Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vena

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Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vena

OFFICE OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY
COUNSEL v. JOHN D. VENA II
(AC 47495)
Elgo, Clark and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent attorney appealed from the trial court’s judgment sus-
pending him from the practice of law in Connecticut for five years as
reciprocal discipline to his suspension from the practice of law in Virginia
for five years for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. He claimed,
inter alia, that the court lacked authority to suspend him for five years
pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 2-39) because he was not a member of
the Virginia bar and, thus, the discipline was not reciprocal. Held:

The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the attorney discipline
brought pursuant to Practice Book § 2-39, as that rule plainly outlines the
court’s authority to hear and determine whether discipline is appropriate
for attorneys admitted in Connecticut and disciplined in another jurisdiction,
and the respondent provided no analysis to support his claim that the court
lacked authority because he was not admitted to practice in Virginia.

The respondent’s unpreserved claim that the trial court’s imposition of
reciprocal discipline against him violated his right to due process failed
under the third prong of State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as he failed to
establish a constitutional violation that deprived him of a fair trial.

The trial court’s finding that the respondent failed to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that the Virginia proceedings against him were so
lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard that it would constitute a grave
injustice to impose commensurate discipline in Connecticut was not clearly
erroneous.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by suspending the respondent
from the practice of law in Connecticut for a period of five years, as it fell
within the discipline warranted under Practice Book § 2-39.

Argued May 20—officially released October 28, 2025

Procedural History

Presentment by the petitioner for alleged profes-
sional misconduct by the respondent, brought to the
Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford and
tried to the court, Cobb, J.; judgment suspending the
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Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vena

respondent from the practice of law for five years, from
which the respondent appealed to this court. Affirmed.
James F. Sullivan, for the appellant (respondent).
Brian B. Staines, chief disciplinary counsel, with
whom, on the brief, was Thomas J. Sousa, Jr., assistant
chief disciplinary counsel, for the appellee (petitioner).
Opinion

CLARK, J. The present appeal arises out of a recipro-
cal disciplinary proceeding commenced pursuant to
Practice Book § 2-39 by the petitioner, the Office of
Chief Disciplinary Counsel, against the respondent,
John D. Vena II, after his suspension from the practice
of law in Virginia for five years for engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law. The respondent appeals
from the judgment of the trial court, which entered a
commensurate order suspending the respondent from
the practice of law in Connecticut for five years.
The respondent claims on appeal that the trial court
(1) lacked authority to suspend him for five years pursu-
ant to Practice Book § 2-39 because he was not a mem-
ber of the Virginia bar and, therefore, the discipline was
not reciprocal, (2) erred by concluding that he failed
to establish a defense to reciprocal discipline under § 2-
39, and (3) abused its discretion by imposing a five year
suspension in Connecticut pursuant to § 2-39 because
the misconduct that occurred in Virginia warrants dif-
ferent discipline in Connecticut. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The record reveals the following facts and procedural
history relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The
respondent is an attorney admitted to the practice of
law in Connecticut. Effective May 19, 2023, the respon-
dent was suspended from the practice of law in Virginia
for a period of five years by the Virginia State Bar
Disciplinary Board (board). The case before the board
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Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vena

primarily concerned then Fairfax County Circuit Court
Judge Thomas Mann’s complaint to the Virginia State
Bar with respect to the respondent’s conduct on Decem-
ber 17, 2021, before the Fairfax County Circuit Court.

In its memorandum order of suspension (order of
suspension), the board made the following findings
relating to the respondent’s conduct on December 17,
2021. On that date, the respondent appeared before
Judge Mann at the Fairfax County Circuit Court’s
monthly discontinuance docket in the case Lalich v.
Lewis. Kimberly Lalich, the plaintiff in the aforemen-
tioned case, retained Tyrone Law Group as counsel
prior to the December 17, 2021 hearing. Bruce A. John-
son was the attorney of record in her case. The respon-
dent was employed by Tyrone Law Group. No court
reporter was present at the December 17, 2021 discon-
tinuance docket, but the audio of the proceedings was
recorded, and the relevant portions were transcribed
and entered as an exhibit by the Virginia State Bar in
the respondent’s Virginia disciplinary proceeding. The
transcript of the December 17, 2021 hearing indicates
that the respondent represented himself as an attorney
and engaged in the practice of law before the Virginia
court. Specifically, the board found that the hearing
transcript reflects the following.1 The court asked, ‘‘So
who’s here?’’ and the respondent replied, ‘‘John Vena
on behalf of the plaintiff. Kimberly Lalich, the plaintiff,
is also appearing.’’ When asked, ‘‘And who do you repre-
sent?’’ the respondent replied, ‘‘Ms. Lalich.’’ The respon-
dent had further conversation with the court about the
facts in Lalich v. Lewis and argued procedural matters.
At no time did the respondent inform the court that he
was not a member of the Virginia bar, nor did he state
that he was only there to inform the court that the
1
The transcript of the Virginia proceeding was not made part of the record
in the Connecticut proceeding.
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attorney of record was late. The court asked the respon-
dent to enter his appearance in writing, but the respon-
dent would not do so. Judge Mann and his law clerk
determined that the respondent was not a member of
the Virginia bar, and Judge Mann filed a complaint to
the Virginia State Bar that same day alleging that the
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
The order of suspension further reveals the following
facts regarding the respondent’s Virginia disciplinary
proceeding. A prehearing conference in the respon-
dent’s Virginia disciplinary matter was conducted on
April 19, 2023. At the prehearing conference, the respon-
dent made a motion to continue the matter so that he
could obtain counsel. The motion was denied by the
chair of the board because the respondent received
notice of the proceedings and hearing in January, Febru-
ary, and March, 2023, and, therefore, had adequate time
to obtain counsel.2 At the prehearing conference the
respondent was granted the opportunity to submit, late,
a witness list and exhibits, and to have witnesses partici-
pate remotely. He also had the opportunity to object
to the Virginia State Bar’s exhibits. The respondent was
additionally reminded that it was his responsibility to
arrange for the technology for his remote witnesses
and to coordinate technology issues with the clerk’s
office prior to the hearing. At the prehearing conference
the respondent ‘‘was disruptive, rude, and demon-
strated a complete disrespect for the disciplinary pro-
ceedings and the parties to the prehearing conference
by refusing to comply with requests from the chair to
conduct himself in a professional and polite manner,
to discontinue insulting other parties on the call, and
stop interrupting other people while they were speak-
ing.’’
2
The board’s order also stated: ‘‘All legal notices of the date and place
of the April 28 . . . and May 19, 2023 hearings were timely sent by the
Clerk of the Disciplinary System . . . in the manner prescribed by the Rules
of the Supreme Court of Virginia . . . .’’
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The hearing in the respondent’s matter was con-
ducted by the board over the course of two days: April
28 and May 19, 2023. On those two days, the respondent
appeared in person as a self-represented party before
the board. The hearing began on April 28, 2023. Bar
counsel presented her case first. The respondent did
not make prior arrangements for remotely participating
witnesses or to understand the technology, which
caused considerable disruption. ‘‘It was necessary for
bar counsel or the clerk’s office to allow the respondent
to use their computers’’ in order for the respondent
to cross-examine witnesses. Moreover, the respondent
‘‘repeatedly interrupted other parties and the board,
spoke while other parties were speaking, made rude and
disrespectful comments while others were speaking,
cursed at one witness, and continuously demonstrated
contempt and disrespect for bar counsel and the chair.’’
Bar counsel concluded her case at 4:30 p.m. on April
28, 2023, at which point it was determined that the
respondent would require another day to present his
case, so the parties agreed to continue the hearing until
May 19, 2023.

