C. D. v. R. C.

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C. D. v. R. C.

C. D. v. R. C.*
(AC 46958)
Alvord, Moll and Clark, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff father, who had filed an application for child custody and
visitation with respect to the parties’ minor child, appealed from the trial
court’s judgment awarding the parties joint legal custody of the child,
awarding the defendant mother primary physical custody of the child, and
granting the defendant’s request for permission to relocate from Connecticut
to Virginia with the child. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court
applied improper legal standards in considering the defendant’s relocation
request. Held:
The trial court did not apply inapplicable law in favor of relocation but instead
properly applied the best interest of the child standard in considering the
defendant’s relocation request, as the court repeatedly stated in its memo-
randum of decision that its references to Ireland v. Ireland (246 Conn. 413),
which is limited to postjudgment relocation cases, were offered in support
of its consideration of the family unit as a whole and its factual findings as
to the best interest determination.
The trial court also did not assert different legal standards for relocation,
as the plaintiff claimed, depending on whether the minor child’s parents
were married or unmarried, as the court’s observations about the parties’
circumstances and the fact that they had never been married to each other
did not evidence the application of a more lenient standard to an unmarried
parent seeking to relocate but, rather, could be read to distinguish postjudg-
ment relocation cases and to pertain to the parties’ relationship and its
breakdown, especially in light of the court’s repeated, proper recitation of
the applicable legal standard in its decision.
This court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
permitting the defendant to relocate to Virginia with the minor child, as the
court’s finding that relocation was in the child’s best interest was supported
by detailed factual findings, including that the parties’ circumstances in
Connecticut were not in the child’s best interest, relocation would elevate
the defendant’s career prospects and strengthen her support network, as
her mother in Virginia was dedicated to assisting with childcare, and the
lower cost of living in Virginia would allow the defendant to better provide
for the child, who the court found to be resilient and adaptable, in a spacious
home that was a substantial improvement over the modest apartment the
defendant and the child shared in Connecticut.

Argued November 12, 2025—officially released January 27, 2026
*
In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2024),
we decline to identify any person protected or sought to be protected
under a protection order, protective order, or a restraining order that
was issued or applied for, or others through whom that person’s identity
may be ascertained.
C. D. v. R. C.

Procedural History

Application for custody of the parties’ minor child,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the
court, Hon. Stanley Novack, judge trial referee, issued
a certain order with respect to the minor child; there-
after, the defendant filed a motion seeking permission
to relocate with the minor child; subsequently, the case
was tried to the court, Vizcarrondo, J.; judgment award-
ing the parties’ joint legal custody and permitting the
defendant to relocate, from which the plaintiff appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Brandon B. Fontaine, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Anthony L. Cenatiempo, with whom, on the brief,
was Norman A. Roberts II, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this child custody/visitation action,
the plaintiff, C. D., appeals from the judgment of the
trial court ordering that the defendant, R. C., be permit-
ted to relocate to Virginia with the parties’ minor child.
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) applied
improper legal standards in considering the defendant’s
request to relocate and (2) abused its discretion in con-
ducting its analysis of the child’s best interest.1 We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant
to our resolution of the present appeal. The parties met
in 2016 and have one child together, who was born in
March, 2017. In 2017, the plaintiff purchased a home
in Stamford, where the parties lived together. In June,
2018, after the breakdown of the parties’ relationship,
1
The current guardian ad litem, Attorney Lorraine Carcova of Con-
necticut Legal Services, Inc., filed the following cursory statement
with this court: “As guardian ad litem for the minor child in the above
referenced case, Attorney Jill Plancher recommended against relocation
at the time of trial. As such, and because Attorney Plancher is currently
retired from the practice of law, Connecticut Legal Services adopts the
brief of the appellant.”
C. D. v. R. C.

the defendant traveled to Virginia with the parties’ child
and remained there. The defendant filed an application
for a temporary restraining order, which was granted as
to the defendant but did not extend to the parties’ child.
The plaintiff commenced the present child custody/
visitation action in August, 2018. In his application, he
sought joint legal custody of the minor child, a parent-
ing responsibility plan, and regular parenting time at
least three times per week, eight hours each time. The
plaintiff also filed an application for an emergency ex
parte order of custody, pursuant to which he sought
orders requiring that the defendant return the child to
Connecticut and granting him visitation three days per
week for eight hours each day. The court, Hon. Stanley
Novack, judge trial referee, issued an order with respect
to the ex parte application that required the defendant
to “return the minor child to Connecticut” by September
5, 2018, and granted the plaintiff “supervised access to
the child temporarily.”
On March 4, 2019, the defendant filed a motion seeking
permission to relocate with the minor child to Virginia.
The plaintiff objected to the motion to relocate. Upon
agreement of the parties, Attorney Jill Plancher was
appointed as the minor child’s guardian ad litem. In
August, 2019, the parties stipulated that the plaintiff’s
parenting time would be unsupervised. The parenting
schedule was amended, and the plaintiff had parenting
time every other weekend and midweek every Tuesday
and on alternating Thursdays.
Trial was held over the course of four dates in March
and May, 2023. Both parties testified, along with a neigh-
bor of the plaintiff, the defendant’s potential future
employer, the child’s maternal grandfather, the child’s
maternal grandmother, and Plancher. The plaintiff sub-
mitted proposed orders, in which he requested regular
parenting time with the child according to a two week
rotating schedule. In week one, the plaintiff would have
parenting time overnight on Tuesdays and Thursdays.
In week two, the plaintiff would have parenting time
C. D. v. R. C.

