Netter v. Netter

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Netter v. Netter

STEPHANIE NETTER v. DONALD NETTER
(AC 46484)
Alvord, Suarez and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment dissolving his mar-
riage to the plaintiff and granting certain other relief. He claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly treated certain trust assets as part of the marital
estate subject to distribution pursuant to statute (§ 46b-81). Held:

The trial court’s finding that a spendthrift trust created by the defendant’s
father prior to the parties’ marriage was part of the marital estate and subject
to distribution pursuant to § 46b-81 was clearly erroneous, as the trust
agreement provided that all trust distributions to the defendant had to be
approved by a disinterested trustee, and, accordingly, the defendant had no
presently enforceable right to receive his interest in the trust and the court
should not have considered it an asset of the marital estate that it was
authorized to divide pursuant to § 46b-81.

The trial court properly determined that three trusts created by the defendant
during the parties’ marriage and funded with marital assets constituted
divisible marital property, as, although the trusts were created as self-settled
spendthrift trusts under South Dakota law, at the time the trusts were
created Connecticut did not recognize the validity of self-settled trusts and,
even if the trusts had satisfied the requirements of the Connecticut Qualified
Dispositions in Trust Act (§ 45a-487j et seq.), enacted in 2019, they would
nonetheless be void as a matter of public policy by virtue of the fact that
sustaining them and excluding their assets from distribution would unfairly
prejudice the plaintiff.

This court, having concluded that the trial court improperly treated the
assets from one of the trusts as marital property, determined that, on remand,
the entirety of the mosaic of financial orders, excluding the personal property
distribution order, must be refashioned, as it was uncertain whether the
trial court’s other financial orders would remain intact after reconsidering
the property distribution orders in a manner consistent with this court’s opin-
ion.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sole legal custody
of the parties’ minor children to the plaintiff, as the court’s findings, which
were either unchallenged or based on its credibility determinations and
which were consistent with the testimony and recommendations of the
guardian ad litem, supported the award of sole legal custody to the plaintiff.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to its order that
the plaintiff have access to the former marital residence to retrieve her
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Netter v. Netter
personal belongings, as the order was sufficiently clear and explicit and
was appropriately tailored to the facts and circumstances of this case.

Argued March 18—officially released October 21, 2025

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford-Norwalk and tried to the court, Heller,
J.; judgment dissolving the marriage and granting cer-
tain other relief, from which the defendant appealed to
this court. Appeal dismissed in part; reversed in part;
new trial.

Kevin F. Collins, for the appellant (defendant).
James P. Sexton, with whom were Aidan R. Welsh
and John R. Weikart, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

BEAR, J. The defendant, Donald Netter, appeals from
the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage
to the plaintiff, Stephanie Netter, and from certain finan-
cial orders, an order awarding the plaintiff sole legal
custody of the parties’ two children, who were both
then minors, and an order permitting the plaintiff access
to the marital residence in order to retrieve her personal
belongings.1 On appeal, the defendant claims that the
court improperly (1) treated trust assets from four sepa-
rate trusts as marital property under General Statutes
1
The trial court previously had issued a nearly identical pendente lite
access order, in a June 9, 2021 memorandum of decision, from which the
defendant appealed. See Netter v. Netter, 220 Conn. App. 491, 493, 298 A.3d
653 (2023). While that appeal was pending, the court issued its memorandum
of decision dissolving the parties’ marriage. Id., 497. This court thereafter
dismissed as moot the portion of that appeal that challenged the pendente
lite access order upon concluding ‘‘that there is no practical relief that we
may afford the defendant as to the pendente lite access order because it
was superseded by the access order contained within the final dissolution
judgment.’’ Id., 498.
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Netter v. Netter

§ 46b-81 and ordered the defendant to make a lump
2

sum property distribution to the plaintiff using funds
from those trusts, (2) calculated his earning capacity
and relied on that ‘‘astronomical’’ calculation to set
‘‘unachievable child support and alimony orders,’’ (3)
ordered the defendant to secure and maintain a $5,000,000
life insurance policy, (4) ordered the defendant to pay
$3,300,000 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff, (5) valued
the assets within the marital estate, including, but not
limited to, the trust assets, (6) faulted him for the break-
down of the marriage and awarded the plaintiff sole
legal custody of the parties’ two, then minor, children,
and (7) issued a vague and imprecise order that allows
the plaintiff unrestricted access to the parties’ former
marital residence in order to retrieve her personal prop-
erty in violation of his constitutional rights. Because
we conclude that the court improperly determined that
trust assets from one of the four trusts—i.e., the spend-
thrift trust the defendant’s father created for the defen-
dant’s benefit, prior to the marriage—constituted divisi-
ble marital property, and ordered the defendant to make
2
General Statutes § 46b-81 provides: ‘‘Assignment of property and transfer
of title. (a) At the time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a marriage
or for legal separation pursuant to a complaint under section 46b-45, the
Superior Court may assign to either spouse all or any part of the estate of
the other spouse. The court may pass title to real property to either party
or to a third person or may order the sale of such real property, without
any act by either spouse, when in the judgment of the court it is the proper
mode to carry the decree into effect.
‘‘(b) A conveyance made pursuant to the decree shall vest title in the
purchaser, and shall bind all persons entitled to life estates and remainder
interests in the same manner as a sale ordered by the court pursuant to the
provisions of section 52-500. When the decree is recorded on the land records
in the town where the real property is situated, it shall effect the transfer
of the title of such real property as if it were a deed of the party or parties.
‘‘(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if any, to be assigned,
the court, after considering all the evidence presented by each party, shall
consider the length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment, dissolution
of the marriage or legal separation, the age, health, station, occupation,
amount and sources of income, earning capacity, vocational skills, educa-
tion, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and
the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income.
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Netter v. Netter