On May 19, 2023, the respondent, again, had not
arranged for remote participation of witnesses and was
unable to understand the technology and ‘‘once again
demonstrated disrespectful, rude, and disorderly con-
duct by refusing to cooperate with the chair’s requests
to conduct himself in a professional manner, by continu-
ing to talk over other parties and make comments about
other speakers, and continually disparaging the disci-
plinary process.’’ The board and the clerk’s office assisted
with providing technology so that the respondent could
have his witnesses participate remotely to ensure that
he had the opportunity to present his case and evidence.
Over the course of the two day hearing, both parties
had the opportunity to offer and to object to proffered
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exhibits. The respondent presented four witnesses, sub-
mitted four exhibits, three of which were admitted into
evidence, and concluded his case on May 19, 2023.
In its order of suspension, dated August 1, 2023, the
board suspended the respondent from the practice of
law in Virginia for five years effective May 19, 2023.
The board imposed the suspension on the basis of its
findings by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law in violation of rule 5.5 (c) of the Virginia Rules of
Professional Conduct, and engaged in conduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation that
reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness to practice law, in violation of Rule 8.4 (b) and
(c) of the Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct. Spe-
cifically, the board found by clear and convincing evi-
dence ‘‘that the respondent’s conduct on December 17,
2021, before the Fairfax County Circuit Court consti-
tuted the practice of law in Virginia. When the case was
called by the court, the respondent stated that he was
there for Ms. Lalich, the plaintiff. The respondent in
fact spelled his name for the court so that the court
would know who he was. Although the respondent at
times noted that he was with the Tyrone Law Group,
he did not explain to the court that he was not licensed
to practice law in Virginia, nor did he state that he was
only there to inform the court that the Virginia attorney
retained to handle the matter was running late. The
respondent was evasive with the court about noting his
appearance with the court and deliberately refused to
fill out the paperwork provided to him by the court to
note his appearance. The respondent presented proce-
dural matters and facts to the court regarding [Lalich’s]
case. The respondent’s testimony inferred that, had he
not been in court on December 17, 2021, to take the
actions that he did, [Lalich], as well as his law firm,
would have suffered adverse consequences. The board
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found that the respondent held himself out to be a
lawyer by his representations to the court and by
arguing procedural aspects of [Lalich’s] case to the
court.’’ Furthermore, the board found for the same rea-
sons that ‘‘the respondent committed a deliberately
wrongful act that reflected adversely on his honesty,
trustworthiness and fitness to practice law. The respon-
dent knew he was not licensed to practice before the
Fairfax County Circuit Court and he also knew that a
Virginia licensed attorney had been retained to handle
the matter for [Lalich] . . . . There was no reason for
the respondent to become involved in the matter before
Judge Mann on December 17, 2021, yet the respondent
chose to stand with [Lalich] and act on her behalf and
to protect his law firm. When repeatedly asked by Judge
Mann and the court staff to note his appearance, the
respondent failed to inform the court of his status as
a nonlicensed attorney but instead misrepresented him-
self. Additionally, the respondent was dishonest with
the [Virginia State Bar] during the investigation of the
complaint regarding his conduct in court as he misrep-
resented what he had said to the court as well as his
actions in the courtroom.’’
After the board concluded by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent violated rules 5.5 (c) and
8.4 (b) and (c) of the Virginia Rules of Professional
Conduct, to determine the appropriate sanction, the
board considered evidence on both aggravating and
mitigating factors for sanctions. The board found the
following aggravating factors: the respondent (1)
engaged in ‘‘[b]ad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules
or orders’’; (2) engaged in ‘‘[d]eceptive practices during
the disciplinary process’’; (3) ‘‘failed to demonstrate
any appreciation of the wrongful nature of his unautho-
rized representation of a client in the Fairfax County
Circuit Court, his misrepresentation to the court, or
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his untruthful conduct during the Virginia State Bar’s
investigation’’; and (4) had practiced law for more than
three decades. (Emphasis in original). The only mitigat-
ing factor the board found was that the respondent had
no prior disciplinary record.
The respondent appealed from the board’s order of
suspension to the Virginia Supreme Court, which dis-
missed the appeal.
In early December, 2023, the petitioner received noti-
fication of the respondent’s Virginia suspension. On
December 21, 2023, the petitioner filed an application
for reciprocal discipline in the Superior Court pursuant