overnight on Tuesdays and from Friday afternoon until
Monday morning.
On September 8, 2023, the court, Vizcarrondo, J.,
issued its memorandum of decision, in which it deter-
mined that it was in the best interest of the child to
grant the defendant’s motion to relocate to Virginia.
The court first made the following findings with respect
to each party. The plaintiff is employed full time for a
land use, surveying, and engineering firm started by his
grandfather. In addition to work travel, he also devotes
a significant portion of his time to studying for pro-
fessional certifications, with the expectation that he
will inherit the company. The plaintiff’s net income in
2022 was approximately $63,515. The child’s paternal
grandparents live in Greenwich and share a close bond
with the child. The plaintiff is engaged, and his fiancée,
who has a cordial relationship with the defendant, also
is the parent of a child. The plaintiff intends to relocate
within the Stamford area and form a household with his
fiancée and her child.
The court found that the plaintiff is “not willing to
relocate to Virginia, which is understandable for reasons
both personal and professional. On the other hand, the
plaintiff is not seeking primary custody here in Con-
necticut. It is his expectation that the defendant will
continue as [the child’s] primary custodian. Though
[the child’s] primary residence is with his mother, the
plaintiff shares significant parenting time during which
he performs routine parenting duties, including school
pickups and drop-offs. Nonetheless, the share of parent-
ing duties is not equal, and the defendant has borne the
laboring oar of daily and routine parenting. Even if the
defendant were to consent to transfer primary physical
custody—which she does not—the court is not persuaded
that the plaintiff is prepared to assume the role of pri-
mary physical custodian.”
The court found that the defendant was raised in Vir-
ginia and obtained a degree in kinesiology and busi-
ness from James Madison University. The defendant
C. D. v. R. C.

is employed at Greenwich Country Day School, and has
a net income of approximately $27,900, which is only
slightly more than an income supporting a finding of
indigency. The defendant lives with the child in a 900
square foot apartment in Stamford, where her monthly
rent is $1600, exclusive of utilities. The court found that
the defendant lacks a support network in Connecticut,
leaving her largely reliant on the plaintiff, and found that
she has undergone treatment for depression and anxiety
in connection with the uncertainty of this litigation.
The court found that the plaintiff has professional and
personal obligations that constrain him from commit-
ting more time to the child’s care. The court found the
result of these constraints to be that “the defendant must
contend with the difficulties of rearing a child without
adequate emotional or logistical support.” The court
found that the defendant’s lack of support has “adversely
impacted her employment prospects and has hampered
her ability to provide for [the child].” The court further
found that, “because she cannot earn more, and because
of the high cost of living in Connecticut, she cannot cur-
rently afford more than the modest apartment she and
[the child] share. . . . Her inability to provide better for
[the child], particularly in comparison to his father, is
a source of significant stress, disappointment, and bit-
terness—all of which are contrary to [the child’s] best
interests.”
With respect to the proposed relocation, the court
found that the town in Virginia the defendant seeks to
relocate to is “picturesque” and that its location near
James Madison University provides educational, develop-
mental, and recreational opportunities. The court found
that the move will bring the child near to his maternal
uncle and grandmother, who purchased a home neighbor-
ing her own in which the defendant and the child would
live. The court further found that “the proposed reloca-
tion will have the tangible effect of strengthening the
defendant’s childcare network, reducing her potential
reliance on costly third-party childcare, and strengthen
C. D. v. R. C.

