghan E. Collins, for the appellant (defendant).
Maria A. Dornfried, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

CLARK, J. The defendant, G. D., appeals from the
judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to
the plaintiff, R. D. On appeal, the defendant claims
that the court erred in (1) awarding the plaintiff sole
physical and legal custody of the parties’ minor children
without granting the defendant visitation, (2) ordering
the defendant to pay periodic and pendente lite alimony
to the plaintiff, (3) calculating the plaintiff’s income for
purposes of determining the defendant’s child support
obligations, (4) ordering the defendant to secure and
maintain a $700,000 life insurance policy for the benefit
of the children as security for his child support obliga-
tions, and (5) ordering the defendant to pay $20,000 in
attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to this appeal. The parties were married on September
R. D. v. G. D.

22, 2006, and have two children born of the marriage:
a daughter, A, born in May, 2008, and a son, N, born in
June, 2012. The parties jointly own a home in Weston
(Weston residence), in which they resided at the time of
their separation. The parties also jointly own an apart-
ment in New York (New York apartment).1
The plaintiff has a bachelor’s degree from the Univer-
sity of Vermont and a master’s degree from Middlebury
Institute of International Studies. Since February, 2021,
the plaintiff has worked as an independent contractor,
earning $35 per hour providing customer service and
billing services. The defendant has a master’s degree
from Central European University and doctorate degrees
from St. Petersburg State University and Stanford Uni-
versity. The defendant has worked in the field of adver-
tising and marketing since 2006. He was unemployed
from September, 2018, through January, 2022. Since
January 31, 2022, the defendant has been employed as
a senior vice president at Havas Health, Inc., where he
earns a salary of $5000 per week before taxes and other
deductions.
The defendant was verbally and emotionally abusive
toward the plaintiff and both children and physically
abused the plaintiff and A. In its memorandum of deci-
sion, the court recounted two incidents of the defendant’s
abuse in detail. The first incident occurred on Cape Cod on
or around July 31, 2019, while the defendant was driving
the family back to a cottage in Dennis Port, Massachu-
setts (Cape Cod incident). The court found that, “[o]n the
trip home, the [plaintiff] grabbed and turned the steering
wheel because she perceived that the [defendant] was
swerving the car toward oncoming traffic from the other
direction. The [defendant] responded by hitting and/or
1
In addition to their jointly owned properties, the plaintiff owns a 5
percent interest in a family cottage in Dennis Port, Massachusetts, and
the defendant owns an apartment and one unit in a duplex, both located
in Russia. As part of the judgment of dissolution, the court awarded each
party their separate ownership interests in their respective properties,
and neither party has raised any claims with respect to those assets.
Accordingly, we will not address those assets further in this opinion.
R. D. v. G. D.

pushing the [plaintiff’s] head away, which prompted the
[plaintiff] to strike back and begin kicking the [defen-
dant] as she lay on her back against the front passenger
door. Each party inflicted injuries upon the other as the
struggle continued intermittently for the remainder of
the drive, the [defendant] periodically slowing down or
pulling over to focus on hitting the [plaintiff]. When the
parties arrived at their cottage, the [plaintiff] rolled out
of the passenger door onto the ground. The [defendant]
exited the vehicle, approached the [plaintiff] as she lay
on the ground, clasped his hands together and brought
them down forcefully upon her head. The impact of the
blow caused damage to multiple teeth of the [plaintiff].”
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that he had
acted in self-defense, noting that his claim was “undercut
by the fact that he struck his final injurious blow to the
[plaintiff] after the car had stopped and she had rolled
out of the car and lay defenseless on the ground, when
any danger of a car accident or further injury to the
[defendant] had passed.”2 The Cape Cod incident resulted
in an investigation by the Department of Children and
Families, which substantiated allegations of physical and
emotional neglect by the defendant as to both children.
The second incident occurred at the Weston residence
on January 25, 2021, after A refused to practice piano
in accordance with the defendant’s demands (piano
incident). Unbeknownst to the defendant, the plaintiff
recorded the incident on her phone, and the recordings
were admitted as exhibits during trial. The court found
that “[t]he video of the piano incident is very disturb-
ing. The [defendant] conducts a tirade that continues
for at least fifteen to twenty minutes after the [plain-
tiff] begins filming. He yells loudly throughout, almost
nonstop, directing most of his invective at [A] but also
addressing, at times, the [plaintiff] and [N]. He calls [A] a
‘stupid idiot,’ ‘fucking dumb,’ and ‘stupid fucking idiot.’
Speaking more generally to and about both children, he
2
The defendant was arrested as a result of the incident, but the charges
were later dismissed because the plaintiff declined to cooperate as a
witness.
R. D. v. G. D.

screams such things as, ‘I hate you kids’ and ‘fucking
losers.’ He criticizes them for wanting to do activities
that he says are favored by lazy American children but
which he considers useless, such as reading Harry Potter
books. He calls the plaintiff a ‘fucking American loser.’3
He says to the family, ‘You’re all pathetic losers.’
“The abuse by the defendant during the piano inci-
dent is not only verbal. The defendant concedes during
the filmed portion of the incident that he had struck
[A] with a shoe moments earlier. The video, and the
plaintiff’s credible testimony, show that he struck [A]
again and that he spit on her. The credible testimony of
the plaintiff, consistent with the video, also shows that
the defendant grabbed [A] by the neck as she sat on the
piano bench and repeatedly slammed her head down on
the keyboard.” (Footnote added; footnotes omitted.) The
defendant was arrested as a result of the piano incident
and is subject to a criminal protective order prohibiting
him from having any contact with the plaintiff or the
children, except by written communication.
Within days after the piano incident, the plaintiff left
the marital home in Weston and moved with the children
to an apartment in Old Saybrook. The plaintiff com-
menced this action on February 3, 2021. The complaint
alleged that the marriage had broken down irretrievably
and requested, inter alia, sole legal and physical custody
of A and N, as well as child support, alimony, and an
equitable distribution of the marital assets.
In addition to the dissolution action underlying this
appeal, the plaintiff also filed, in a separate action, an ex
parte application for a restraining order, alleging that the
defendant had engaged in repeated and escalating acts
of physical and emotional abuse against the plaintiff and
the children. On February 4, 2021, the court, Albis, J.,
entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the
defendant from having any contact with the plaintiff
3
The defendant was born in Russia and immigrated to the United
States in 1997 to attend Stanford University.
R. D. v. G. D.

and both children.4 On February 25, 2021, the court,
Hon. Gerard I. Adelman, judge trial referee, entered an
order on the plaintiff’s application granting the plaintiff
temporary custody of the children and prohibiting the
defendant from having any contact with the plaintiff
and the children, but requiring the plaintiff to provide
the defendant with a weekly update on the children’s
activities and permitting the defendant to write letters
to the children.
On February 16, 2021, the plaintiff filed motions for
child support and alimony pendente lite. As of Febru-
ary 9, 2022, the court had not ruled on the plaintiff’s
motions. On that date, the plaintiff filed a renewed
motion for child support pendente lite. On March 29,
2022, the parties filed, and the court adopted as an
order of the court, an agreement requiring, inter alia,
the defendant to pay child support pendente lite in the
amount of $535 per week. The agreement did not address
the plaintiff’s request for alimony, and, on October 28,
2022, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for alimony
pendente lite. As of the commencement of trial, the court
had not entered any orders with respect to the plaintiff’s
motions for alimony pendente lite.
On June 28, 2021, with the agreement of the parties,
the court appointed Michael Perzin as guardian ad litem
for the children. On December 21, 2021, pursuant to
4
The dissolution complaint and the restraining order application were
both filed in the judicial district of Middlesex. On February 5, 2021, after
the court already had granted the plaintiff’s ex parte application for a
restraining order, the defendant filed a competing ex parte application
for a restraining order in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk. The
defendant’s application was initially granted on an ex parte basis, but,
after being notified that Judge Albis had already entered an ex parte
restraining order in favor of the plaintiff, the court, McLaughlin, J.,
vacated the ex parte order and transferred the matter to the judicial
district of Middlesex. We take judicial notice of the defendant’s applica-
tion and the subsequent orders pertaining to that application. See State
v. Santiago, 142 Conn. App. 582, 592 n.12, 64 A.3d 832 (“[i]t is well
established that this court can take judicial notice of facts contained
in the files of the Superior Court” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 309 Conn. 911, 69 A.3d 307 (2013).
R. D. v. G. D.