to Practice Book § 2-39 seeking commensurate disci-
plinary action against the respondent. Attached to the
application was a copy of the board’s order of suspen-
sion. The application alleged that the respondent was
admitted to the Connecticut bar on January 30, 1986,
and that, effective May 19, 2023, the respondent had
been suspended from the practice of law in Virginia for
a period of five years. On December 27, 2023, the trial
court issued an order for hearing and notice. The order
for hearing and notice directed the respondent to ‘‘file
within thirty . . . days of service, with proof of service
upon the Disciplinary Counsel, an answer admitting or
denying the action in the other jurisdiction and setting
forth, if any, reasons why commensurate action in this
state would be unwarranted.’’
The return of service indicates that the respondent
was served by certified mail with the application for
reciprocal discipline, the order for hearing and notice,
and a certified copy of the Virginia order of suspension
on January 2, 2024.3 The matter was assigned for a
hearing before the court, Cobb, J. As of the March 11,
3
At the hearing, the petitioner indicated that service was made on January
13, 2024. The respondent does not claim that he was not properly served,
and he did appear.
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2024 presentment hearing, the respondent had not filed
an answer to the application for reciprocal discipline,
as he was required to do pursuant to Practice Book
§ 2-39 (b).4 Nevertheless, the court allowed the respon-
dent to present evidence to attempt to prove any of the
factors outlined in § 2-39 to show that commensurate
discipline was unwarranted. At the hearing, the respon-
dent was the only witness to testify and he offered no
exhibits into evidence.
The respondent’s relevant testimony at the present-
ment hearing, outlined herein, centered on his con-
tention that the board made erroneous factual findings,
that the proceedings were unfair, and that his actions
and unblemished disciplinary history prior to the Vir-
ginia suspension did not warrant the discipline
imposed.
The respondent testified that his actions on Decem-
ber 17, 2021, in the matter of Lalich v. Lewis were
‘‘wholly inadvertent.’’ Specifically he testified that ‘‘[t]he
attorney [he] worked for, Erick Tyrone . . . was to be
the attorney of record but [Tyrone] got suspended by
the Maryland Bar . . . .’’ For that reason, Tyrone
‘‘asked [the respondent] if [he] knew an attorney who
had bar in Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. . . .’’ The
respondent ‘‘knew of such an attorney’’ and his name
was Bruce Johnson. The respondent then testified that
he ‘‘introduced [Johnson] to [Tyrone] and about a week
approximately prior to [the December 17, 2021 hearing],
[Tyrone] hired [Johnson] on . . . a part-time basis’’
and that ‘‘[t]he [December 17, 2021] hearing was sched-
uled for a Thursday of the first week that [Johnson]
was to work . . . .’’ The respondent testified that he
‘‘was more familiar with the facts of the case than was
[Johnson], but [Johnson] was the attorney of record.
4
The respondent filed his answer on October 31, 2024, well after the court
had already issued its order imposing reciprocal discipline.
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. . . So, [the respondent] agreed to go with him in case
he needed assistance with the facts of the case’’ but
‘‘[w]hen [the respondent] got to the courtroom . . .
[Johnson] was not there’’ so ‘‘[the respondent] went
forward simply to request a continuance on the grounds
that [the] attorney was late.’’ The respondent testified
that he ‘‘very clearly told [Judge Mann] [he] only repre-
sent[ed] the law firm and [he] did not represent [Lal-
ich].’’ He further testified that Judge Mann ‘‘continued
the case and [the respondent] met with the client in a
. . . witness room off the back of the courtroom,’’ but
‘‘[w]hen [they] got back, [Judge Mann] informed [the
respondent] that [Johnson] had already requested a con-
tinuance through the daily court or something like that
. . . and the other judge granted it, and this made
[Judge Mann] very mad because he said he was the
only judge who should be in control of whether or not
parties get continuances on his docket.’’ He further
testified that ‘‘the case was continued and [he and Lal-
ich] left the courtroom with no further action and [he]
assumed everything was fine’’ but later ‘‘found out that
. . . Judge Mann got mad at not only the lawyer, [John-
son], who requested the continuance but [also] the
judge who granted the continuance. . . . [T]hen [Judge
Mann] found out [the respondent] was not admitted in
Virginia . . . and somehow decided to go after [him].’’
The respondent then testified that the transcript pro-
duced at his hearing ‘‘was false . . . .’’ To support that
assertion, he testified that, during the investigation of
the complaint, he ‘‘demanded a transcript’’ of the
December 17, 2021 proceedings but was told ‘‘at least
six times, one, there was no court clerk, and two, that
the recording of the courtroom was not working that
day and there would be no transcript.’’
Next, he testified that, ‘‘[f]rom the very get-go, it was
clear [he] was not going to get a fair hearing’’ in the
Virginia disciplinary proceeding and that he ‘‘requested
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Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Vena