(by virtue of proximity and accessibility) [the child’s]
ties to his extended maternal family.”
The court found that the defendant had secured imme-
diate employment in a preschool facility in Virginia,
which, although providing a salary commensurate with
her earnings in Connecticut, provides for a reasonable
expectation of salary increases. The court also noted
the lower cost of living in Virginia, which allowed the
defendant the ability to afford the expenses related to a
three-bedroom home. The court found that the proposed
home in Virginia would redress “a detrimental dispar-
ity in [the] parents’ respective resources that impacts
substantially [the child’s] best interests.”
With respect to the child, the court credited the testi-
mony of the guardian ad litem and found that the child
is “articulate for his age and is advanced in all develop-
mental milestones.” The child has adjusted well to both
of his parents’ homes, and the guardian ad litem “found
no indicators of distress in either environment.” The
court found that the child is “resilient and adaptable
and will make a successful transition.” The court stated:
“In the [guardian ad litem’s] credible view, [the child]
is comfortable in Connecticut, though he can adapt to
life elsewhere, including Virginia. The [guardian ad
litem’s] visit to Harrisonburg [Virginia] confirmed that
the proposed living situation there presents a substantial
improvement over the defendant’s circumstances in
Connecticut. [The guardian ad litem] found the Virginia
home spacious with an excellent yard and noted that its
proximity to the nearby college campus provided ample
recreational and developmental opportunities for [the
child]. In Virginia, the [the guardian ad litem] observed
[the child] enjoying himself—playing and interacting
with his maternal grandparents, and his uncle, with
whom [the child] also has a loving bond. Nonetheless,
the [guardian ad litem’s] considered belief is that [the
child’s] interests are best served by remaining in Con-
necticut, where he can share equal access to both parents.
C. D. v. R. C.

Because of its expected impact on the plaintiff’s parental
relationship, she recommends against relocation.”
With respect to the plaintiff, the court found that
“he is an excellent father and provider. This court is
impressed by his efforts to ensure that [the child] has
access to and enjoys enriching opportunities, like his
enrollment in multiple sports programs. It is also clear
that the plaintiff has availed himself of significant oppor-
tunities to bond with his son, playing together and par-
taking of mutual activities like raising chickens in the
backyard. This court is loath to disrupt that relation-
ship, but remedial action is required here, as the court
finds that the parental bond between father and son has
developed at the defendant’s expense. Given her current
circumstances, it is not possible for her to provide com-
mensurate opportunities. As mentioned above, although
the plaintiff enjoys parenting time raising chickens with
[the child] in his spacious backyard, the defendant is
rearing [the child] in a cramped apartment in a modest
neighborhood where safety is a concern. And while the
plaintiff proposes to pay more in child support to address
that disparity, the court concludes that any reasonable
increase in child support would be insufficient to equal-
ize the advantage in square footage, outdoor play space,
proximity to amenities, neighborhood quality, and safety
to be gained by relocating to Harrisonburg.
“The imbalance in the current parental dynamic is
not in [the child’s] best interest. This court declines to
enshrine circumstances that promote a binary role where
[the child] alternates between life with mother in dour
circumstances and idealized life with father. Those cir-
cumstances have sown seeds of resentment that should
not be permitted to take root.”
The court found that the proposed relocation is nec-
essary, in that the present circumstances are not in
the child’s best interest and are likely to harm him in
the long term. Specifically, the court found that the
parties’ relationship is strained. They had cohabitated
for “approximately six months when the relationship
C. D. v. R. C.

devolved under claims of domestic violence.” The court
found that, “[u]nder the circumstances, the defendant
is quite reasonable in her desire to begin a new life out-
side of Connecticut. Here, she holds few significant ties
beyond the obligation to raise her son, and she is doing
so largely without a robust support network of her own.
Given the circumstances, denying the defendant the
opportunity to relocate is tantamount to a legal tether,
in that she performs the lion’s share of daily, routine
parental duties in service of maintaining the plaintiff’s
parental privileges. . . . The adverse psychological effect
on the defendant is obvious, and the resulting impact on
her relationship with [the child] is reasonably foresee-
able.” (Citation omitted.)
Finally, the court made the following findings with
respect to mitigating the adverse effects of the reloca-
tion: “This court has weighed the impact of the defen-
dant’s relocation on the quantity and quality of [the
child’s] future contact with his father and with his pater-
nal family, whom he loves. Car travel between Stamford
and Harrisonburg requires at least six hours of travel
or more, and it would be foolhardy to suggest that that
distance will not impact the frequency of [the child’s]
contact with his father or the [paternal] family. But
courts have frequently approved relocations involving
greater distances, and distance alone is no reason why
the plaintiff cannot enjoy quality parenting time or
why [the child’s] bond with his paternal family should
not continue to flourish. First, technology continues
to improve the ability for interactive contact between
family members over significant distances. The court’s
order will require both parties to adopt such technology
for this purpose. Second, this court proposes to grant the
plaintiff routine parenting access whenever possible. The
court will also balance responsibility for transporting
[the child] and encourage the parties to use flexibility,
common sense, and cooperation to maximize the amount
and quality of the plaintiff’s parenting time. Successful
visitation access in Virginia is feasible. . . . This court
finds that, despite past difficulty, the plaintiff’s access
C. D. v. R. C.