the agreement of the parties, the court appointed Ste-
phen Humphrey, a forensic psychologist, to conduct a
psychological evaluation of the parties and the children
for the purpose of “assess[ing] the parenting abilities of
each party and mak[ing] recommendations concerning
what custody and access orders would be in the children’s
best interests.”
The case was tried to the court, Albis, J., over the
course of eleven nonconsecutive days between February
6 and December 4, 2023.5 On April 3, 2024, the court
issued a memorandum of decision dissolving the parties’
marriage. The court determined that the defendant was
significantly more responsible than the plaintiff for the
breakdown of the parties’ marriage, finding that his
abuse of the plaintiff and the children “directly and sub-
stantially contributed to the breakdown of the marriage
and the deterioration of his relationship with the chil-
dren . . . .” The court awarded the plaintiff sole legal and
physical custody of the children and declined to grant the
defendant visitation with either child. The court ordered
that the defendant may send two letters and one gift per
week to N but ordered that the defendant had no right
of contact with A. The court further ordered the defen-
dant to engage in psychotherapy focused on helping him
“understand the impact of his words and behavior on the
children and to deal with his anger appropriately.” The
court ordered that, when the defendant has completed a
minimum of twenty sessions of such therapy, he may file
a motion for modification seeking visitation. The court
also ordered that the defendant shall have the right to
access the children’s academic and health records, with
certain specified limitations, and ordered the plaintiff
to provide the defendant with a monthly written report
of the children’s activities.
The court found the presumptive child support payable
by the defendant to be $569 per week and ordered the
5
As explained subsequently in this opinion; see footnote 15 of this
opinion; the defendant provided us with a transcript of only eight of
the eleven trial days.
R. D. v. G. D.

defendant to pay that amount to the plaintiff by wage
withholding. The court further ordered the defendant to
maintain medical and dental insurance coverage for the
children at his sole expense, and ordered the defendant
to pay 68 percent, and the plaintiff 32 percent, of the
children’s unreimbursed medical and childcare expenses.
The court also ordered that, “[t]o the extent that it is
available at a reasonable cost, the defendant shall obtain
and maintain a policy of life insurance on his life with
a death benefit of at least $700,000 for so long as there
remains in effect a court-ordered obligation for child sup-
port or postmajority educational expenses or the court
continues to have jurisdiction to enter such an order.”
With respect to alimony, the court ordered the defen-
dant to pay the plaintiff $650 per week for seven years or
until the death of either party or the plaintiff’s remar-
riage, whichever occurs first. The court also entered an
order on the plaintiff’s motions for alimony pendente
lite requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff $650
per week from January 31, 2022, through the date of
judgment, resulting in an arrearage of $73,450.6
The court also ordered the parties to sell the Weston
residence and to split the proceeds of such sale, 60 percent
to the plaintiff and 40 percent to the defendant, and to
sell the New York apartment and to split the proceeds of
such sale equally. The court further ordered the defen-
dant to transfer from his retirement accounts the amount
necessary to equalize the value of the parties’ retirement
assets. Finally, the court awarded the plaintiff $20,000
in attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. Additional facts
will be set forth as necessary.
6
The court also ordered that (1) in the event that the defendant has not
paid the alimony arrearage at the time of the sale of the Weston residence
or the New York apartment, the defendant shall utilize his share of the
proceeds from the sale of those properties to satisfy the arrearage, and
(2) the defendant shall obtain a life insurance policy for the benefit of
the plaintiff with a minimum death benefit of $300,000 and maintain
such policy for as long as he is obligated to pay alimony. The defendant
does not challenge these aspects of the court’s alimony award.
R. D. v. G. D.

I
The defendant first claims that the court erred in
awarding the plaintiff sole physical and legal custody
of the parties’ children without granting him visitation.
Specifically, he claims that the court failed to consider
“the rights and responsibilities of both parents” and did
not “provide the [children] with the active and consistent
involvement of both parents commensurate with their
abilities and interests,” as required by General Statutes
§ 46b-56 (b).7 We disagree.
The following legal principles and standard of review
are relevant to the defendant’s claim. “Orders regarding
the custody and care of minor children . . . are governed
by . . . § 46b-56, which grants the court broad discretion
in crafting such orders. . . . [Section] 46b-56 (a) provides
in relevant part: In any controversy before the Superior
Court as to the custody or care of minor children . . .
the court may make . . . any proper order regarding the
custody, care, education, visitation and support of the
children if it has jurisdiction . . . . Subject to the provi-
sions of [General Statutes §] 46b-56a, the court may
assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the
parents jointly, or may award custody to either parent
or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon
the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and
7
In connection with his argument that the court failed to consider the
rights and responsibilities of both parents, the defendant asserts that
“the constitutional rights surrounding parents and children are among
the most significantly protected by our courts” and argues that the
court’s order “strays from honoring . . . [his] constitutional parenting
rights . . . .” The defendant, however, did not raise any constitutional
challenge before the trial court, does not argue in his principal appellate
brief or his reply brief that the court’s order violates his constitutional
rights, and has not presented any analysis that would support such a
claim. Rather, he argues that, “[u]nder the law and circumstances, the
underlying judgment does not fulfill the multiple considerations of §
46b-56 (b), nor does it embody the ultimate best interests of the chil-
dren.” Accordingly, we construe the defendant’s claim to be that the
court abused its discretion in declining to award him any visitation. To
the extent that the defendant intended to raise a constitutional claim,
we decline to review it on the ground that it is inadequately briefed. See
Cardona v. Padilla, 230 Conn. App. 534, 549 n.13, 330 A.3d 912 (2025).
R. D. v. G. D.

limitations as it deems equitable. . . . (b) In making . . .
any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section,
the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be
considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly
that serve the best interests of the child and provide
the child with the active and consistent involvement
of both parents commensurate with their abilities and
interests. . . . [Section] 46b-56 (c) directs the court, when
making any order regarding the custody, care, educa-
tion, visitation and support of children, to consider the
best interests of the child, and in doing so [the court]
may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of
[seventeen enumerated] factors8 . . . . The court is not
8
“ ‘In determining the best interests of the child, the court looks to
the factors enumerated in § 46b-56 (c): “(1) The physical and emotional
safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the
child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand
and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material informa-
tion obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the
child; (5) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past and
current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the
child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the
best interests of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent
to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship
between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including
compliance with any court orders; (8) any manipulation by or coercive
behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’
dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life
of the child; (10) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and
community environments; (11) the length of time that the child has
lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of
maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may
consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family
home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12)
the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both;
(13) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except
that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and
of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed
custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (14) the
child’s cultural background; (15) the effect on the child of the actions
of an abuser, if any domestic violence, as defined in [General Statutes
§] 46b-1, has occurred between the parents or between a parent and
another individual or the child; (16) whether the child or a sibling of the
child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in [General
Statutes §] 46b-120; and (17) whether the party satisfactorily completed
R. D. v. G. D.