[the panel] recuse themselves’’ and ‘‘objected to several
of the procedures.’’ He testified, for example, that
‘‘Judge Mann got promoted to the Virginia Supreme
Court’’ and he believed that, ‘‘in deference to Judge
Mann, they went along with his complaint . . . .’’ He
also testified that he ‘‘attempted several times to request
[a] continuance to get a lawyer’’ but that the request
was denied. Additionally, the respondent testified that
a bar investigator ‘‘served process on [his] daughter’’
but that his daughter ‘‘was thirteen years old.’’
The respondent further disputed additional facts
found by the board in its order of suspension, including
that bar counsel did not conclude her case until 6 p.m.
on April 28, 2023, but that he had to ‘‘wind up [his]
case’’ by 3 p.m. on May 19, 2023, which ‘‘condensed the
testimony of all [his] witnesses.’’
Finally, the respondent testified that he has ‘‘been a
member of the Connecticut bar for thirty-eight years,
and [has] had no colorable claim of violation of any of
the ethical codes or any misconduct whatsoever.’’ He
further testified that ‘‘Lalich ended up having her case
settled’’ so ‘‘there was no harm to the client or to the
public.’’
At the conclusion of the presentment hearing, the
court determined that the respondent failed to establish
by clear and convincing evidence any of the defenses
to the imposition of commensurate discipline under
Practice Book § 2-39. Thus, the court found reciprocal
discipline was appropriate. On March 12, 2024, the court
issued an order imposing reciprocal discipline and sus-
pending the respondent from the practice of law in
Connecticut for a period of five years, effective May
19, 2023. This appeal followed.
Before addressing the respondent’s claims, we begin
with a review of the well established principles of law
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governing attorney disciplinary actions. ‘‘Attorney disci-
plinary proceedings are for the purpose of preserving
the courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to [practice] in them. . . . An attorney
as an officer of the court in the administration of justice,
is continually accountable to it for the manner in which
he exercises the privilege which has been accorded
him. His admission is upon the implied condition that
his continued enjoyment of the right conferred is depen-
dent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise
it, so that when he, by misconduct in any capacity,
discloses that he has become or is an unfit or unsafe
person to be entrusted with the responsibilities and
obligations of an attorney, his right to continue in the
enjoyment of his professional privilege may and ought
to be declared forfeited. . . . Therefore, [i]f a court
disciplines an attorney, it does so not to mete out pun-
ishment to an offender, but [so] that the administration
of justice may be safeguarded and the courts and the
public protected from the misconduct or unfitness of
those who are licensed to perform the important func-
tions of the legal profession.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Disciplinary
Counsel v. Burbank, 195 Conn. App. 416, 430, 224 A.3d
1185, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 906, 226 A.3d 707 (2020),
cert. denied, U.S. , 141 S. Ct. 1059, 208 L. Ed.
2d 526 (2021).
‘‘Practice Book § 2-395 sets forth the procedures by
which Connecticut courts may impose commensurate
5
Practice Book § 2-39 provides in relevant part that: ‘‘(a) Upon being
informed that a lawyer admitted to the Connecticut bar has resigned, been
disbarred, suspended or otherwise disciplined, or placed on inactive disabil-
ity status in another jurisdiction, and that said discipline or inactive disability
status has not been stayed, the disciplinary counsel shall obtain a certified
copy of the order and file it with the Superior Court for the judicial district
wherein the lawyer maintains an office for the practice of law in this state,
except that, if the lawyer has no such office, the disciplinary counsel shall
file the certified copy of the order from the other jurisdiction with the
Superior Court for the judicial district of Hartford. No entry fee shall be
required for proceedings hereunder.
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reciprocal discipline on an attorney admitted to the
Connecticut bar who has been disciplined for profes-
sional misconduct in another jurisdiction.’’ (Footnote
added.) Id. Pursuant to § 2-39 (a), upon being informed
of an attorney’s discipline in another jurisdiction, disci-
plinary counsel shall file a certified copy of the disciplin-
ary order with the Superior Court. Pursuant to § 2-39
(b), the disciplinary order serves as prima facie evi-
dence that the order and findings in it are true and as
an order to show cause directing the disciplined attor-
ney to file an answer within thirty days of service with
reasons, if any, why commensurate action is unwar-
ranted. See id., 431. Section 2-39 (c) provides: ‘‘Upon
the expiration of the thirty day period the court shall
assign the matter for a hearing. After hearing, the court
shall take commensurate action unless it is found that
the respondent has established by clear and convincing
evidence that: (1) The procedure in the predicate matter
was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as
to constitute a deprivation of due process; or (2) There
was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct
in the predicate matter as to give rise to the clear convic-
tion that the court could not, consistent with its duty,
accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or (3)
The discipline imposed would result in grave injustice;
or (4) The misconduct established in the predicate mat-
ter warrants substantially different discipline in this
‘‘(b) Upon receipt of a certified copy of the order, the court shall forthwith
cause to be served upon the lawyer a copy of the order from the other
jurisdiction and an order directing the lawyer to file within thirty days of
service, with proof of service upon the disciplinary counsel, an answer
admitting or denying the action in the other jurisdiction and setting forth,
if any, reasons why commensurate action in this state would be unwarranted.
Such certified copy will constitute prima facie evidence that the order of
the other jurisdiction entered and that the findings contained therein are
true. . . .
‘‘(d) Notwithstanding the above, a reciprocal discipline action need not
be filed if the conduct giving rise to discipline in another jurisdiction has
already been the subject of a formal review by the court or Statewide
Grievance Committee.’’
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state; or (5) The reason for the original transfer to
inactive disability status no longer exists.’’
I
The respondent first claims that the trial court did
not have the authority to suspend him for five years
pursuant to Practice Book § 2-39. Specifically, the
respondent argues that ‘‘the trial court only has the
power to impose reciprocal discipline’’ and that the
suspension imposed by the court was not reciprocal
discipline because, ‘‘[d]espite the Virginia [board’s] rul-
ing, [he] was never suspended from the practice of law
in Virginia because he was never licensed in Virginia.’’
Although the respondent acknowledges that he did not
raise this claim in the trial court, he argues that his
claim implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion and, therefore, can be raised for the first time on
appeal. Alternatively, the respondent argues that this
claim is reviewable under State v. Golding, 213 Conn.
233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re
Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015),
because his ‘‘suspension implicates certain constitu-
tional rights of the respondent who has a property inter-