to [the child] in Virginia will be greatly improved by both
the termination of acrimonious litigation and the move
to the new three-bedroom home in Harrisonburg. There,
the defendant has assured this court that the plaintiff
will be welcome, and the availability of an extra bed-
room dispels any suggestion that his visits will require
the plaintiff to visit with [the child] in expensive and
unwelcoming hotel rooms. Further, the court’s orders
will allow the plaintiff to exercise substantial parenting
time in Connecticut, including most [of the child’s] sum-
mer vacation, as well as multiple holiday weekends, the
next several Christmas holidays, and other substantial
periods sufficient to ensure that [the child] maintains
contact with the plaintiff and his Connecticut family,
including his loving paternal grandparents with whom
he has always enjoyed a close bond.”
In its orders, the court awarded the parties’ joint legal
custody. The court awarded the defendant primary physi-
cal custody and permitted her to relocate to Virginia with
the child. The court ordered the parties to establish a
video communication schedule, such that the plaintiff
may communicate with the child at least three times dur-
ing the workweek, at least once during the weekend, and
in connection with special occasions. The court ordered
that the defendant would have similar access during
the plaintiff’s parenting time. The court ordered that
the plaintiff would have parenting time in Connecticut
on three long weekends during the school year; spring
breaks; alternating Thanksgiving breaks; and the next
three Christmas breaks, with alternating Christmas
breaks thereafter. With respect to parenting time in
Virginia, the court ordered: “Upon agreement of the
parties, not to be unreasonably withheld, the plaintiff
shall have flexible access to visit the child in Virginia upon
reasonable notice (i.e., ten days in advance), including
exercising parenting time during any holiday weekend.
Weekend parenting time in Virginia will commence Fri-
day after school, through Sunday evening at 8 p.m. The
plaintiff shall be permitted, though not required, to
lodge in the defendant’s Harrisonburg home to facilitate
C. D. v. R. C.

the plaintiff’s parenting time. During the plaintiff’s
parenting time, the defendant shall make all reasonable
effort to provide the plaintiff with exclusive use of the
home during daytime hours, so as not to unreasonably
interfere with the plaintiff’s parenting time.”
This appeal followed. The plaintiff filed a motion
requesting that the trial court stay the relocation orders
during the pendency of the appeal, which was denied.
The plaintiff filed a motion for review of the trial court’s
denial of the stay with this court, which granted the
motion for review but denied the relief requested therein.
I
The plaintiff’s first claim on appeal is that the trial
court improperly “utilized inapplicable law in favor of
relocation and took the view that the law had shifted
considerably more in favor of relocation in recent years,
and . . . asserted two different standards for relocation
depending on whether parents are married or unmar-
ried.” We consider in turn each aspect of the plaintiff’s
claim.
We first set forth our standard of review. “The question
of whether the court applied the correct legal standard
is a question of law subject to plenary review.” J. Y. v.
M. R., 215 Conn. App. 648, 665, 283 A.3d 520 (2022).
Resolving the plaintiff’s claim also requires us to con-
strue the court’s orders. “[O]ur deferential standard of
review [in domestic relations cases] . . . does not extend
to the court’s interpretation of and application of the
law to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of law is
entitled to plenary review on appeal. . . . Moreover, [t]he
construction of [an order or] judgment is a question of law
for the court . . . [and] our review . . . is plenary.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 664. “[A]n opinion must
be read as a whole, without particular portions read
in isolation, to discern the parameters of its holding.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jason R., 306
Conn. 438, 453, 51 A.3d 334 (2012). Furthermore, “if it
is not otherwise clear from the record that an improper
C. D. v. R. C.

standard was applied, the appellant’s claim will fail on
the basis of inadequate support in the record.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.
We first address the plaintiff’s claim that the court
improperly applied a presumption in favor of relocation.
The following legal background is relevant: “In Ireland
v. Ireland, 246 Conn. 413, 414–15, 717 A.2d 676 (1998),
our Supreme Court addressed the issue of a custodial
parent seeking permission to relocate out of state with a
minor child. In its decision, our Supreme Court held that
a custodial parent seeking permission to relocate bears
the initial burden of demonstrating, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that (1) the relocation is for a legitimate
purpose, and (2) the proposed location is reasonable in
light of that purpose. Once the custodial parent has
made such a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to
the noncustodial parent to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the relocation would not be in the
best interests of the child. . . . The court also set forth
factors that must be considered in determining the best
interests of the child in future relocation cases.” (Citation
omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) N. R. v. M. P., 227 Conn. App. 698, 717–18,
323 A.3d 1142 (2024).
“In Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn. App. 173, 176, 789 A.2d
1104, cert. denied, 260 Conn. 910, 796 A.2d 556 (2002),
this court addressed the question of whether Ireland
applies to relocation issues that arise when the initial
custody determination is made . . . . In concluding that
Ireland does not extend to such situations, we held that
Ireland is limited to postjudgment relocation cases. We
conclude[d] that because the Ireland court did not expand
its holding to affect all relocation matters, relocation
issues that arise at the initial judgment for the dissolu-
tion of marriage continue to be governed by the standard
of the best interest of the child as set forth in [General
Statutes] § 46b-56. While the Ireland factors may be
considered as best interest factors and give guidance to
the trial court, they are not mandatory or exclusive in
C. D. v. R. C.