required to assign any weight to any of the factors that
it considers.” (Footnote in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Cardona v. Padilla, 230 Conn. App.
534, 544–45, 330 A.3d 912 (2025).
“In reaching a decision as to what is in the best inter-
ests of a child, the court is vested with broad discretion
and its ruling will be reversed only upon a showing that
some legal principle or right has been violated or that
the discretion has been abused. . . . As our Supreme
Court recently reiterated, [t]he authority to exercise
the judicial discretion [authorized by § 46b-56] . . . is not
conferred [on] [the state’s appellate courts], but [on] the
trial court, and . . . we are not privileged to usurp that
authority or to substitute ourselves for the trial court.
. . . A mere difference of opinion or judgment cannot
justify our intervention. Nothing short of a conviction
that the action of the trial court is one [that] discloses a
clear abuse of discretion can warrant our interference.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) N. R. v. M. P., 227
Conn. App. 698, 716, 323 A.3d 1142 (2024).
It is well established that a parent’s right to visitation
is subordinate to the best interest of the child. See C. D.
v. C. D., 218 Conn. App. 818, 836, 293 A.3d 86 (2023)
(“in matters involving child custody . . . while the rights,
wishes and desires of the parents must be considered it
is nevertheless the ultimate welfare of the child [that]
must control the decision of the court” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). “A parent’s privilege of visitation
of children whose custody has been awarded to the other
parent in a divorce action . . . is not an absolute right but
one which is dependent on what is for the best interests
of the children even though such visitation rights may
be restricted or effectively terminated.” Raymond v.
Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 741, 345 A.2d 48 (1974).
Thus, when a court determines that visitation by the
noncustodial parent would be detrimental to the child’s
best interest, it is within the court’s discretion to decline
participation in a parenting education program established pursuant
to [General Statutes §] 46b-69b.” General Statutes § 46b-56 (c).’ ” Car-
dona v. Padilla, 230 Conn. App. 534, 544 n.11, 330 A.3d 912 (2025).
R. D. v. G. D.

to award visitation. See, e.g., El Idrissi v. El Idrissi,
173 Conn. 295, 301, 377 A.2d 330 (1977) (court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding mother sole custody and
denying father any rights of visitation when court found
that defendant previously threatened to harm and kidnap
child, withheld necessary medical care from child, and
had not seen child since he was less than two years old);
Ortega v. Bhola, 88 Conn. App. 457, 458, 869 A.2d 1261
(2005) (court did not err in denying father visitation
when father had not seen child in three years and had
been incarcerated for most of child’s life).
The defendant nevertheless argues that the court’s
factual findings do not support its decision not to award
him visitation. In support of that contention, the defen-
dant relies on our recent decision in Cardona v. Padilla,
supra, 230 Conn. App. 534, in which we concluded that a
trial court abused its discretion by ordering only limited
visitation without making factual findings to support its
conclusion that the limitations were in the child’s best
interest. The defendant argues that the court likewise
abused its discretion in the present case because “the
findings do not rise to the level of ‘complete unfitness’
that is spoken to in Cardona to avoid ‘active and consis-
tent involvement’ in the children’s lives.”9 We are not
persuaded.10
In Cardona, the trial court awarded the parties joint
physical and legal custody of their child but ordered that
9
At one point in his principal appellate brief, the defendant charac-
terizes his claim as one challenging the trial court’s application of an
allegedly improper legal standard and, therefore, argues that his claim
raises a question of law subject to plenary review. In his analysis, how-
ever, the defendant does not point to any part of the court’s decision
indicating that the court failed to apply the standard set forth in §
46b-56 (b). Instead, the defendant’s argument focuses on the question
of whether the court’s findings justified its decision not to award him
visitation. Consistent with our precedent, we review the defendant’s
claim under the abuse of discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Car-
dona v. Padilla, supra, 230 Conn. App. 550 (reviewing under abuse of
discretion standard claim that court erred by granting only limited
visitation without finding “that [the plaintiff] was unfit or that she
presented a physical danger to the child”).
10
We note that, as discussed in footnotes 15 and 16 of this opinion,
the defendant’s failure to provide us with a complete transcript of the
R. D. v. G. D.

the child would live with the father in Florida during
the school year and spend only summers, one week in
late December, and one long weekend around the Easter
holiday with the mother in Connecticut. Id., 540–41.
After the court issued an oral ruling detailing its custody
and visitation orders, the mother asked the court to con-
sider awarding her additional visitation time in Florida
at her own expense. Id., 542–43. The court denied that
request on the basis that the child needed stability and
that frequent long-distance travel would not be in the
child’s best interest. Id., 543, 553 n.15.
On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court
abused its discretion because its factual findings did
not support the limited visitation time awarded to the
mother. Id., 555. We explained that, although trial courts
are vested with broad discretion in crafting custody
and visitation orders, “the plain language of [§ 46b-56
(b)] conveys a legislative intent that orders regarding
proceedings precludes our review of any claims that would require us
to assess whether the trial court’s decision is supported by the evidence
in the record. See Krausman v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 236 Conn.
App. 109, 127, 347 A.3d 198 (2025) (“[I]n connection with a claim that
requires this court to review the evidence presented at trial . . . we must
consider the evidence as a whole, including evidence of a testimonial
nature. In the absence of a complete transcript, we would have to resort
to speculation to resolve [the appellant’s challenge to the factual find-
ings of the trial court].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). With
respect to the court’s custody and visitation orders, however, the
defendant does not argue that the court’s orders are not supported by
the evidence. Rather, he argues that the court’s findings do not justify
its decision not to grant him visitation with the children in light of
the requirement in § 46b-56 (b) that the court consider “the rights and
responsibilities of both parents” and “enter orders accordingly that . .
. provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both
parents commensurate with their abilities and interests.” Specifically,
in his principal appellate brief, he argues that “the findings do not rise
to the level of ‘complete unfitness’ that is spoken to in Cardona to avoid
‘active and consistent involvement’ in the children’s lives.” Similarly, in
his reply brief, he argues that “the trial court did not make any finding
that the defendant was an unfit parent, and no finding suggests that
he is ‘completely unfit.’ ” Because this claim requires us to review the
memorandum of decision to determine whether the findings support
the court’s decision not to grant the defendant visitation, the present
record is adequate to review the defendant’s claim.
R. D. v. G. D.

custody and visitation provide the child with active and
regular or steady involvement by both parents, when the
circumstances permit.” Id., 552. We concluded that the
trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the
mother additional visitation because “the very unbal-
anced visitation order is not supported by any underly-
ing factual findings demonstrating why such a limited
visitation schedule is warranted, such as a finding of
complete unfitness.” (Footnote omitted.) Id., 558–59.
We reached that conclusion because “[t]he court’s deci-
sion [was] devoid of any findings specifically related to
the [mother’s] fitness that would suggest that the court
determined that it was in the child’s best interest to limit
the child’s visitation with the [mother],” and the court
had “specifically found that the [mother] was not ‘unfit
in any way’ and that neither parent posed ‘a physical
danger to the child . . . .’ ” Id., 553. We further reasoned
that the court’s concerns about frequent long-distance
travel “do not by themselves provide a basis for denying
a child the active involvement [of a parent] in the child’s
life,” especially in light of the fact that the mother spe-
cifically requested that the court award her additional
visitation time in Florida at her own expense. Id., 555.
Unlike in Cardona, the trial court in the present case
expressly determined that “[a] grant of visitation to the
[defendant] at this time would not be in the children’s
best interests” and made detailed findings concerning
the defendant’s unfitness as a parent and the physical
and psychological danger he posed to the children. The
court found that the defendant’s “angry outbursts . . .
when he disapproved of his family’s behavior . . . were
common occurrences,” that he “regularly yelled at the
[plaintiff] and the children when any of them dared to
disagree with him or failed to comply with his demands
and expectations,” and that he “spit at the [plaintiff]
and [A] in anger.” The court further found that the
defendant’s “acts of domestic violence . . . have had a
severely harmful psychological impact on the children”
and credited Humphrey’s opinion that “the children were
deteriorating psychologically because of the [defendant’s]
R. D. v. G. D.

