State v. Dennis

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion
motions and petitions for certification is the “officially
released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecticut
Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports
or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest version is
to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying an
opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Journal and
subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut
Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the
State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced
or distributed without the express written permission of
the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial
Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
State v. Dennis

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL
ANTHONY DENNIS
(AC 47677)
Suarez, Westbrook and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment revoking his pro-
bation and imposing a sentence of incarceration. He claimed, inter alia,
that the court’s finding that he violated his probation by failing to submit
to counseling as required pursuant to the conditions of his probation was
clearly erroneous. Held:

The trial court’s finding that the defendant had violated his probation was
not clearly erroneous, as that finding was supported by evidence in the
record and this court was not left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake was made.

The defendant’s claim that he lacked adequate notice that he was required,
as conditions of his probation, to gain admission into a specific treatment
program and to admit that he was abusing alcohol was unavailing, as the
defendant had sufficient notice of the terms of his probation to satisfy the
requirements of due process.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the defendant’s
probation and imposing a sentence of incarceration, as the court had ample
evidence before it to support its finding that the beneficial purposes of pro-
bation were no longer being served.

Argued September 11, 2025—officially released February 10, 2026

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with violation of
probation, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Fairfield and tried to the court, McShane,
J.; judgment revoking the defendant’s probation, from
which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Ruth Burke, deputy assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).
Rebecca Z. Oestreicher, special deputy assistant
state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph
State v. Dennis

T. Corradino, state’s attorney, and Justina Moore, assis-
tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Michael Anthony
Dennis, appeals from the judgment of the trial court
finding him in violation of, and revoking, his probation
pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-32,1 and committing
him to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction
to serve thirty months of incarceration. The defendant
claims that (1) the court’s finding that he violated his
probation by failing to submit to counseling as required
pursuant to his conditions of probation is clearly errone-
ous, (2) he lacked adequate notice that he was required
to gain admission into a specific treatment program
and to admit that he was abusing alcohol, and (3) the
court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and
sentencing him to incarceration because the beneficial
aspects of probation were still being served. We disagree
and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following procedural history and facts, which were
found by the court on the basis of the evidence presented
at the violation of probation hearing or are otherwise
undisputed in the record, are relevant to our resolution
of this appeal. In January, 2015, the defendant was con-
victed of assault in the first degree in violation of General
1
General Statutes § 53a-32 provides in relevant part: “(a) At any time
during the period of probation . . . the court or any judge thereof may
issue a warrant for the arrest of a defendant for violation of any of the
conditions of probation . . . .
** *
“(d) If such violation is established . . . the court may . . . (4) revoke
the sentence of probation . . . . If such sentence is revoked, the court
shall require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed or impose
any lesser sentence. Any such lesser sentence may include a term of
imprisonment, all or a portion of which may be suspended entirely or
after a period set by the court, followed by a period of probation with
such conditions as the court may establish. No such revocation shall be
ordered, except upon consideration of the whole record and unless such
violation is established by the introduction of reliable and probative
evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence. . . .”
State v. Dennis

Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) and carrying a pistol without a
permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2015)
§ 29-35 (a). The court imposed a total effective sentence
of fifteen years of incarceration, execution suspended
after seven years, followed by five years of probation.
On September 6, 2018, the defendant was released from
custody and began to serve the probationary portion of
his sentence. Prior to his release, the defendant reviewed
and signed the conditions of his probation, pursuant
to which he was ordered, inter alia, to “[s]ubmit to any
medical and/or psychological examination, urinalysis,
alcohol and/or drug testing, and/or counseling sessions
required by the court or the probation officer” and “not
[to] violate any criminal law of the United States, this
state or any other territory.” The conditions of proba-
tion also contained court-ordered special conditions,
including that the defendant undergo “substance abuse
evaluation and treatment including random urines.”
Between October 31, 2019, and October 20, 2022, the
defendant’s probation was supervised by the Judicial
Administrative Monitoring Service (JAMS).2
Because of multiple positive urinalysis results for
alcohol, the defendant eventually was released from
supervision by JAMS and assigned a probation officer,
Devyn Coutant, who took over his probation supervision.
Coutant referred the defendant to Southwest Community
Healthcare (Southwest) for substance abuse and mental
health evaluation and treatment. The defendant attended
treatment sessions at Southwest, but his attendance
“was very sporadic.”3 The defendant understood that
he was required to attend Southwest treatment ses-
sions sober and that Southwest would send him home if
a Breathalyzer test showed that he had a positive blood
2
As stated by the trial court, JAMS is a division of the Office of Adult
Probation and supervises probationers who require “less stringent
supervision.”
3
Coutant testified as follows regarding the defendant’s failure to
complete treatment with Southwest: “It’s either he goes, they send him
home because he’s intoxicated while in treatment, or he just doesn’t
go, but they keep the referral open for a certain amount of time before
discharging him.”
State v. Dennis