the judgment context.” (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) N. R. v. M. P., supra, 227
Conn. App. 718–19.
“Our legislature adopted the factors set forth by our
Supreme Court in Ireland and enacted No. 06-168 of
the 2006 Public Acts, codified at [General Statutes]
§ 46b-56d, which is limited to any proceeding before
the Superior Court arising after the entry of a judgment
awarding custody of a minor child . . . .” (Emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 718. In
addition to codifying the Ireland factors,2 § 46b-56d (a)
removed the burden shifting scheme set out in Ireland.
See Lederle v. Spivey, 113 Conn. App. 177, 187, 965 A.2d
621, cert. denied, 291 Conn. 916, 970 A.2d 728 (2009).
Section 46b-56d (a) provides: “In any proceeding before
the Superior Court arising after the entry of a judgment
awarding custody of a minor child and involving the
relocation of either parent with the child, where such
relocation would have a significant impact on an exist-
ing parenting plan, the relocating parent shall bear the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that (1) the relocation is for a legitimate purpose, (2) the
proposed location is reasonable in light of such purpose,
and (3) the relocation is in the best interests of the child.”
Section 46b-56 (a), which governs relocation issues
that arise at the entry of a judgment awarding custody,
provides in relevant part that “the court may make or
modify any proper order regarding the custody, care,
2
General Statutes § 46b-56d (b) provides: “In determining whether to
approve the relocation of the child under subsection (a) of this section,
the court shall consider, but such consideration shall not be limited to:
(1) Each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation; (2) the
quality of the relationships between the child and each parent; (3) the
impact of the relocation on the quantity and the quality of the child’s
future contact with the nonrelocating parent; (4) the degree to which the
relocating parent’s and the child’s life may be enhanced economically,
emotionally and educationally by the relocation; and (5) the feasibility
of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating parent and
the child through suitable visitation arrangements.”
C. D. v. R. C.

education, visitation and support of the children if it has
jurisdiction . . . .” Subsection (b) of § 46b-56 provides in
relevant part that a trial court, in crafting such orders,
shall consider “the rights and responsibilities of both
parents . . . and the court shall enter orders accordingly
that serve the best interests of the child and provide the
child with the active and consistent involvement of both
parents commensurate with their abilities and interests. .
. .” Section 46b-56 (c) requires the trial court, when mak-
ing or modifying an order as provided in subsections (a)
and (b), to “consider the best interests of the child” and
enumerates seventeen factors.3 Subsection (c) further
3
The seventeen enumerated factors are: “(1) The physical and emotional
safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental needs of the
child; (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand
and meet the needs of the child; (4) any relevant and material informa-
tion obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the
child; (5) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (6) the past and
current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the
child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the
best interests of the child; (7) the willingness and ability of each parent
to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship
between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including
compliance with any court orders; (8) any manipulation by or coercive
behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’
dispute; (9) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life
of the child; (10) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and
community environments; (11) the length of time that the child has
lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of
maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may
consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family
home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (12)
the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both;
(13) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except
that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and
of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed
custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (14) the
child’s cultural background; (15) the effect on the child of the actions
of an abuser, if any domestic violence, as defined in section 46b-1, has
occurred between the parents or between a parent and another indi-
vidual or the child; (16) whether the child or a sibling of the child has
been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120;
and (17) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a
parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b.”
General Statutes § 46b-56 (c).
C. D. v. R. C.