abuse and neglect . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) The court also found that the children’s physical
and psychological well-being had improved since they
moved away from the defendant, noting that they “feel
safe and secure in their new home, in large part due to
the absence of the psychological and emotional stress
caused by their father’s conduct toward them and the
plaintiff.”
The court also determined that, despite the passage of
time and participation in individual therapy, the defen-
dant “still lacks a basic understanding of the trauma he
has inflicted on [the children]” and that he “continues to
believe he has done nothing seriously wrong” and “views
himself as the true victim.” The court found that the
defendant “is rarely, if ever, willing to take responsibil-
ity for his own mistakes or misconduct” and “blames his
problems, poor decisions, or inappropriate conduct on
other people or external forces,” noting that he blames
A for the piano incident and “considers [the plaintiff’s]
filming of [that] incident to be a more serious transgres-
sion than his own words and actions during it.” The court
found that, in light of the defendant’s history of abuse
and lack of insight as to the harm he caused the children,
“the renewal of contact between the [defendant] and the
children would likely result in the [defendant’s] resump-
tion of his abusive behavior” and would be detrimental
to their temperament and developmental needs.
Finally, as the court noted, the defendant is subject to
two criminal protective orders that prohibit him from
having any contact with the children other than by writ-
ten communication. During oral argument before this
court, the defendant’s counsel acknowledged that those
protective orders do not currently have any expiration
date and that the criminal charges against the defendant
arising from the piano incident remain pending. Thus,
even if the court had granted the defendant visitation, he
still would not be able to have any in person or telephone
R. D. v. G. D.

contact with his children because the criminal protective
orders prohibit him from doing so.
The defendant’s contention that the court abused
its discretion because it “failed to take a [less] drastic
approach, despite the opportunity to do so,” is unavail-
ing. He contends that, rather than requiring the defen-
dant to file a motion for modification after he completed
a set number of therapy sessions, the court should have
ordered a “phased in plan” that would have allowed him
to “[work] toward family therapy, or supervised visits,
or supervised phone or video calls . . . .” In support of
that contention, the defendant points to evidence that
he claims demonstrates his commitment to therapy and
argues that the court should not have “required the
defendant to obtain twenty sessions of further therapy
before having the ability to seek modification of the
orders.”
As we previously explained, the trial court is vested
with broad discretion in crafting its custody and visita-
tion orders, and, on appeal, “we allow every reasonable
presumption in favor of the correctness of [the court’s]
action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) F. S. v. J.
S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 785, 310 A.3d 961, cert. denied,
350 Conn. 903, 323 A.3d 344 (2024). Because “the trial
court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the
personal factors significant to a domestic relations case,
such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hear-
ing”; (internal quotation marks omitted) Hathaway v.
Hathaway, 60 Conn. App. 818, 819, 760 A.2d 1280
(2000); it is not our role to second-guess the court’s
exercise of its discretion or to “review the evidence to
determine whether a conclusion different from the one
reached could have been reached.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. Thus, the mere fact that the defen-
dant presented evidence that, if credited, could have
supported providing the defendant with a “phased in”
path to reunification is not sufficient to establish that
the court abused its discretion.
R. D. v. G. D.

Moreover, the court expressly considered—and
rejected—the “phased in” approach that the defendant
advocates for on appeal. Specifically, the court noted that
it “might have ordered a phase in of additional contact by
the [defendant], at least with [N], after the defendant had
completed a certain amount of therapy” but concluded
that such an order would not be in the children’s best
interests because the defendant’s history did not give
the court confidence that he would seriously engage
with therapy. The court found that “[t]he defendant’s
past approach to mental health therapy indicates that
he only remains engaged with providers who accept his
view of his circumstances and agree with his thoughts on
treatment”11 and that “[i]t would not be in the children’s
interests to order an automatic advance to family therapy
with the children, or to a higher level of visitation, after
the defendant had engaged in the specified number of ses-
sions with the therapist of his choice.12 Rather, the inter-
ests of the children would be best served by having the
court assess the progress of the defendant’s therapy in
connection with a future motion to modify visitation.”13
11
Regarding the defendant’s choice of therapists, the trial court found
that “Alex Shvartsman, who testified about his work with the defendant
. . . accepts, and reiterates as his own conclusion, the [defendant’s]
claim that the piano incident was an isolated occasion, even though
the evidence shows the contrary” and “relies unquestioningly upon the
defendant’s version of the history of [the] family. As a result, the focus
of the therapy is not to help the defendant understand the effects of
his conduct, deal with his anger appropriately, or modify his behavior.
Instead, the focus is to help the defendant deal with the sadness and
depression he feels due to the lack of contact with his children.”
12
As the court noted, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-6a (a), “[i]n
a family relations matter, as defined in section 46b-1, if a court orders
that a parent undergo treatment from a qualified, licensed health care
provider, the court shall permit the parent to select a qualified, licensed
health care provider to provide such treatment.”
13
The defendant argues that, instead of requiring him to seek a modi-
fication, the court could have alleviated its concerns about whether he
would participate in therapy in good faith by “allow[ing] the phase in
orders to be paused if the plaintiff filed a motion alleging legitimate
concerns that developed during the process.” He further notes that
“[t]he plaintiff also would always have the right to pursue emergency
custody orders when appropriate . . . .” This argument ignores that
the court made detailed findings concerning the defendant’s failure
R. D. v. G. D.

(Footnote added.) The court explained that it reached
that conclusion because, at a hearing on a motion for
modification, it would “have the opportunity to consider
evidence about the defendant’s progress in the areas of
controlling his words and actions and understanding the
impact of his conduct upon the children,” as well as “evi-
dence about the children’s psychological and emotional
readiness to commence or increase contact with their
father . . . .”14 It is evident from the memorandum of
decision that the court thoughtfully considered a phased
in approach to visitation and decided on the basis of the
evidence that such approach was not appropriate in light
of the defendant’s history of abusive conduct and his
refusal or inability to appreciate the significant harm
that his conduct caused to the children. Accordingly,
we conclude that the court did not err in awarding the
plaintiff sole physical and legal custody of the parties’
children without granting the defendant visitation.
to acknowledge responsibility for his conduct and to appreciate the
harm he caused his children and rejected the defendant’s claim that
he demonstrated his “extensive dedication to therapy over the past
several years.” The court found that the defendant “does not accept the
opinions or recommendations of any professional that do not comport
with his perception of reality” and that his “extensive therapy to date
has not caused [him] to genuinely reassess his own behavior or seriously
consider its impact on the children.” In light of the court’s findings,
we disagree with the defendant’s contention that the court should
have imposed upon the plaintiff the burden to monitor the defendant’s
progress and proactively return to court if she perceived that granting
him visitation would be detrimental to the children. Rather, given the
court’s findings, it was well within the court’s discretion not to grant
the defendant visitation and to require him to seek visitation by way
of a motion for modification.
14
We note that the record indicates that the defendant filed such a
motion for modification on June 24, 2024, in which he alleged that he
had completed twenty therapy sessions in accordance with the court’s
memorandum of decision. On September 22, 2025, after a hearing, the
court, Price-Boreland, J., entered an order dismissing the defendant’s
motion. In the order, the court noted that the criminal protective order
remains “in place with no current expiration date” and that “[t]he next
scheduled date for a hearing on the [criminal] matter is February 16,
2027.” The defendant appealed the dismissal of his motion for modifica-
tion to this court, and that appeal remains pending.
R. D. v. G. D.