est in his right to practice law in Connecticut,’’ and that
the imposition of a five year suspension ‘‘violated his
constitutional right to practice law in this state.’’6 We
6
The respondent also argues in passing that we should ‘‘review this claim
of error under the plain error doctrine given the manifest injustice that has
been caused that has constitutional significance.’’ The respondent, however,
does not set forth the standard of review for determining whether a claim
satisfies the plain error doctrine or explain why the alleged error in the
present case warrants reversal under that doctrine.
‘‘[W]e will not review an underlying claim for plain error unless the request
for relief under that doctrine has been adequately briefed. . . . A party
claiming plain error must engage in a separate analysis under that doctrine
to demonstrate that plain error has occurred under the circumstances of
[the] case. . . . Indeed, a mere conclusory assertion of plain error is insuffi-
cient to allow this court to reach the merits of an unpreserved claim under
that doctrine.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Carlson, 226
Conn. App. 514, 540, 318 A.3d 283, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 911, 324 A.3d
143 (2024). Because the respondent has not provided any analysis to support
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first conclude that the trial court did have subject matter
jurisdiction over this matter of attorney discipline
brought pursuant to § 2-39. We further conclude that
the respondent’s claim fails under Golding because he
has not met his burden to establish a constitutional
violation.
A
We first address the respondent’s claim that the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. ‘‘[B]ecause [a] deter-
mination regarding a trial court’s subject matter juris-
diction is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . .
Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may
raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
at any time.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Com-
mission on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Travel-
ers Indemnity Co., 228 Conn. App. 803, 809, 326 A.3d
557 (2024). ‘‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves the
authority of a court to adjudicate the type of contro-
versy presented by the action before it. . . . A court
does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has
competence to entertain the action before it. . . . Once
it is determined that a tribunal has authority or compe-
tence to decide the class of cases to which the action
belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is
resolved in favor of entertaining the action.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connor v.
Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 442–
43, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).
‘‘[A]ttorney disciplinary proceedings are sui generis
. . . [and] it is the exclusive duty of the Judicial Branch
to regulate attorneys . . . . Once initiated, the court
controls the situation and procedure, in its discretion,
as the interests of justice may seem to it to require.
his claim that reversal is warranted under the plain error doctrine, we
conclude that his claim is inadequately briefed and, therefore, decline to
review it.
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. . . [T]he power of the courts is left unfettered to act
as situations, as they may arise, may seem to require,
for efficient discipline of misconduct and the purging
of the bar from the taint of unfit membership. Such
statutes [and rules of practice] as ours are not restrictive
of the inherent powers which reside in courts to inquire
into the conduct of their own officers, and to discipline
them for misconduct.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Cunha, 230 Conn. App. 265,
284, 330 A.3d 181 (2025).
Moreover, Practice Book § 2-39 specifically states
that, ‘‘[u]pon being informed that a lawyer admitted to
the Connecticut bar has . . . been . . . disciplined
. . . in another jurisdiction . . . disciplinary counsel
shall obtain a certified copy of the order and file it with
the Superior Court,’’ which ‘‘shall assign the matter for
a hearing.’’ Practice Book § 2-39 (a) and (c). Section 2-
39 (c) further allows the court to consider whether
commensurate action is appropriate: ‘‘[T]he court shall
take commensurate action unless it is found that the
respondent has established by clear and convincing
evidence’’ certain factors. Practice Book § 2-39 (c).
Thus, the Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction
over attorney disciplinary proceedings, and § 2-39
plainly outlines the court’s authority to hear and to
determine whether discipline is appropriate for lawyers
admitted in Connecticut and disciplined in another
jurisdiction. Furthermore, the respondent provides no
analysis to support his claim that the court lacked
authority merely because he was not admitted to prac-
tice in Virginia. Accordingly, we conclude that the court
had subject matter jurisdiction.
B
We next address the respondent’s claim that he is
entitled to Golding review of his unpreserved claim
that the court’s imposition of reciprocal discipline
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against him violated his right to due process because
the Virginia judgment against him amounted to a legal
‘‘nullity’’ since he was not licensed there. ‘‘Under Gold-
ing, a defendant can prevail on a claim of constitutional
error not preserved at trial only if all of the following
conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review
the alleged claim of error; (2) the claim is of constitu-
tional magnitude alleging the violation of a fundamental
right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . .
exists and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial;
and (4) if subject to harmless error analysis, the state
has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged
constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cohen v. Statewide
Grievance Committee, 189 Conn. App. 643, 658, 208
A.3d 676 (2019), aff’d, 339 Conn. 503, 261 A.3d 722
(2021). ‘‘The first two steps in the Golding analysis
address the reviewability of the claim, [whereas] the
last two steps involve the merits of the claim.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lafferty v. Jones, 225 Conn.
App. 552, 567, 316 A.3d 742 (2024). ‘‘[W]e are free, how-
ever, to dispose of the claim by focusing on the condi-
tion that appears most relevant under the circum-
stances of the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Kurzatkowski, 119 Conn. App. 556,
564, 988 A.2d 393, cert. denied, 296 Conn. 902, 991 A.2d
1104 (2010).
Assuming, without deciding, that this claim satisfies
the first two prongs of Golding, we conclude that the
respondent cannot prevail under the third prong
because he has failed to demonstrate a clearly identifi-
able constitutional violation that deprived him of a
fair trial.
Under Golding, the burden falls on the respondent
to establish the existence of a constitutional violation
that deprived him of a fair trial. See State v. Beaulieu,
118 Conn. App. 1, 7, 982 A.2d 245 (‘‘[d]efendants who
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seek consideration of unpreserved constitutional
claims [on appeal] . . . bear the burden of establishing
their entitlement to such review under the guidelines
enumerated in Golding’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)), cert. denied, 294 Conn. 921, 984 A.2d 68 (2009).
There is no dispute in the trial court record that the
respondent received notice of the presentment com-
plaint seeking imposition of commensurate action on
the basis of his suspension from the practice of law in
Virginia. There also is no dispute that the trial court