provides that “[t]he court is not required to assign any
weight to any of the factors that it considers, but shall
articulate the basis for its decision.”
In its recitation of the legal standard, the court first
explained that it was “assessing whether relocation is
in [the child’s] best interests” and stated that it “must
consider all relevant factors enumerated in . . . § 46b-56
(c).” It also stated that it had considered Ireland, noting
that our Supreme Court had “adopted additional reloca-
tion factors from New York jurisprudence,” and it set
forth those factors. The court recognized that the Ireland
factors are limited to postjudgment relocation cases but
stated that the “factors may nonetheless be considered for
guidance as ‘best interest’ factors when making an initial
custody determination . . . .” Finally, the court recognized
that § 46b-56d (a) imposes an evidentiary burden on the
relocating parent in a postjudgment relocation case to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) the
relocation is for a legitimate purpose, (2) the proposed
location is reasonable in light of such purpose, and (3)
the relocation is in the best interests of the child.” The
court noted that such evidentiary burden is not applicable
in the present case, citing Lederle v. Spivey, supra, 113
Conn. App. 177.
At the outset of the court’s discussion, it stated that
it had “considered all relevant factors set out in . . .
§ 46b-56 (c), as well as those factors discussed in Ireland,
Tropea [v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727, 665 N.E.2d 145,
642 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1996)],4 and § 46b-56d. The court
has given each factor appropriate weight based on the
evidence but has been guided ultimately by [the child’s]
best interests. Having done so, this court finds that it is
4
“To determine the best interest of the child in a postjudgment relo-
cation matter, our Supreme Court in Ireland adopted the factors as
enumerated by the New York Court of Appeals in Tropea v. Tropea,
[supra, 87 N.Y.2d 727].” Ford v. Ford, supra, 68 Conn. App. 178.
C. D. v. R. C.

in his best interest to relocate with his mother to Har-
risonburg, Virginia.” (Footnote added.)
The court then briefly set forth a historical discus-
sion of views on relocation, both pre- and post-Ireland,
and described in passing what it identified as a shift
away from the discouraging of relocation of custodial
parents. It remarked, inter alia, that “Connecticut and
other jurisdictions now expressly allow for the likelihood
that a custodial parent’s good faith decision to relocate
is in the best interests of the child.”(Emphasis in origi-
nal.) The court next engaged in an extensive analysis of
the proposed relocation, the need for relocation, and
ways to mitigate any adverse effects of the relocation.
The court set forth detailed factual findings in support
of its conclusion that the proposed relocation is in the
best interest of the child, as set forth previously in this
opinion. Finally, the court prefaced its orders by stat-
ing, “[h]aving considered all the evidence, and all the
appropriate factors set forth in . . . § 46b-56 (c), it is the
finding of this court that the best interests of the minor
[child] are served by the following orders.”
Reading the court’s decision as a whole, we conclude
that it did not use inapplicable law in favor of relocation.
Although the court’s decision contained references to
Ireland, the court repeatedly expressed its legal deter-
mination that Ireland was not controlling but, rather,
that the court was guided by the best interest of the
child standard. See In re Denzel W., 225 Conn. App.
354, 377–78, 315 A.3d 346 (rejecting claim that court
improperly shifted burden to respondent where, despite
use of imprecise language, court applied proper stan-
dard), cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 1 (2024).
The challenged language, quotations from Ireland, were
offered in support of the court’s factual findings that
support its best interest determination, as set forth in
more detail in part II of this opinion; see In re M. S., 226
Conn. App. 857, 869, 319 A.3d 833 (court’s remarks that
referenced different legal standard did not necessitate
conclusion that court improperly applied that standard,
C. D. v. R. C.

where court set forth the relevant legal standard on more
than one occasion and made findings in support of rel-
evant legal standard), cert. denied, 349 Conn. 920, 320
A.3d 978 (2024); and we do not view the court’s analysis
as deviating from the neutral best interest standard.
Moreover, we view the court’s discussion as incorporat-
ing considerations of the family unit as a whole, includ-
ing the economic and emotional impact of the proposed
relocation. Our Supreme Court recently has reiterated
that “a trial court’s analysis concerning relocation may
[take] into consideration the interests of the new family
unit as a whole [because such an analysis] is consistent
with the best interests of the child standard. In fact . . .
an attempt to determine what is best for the child without
consideration of what is best for the family unit, with
whom the child spends the most significant amount of
his or her time, would be an incomplete inquiry.” (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) K. S. v. R. S., 350 Conn.
692, 744, 326 A.3d 187 (2024). Moreover, § 46b-56d (b)
permits the court to consider “the degree to which the
relocating parent’s and the child’s life may be enhanced
economically, emotionally and educationally by the relo-
cation.” Having considered the challenged portion of the
court’s decision within the context of the court’s overall
analysis; see, e.g., In re James O., 322 Conn. 636, 654,
142 A.3d 1147 (2016); we conclude that the court did
not use inapplicable law in favor of relocation.
We reach the same conclusion with respect to the
plaintiff’s contention that the court “asserted two dif-
ferent standards for relocation depending on whether
parents are married or unmarried.”5 The plaintiff empha-
sizes remarks the court made during the guardian ad
litem’s testimony. Specifically, the court distinguished
the present case from postjudgment relocation cases,
5
Because we conclude that the trial court did not improperly assert
two different standards in its decision, we need not reach the plaintiff’s
contention that such an assertion would violate due process and equal
protection principles.
C. D. v. R. C.