alcohol content (BAC). On those occasions when the
defendant did attend treatment sessions at Southwest,
he frequently was sent home due to testing positive for
alcohol. Southwest eventually discharged the defendant
from the program due to lack of attendance. Although
the defendant attempted to return to Southwest for
treatment, Southwest declined to admit him because it
concluded that he needed a higher level of care than it
could provide. The defendant then sought admission to
First Step Detox (First Step) but was denied admission
because he refused to admit to drinking alcohol, which
was a condition precedent to admission to First Step.4
During this period, the defendant provided six urine
samples at the Office of Adult Probation, all of which
tested positive for alcohol.5
On June 30, 2023, the defendant was arrested for
and charged with criminal possession of ammunition
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-217.6 Following
4
Coutant gave the following testimony at the violation of probation
hearing: “So, we attempted Southwest, Southwest recommended a
higher level of care. So, we called First Step . . . and he was unable to
go in because the way First Step works is, if you say I’m not drinking
alcohol, I’m not doing drugs, then they’re not going to accept you in.
No matter if I say he tested positive for this, this and this, they won’t
accept him in because they have to go off his word, not mine.”
5
One of these urine samples showed the defendant had a BAC of 0.395.
6
The trial court, in denying a motion to suppress evidence obtained
during the stop and warrantless search of the defendant’s vehicle,
articulated the following facts underlying the defendant’s arrest: “[A]t
approximately 12:16 a.m., Bridgeport Police were dispatched to 32
Revere Street because of a Shot Spotter activation. [‘Shot Spotter is a
system of microphones around a city that uses sound to triangulate the
location of gunshots and relays the information back to patrol officers.’
State v. Jones, 210 Conn. App. 249, 252, 269 A.3d 870, cert. denied,
343 Conn. 901, 272 A.3d 199 (2022).] The Shot Spotter detected a total
of nine gunshots. Bridgeport Police reviewed the surveillance cameras
in the area and determined that the shots originated from a two-door
Dodge Challenger. A closer examination of the area surveillance revealed
that the driver of the Challenger wore a white shirt. At 2:15 a.m., the
Bridgeport Police made an investigatory stop of a Dodge Challenger
in proximity of the Shot Spotter activation. The car was registered to
[the defendant], who, at the time of the stop, was wearing a white shirt.
Moreover, he volunteered to the police that he was the individual who
had interacted with them at the time [the] police were investigating
State v. Dennis