distributions to the plaintiff from that trust, we reverse
the judgment of the trial court with respect to all the
financial orders and remand this case for a new trial
on all financial issues consistent with this opinion, with
the exception of the personal property distribution
order that gives rise to the property access order. We
affirm the judgment of the court as to the custody order
insofar as it pertains to the parties’ remaining minor
child and as to the property access order.3
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of the present appeal. The parties
were married on July 9, 2005, in New York, New York.
The parties have two daughters; the first was born in
October, 2006, and the second was born in May, 2009.4
On March 1, 2017, the plaintiff commenced this action
seeking the dissolution of her marriage to the defen-
dant, alleging that it had broken down irretrievably and
seeking, inter alia, joint legal custody of the parties’
two then minor children. On May 25, 2017, the defendant
filed an answer and cross complaint in which he sought,
inter alia, sole legal custody of the children. The plaintiff
then amended her complaint on February 2, 2018, to
seek sole legal custody of the children.
The proceedings in this matter have been highly con-
tentious and protracted. The trial itself took place on
fifty-seven nonconsecutive days, over the course of sev-
enteen months, between May 5, 2021, and September
The court shall also consider the contribution of each of the parties in the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of their respective estates.’’
3
Because we remand the matter for a new trial on all financial orders,
we need not reach the defendant’s claims that the court improperly (1)
calculated his earning capacity and relied on that ‘‘astronomical’’ calculation
to set ‘‘unachievable child support and alimony orders,’’ (2) ordered the
defendant to secure and maintain a $5,000,000 life insurance policy, (3)
ordered the defendant to pay $3,300,000 in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff,
and (4) valued the assets within the marital estate, including, but not limited
to, the trust assets.
4
Although both children were minors at the time of judgment in this case,
the parties’ older daughter has since reached the age of majority.
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Netter v. Netter

12, 2022. Many pendente lite motions were filed, and
5

the resolution of two such motions gave rise to a prior
appeal by the defendant to this court. See Netter v.
Netter, 220 Conn. App. 491, 493, 298 A.3d 653 (2023).
On January 23, 2023, while that appeal was pending,
the trial court, Heller, J., rendered judgment dissolving
the parties’ marriage. See footnote 1 of this opinion. In
its memorandum of decision, the court found that ‘‘[t]he
plaintiff is fifty-five years old. She attended Syracuse
University and graduated in 1990 from New York Uni-
versity. After she graduated from New York University,
she took some classes locally from Ramapo College.
‘‘The plaintiff received a master’s degree in physical
therapy in 1998 from the Institute for Physical Therapy,
which is now part of the University of St. Augustine
for Health Sciences. She worked in Mississippi and Ala-
bama as a contract physical therapist after graduation.
‘‘The plaintiff became a licensed physical therapist
in New Jersey. She worked as a physical therapist at
the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation and at Twin Boro
Physical Therapy. She was working at Twin Boro when
she and the defendant were married in July, 2005. Her
annual income was approximately $65,000 in 2005,
when she last worked outside of the home.
‘‘The plaintiff is in good health. . . .
‘‘The defendant is sixty-one years old. He is in good
health. He received a bachelor of science degree in
economics from the Wharton School of the University
of Pennsylvania in 1983.
5
The defendant represented himself at trial and the court found that his
‘‘litigation and discovery misconduct contributed to the case taking more
than four years to come to trial and the trial itself lasting’’ as long as it did.
Sixteen witnesses testified at the trial, including the plaintiff, the defendant
and the plaintiff’s expert, Elizabeth Ciccone, who specialized primarily in
business valuation and forensic accounting with Marcum, LLP, and both
parties introduced exhibits that were admitted into evidence.
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Netter v. Netter