stating: “This is not a relocation case under the law
because we are not postjudgment. In a relocation case,
you understand that there is an expectation . . . given the
fact that there was a marriage and presumably a marital
home had been established. And there is a presumption
that the expectations of the parties, as a family unit,
should be disrupted as little as possible, unless there
are compelling reasons, and there we have the relocation
standard.” (Emphasis added.) The court continued: “In
this case, the parties were never married. There was no
expectation set. And so, given the fact that I’ve heard
you testify [to] that factor, which is the length of time
the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environ-
ment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity
in such environment is not a compelling factor for you,
given [the child’s] adaptability. I’m wondering why there
is a preference for [the plaintiff] over [the defendant],
given the fact that they were not a married unit and that
expectation does not exist.”
After these prefatory comments, the court inquired
of the guardian ad litem “[w]hy there’s a preference for
[the plaintiff] to maintain the continuity of the Stam-
ford location, in proximity to his family, and to allow
the continuity of his employment, where the converse
of that seems not to be given equivalent weight in your
determinations.”6
The plaintiff maintains that the court “overtly
expressed this opinion of the law in such a way that it
should be presumed to have been applied by it in the final
decision, even if not expressed there.” The plaintiff goes
on to maintain, however, that the court reinforced that
same principle in its memorandum of decision. Specifi-
6
The trial court continued: “[G]iven the fact that this is a custody
case, originating out of . . . nonmarried parties, where that expectation
doesn’t exist, if that factor is not compelling, then how do we distinguish
whose preference here—[b]ecause it seems to me that, the suggestion is
that [the defendant], in order to see her son, has no option but to effec-
tively become—for lack of a better term—I’ll put it terribly—stuck in
Connecticut against her will.”
C. D. v. R. C.

cally, he points to the following passage: “The court does
not believe its concerns [regarding the imbalance in the
current parental dynamic and resentment felt by the
defendant] are hyperbole. The credible evidence is that
the parties’ relationship, though respectful, is strained.
These are young people that were never married. Indeed,
at the time [the child] was conceived, they had not con-
templated or intended on forming a life together. Unlike
a dissolution of marriage, there was no underlying pre-
sumption that these two people would form a family unit
or that it would be located in Connecticut. The parties
cohabitated for approximately six months when the rela-
tionship devolved under claims of domestic violence. This
court does not purport to reach the merits of that claim,
and there is no serious suggestion that [the child’s] health
and safety is at risk from either parent; nonetheless, the
underlying relationship between the parties is not only
practically nonexistent but is marred by a significant
history of acrimony.” (Emphasis added.)
We are not persuaded that the trial court’s observa-
tions evidence its application of a more lenient standard
to an unmarried parent seeking to relocate. Rather, read
in context, these intermittent comments offered during
the course of trial can be read as seeking to distinguish
postjudgment relocation cases. Moreover, the challenged
finding within its memorandum of decision, when con-
sidered within the full passage, pertains to the parties’
relationship and that relationship’s breakdown. We
do not read the comments to show that the trial court
applied a different standard, especially in light of the
court’s proper recitation of the applicable legal standard
numerous times throughout its decision. Moreover, we
are reminded that, “if it is not otherwise clear from the
record that an improper standard was applied, the appel-
lant’s claim will fail on the basis of inadequate support
in the record.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
C. D. v. R. C.

Jason R., supra, 306 Conn. 453. Accordingly, we reject
the plaintiff’s claim.
II
The plaintiff’s second claim on appeal is that the trial
court abused its discretion in permitting the defendant
to relocate with the parties’ child. We are not persuaded.
“Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision
regarding custody, visitation and relocation orders is one
of abuse of discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Lederle v. Spivey, supra, 113 Conn. App. 185. “In
determining whether a trial court has abused its broad
discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every
reasonable presumption in favor of the correctness of its
action. . . . Appellate review of a trial court’s findings
of fact is governed by the clearly erroneous standard of
review. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when
there is no evidence in the record to support it . . . or when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. . . .
Our deferential standard of review, however, does not
extend to the court’s interpretation of and application
of the law to the facts. It is axiomatic that a matter of
law is entitled to plenary review on appeal. . . . As has
often been explained, the foundation for [our deferential]
standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advanta-
geous position to assess the personal factors significant
to a domestic relations case . . . .” (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) N. R. v. M. P., supra,
227 Conn. App. 713.
Moreover, “[t]he authority to exercise the judicial
discretion [authorized by § 46b-56] . . . is not conferred
[on] this court, but [on] the trial court, and . . . we are
not privileged to usurp that authority or to substitute
ourselves for the trial court. . . . A mere difference of
opinion or judgment cannot justify our intervention.
Nothing short of a conviction that the action of the trial
court is one [that] discloses a clear abuse of direction can
C. D. v. R. C.