the defendant’s arrest, Coutant prepared a violation of
probation warrant. Coutant believed that probable cause
existed that the defendant had violated his probationary
conditions because, as he later testified at the probation
violation hearing, “[h]e was arrested for possession of
ammunition,” which constituted a violation of a “crimi-
nal law in . . . this state . . . .” Moreover, he believed that
probable cause existed that the defendant had violated
the condition of his probation that he “[s]ubmit to any
medical and/or psychological examination, urinalysis,
alcohol and/or drug testing, and/or counseling sessions
required by the court or the probation officer” because
he had “failed to attend Southwest when asked; he did
not go into detox; and he rendered several urinalysis
[that tested positive] for alcohol.” Coutant signed the
warrant for violation of probation on July 6, 2023, and
the state’s attorney’s office submitted it to the court on
July 13, 2023, at which time it was signed by the court.
The court, McShane, J., conducted a three day proba-
tion violation hearing. The evidentiary phase began
on January 31 and concluded on February 14, 2024.
At the conclusion of evidence, the court heard argu-
ments from the parties. The state argued that it had met
its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant had failed to comply with
the conditions of his probation which, according to the
state, included requirements “[that he] comply with AIC,
substance abuse [evaluation], and treatment, provide
random urines, possess no narcotics, weapons, or drugs,
participate in Project Safe Neighborhood, and maintain
employment.” Defense counsel argued, in relevant part:
“I acknowledge that [the defendant] did provide urines to
probation that did test positive for alcohol. I would note
for the court that he was going to Southwest. That he
the shots fired. The officers who conducted the stop were aware that
[the defendant] had a record and that he was currently on probation.
The police search[ed] the car and, in a locked glove compartment, found
thirteen live rounds of nine millimeter ammunition. . . . [The defendant]
was arrested on scene and taken into custody.” (Footnote omitted.) The
defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained at the time
of his arrest, arguing that both the stop and search of his vehicle were
unlawful and improperly predicated on the fact that the police officers
involved knew of the defendant’s probationary status.
State v. Dennis

did try to get engaged in treatment. However, it seems
that when he showed up, he did test positive for alcohol.
. . . I don’t think that his levels at that point were over
the legal limit, but he did test positive for alcohol when
he went to Southwest to receive treatment. It seems
surprising or shocking to me that Southwest isn’t bet-
ter equipped to get someone engaged in treatment when
they show up there testing positive. It would seem to me
that the answer wouldn’t be, well, we’re going to turn
him away because he’s positive for alcohol. He’s there
because he needs the treatment. He showed up. He met
with his probation officer. He complied with home visits
and office visits, and he provided urines to the Office of
Adult Probation. I think, based on all of that, the state
has not met its burden in this particular case.”
The court disagreed, ruling on the record as follows:
“As the parties are well aware, to satisfy due process, they
must be afforded a full and fair two part hearing prior
to probation being revoked, if it’s going to be revoked at
all. And the parties are well aware of what the burden of
proof is in this particular case. . . . [Coutant] testified,
and I find him very credible. I find that he has satisfied
the burden, so to speak, and that the court finds by a fair
preponderance of the evidence the defendant . . . violated
conditions of his probation.
“Specifically, he failed to comply with conditions regard-
ing counseling as deemed necessary and appropriate by
the Office of Adult Probation. I’m not going to go into
whether or not that subsequent arrest [for criminal pos-
session of ammunition] qualifies as grounds for violation
of probation because, quite frankly, I haven’t ruled on
whether or not the stop and/or subsequent seizure is
proper under our law. So, with that, by a fair preponder-
ance of the evidence, I find the defendant is, in fact, in
violation of his probation.”7
7
In a memorandum of decision dated the day before the dispositional
phase of the probation violation hearing, the court denied the defen-
dant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in conjunction with his
June 30, 2023 arrest. The defendant does not challenge that ruling on
appeal. On March 8, 2024, the defendant pleaded nolo contendere to
State v. Dennis