provided the respondent with an opportunity to be
heard. A presentment hearing was conducted on March
11, 2024, and despite his failure to file a timely answer,
the trial court permitted the respondent to testify and
to present witnesses and evidence to show why com-
mensurate discipline would not be appropriate in Con-
necticut. At the hearing, the respondent was repre-
sented by counsel. The respondent does not claim that
the process for notice and hearing prescribed in Prac-
tice Book § 2-39 was not followed.
In his briefs to this court, the respondent fails to
articulate any basis for his claim that his constitutional
rights were violated. Instead, he focuses his argument
on the nature of his property interest in his law license,
correctly observing that ‘‘[a] license to practice law is
a property interest that cannot be suspended without
due process.’’ Statewide Grievance Committee v. Bot-
wick, 226 Conn. 299, 306, 627 A.2d 901 (1993). Indeed,
we have long recognized that, ‘‘[b]ecause a license to
practice law is a vested property interest, an attorney
subject to discipline is entitled to due process of law.
. . . In attorney grievance proceedings, due process
mandates that [b]efore discipline may be imposed, an
attorney is entitled to notice of the charges, a fair hear-
ing and an appeal to court for a determination of
whether he or she has been deprived of these rights in
some substantial manner.’’ (Internal quotation marks
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omitted.) Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Burbank,
supra, 195 Conn. App. 439.
Although the respondent’s property interest in his
law license may be relevant to Golding’s second prong,
the existence of such an interest alone is insufficient
to satisfy Golding’s third prong, which requires a party
to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional viola-
tion that deprived him of a fair trial. See Cohen v. State-
wide Grievance Committee, supra, 189 Conn. App.
656–58 (finding plaintiff’s claim that ‘‘disciplinary coun-
sel violated her due process rights by refusing to con-
duct an investigation into the allegations of misconduct
against her’’ did not amount to constitutional violation
and was not reviewable under Golding because plaintiff
provided ‘‘no analysis as to why the failure to investigate
deprived her of her constitutional rights’’). The respon-
dent fails to explain how his constitutional rights were
violated in this case. Rather, his claim rests on his bare
and conclusory assertion that, because he was not
licensed to practice law in Virginia, his suspension from
the practice of law in that state was a nullity and, there-
fore, that the imposition of discipline under Practice
Book § 2-39 in these circumstances was a constitutional
violation. He fails, however, to cite to any authority,
and we are aware of none, to support his contention
that the imposition of reciprocal discipline pursuant to
§ 2-39 based on the judgment of a foreign jurisdiction
suspending an attorney not licensed to practice in that
jurisdiction for engaging in the unauthorized practice
of law violates an attorney’s right to due process.7 Thus,
7
We note that the respondent’s argument, if accepted, would have signifi-
cant practical ramifications. It would require the trial court here to conduct
a de novo trial to determine whether an attorney licensed to practice in
Connecticut engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in a foreign jurisdic-
tion. This, in turn, would require the application of the law of the foreign
jurisdiction to determine whether the attorney violated that state’s rules
regarding the unauthorized practice of law, and the production of witnesses
and evidence from that foreign jurisdiction. His claim also seems to call
into question our own rules of practice, which authorize the Superior Court
to discipline an attorney licensed in another state who engages in the unau-
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the respondent has failed to establish a constitutional
violation that has deprived him of a fair trial. As a result,
we conclude that the respondent’s claim fails under the
third prong of Golding.
II
The respondent next claims that the trial court erred
by suspending him for five years because he was
deprived of his right to a fair trial in the Virginia proceed-
ing and because the imposition of that penalty resulted
in a ‘‘grave injustice.’’ Specifically, the respondent
argues that the imposition of a five year suspension
constitutes a grave injustice because he had no prior
history of discipline and that Judge Mann had a vendetta
against him which deprived him of a fair trial. Although
the respondent’s brief is not a model of clarity, we
construe his claim to be that the court erred in conclud-
ing that he failed to establish a defense pursuant to
Practice Book § 2-39 (c) by clear and convincing evi-
dence. We disagree.
Practice Book § 2-39 (c) provides in relevant part
that, after a hearing in a reciprocal disciplinary proceed-
ing, ‘‘the court shall take commensurate action unless
it is found that the respondent has established by clear
thorized practice of law in Connecticut. Rule 5.5 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to
practice in this jurisdiction, shall not: (1) except as authorized by law,
establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this
jurisdiction for the practice of law; or (2) hold out to the public or otherwise
represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in this jurisdiction.
. . .’’ Additionally, rule 8.5 allows the discipline of attorneys not admitted
in Connecticut but who engage in the practice of law here: ‘‘A lawyer
admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority
of this jurisdiction, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A
lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the disciplinary
authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any
legal services in this jurisdiction. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary
authority of both this jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same
conduct.’’ Rules of Professional Conduct 8.5 (a).
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and convincing evidence that: (1) The procedure in the
predicate matter was so lacking in notice or opportunity
to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process;
or . . . (3) The discipline imposed would result in
grave injustice . . . .’’
‘‘[C]lear and convincing proof denotes a degree of
belief that lies between the belief that is required to
find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an
ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to
find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden]
is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier
a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly
probably true, that the probability that they are true or
exist is substantially greater than the probability that
they are false or do not exist. . . . Our Supreme Court
has stated that the clear and convincing standard is a
demanding standard that should operate as a weighty
caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids
relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or con-
tradictory.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief
Disciplinary Counsel v. Burbank, supra, 195 Conn.
App. 431. ‘‘Because whether a respondent has estab-
lished a defense to a disciplinary order by clear and
convincing evidence presents a question of fact for the
trier, it follows that our review of a court’s finding that
a respondent has failed to meet that high burden of
persuasion is limited to whether that finding is clearly
erroneous.’’ Id., 432. ‘‘Under this highly deferential stan-