II
The defendant next claims that the court erred in order-
ing him to pay periodic and pendente lite alimony to the
plaintiff. Specifically, the defendant claims that (1) the
court improperly awarded the plaintiff alimony based on
the defendant’s postseparation increase in income, and
(2) the court improperly awarded “retroactive” alimony
pendente lite at the time of the dissolution judgment.
We disagree with both claims.15
We first set forth the legal principles and standard
of review applicable to a court’s alimony award. “The
15
The defendant also claims that the court abused its discretion in
awarding both periodic alimony and alimony pendente lite because the
record does not support that either award comports with an “accepted
purpose” for which alimony may be awarded. The defendant, however,
did not provide us with a complete transcript of the proceedings, thereby
precluding our review of this claim.
Specifically, the record indicates that trial commenced on February
6, 2023. The transcript from that date indicates that the plaintiff’s
counsel commenced, but did not complete, her direct examination of
the defendant. Before adjourning for the day, the court stated that it
would “resume on the second day with continued direct examination of
[the defendant] by [the plaintiff’s counsel].” The record indicates that
additional trial dates were held on March 20, 23 and 30, 2023, but the
defendant did not provide us with a transcript of the proceedings from
those dates. The next trial date for which the defendant provided a tran-
script was May 8, 2023. At the outset of the proceedings on that date,
the court stated that “when we concluded [the defendant] was on the
stand; he was being questioned by [the defendant’s counsel],” to which
the defendant’s counsel replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” Thus, the record
indicates that there were three days of trial for which the defendant
did not provide us with a transcript and that we do not have a complete
transcript of the defendant’s testimony. Without a complete transcript
of the proceedings, we cannot assess the defendant’s claim that the
record does not support the court’s alimony award. See McGaffin v.
Roberts, 193 Conn. 393, 409, 479 A.2d 176 (1984) (“the validity of any
claim that the trial court’s decision is not supported by the evidence may
be tested only by reference to the record together with the transcripts
and exhibits filed in the case”), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1050, 105 S. Ct.
1747, 84 L. Ed. 2d 813 (1985); see, e.g., Calo-Turner v. Turner, 83 Conn.
App. 53, 55–56, 847 A.2d 1085 (2004) (defendant’s failure to provide
complete transcript precluded review of claim that court improperly
found parties equally at fault for breakdown of marriage because that
claim “required [this court] to determine whether there was a basis from
R. D. v. G. D.

decision of whether to award alimony to a party rests
in the discretion of the trial court after consideration
of the statutory factors set forth in [General Statutes]
§ 46b-82. . . . That section requires the trial court to
consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the
annulment, dissolution of the marriage or legal separa-
tion, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills,
education, employability, estate and needs of each of the
parties and the award, if any, which the court may make
pursuant to [General Statutes §] 46b-81 [concerning the
division of marital property] . . . . In awarding alimony,
[t]he court must consider all of these criteria. . . . It need
not, however, make explicit reference to the statutory
criteria that it considered in making its decision or make
express findings as to each statutory factor. . . . The
trial court may place varying degrees of importance on
each criterion according to the factual circumstances of
each case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Emrich
v. Emrich, 233 Conn. App. 324, 328–29, 340 A.3d 517
(2025).
“We review financial awards in dissolution actions
under an abuse of discretion standard. . . . In order to
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we
must find that the court either incorrectly applied the law
or could not reasonably conclude as it did. . . . In deter-
mining whether the trial court’s broad legal discretion
is abused, great weight is due to the action of the trial
court and every reasonable presumption should be given
in favor of its correctness. . . . We apply that standard of
review because it reflects the sound policy that the trial
court has the unique opportunity to view the parties and
their testimony, and is therefore in the best position to
assess all of the circumstances surrounding a dissolu-
tion action, including such factors as the demeanor and
the attitude of the parties.” (Internal quotation marks
which the trial court could have found that the parties were equally at
fault for the breakdown of the marriage”).
R. D. v. G. D.

omitted.) Hallock v. Hallock, 228 Conn. App. 81, 85–86,
324 A.3d 193 (2024).
A
The defendant claims that the court erred in relying
on his postseparation income in determining its alimony
award. In support of his claim, the defendant relies on
Dan v. Dan, 315 Conn. 1, 105 A.3d 118 (2014), in which
our Supreme Court concluded that an increase in the
supporting spouse’s income after dissolution, standing
alone, is insufficient to justify a modification of alimony
when the initial award remains sufficient to fulfill the
intended purpose of the award. Id., 11–14. The defendant
argues that Dan stands for the broad principle that a
supported spouse should not “benefit from the prosper-
ity of the other spouse after the joint relationship has
ceased” and that “there is no reason that the same ratio-
nale would not apply postseparation . . . .” He contends
that the court’s alimony award violated that principle
because the award was “based simply on the fact that the
defendant earned significantly more than the plaintiff
at the time of dissolution . . . .”
The defendant’s claim is foreclosed by this court’s
decision in Panganiban v. Panganiban, 54 Conn. App.
634, 736 A.2d 190, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 920, 742 A.2d
359 (1999), as well as Dan itself. In Panganiban, the
husband, who was frequently unemployed and receiving
public assistance during the marriage, won $16 million in
a lottery, payable in installments of $800,000 each year,
after the parties separated but before their marriage was
dissolved. Id., 636–37. The trial court awarded the wife
$6000 per month in alimony, and the husband appealed,
claiming that the court erred in relying on his lottery
winnings because “the alimony award [was] far above
anything to which the [wife] had been accustomed, based
on her station in life and standard of living.” Id., 642.
This court rejected that claim, concluding that “what
a spouse can afford to pay for support and alimony is a
material consideration in the court’s determination as
R. D. v. G. D.

to what is a proper order.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 642–43.
In Dan, the court concluded that it is improper for a
trial court to grant an upward modification of alimony
“when the sole change in circumstances is an increase
in the income of the supporting spouse . . . .” (Emphasis
in original.) Dan v. Dan, supra, 315 Conn. 14–15. In
reaching that conclusion, the court expressly distin-
guished that case on the basis that it involved an initial
award of alimony that was based on income earned prior
to dissolution. See id., 14 n.11. Specifically, the court
rejected the contention that Panganiban supported the
trial court’s authority to award an upward modification
of alimony based solely on a postdissolution increase in
income, concluding that Panganiban was distinguishable
in part “because (1) the supporting spouse in Panganiban
won the lottery during the marriage, [and] (2) the case
involved an initial alimony award, not a modification . . .
.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. Thus, Dan and Panganiban
foreclose the defendant’s claim that it is improper for
a court to rely on a postseparation, but predissolution,
increase in income when entering an initial alimony
award.
Moreover, even if the defendant were correct that
Dan applies to an initial award of alimony, the record
does not support his claim that the court’s alimony
award was based solely on his postseparation increase
in income. Rather, in accordance with its obligation to
consider all of the factors set forth in § 46b-82 (a); see
Emrich v. Emrich, supra, 233 Conn. App. 329; the court
expressly stated that, in awarding the plaintiff alimony,
it “[c]onsider[ed] the causes of the dissolution of the
marriage, the length of the marriage, the parties’ ages,
health and station, the amounts and sources of their
respective incomes, and the other pertinent factors set
forth in . . . § 46b-82 . . . .” Because the court properly
considered the factors required by § 46b-82, we conclude
R. D. v. G. D.

that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding
the plaintiff alimony.
B
The defendant also claims that the court erred by
awarding pendente lite alimony “retroactively” at the
time of the dissolution. In support of his claim, the defen-
dant relies on decisions of this court holding that alimony
pendente lite orders may not be modified retroactively
in the absence of a pending motion to modify. See, e.g.,
Elliott v. Elliott, 14 Conn. App. 541, 545, 541 A.2d 905
(1988). He argues that the rationale of those decisions
“impl[ies] that a retroactive order on a pendente lite
motion, decided for the first time at the time of dis-
solution, is equally improper” and that, “[i]n line with
[those] authorities . . . the court’s retroactive alimony
determination lacks statutory authority.”16 We disagree.
General Statutes § 46b-83 (a) provides in relevant part
that “[a]t any time after the return day of a complaint
[in a dissolution action] . . . and after hearing, alimony
. . . pendente lite may be awarded to either of the par-
ties from the date of the filing of an application therefor
with the Superior Court. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus,
§ 46b-83 (a) expressly allows a court to enter an award
of pendente lite alimony effective “from the date of the
filing of [the] application . . . .” Here, the plaintiff’s first
motion for alimony pendente lite was filed on February
16, 2021. The trial court found that the defendant was
“unemployed except for sporadic part-time employment”
until January, 2022. In entering the award of alimony
pendente lite, the court explained that it made the award
retroactive to January 31, 2022, because that “is the
date of the [defendant’s] commencement of employ-
ment with his current employer at approximately his
16
The defendant also claims that, even if the court had authority to
enter the alimony pendente lite order at the time of dissolution, the
court abused its discretion because there was insufficient evidence to
support the award. For the reasons discussed in footnote 15 of this
opinion, the defendant’s failure to provide us with a complete transcript
of the proceedings precludes our review of this claim.
R. D. v. G. D.