The court conducted the dispositional phase of the pro-
bation violation hearing on February 23, 2024. The state
took the position that the defendant’s probation should be
revoked. The prosecutor noted that the defendant owed
eight years of incarceration on the unsuspended portion
of the underlying fifteen year sentence for which he was
found in violation of his probation. The prosecutor fur-
ther argued that, in addition to the pending felony ammu-
nition case, the defendant’s criminal history included a
2005 conviction for failure to appear and a related 2007
conviction for violation of probation. Also in 2007, the
defendant was convicted of possessing a pistol without a
permit and later was convicted of violating his probation
in relation to that conviction. Although defense counsel
acknowledged that the defendant was “struggling with
alcohol,” that some of the defendant’s urine samples
had tested positive for alcohol, and that the defendant
had presented to Southwest intoxicated, counsel argued
that the defendant nonetheless had attempted “to get
engaged in treatment.” The defendant addressed the
court on his own behalf, stating in relevant part that
he understood that he was required to attend sessions
at Southwest sober and that he would be sent home if
his Breathalyzer test showed a positive blood alcohol
content. The defendant also conceded that he was using
alcohol during his probation, had provided urine samples
that tested positive for alcohol, and attended Southwest
while intoxicated.
one count of criminal possession of ammunition in violation of General
Statutes § 53a-217 and was sentenced by the court, Jones, J., to two
years of incarceration. Because the trial court expressly declined to
decide whether the defendant’s arrest on the criminal possession of
ammunition charge constituted an independent basis for finding that
he violated the conditions of his probation, we need not consider what
effect, if any, his subsequent conviction on that charge has regarding
the court’s finding of a probation violation. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez,
320 Conn. 694, 695, 132 A.3d 731 (2016) (holding that, by pleading
guilty to attempt to commit arson while he was on probation, defendant
rendered moot appellate claim that evidence was insufficient to support
trial court’s finding that he violated terms of his probation to refrain
from violating any criminal laws).
State v. Dennis

On the basis of the evidence presented, the court found
that the ends of probation were no longer being met and
that probation no longer served a useful rehabilitative
purpose. In particular, the court found that the defen-
dant had failed to make “sincere and legitimate attempts
to get counseling” or “legitimate attempts” to get inpa-
tient counseling. The court explained on the record: “I
recognize admitting you have a problem is the first step.
But it would have been the step you needed to take in
order to get inpatient [counseling] and you didn’t do that.
There is [the] fact that your prior history indicates that
you had a violation of probation in which you did not suc-
cessfully complete. I take that into consideration. I also
take into consideration not just a Payne violation8 . . .
but the fact that it’s of similar conduct. And that is, it’s
not possession of a pistol without a permit or not criminal
possession of a firearm, but it is a criminal possession of
ammunition. I’ve taken all of this into consideration. And
like I said, which I keep going back to, is the [defendant]
had fifty-three days left of probation. So, I have taken
that overriding concern into my—into my calculation
so to speak . . . .” (Footnote added.) The court revoked
the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to serve
thirty months of his previously suspended eight years
of incarceration. This appeal followed.
We begin with principles of law governing our review.
A defendant’s rights attendant to a probation violation
hearing are well settled. “The hearing itself involves two
distinct components. Initially, the court conducts an
8
See Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565, 541 A.2d 504, cert. denied,
488 U.S. 898, 109 S. Ct. 242, 102 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1988). In Payne, our
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply under the
circumstances of that case but left open “whether the exclusionary rule
would apply in probation revocation proceedings when the police officer
who had conducted the search was aware or had reason to be aware of
the suspect’s probationary status. If illegally obtained evidence was
admissible in such circumstances, the police officer might very well
discount the fact that such evidence was inadmissible at a criminal
trial, believing that incarceration of the probationer would instead be
achieved through the revocation of his probation. Application of the
exclusionary rule to the probation [revocation] hearing might therefore
contribute significantly to the deterrence of illegal searches.” Id., 573.
State v. Dennis

adversarial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
defendant has indeed violated a condition of probation.
. . . The state must establish a violation of probation by
a fair preponderance of the evidence. . . . That is to say,
the evidence must induce a reasonable belief that it is
more probable than not that the defendant has violated
a condition of his or her probation. . . . This court will
not disturb a trial court’s factual determination that
a violation has occurred unless that determination is
clearly erroneous. . . .
“Second, if the evidence supports a violation, the
court exercises its discretion and determines whether
the beneficial, rehabilitative purposes of probation are
still being served or whether the need to protect the
public outweighs the probationer’s interest in liberty.
. . . Thus, an appellate court will affirm an exercise of
discretion reinstating an original sentence or ordering
incarceration, absent a manifest abuse of discretion or
injustice requiring reversal. . . .
“Probation revocation proceedings fall within the
protections guaranteed by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment [to] the federal constitution.9 .
. . Probation itself is a conditional liberty and a privi-
lege that, once granted, is a constitutionally protected
interest. . . . [Accordingly] [t]he revocation proceed-
ing must comport with the basic requirements of due
process because termination of that privilege results in
a loss of liberty.” (Citations omitted; footnote added;
footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Reilly, 60 Conn. App. 716, 725–26, 760 A.2d
1001 (2000).
“Where noncriminal activity forms the basis for the
revocation of probation, due process requires specific
knowledge that the behavior involved is proscribed.
[W]here the proscribed acts are not criminal, due process
9
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal
constitution provides in relevant part: “[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law . . .
.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.
State v. Dennis