warrant our interference.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Zhou v. Zhang, 334 Conn. 601, 632–33, 223
A.3d 775 (2020).
The plaintiff contends that the court considered
improper factors or placed undue weight on them. He
argues that the court “should not have penalized the
plaintiff for his strong bond with his child,” and asserts
that the court did so by making unfair findings regarding
the imbalance in the current parental dynamic and that
the parental bond between the plaintiff and the child had
developed at the defendant’s expense; the court’s find-
ing that the child’s current circumstances were “likely
to harm him in the long term” was unsupported by any
evidence because “it was clear that the defendant had
been successful at insulating [the child] from any detri-
ment”; the court’s findings regarding the defendant’s
current circumstances, including that she lives “in a
modest neighborhood where safety is a concern,” were
erroneous;7 the court could have addressed its concerns
by the defendant relocating in Connecticut, or by award-
ing greater child support to keep the defendant in the
Stamford area; relocation to Virginia provided almost
no financial benefit;8 the court’s finding that the child
7  
We note that the defendant testified as follows regarding the differ-
ences between her current living situation in Stamford and the proposed
home in Virginia:
“[The Defendant]: We would have a . . . home in a good neighborhood
versus our 900 square foot two-bedroom apartment for $100 more a
month.
“[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Do you believe that it’s in [the child’s]
current best interest to have the two-bedroom or the home that you
just described to live in in Virginia as opposed to being able to see his
father every week?
“[The Defendant]: Well, I don’t think the situation is ideal any way
you cut it, but I do think it is in [the child’s] best interest to have a
home with a yard in a good school district, in a safe neighborhood for
him to grow up in, yes.”
8
The defendant testified that “the mortgage payment for the [Virginia]
home that I would . . . own at some point is less than the rent that I pay
currently and in my income restricted apartment.” Moreover, the court
found that, “[t]hough the anticipated salary [in Virginia] is roughly
commensurate with her Connecticut earnings, it is sufficient to meet
her anticipated expenses. Moreover, there is a reasonable expectation of
C. D. v. R. C.

deserved to grow up with a yard was already met during
the plaintiff’s parenting time in Connecticut; the court
improperly placed emphasis on the defendant’s family
in Virginia; and the court supported its orders “with
a visitation schedule in Virginia that is inconsistent
with its findings and that would be unworkable,” includ-
ing permitting visitation within the defendant’s home.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff urges
this court to conclude, “[b]ased on any of these reasons,
or any combination of them . . . that the court erred or
abused its discretion . . . .”
We reiterate that the trial court is accorded the author-
ity to exercise judicial discretion under § 46b-56, and
“[n]othing short of a conviction that the action of the
trial court is one [that] discloses a clear abuse of discre-
tion can warrant our interference.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Coleman v. Bembridge, 207 Conn. App.
28, 54, 263 A.3d 403 (2021). We have no such conviction
in this case. The trial court found that it was in the best
interest of the child to relocate with the defendant to
Virginia and supported that determination with detailed
factual findings regarding the best interest of the child.
Specifically, the court explained that it carefully had
considered the defendant’s proposal and found that the
proposed relocation would address concerns, includ-
ing the defendant’s lack of a support network and the
high cost of living in Connecticut preventing her from
affording more than the modest apartment she shares
with the child. The court found that the proposed reloca-
tion would allow the defendant to provide better for the
child, given the lower cost of living in Virginia and would
strengthen the defendant’s support network, which, in
turn, would elevate the defendant’s career prospects.
The court found that the proposed home presented a
substantial improvement over the child’s present stan-
dard of living, including its sizeable yard and proximity
salary increases. Even working for similar wages, the court is satisfied
that the defendant will be better able to provide for [the child] given
Virginia’s lower cost of living, as demonstrated by her ability to pay
similar housing costs for a three-bedroom home.”
C. D. v. R. C.

to his maternal grandmother, who the court found was
dedicated to assisting the defendant with childcare. The
court found that the child is resilient and adaptable, and
noted the child’s comfort in Virginia as has been shown
during his frequent trips there. The court found that the
parties’ current circumstances were not in the child’s
best interest noted the defendant’s difficulty in raising
the child without a robust support network. The court
found that the resulting impact on her relationship with
the child was reasonably foreseeable. Finally, the court
weighed the impact of the relocation on the quantity and
quality of the child’s contact with the plaintiff and the
paternal family and attempted to mitigate the adverse
effects of the relocation by ensuring that the plaintiff
would exercise substantial parenting time in Connecticut.
The court also found that successful visitation in Virginia
is feasible. In light of the record before the court, we
cannot conclude that the relocation order constituted
an abuse of its discretion. See Lederle v. Spivey, supra,
113 Conn. App. 190.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.