current rate” and noted that “[t]he date of retroactivity
so ordered is almost one year later than the filing date
of the plaintiff’s first motion for pendente lite alimony
on February 16, 2021.” Because § 46b-83 (a) expressly
permits the court to award pendente lite alimony from
the date of the application, the court had the statutory
authority to award pendente lite alimony retroactive to
January 31, 2022.
The defendant’s contention that the court lacked
authority to decide the pendente lite motion at the time
of the dissolution judgment is foreclosed by this court’s
recent decision in Hallock v. Hallock, supra, 228 Conn.
App. 81. In Hallock, the defendant filed a motion for ali-
mony pendente lite on July 2, 2020. Id., 87. At the time
the dissolution trial commenced on October 24, 2021,
the court had not ruled on the defendant’s motion. Id.,
88. In its memorandum of decision, the court declined
to award alimony to either party and stated that it had
“considered all pending motions in making this decision”
and “resolve[d] all of them.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 89. The defendant subsequently filed a
motion for articulation requesting that the court articu-
late “the specific pending motions it had resolved, as well
as the reasoning and outcome of these motions.” Id., 84.
The court granted that motion and issued an articulation
stating that it had “resolved pending motions not by
independently resolving them but by rolling all issues into
the trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 85.
On appeal, this court rejected the defendant’s claim
that the court erred by failing to address her pendente
lite motion “in a separate and distinct manner prior to
considering the final financial orders . . . .” Id., 86. We
concluded that the court had “independently considered
the claims made in the pendente lite motions filed by the
defendant and incorporated its ruling on those motions
in its final financial orders as part of the ultimate disso-
lution of the parties’ marriage . . . .” Id., 91. We further
concluded that the trial court is not required “to conduct
separate hearings with respect to pendente lite issues
if it considers these issues in deciding the permanent
R. D. v. G. D.

orders as was done in this case. . . . Although our law
provides a process to order temporary or pendente lite
orders of alimony and support, it does not require that
the court consider these motions as a condition pre-
cedent to making final orders.” (Footnote omitted.) Id.,
91–92. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim
that the court lacked authority to award alimony pen-
dente lite at the time of the dissolution judgment.17
III
The defendant next claims that the court erred in its
child support award by failing to include as income man-
datory distributions that the plaintiff receives from an
inherited individual retirement account (IRA) when
calculating her income. We disagree.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to this claim. In the plaintiff’s financial affidavit, she
17
The defendant also argues that the plaintiff abandoned her initial
February, 2021 pendente lite motion by (1) filing a second motion on
October 28, 2022, that “[did] not indicate it was an amendment to her
February, 2021 motion,” and (2) filing a request on August 31, 2023, for
the court to hold a hearing on her October, 2022 pendente lite motion
without mentioning her February, 2021 motion. The defendant argues,
therefore, that, if the court had the authority to award pendente lite
alimony at the time of the dissolution judgment, the October, 2022
motion was the “controlling filing,” and it was improper for the court
to award pendente lite alimony retroactive to January 31, 2022.
Prior to trial, however, the plaintiff filed a proposed order expressly
requesting that the court award alimony “retroactive back to the date
of the first filing request (2021).” The plaintiff included an identical
request in an updated proposed order that she filed on November 22,
2023. In her posttrial brief, the plaintiff noted that she had filed her
first pendente lite alimony motion on February 16, 2021, and again
requested that the court award alimony retroactive to that date. The
defendant did not address alimony at all in his posttrial brief and, in
his reply brief, argued only that the court “should deny [the plaintiff’s]
request for alimony, or in the event of granting it, should make it a
minimal amount, and for a short period of time.” The defendant never
objected to the court considering the plaintiff’s first pendente lite
motion and did not argue that it would be improper to use that date as
the retroactivity date. Given that the plaintiff consistently requested
that the court award alimony pendente lite retroactive to the date of
her initial motion, the record does not support the defendant’s claim
that the plaintiff abandoned that motion.
R. D. v. G. D.

listed as a retirement asset an “inherited IRA” with a
balance of approximately $65,000 and listed as “other
income” approximately $41 per week that she receives
from that IRA. In the defendant’s financial affidavit,
he listed as retirement assets an IRA with a balance of
$133,000 and a 401 (k) with a balance of $13,700. At
trial, the plaintiff testified that she inherited the IRA
from her father in or around 2014. She further testified
that she is required to take a minimum distribution from
the IRA in the approximate amount of $2100 per year,
that she withdraws the minimum amount as a lump
sum once per year, and that she pays income taxes on
the withdrawals.18
As discussed previously, the court found the presump-
tive child support payable by the defendant to be $569
per week and ordered the defendant to pay that amount
to the plaintiff. In its memorandum of decision, the court
noted that it considered the plaintiff’s inherited IRA as
an “asset in connection with its orders for the division of
property and [did] not also include the distributions in the
plaintiff’s income for purposes of considering alimony
and child support.” In dividing the marital assets, the
court ordered that the parties’ “retirement assets shall
be equalized” and ordered the defendant to transfer to
the plaintiff the amount necessary to equalize the assets.
The defendant’s claim requires us to interpret the
Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines (guidelines) and,
therefore, is a question of law subject to plenary review.
See Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 357, 710 A.2d
717 (1998). “[W]here the legal conclusions of the court
are challenged, we must determine whether they are
legally and logically correct and whether they find sup-
port in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision .
18
An individual who inherits an IRA is required to take minimum
distributions from the account each year. See 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a) (9) (B)
(2024); 26 C.F.R. § 1.408-8 (a) (2025); see also Clark v. Rameker, 573
U.S. 122, 125, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 189 L. Ed. 2d 157 (2014) (“the owner
of an inherited IRA . . . must either withdraw the entire balance in the
account within five years of the original owner’s death or take minimum
distributions on an annual basis”).
R. D. v. G. D.

. . . In construing statutes,19 [o]ur fundamental objective
is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of
the legislature. . . . In seeking to discern that intent, we
look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative
history and circumstances surrounding its enactment,
to the legislative policy it was designed to implement,
and to its relationship to existing legislation and com-
mon law principles governing the same general subject
matter.” (Citations omitted; footnote added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gentile v. Carneiro, 107 Conn.
App. 630, 640, 946 A.2d 871 (2008). Moreover, General
Statutes § 1-2z provides that “[t]he meaning of a stat-
ute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the
text of the statute itself and its relationship to other
statutes. If, after examining such text and considering
such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and
unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable
results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the
statute shall not be considered.”
The guidelines require the court to “use the parents’
net income, defined as gross income minus allowable
deductions, as a basis for calculating the child-support
obligation.” A. Rutkin et al., 8 Connecticut Practice
Series: Family Law and Practice (3d Ed. 2010) § 38:20,
p. 313. The guidelines define gross income as “the aver-
age weekly earned and unearned income from all sources
before deductions . . . .” Regs., Conn. State Agencies §
46b-215a-1 (11). The guidelines do not further define
“earned and unearned income,” but provide that gross
income “includ[es] but [is] not limited to” twenty-two
delineated items, one of which is “pension and retirement
income.” Id., § 46b-215a-1 (11) (A) (xiii).
There is no appellate precedent in Connecticut address-
ing whether a distribution from an inherited IRA
19
In Vickery v. Vickery, 25 Conn. App. 555, 595 A.2d 905, cert. denied,
220 Conn. 919, 597 A.2d 344 (1991), this court held that the guidelines
carry the force of statute because “the General Assembly incorporated
the guidelines by reference in [No. 89-203 of the 1989 Public Acts]
and mandated that the guidelines be considered” in all child support
determinations. Id., 562.
R. D. v. G. D.