mandates that the [probationer] cannot be subject[ed] to
a forfeiture of his liberty for those acts unless he is given
prior fair warning.” (Footnote omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 729. “The purpose of notice of
conditions is to ensure that the probationer understands
the precise terms of his obligations and that he risks
termination of his probation if he fails to meet those
obligations.” Id., 728. “Written conditions of probation
formally imposed by a court order usually provide notice
sufficient to satisfy due process. Therefore, where there
is an alleged violation of an explicit condition, it would
be difficult for a defendant to claim successfully that he
was denied due process on the ground of no fair notice.
Obviously, a finding of actual notice impliedly includes
a finding of fair notice.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. “[T]he
interpretation of a probation condition and whether
it affords a probationer fair warning of the conduct
proscribed thereby are essentially matters of law and,
therefore, give rise to de novo review on appeal.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 727–28. With these
general principles and standards of review in mind, we
turn to the defendant’s claims on appeal.
I
The defendant first claims that the court’s finding
that he had violated his probation by failing to submit
to counseling as required by the terms of his probation
was clearly erroneous. Having reviewed the hearing
transcript along with the evidence submitted at the
hearing, we conclude that the state presented evidence
sufficient to induce in the trial court a reasonable belief
that it was more probable than not that the defendant
had violated a condition of his probation. Accordingly,
we reject the defendant’s claim.
As previously stated, we review a court’s finding that
a defendant violated the conditions of his probation for
clear error. In determining whether a finding is clearly
erroneous, it is not the role of this court to weigh the
evidence presented or to evaluate the credibility of wit-
nesses. See Milazzo-Panico v. Panico, 103 Conn. App.
State v. Dennis

464, 469–70, 929 A.2d 351 (2007). Rather, “[a] finding
of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence
to support it . . . or when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed. . . . In making this determination,
every reasonable presumption must be given in favor
of the trial court’s ruling.” (Emphasis added; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Megos, 176 Conn.
App. 133, 141, 170 A.3d 120 (2017). In making its fac-
tual determination regarding whether the defendant
violated the conditions of his probation, the trial court,
as the trier of fact, is entitled to draw any reasonable
and logical inferences from the evidence presented. See
State v. McElveen, 69 Conn. App. 202, 205, 797 A.2d
534 (2002).
In his appellant’s brief, the defendant contends that
the record shows that he actively engaged with Coutant
to find suitable counseling, including by participating in
intake interviews for both Southwest and First Step, and
that the state has not proved, on the basis of Coutant’s
testimony, that any shortfall in his performance rose
to the level of a failure to complete either program or
thus constituted a violation of probation. He acknowl-
edges that Coutant testified that the defendant was not
forthcoming during the intake process with First Step
about the extent of his alcohol use—the result of which
was his previous release from Southwest and rejection
from First Step—but argues that Coutant’s testimony
was contradictory and not credible. The defendant also
directs our attention to the fact that Coutant suggested
that, if the defendant had not been arrested on the ammu-
nition charge, he would have continued working with the
defendant to find appropriate treatment. He argues that
it “sets an absurd and unworkable precedent” to conclude
that the defendant “may be violated and incarcerated
based solely on [Coutant’s] testimony.” We disagree.
The court found that Coutant’s testimony was cred-
ible, and the court was entitled to credit any portion of
State v. Dennis