dard, [w]e do not examine the record to determine
whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclu-
sion other than the one reached. Rather, we focus on
the conclusion of the trial court, as well as the method
by which it arrived at that conclusion, to determine
whether it is legally correct and factually supported.
. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there
is no evidence to support it . . . or when although
there is evidence in the record to support it, the
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reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The respondent first argues that the imposition of a
five year suspension for misconduct ‘‘that was anything
but egregious’’ and in light of his thirty-eight years of
practice with no history of disciplinary sanctions would
result in a grave injustice.
As discussed previously, pursuant to Practice Book
§ 2-39 (b), the certified copy of the Virginia order of
suspension served as prima facie evidence that the
respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
when he appeared in the Fairfax County Circuit Court
and that he engaged in misconduct that reflected on
his fitness to practice law. Specifically, the board found
that the respondent appeared for a client and argued
procedural matters and facts in the case of Lalich v.
Lewis without informing the court that he was not
admitted to practice law in Virginia. The order of sus-
pension further indicated that the respondent engaged
in misconduct during the investigation and hearings in
the Virginia disciplinary proceedings. At the present-
ment hearing in Connecticut, the respondent testified
that he had no disciplinary history for the thirty-eight
years he has been admitted to practice in Connecticut,
which the petitioner did not dispute.
It was the respondent’s burden to show by clear and
convincing evidence that the imposition of commensu-
rate discipline in Connecticut would result in a grave
injustice. Although it is true that lack of prior discipline
can be considered as a mitigating factor in the determi-
nation of sanctions for attorney disciplinary proceed-
ings,8 that single mitigating factor does not persuade
8
See Disciplinary Counsel v. Serafinowicz, 160 Conn. App. 92, 99–100,
123 A.3d 1279 (‘‘Connecticut courts reviewing attorney misconduct, there-
fore, have consulted the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing
Lawyer Sanctions [ABA standards] . . . . Although the [ABA] standards
have not been officially adopted in Connecticut, they are used frequently
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us that the court’s finding that the respondent failed to
meet his burden of demonstrating by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that a grave injustice would occur if com-
mensurate discipline was imposed was clearly errone-
ous.
The respondent also argues that the court ‘‘should
have considered the evidence that Judge Mann . . .
had a vendetta [against] the respondent, was acting
out of anger and vindictiveness, and not to protect the
public.’’ Under Practice Book § 2-39 (c) (1), if proven
by clear and convincing evidence, the failure to receive
a fair hearing and due process in the Virginia proceeding
would be a defense to the imposition of commensurate
discipline.9
The board’s order of suspension, however, indicates
that the respondent had adequate notice of the charges
against him and a fair hearing. The order of discipline
reflects that, over the course of the two day Virginia
proceeding, the respondent was able to present evi-
dence, testify, and object to exhibits, and that when
more time was needed for the hearing it was continued
for a second day. The order also shows that the board
took extraordinary efforts to ensure that the respondent
could present his witnesses.
by the Superior Court in evaluating attorney misconduct and in determining
discipline . . . . [A]fter a finding of misconduct, a court should consider:
(1) the nature of the duty violated; (2) the attorney’s mental state; (3) the
potential or actual injury stemming from the attorney’s misconduct; and (4)
the existence of aggravating or mitigation factors. . . . The mitigation fac-
tors include: (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record . . . .’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 319 Conn. 953,
125 A.3d 531 (2015).
9
See Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Burbank, supra, 195 Conn. App. 439
(‘‘if proven by clear and convincing evidence, the failure to receive due
process in a disciplinary proceeding in another jurisdiction certainly would
be a proper defense to the imposition of reciprocal discipline in Connecti-
cut’’). In his brief the respondent seems to argue his denial of a fair hearing
under the grave injustice provision of Practice Book § 2-39 (c) (3), although
§ 2-39 (c) (1) specifically allows for such an attack on the predicate matter.
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At the presentment proceeding in Connecticut, the
only evidence the respondent offered was his own testi-
mony, in which he claimed that Judge Mann was acting
out a vendetta against him and that the board ‘‘went
along with [Judge Mann’s] complaint’’ because he was
appointed to the Virginia Supreme Court.’’ The respon-
dent presented no evidence in the trial court that Judge
Mann was involved in the grievance matter beyond the
filing of the complaint, nor did he provide any evidence
other than his own testimony that he was deprived of
due process in the proceeding. Thus, on the basis of
the record, we are unpersuaded that the trial court
clearly erred in finding that the respondent failed to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
Virginia proceedings were so lacking in notice or oppor-
tunity to be heard that it would constitute a grave injus-
tice to impose commensurate discipline in Connecticut.
III
The respondent’s final claim is that the trial court
abused its discretion by imposing a five year suspension
in Connecticut because the suspension is excessive
when compared to the sanctions imposed in other cases
that, he contends, involved more egregious conduct,
and because he poses no risk to the public. We conclude
that the court’s imposition of a five year suspension
was not an abuse of its discretion and falls within the
discipline warranted under Practice Book § 2-39.
‘‘In attorney grievance cases, in the absence of man-
datory statutory sanctions, a reviewing court must defer
to the discretion of the fact finder, whether it be the
trial court or the committee, because the fact finder is
in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the
demeanor of the parties. . . . Accordingly, once a trial
court has found by clear and convincing evidence that
an attorney has engaged in professional misconduct,
the court has the inherent judicial power, derived from
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judicial responsibility for the administration of justice,
to exercise sound discretion to determine what sanction
to impose in light of the entire record before it. . . .
It is not for an appellate court to decide whether, under
the circumstances of a particular case, it would have
imposed a harsher sanction on the defendant. . . .
Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing [the sanction that it
did]. The scope of review by this court on a claim
that the trial court abused its discretion is well settled.
[E]very reasonable presumption should be given in
favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling. . . .
Reversal is required only where an abuse of discretion
is manifest or where injustice appears to have been
done.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Disciplinary Counsel v. Parnoff, 158 Conn.
App. 454, 480–81, 119 A.3d 621 (2015), aff’d, 324 Conn.
505, 152 A.3d 1222 (2016).