constitutes income within the meaning of the guide-
lines, and the defendant does not cite any case law to
support his claim that the court was required to include
the plaintiff’s mandatory distributions in calculating
her income. Rather, the defendant relies solely on the
fact that the definition of “ ‘[g]ross income’ ” set forth in
the guidelines includes “retirement income” and argues
that “the court’s exclusion of income directly contradicts
guideline requirements without an authoritative basis
to do so.” Although not expressly stated, we understand
the defendant’s argument to be that, because an IRA
is nominally a “retirement account,” funds withdrawn
from an IRA must constitute “retirement income” under
the guidelines.
As an initial matter, we disagree with the defen-
dant that funds withdrawn from an inherited IRA are
“retirement income” within the meaning of the guide-
lines merely because an IRA is nominally a “retirement
account.” As the United States Supreme Court has rec-
ognized, “[i]nherited IRAs do not operate like ordinary
IRAs” because, “[u]nlike with a traditional or Roth IRA,
an individual may withdraw funds from an inherited
IRA at any time, without paying a tax penalty.”20 Clark
v. Rameker, 573 U.S. 122, 125, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 189 L.
Ed. 2d 157 (2014). The owner of an inherited IRA also
is not permitted to make contributions to the account
and, therefore, does not receive the tax benefits normally
attendant to owning an IRA. See 26 U.S.C. § 219 (d) (4)
(2024); see also Clark v. Rameker, supra, 125. Thus,
from the standpoint of the beneficiary, an inherited IRA
20
The beneficiary is required to pay income tax on the amount with-
drawn from the inherited IRA but is not required to pay the tax penalty
as she would for early withdrawals from her own IRA or 401 (k). See
26 U.S.C. § 72 (t) (1) and (2) (A) (ii) (2024). The fact that the plaintiff
is required to pay income taxes on the distributions from her inherited
IRA does not impact whether those distributions are income for child
support purposes. See Jenkins v. Jenkins, 243 Conn. 584, 593, 704
A.2d 231 (1998) (“[N]either the state nor federal tax code definition
is controlling [in determining whether something is income for child
support purposes]. Because the guidelines contain their own definition
of gross income, it is that definition that is determinative.”).
R. D. v. G. D.

does not function as a retirement account but is more
akin to a savings account from which the beneficiary can
withdraw funds at her discretion.
Moreover, the plain meaning of the term “income” does
not support the defendant’s contention that mandatory
distributions from an inherited IRA should be included
in calculating income for purposes of the guidelines.
In Birkhold v. Birkhold, 343 Conn. 786, 276 A.3d 414
(2022), our Supreme Court quoted approvingly the defini-
tion of “income” in Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, which “defines ‘income’ as ‘something that
comes in as an increment or addition usu[ally] by chance
. . . a gain or recurrent benefit that is usu[ally] measured
in money and for a given period of time, derives from
capital, labor, or a combination of both, includes gains
from transactions in capital assets, but excludes unreal-
ized advances in value: commercial revenue or receipts
of any kind except receipts or returns of capital . . . .’
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) p.
1143 . . . .”21 Birkhold v. Birkhold, supra, 797. Because
the beneficiary of an inherited IRA has access to the
entire balance and may withdraw funds from the account
at any time without penalty, withdrawals from such an
account are not an “addition . . . [or] a gain or recurrent
benefit . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Thus, withdrawals from an inherited IRA do not qualify
as income within the plain meaning of that term.
Case law from this court and our Supreme Court inter-
preting the term “income” in the guidelines also does not
support the defendant’s argument that mandatory with-
drawals from an inherited IRA are “retirement income”
merely because the account nominally is a retirement
21
Although Birkhold involved a determination of the parties’ income
for purposes of alimony, our Supreme Court has instructed that con-
sideration of such cases is appropriate in construing the term income
for purposes of child support because “alimony and child support are
issues that are entirely interwoven and require similar treatment”
and “[t]he statutory provisions governing awards of alimony and child
support employ many of the same criteria.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Unkelbach v. McNary, supra, 244 Conn. 361 n.4.
R. D. v. G. D.

account. In Sheppard v. Sheppard, 80 Conn. App. 202,
834 A.2d 730 (2003), for example, this court concluded
that, even though the guidelines expressly define “gross
income” to include “ ‘estate or trust income,’ ” not “all
funds derived from an estate or trust qualify under that
definition.” Id., 213. This is because, as our Supreme
Court has recognized, “[d]espite the generally expansive
meaning of the term, not every receipt of funds will be
considered income.” Birkhold v. Birkhold, supra, 343
Conn. 797. Instead of applying a mechanical approach
to the determination of whether a particular item con-
stitutes income, our Supreme Court has instructed that
we construe the term to effectuate the guidelines’ goal of
ensuring “that children should receive the same propor-
tion of parental income that they would have received
had the family remained intact.” Unkelbach v. McNary,
supra, 244 Conn. 357. To that end, our courts have looked
to whether the item in question, “in effect, increase[s]
the amount of a parent’s income that is available for
child support purposes.” Id., 360.
As discussed previously, the plaintiff testified that she
received her inheritance in 2014, some seven years before
the parties separated and ten years before the dissolution
judgment. At that point, the entire balance of the account
belonged to the plaintiff, and the funds were available
for her to use for any purpose and in any amount, as long
as she withdrew at least the minimum amount per year
required by federal law. Thus, any money the plaintiff
withdraws from the account going forward does not
result in a gain to her or increase her available resources.
In that sense, aside from the tax burden associated with
the mandatory withdrawals, when the plaintiff with-
draws funds from her inherited IRA, it is no different
than if she transferred funds from a savings account to
a checking account; the funds are already hers and are
available to her at any time. Put differently, the distri-
butions that the plaintiff receives from her inherited
IRA do not “increase the amount of income available for
support purposes.” Id., 362. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court did not err in calculating the plaintiff’s
R. D. v. G. D.

income for purposes of determining the defendant’s child
support obligation.22
IV
We next address the defendant’s claim that the court
erred in ordering him to secure and maintain a $700,000
life insurance policy for the benefit of the children as
security for his child support obligations. The defendant
contends that the order was improper because it requires
him to maintain a policy in an amount that exceeds what
he reasonably can expect to pay in child support for the
duration of his obligation.23 We disagree.
General Statutes § 46b-84 (f) (1) provides in relevant
part: “After the granting of a decree annulling or dis-
solving the marriage or ordering a legal separation . . .
the court shall inquire into the child’s need of mainte-
nance and the respective abilities of the parents to supply
maintenance. The court shall make and enforce the decree
for the maintenance of the child as it considers just, and
may direct security to be given therefor, including an
order to either party to contract with a third party for
22
The defendant also asserts that, if the court properly excluded the
mandatory distributions from the plaintiff’s inherited IRA in calculating
her income, it “still erred by including the plaintiff’s retirement income
tax deductions in its child support calculation.” The guidelines, however,
expressly provide that “ ‘[a]llowable deductions’ ” include “either Social
Security taxes or, in lieu thereof, mandatory retirement plan deductions
for an amount not to exceed the maximum amount permissible under
Social Security . . . .” Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b-215a-1 (1) (B).
The defendant does not cite any authority to support his claim that the
court should have disregarded the guidelines and refused to subtract
the plaintiff’s mandatory retirement deductions when calculating her
net income. Accordingly, we reject the defendant’s claim.
23
The defendant also argues that the court erred because its order does
not contain language permitting him to terminate the life insurance
policy when his child support obligation ceases. As the plaintiff notes
in her brief, however, the court’s order expressly requires the defendant
to maintain the life insurance policy only “for so long as there remains
in effect a court-ordered obligation for child support or postmajority
educational expenses or the court continues to have jurisdiction to enter
such an order.” We therefore conclude that the defendant’s claim that
his life insurance obligation “essentially exists in perpetuity” is not
supported by the record.
R. D. v. G. D.