his testimony and to draw any reasonable inferences
that flowed from his testimony. Our review of the record
reveals that the state presented evidence that the defen-
dant had failed regularly to attend his counseling ses-
sions with Southwest and routinely violated Southwest’s
requirement that he not test positive for alcohol in order
to receive counseling. Although the defendant argues
that the record shows that he submitted to the intake pro-
cesses, the court assessed that the defendant’s attempts
at seeking treatment were insincere, and his marginal
efforts at compliance did not negate his continued use
of alcohol and his refusal to admit to the same, which
resulted in him not participating in the programs and
treatment that his probation officer required of him. In
short, the court’s finding that the defendant had vio-
lated his probation was not clearly erroneous because
that finding is supported by evidence in the record and
we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake was made.
II
The defendant also claims that he lacked adequate
notice that, in order to successfully submit to treatment
as required under the conditions of his probation, he
needed to gain admission into a specific treatment pro-
gram or to admit that he had an alcohol abuse problem.
We conclude that the defendant had sufficient notice of
the terms of his probation to satisfy the requirements
of due process.
To comport with due process, conditions of probation
must provide a person of ordinary intelligence with the
opportunity to understand his obligations under the
terms that he has reviewed and agreed to follow. See
United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 280 (2d Cir.
2006). “[F]air warning [of a probation order] is not to be
confused with the fullest, or most pertinacious, warning
imaginable. Conditions of probation do not have to be cast
in letters six feet high, or to describe every possible per-
mutation, or to spell out every last, self-evident [detail.
. . . Conditions] of probation may afford fair warning
State v. Dennis

even if they are not precise to the point of pedantry. In
short, conditions of probation can be writtenand must
be readin a commonsense way.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Gaymon, 93 Conn. App. 569,
574–75, 889 A.2d 880, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 927, 895
A.2d 799 (2006).
This court previously has rejected a claim that a defen-
dant’s probation was improperly revoked because he
lacked notice of the particular treatment program that
his probation officer directed him to attend. See State
v. DeMasi, 34 Conn. App. 46, 52–53, 640 A.2d 138,
cert. denied, 230 Conn. 906, 644 A.2d 920 (1994). In
DeMasi, the defendant was found to have violated a spe-
cial condition of his probation ordering “such inpatient
or outpatient psychological and psychosexual treatment
as is deemed appropriate and/or necessary by the depart-
ment of adult probation . . . .” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 48. One of the claims that the defendant
asserted in his appeal from the judgment of violation of
probation was that his probation officer had somehow
changed the conditions of his probation by requiring him
to attend a particular sex offender treatment program
and that he should have received formal notice of that
change. Id., 52. This court rejected that claim, explain-
ing as follows: “When the defendant was placed on pro-
bation, one of the conditions was that he receive ‘such
inpatient or outpatient psychological and psychosexual
treatment as is deemed appropriate and/or necessary by
the department of adult probation.’ . . . The probation
officer was to determine which program the defendant
must attend. Therefore, the insistence by [the probation
officer] that the defendant attend a certain program was
consistent with the conditions of probation as imposed.”
(Emphasis omitted.) Id., 52–53.
In the present case, the defendant reviewed the terms
of his probation prior to his release and, through his sig-
nature, agreed to abide by those terms. One of the condi-
tions of the defendant’s probation, which were admitted
into evidence at the hearing, was that he “submit to
State v. Dennis

any . . . counseling sessions required by the Court or the
Probation Officer.” (Emphasis added.) In addition, one
of the special conditions of probation imposed by the
court was that the defendant undergo substance abuse
evaluation and treatment. As was the case in DeMasi,
the clear language of the conditions of probation required
the defendant to attend whatever treatments his proba-
tion officer required. A person of ordinary intelligence,
reading the conditions of probation in a commonsense
way, would understand that, in order to comply with the
express requirement that he submit to any counseling
sessions required by his probation officer, the defendant
would need to make a reasonable effort also to comply
with any prerequisites or conditions necessary to enter
and remain in the treatment or counseling program he
was directed to attend. The fact that the conditions of
probation did not expressly require him to gain admis-
sion into a specific treatment program or to admit that
he has an alcohol problem does not mean that he lacked
sufficient notice of the terms of his probation.
We agree with the state that the conditions of pro-
bation did not have to refer to a particular treatment
program in order to comport with due process. The con-
ditions that the defendant agreed to follow, namely that
he attend counseling sessions and undergo substance
abuse evaluation and treatment, particularly when read
in conjunction with one another, provided the defendant
with reasonable notice that he was required to submit
to whatever treatment program his probation officer
deemed appropriate and ordered him to attend. By only
sporadically attending treatments at Southwest, many
times being sent home for failing a blood alcohol test,
and not admitting to having an alcohol problem so as to
enable him to get the substance abuse treatment that
he clearly needed and that was ordered by the court
as a special condition of his probation, he failed to act
reasonably to meet the conditions clearly required by
State v. Dennis