‘‘Abuse of discretion is synonymous with a failure to
exercise a sound, reasonable, and legal discretion. It is
a strict legal term indicating that [an] appellate court
is of [the] opinion that there was [the] commission of
an error of law by the trial court. . . . A discretion
exercised to an end or purpose not justified by and
clearly against reason and evidence. Unreasonable
departure from considered precedents and settled judi-
cial custom, constituting error of law. . . . A judgment
or decision by an administrative agency or judge which
has no foundation in fact or in law. Abuse of discretion
by [a] trial court is any unreasonable, unconscionable
and arbitrary action taken without proper consider-
ation of facts and law pertaining to [the] matter sub-
mitted.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Statewide Grievance Committee v.
Glass, 46 Conn. App. 472, 479–80, 699 A.2d 1058 (1997).
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‘‘A court disciplining an attorney does so not to pun-
ish the attorney, but rather to safeguard the administra-
tion of justice and to protect the public from the miscon-
duct or unfitness of those who are members of the legal
profession. . . . Inherent in this process is a large
degree of judicial discretion. . . . A court is free to
determine in each case, as may seem best in light of
the entire record before it, whether a sanction is appro-
priate and, if so, what that sanction should be. . . .
Accordingly, a court may accomplish the goal of pro-
tecting the public and the courts by imposing a sanction
that deters other attorneys from engaging in similar
misconduct.’’ (Citations omitted.) Statewide Grievance
Committee v. Fountain, 56 Conn. App. 375, 378, 743
A.2d 647 (2000).
Under Practice Book § 2-39, unless the respondent
established by clear and convincing evidence one of
the factors in § 2-39 (c), commensurate discipline is
warranted. See In re Weissman, 203 Conn. 380, 384,
524 A.2d 1141 (1987) (‘‘[A] lawyer who offers a defense
to the disciplinary order of the other jurisdiction is
obligated to prove such a defense by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. In the absence of such a rebuttal of the
disciplinary order of the other jurisdiction, the trial
court in this state must, after a hearing, impose com-
mensurate action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)). We recognize that commensurate action does
not necessarily require identical discipline. See Chief
Disciplinary Counsel v. Burbank, supra, 195 Conn.
App. 433 n.13 (‘‘[C]ommensurate action under . . .
[§ 2-39] (c) does not mean identical action. The trial
court ha[s] inherent judicial power, derived from judi-
cial responsibility for the administration of justice, to
exercise sound discretion to determine what sanction to
impose in light of the entire record before it.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)). We also note that present-
ment actions brought pursuant to § 2-39 are not trials
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de novo where a judge is tasked with the initial review
of the misconduct in the foreign jurisdiction. Rather,
§ 2-39 instructs a trial court to impose commensurate
discipline, based upon findings made in a foreign juris-
diction, unless a respondent proves by clear and con-
vincing evidence that one of the enumerated exceptions
applies.
Here, the record reveals that, pursuant to Practice
Book § 2-39, the court heard evidence and argument
from the respondent during the presentment hearing in
support of his claim that commensurate discipline was
unwarranted. The only evidence the respondent offered
at that hearing was his own testimony. On the basis of
the record before it, the court found that the respondent
failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any
of the enumerated grounds for deviating from commen-
surate discipline under § 2-39.
In his briefs to this court, the respondent cites to
several cases, none of which involved the imposition
of reciprocal discipline under Practice Book § 2-39, in
which attorneys received less severe sanctions for what
he argues constituted more egregious conduct than his
own.10 We have reviewed those cases and agree with
10
In his brief the respondent cites the following cases in support of his
claim that the five year suspension was an abuse of the trial court’s discre-
tion: Statewide Grievance Committee v. Shluger, 230 Conn. 668, 680–81,
646 A.2d 781 (1994) (finding suspension of attorney from practice of law
for three years for intentionally understating his taxable income was not
abuse of discretion because of ‘‘serious and repeated nature of the defen-
dant’s misconduct’’ and because it was misconduct that ‘‘involves fraud,
deceit and dishonesty’’ which ‘‘bears directly on [an attorney’s] fitness to
practice law’’); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Fountain, supra, 56 Conn.
App. 377–83 (finding trial court’s imposition of three month suspension on
attorney who forged signature of affiant and then notarized affidavit, after
weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, was not abuse of discretion);
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Spears, Superior Court, judicial
district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (September 25, 2023) (sus-
pending attorney for two years after finding he violated Rules of Professional
Conduct through his false and defamatory allegations against judges, prose-
cutors, and Glastonbury Police Department). The respondent also cites to
Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335 Conn. 474, 239 A.3d
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the petitioner that the respondent’s comparison of ‘‘his
situation to other cases without examining all the rele-
vant criteria is insufficient’’ to establish that the court
abused its discretion. ‘‘[T]he imposition of sanctions
should be individualized and tailored to the facts of the
particular case.’’ Disciplinary Counsel v. Serafinowicz,
160 Conn. App. 92, 102, 123 A.3d 1279, cert. denied, 319
Conn. 953, 125 A.3d 531 (2015).
Here, the prima facie evidence from the Virginia sus-
pension order reflects findings that the respondent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
engaged in conduct implicating his honesty and fitness
to practice law by virtue of his appearance and repre-
sentations in front of Judge Mann at the Fairfax County
Circuit Court. The suspension order also reflects the
existence of several aggravating factors that were con-
sidered by the board when it imposed the five year
suspension, including the respondent’s bad faith
obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings and failure
to recognize the wrongful nature of his actions. Because
the respondent has not met his burden of demonstrating
that the trial court acted arbitrarily by ordering a sus-
pension commensurate with the one imposed by the
board, and on the basis of our review of the record that
was before the court, we conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion by imposing discipline commen-
surate with the discipline imposed in Virginia.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
288 (2020), which affirmed a trial court decision that imposed a one year
suspension on an attorney who, among other things, was found to have
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by depositing personal funds
into her IOLTA account, by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice, and by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Id.,
477–79. Miller, notably, was not appealed on the ground that the one year
suspension constituted an abuse of the trial court’s discretion; rather, the
respondent in that case claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that
she had engaged in misconduct. Id., 475.