periodic payments or payments contingent on a life to
the other party. The court may order that a party obtain
life insurance as such security unless such party proves,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that such insurance
is not available to such party, such party is unable to pay
the cost of such insurance or such party is uninsurable.”
As with our review of the court’s other financial orders,
we review the court’s order for a party to obtain life
insurance as security for child support for an abuse of
discretion “allow[ing] every reasonable presumption . . .
in favor of the correctness of [the trial court’s] action.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lederle v. Spivey,
113 Conn. App. 177, 194, 965 A.2d 621, cert. denied,
291 Conn. 916, 970 A.2d 728 (2009).
The defendant claims that the court’s order was
improper because it requires him to maintain a life insur-
ance policy that exceeds the amount necessary to secure
his child support obligations. Relying only on what he
acknowledges is “a rough calculation” of the total amount
he would be required to pay in weekly child support pay-
ments, the defendant argues that a $700,000 policy is
excessive because, “[u]ntil both children reach the age of
majority, [his] total anticipated child support obligation
equates to $110,000 more or less.” Even if we assume
that the defendant is correct in his calculation, however,
he acknowledges that it does not account for his share of
the children’s future medical, childcare, extracurricular,
or postmajority educational expenses. The court ordered
the defendant to maintain medical and dental insurance
coverage for the children at his sole expense, to pay 68
percent of the children’s unreimbursed medical and
childcare expenses, and to pay 50 percent of the children’s
extracurricular expenses. The court also found “that
it is more likely than not that the parents would have
provided support to the children for higher education
or private career school if the family were intact” and
retained jurisdiction to enter postmajority educational
support orders pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c.24
24
General Statutes § 46b-56c permits a court, at the time of the dis-
solution judgment or at a later date if it retains jurisdiction to do so, to
R. D. v. G. D.

The defendant does not provide any analysis or point us
to any evidence in the record to support his claim that
the life insurance order was excessive when considering
those elements of his child support obligations. In light
of the strong presumption of correctness that we afford
the trial court’s financial orders; see Lederle v. Spivey,
supra, 113 Conn. App. 194; we conclude that the court
did not abuse its discretion in ordering the defendant to
maintain a $700,000 life insurance policy as security for
his child support obligation.
V
Finally, the defendant claims that the court erred in
ordering him to pay $20,000 in attorney’s fees to the
plaintiff. The defendant contends that the court’s award
of attorney’s fees was improper because there was insuf-
ficient evidence to establish (1) the reasonableness of the
fee award, and (2) that the plaintiff lacked sufficient
liquid assets to pay for her own attorney’s fees.25 We
decline to review the defendant’s claim.
As discussed previously; see footnote 15 of this opin-
ion; when a claim requires us to determine whether the
court’s decision is supported by sufficient evidence, the
appellant’s failure to provide a complete transcript of
the proceedings precludes our review of that claim. See
Calo-Turner v. Turner, 83 Conn. App. 53, 56, 847 A.2d
enter orders “requiring a parent to provide support for a child or children
to attend for up to a total of four full academic years an institution of
higher education or a private career school for the purpose of attain-
ing a bachelor’s or other undergraduate degree, or other appropriate
vocational instruction. . . .”
25
Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-62 (a), the trial court in a dis-
solution proceeding “may order either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable
attorney’s fees of the other in accordance with their respective financial
abilities and the criteria set forth in section 46b-82. . . .”
“[A]n award of attorney’s fees in a marital dissolution case is war-
ranted only when at least one of two circumstances is present: (1) one
party does not have ample liquid assets to pay for attorney’s fees; or (2)
the failure to award attorney’s fees will undermine the court’s other
financial orders.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dolan v. Dolan,
211 Conn. App. 390, 405, 272 A.3d 768, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924,
275 A.3d 626 (2022).
R. D. v. G. D.

1085 (2004). Here, the defendant’s claim would require
us to assess whether there was sufficient evidence to
support a finding either that the plaintiff “does not have
ample liquid assets to pay for attorney’s fees” or that
“the failure to award attorney’s fees will undermine the
court’s other financial orders.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Dolan v. Dolan, 211 Conn. App. 390, 405, 272
A.3d 768, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 924, 275 A.3d 626
(2022). Because there were three days of trial for which
the defendant did not provide a transcript, we have no
way of knowing whether any testimony was presented
during those days that would have shed light on either
issue. Accordingly, we cannot assess the defendant’s
claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the
court’s award of attorney’s fees.
Moreover, this court and our Supreme Court repeatedly
have declined to review claims challenging an award of
fees when the appellant failed to articulate its objection
to the fee award before the trial court. See, e.g., Smith
v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 480–81, 839 A.2d 589 (2004)
(“Although the proponent bears the burden of furnishing
evidence of attorney’s fees at the appropriate time, once
the plaintiffs in this case did make such a request, the
defendants should have objected or at least responded to
that request. Had the defendants demonstrated any inter-
est in objecting to the plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s
fees, the trial court would have been obligated to grant
the defendants an opportunity to be heard.”); Medeiros
v. Medeiros, 175 Conn. App. 174, 205, 167 A.3d 967
(2017) (declining to review claim that court abused its
discretion by failing to consider plaintiff’s ability to
pay attorney’s fees because “defendant not only failed
to bring this objection to the attention of the court at
the time that it considered the plaintiff’s request for
attorney’s fees, but he also failed to raise any objection
to that request”); Dowd v. Dowd, 96 Conn. App. 75, 87,
899 A.2d 76 (declining to review claim that evidence was
insufficient to support award of attorney’s fees when
appellant “had notice of the affidavits [of fees], and was
given the opportunity [to object] during the hearings and
R. D. v. G. D.

in his postjudgment brief . . . [but] raised no objection to
the fees presented”), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 907, 907
A.2d 89 (2006).
Here, the plaintiff filed proposed orders requesting
that the court order the defendant to pay her $50,000
in attorney’s fees and testified at trial that “$50,000
does not even begin to cover” what she paid her attor-
ney. In her posttrial brief, the plaintiff argued that the
court should award her attorney’s fees because she “does
not have ample liquid assets to pay for the cost of this
litigation . . . and whatever support she gets from the
defendant is substantially less than what she has paid
for legal fees, thus undermining the court orders of
child support.” The plaintiff also filed with her posttrial
brief an affidavit from her attorney attesting that the
fees associated with preparing the posttrial brief alone
amounted to $23,400. Although the defendant filed pro-
posed orders prior to trial proposing that “[e]ach party
shall be responsible to pay their own costs of counsel in
connection [with] this dissolution of marriage action,”
the defendant did not address the issue of attorney’s fees
in his posttrial brief or reply brief and did not object to
the affidavit of fees attached to the plaintiff’s posttrial
brief. See, e.g., Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn. App. 268,
285, 880 A.2d 985 (2005) (rejecting claim that court
deprived defendant of opportunity to object to request
for attorney’s fees when defendant failed to file objection
in nearly two month period between plaintiff’s filing of
affidavit of fees and court’s issuance of decision). We also
note that, after the parties filed their posttrial briefs and
reply briefs, the defendant filed a motion requesting the
opportunity to present additional evidence on nineteen
separate issues, including certain evidence that the defen-
dant claimed would “refute” claims made by the plaintiff
in her posttrial brief.26 The defendant did not request the
opportunity to challenge the affidavit of fees attached
to the plaintiff’s posttrial brief or otherwise challenge
the plaintiff’s request for a fee award. Accordingly, we
26
The court denied the defendant’s motion.
R. D. v. G. D.

decline to review the defendant’s claim that the court
erred in its award of attorney’s fees.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.