the terms of his probation. Accordingly, we reject the
defendant’s claim.
III
Finally, the defendant claims that the court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation and sentenced
him to incarceration because the beneficial aspects of
probation were still being served. Having reviewed the
record before us, we conclude that the court’s decision
to revoke the defendant’s probation and order a period
of incarceration was an appropriate exercise of judicial
discretion. Accordingly, we also reject this claim.
As previously stated in this opinion, the standard of
review of the trial court’s decision following the sen-
tencing phase of the revocation of probation hearing
is whether the trial court properly exercised its discre-
tion. “In determining whether there has been an abuse
of discretion, every reasonable presumption should be
given in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. .
. . Reversal is required only [if] an abuse of discretion is
manifest or where injustice appears to have been done.
. . . On the basis of its consideration of the whole record,
the trial court may continue or revoke the sentence of
probation . . . [and] . . . require the defendant to serve
the sentence imposed or impose any lesser sentence. . . .
In making this second determination, the trial court is
vested with broad discretion. . . . In determining whether
to revoke probation, the trial court shall consider the
beneficial purposes of probation, namely rehabilitation
of the offender and the protection of society. . . . The
important interests in the probationer’s liberty and
rehabilitation must be balanced, however, against the
need to protect the public.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Megos, supra, 176 Conn. App. 148–49.
The record reveals that the court carefully considered
that the defendant had nearly completed his probation,
noting that, by the court’s calculations, he had only
fifty-three days left. The court, however, also weighed
a number of other factors, including his prior criminal
State v. Dennis

record and the charges involved, a previous violation
of probation, and the pending felony criminal charge.10
Although eight years remained on the suspended portion
of the defendant’s original sentence, the court never-
theless elected to impose only a thirty month period of
incarceration.11 We are convinced that the trial court
had ample evidence before it to support its finding that
the beneficial purposes of probation no longer were being
served and conclude that the court did not abuse its
discretion by revoking probation and imposing a thirty
month sentence of incarceration.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

10
We again note that the court did not base its substantive violation of
probation finding on this charge or the conduct allegedly underlying it.
It is axiomatic that a defendant’s mere arrest on a criminal charge is not
a sufficient basis for finding that he committed the charged offense or
that, because of the arrest, he violated his probation. Because, however,
a court properly may consider a defendant’s misconduct in a sentencing
proceeding even if it has never led to a conviction, and the defendant
has not challenged its use for that purpose in this case, we have no occa-
sion to review the appropriateness of the court’s consideration of such
evidence here, as it had been presented to a judge and found to establish
probable cause for the defendant’s warranted arrest in relation to the
defendant’s sentencing for violation of probation.
11
The court stated the following on the record prior to sentencing:
“You know, some judges, they get a violation of probation. They have a
hearing and their jobs are easy. I’m hearing violation. That the probation
is no longer serving a useful rehabilitative purpose. How much time they
have hanging, give them that time. It’s not a lot of thought processes
involved. But I’ve been thinking about this case a lot. And you know
it’s what your lawyer said and what you said . . . . You had served four
years [and] ten months on probation. Three of those years were JAMS.
I [have] been around long enough to know about JAMS. . . . The people
who go to JAMS are the people who were doing well on probation. And
I, you know, this could be very easy sentencing. I say you owe eight, do
the eight, see you later. That’s it. But I’m not going to do that. And
I’m not going to do that because, as I said, by the time this was signed
by a judge of the Superior Court, which tolled the probation, you had
fifty-three days remaining.”