‘‘The defendant has over thirty years of professional
investment experience, according to his curriculum
vitae, or CV. He has served on the boards of four public
companies. As described in his CV, the defendant was
a founder of Dolphin Limited Partnerships. He served as
a senior managing director of Dolphin Holdings Corp.,
a co-senior managing director of Dolphin Holdings
Corp. II, and senior managing director of Dolphin Hold-
ings Corp. III, all entities under the Dolphin umbrella.
The three Dolphin limited partnerships—Dolphin Lim-
ited Partnership, LP (DLP I), Dolphin Domestic Fund
II, LP, and Dolphin Master Fund II, LP (collectively,
DLP II), and Dolphin Limited Partnership III, LP—and
Dolphin Financial Partners, LLC (DFP), were described
as sizable investors in over twenty public companies
on the defendant’s CV.
‘‘The defendant was employed by Geneve Corpora-
tion (Geneve) at the time of the marriage. Geneve is a
subsidiary of Geneve Holdings, Inc. (Geneve Holdings),
a private financial holding company controlled by his
family. Geneve Holdings’ assets are comprised primarily
of insurance companies. The defendant’s father, Edward
Netter, was the head of Geneve. The defendant earned
compensation of approximately $50,000 in 2005 from
Geneve. The defendant also managed the various Dol-
phin entities from his Geneve office.
‘‘Edward Netter died from cancer on February 16,
2011. The defendant’s mother, Barbara Netter, became
the majority shareholder of Geneve Holdings. The
defendant’s relationship with Geneve deteriorated. In
early 2013, he was either terminated or he resigned from
his position with Geneve. He relocated the business
operations of the Dolphin entities to the marital resi-
dence, located at 623 Round Hill Road, Greenwich, Con-
necticut (the Round Hill Road property). The defendant
has managed his business interests from the pool house
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Netter v. Netter

at the Round Hill Road property since that time.’’ (Foot-
notes omitted.)
The court explained that ‘‘[t]he parties enjoyed an
affluent lifestyle during the marriage’’ and further indi-
cated that ‘‘[t]he defendant brought significant assets
to the marriage.’’ The court noted, among other things,
that ‘‘[t]he defendant was the primary beneficiary and
trustee of The Donald Netter Family Trust.’’ Regarding
the defendant’s income, the court found that his ‘‘finan-
cial affidavit reflects net monthly income of $3599’’ and,
‘‘[c]onsidering the defendant’s years of experience in
finance and as a fund manager, his professional creden-
tials, and his prior earnings, [determined] that the defen-
dant has a present earning capacity of at least $2,500,000
annually.’’ Moreover, the court found that the ‘‘defen-
dant controls assets worth in excess of $175,000,000.’’
The court determined that the defendant was respon-
sible for the breakdown of the marriage. It deemed the
plaintiff’s testimony credible and explained that she
‘‘testified that there were six main reasons for the break-
down of the marriage: the defendant’s paranoia and
suspicious behavior; his controlling and abusive con-
duct; his sexually coercive behavior; his inability to get
along with others; his conviction that [the plaintiff] was
anorexic; and his gaslighting her and telling her she was
crazy.’’ Among other things, ‘‘[t]he defendant constantly
accused the plaintiff of being after his money.’’ He
‘‘would not provide information to the plaintiff regard-
ing their finances. He refused to discuss any financial
matters with her. Without the plaintiff’s knowledge, the
defendant transferred most of the marital assets into
irrevocable South Dakota trusts . . . .’’
To this end, the court stated that the defendant had
‘‘identifie[d] four South Dakota trusts as assets on his
financial affidavit: The Six Cataracts Trust, The DASSA
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Netter v. Netter

Trust, The Scout Resources Trust, and The Ann Hold-
ings Trust’’ and it made certain findings pertaining to
each one. (Footnote omitted.) The court explained that,
‘‘[o]ther than The Six Cataracts Trust, the trusts are
self-settled trusts,6 formed by the defendant after the
date of the marriage with marital assets.’’ (Emphasis
added; footnote added.)
The court further explained that ‘‘The Six Cataracts
Trust, formerly The Donald Netter Family Trust,7 was
6
‘‘Under Connecticut law, a trust is self-settled if a settlor places his or
her assets into trust for his or her own benefit.’’ Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 326
Conn. 438, 456, 165 A.3d 1137 (2017).
7
The Donald Netter Family Trust Agreement was admitted into evidence,
as plaintiff’s exhibit 473, during Elizabeth Ciccone’s direct testimony at trial.
See footnote 5 of this opinion. Although the defendant did not object to its
admission into evidence, he did request, immediately after it was admitted,
that it ‘‘be filed under seal.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel voiced no objection to
the defendant’s request, and the court issued an order dated November 4,
2021, sealing plaintiff’s exhibit 473.
We note that the defendant did also file thereafter, at the court’s request,
a motion to seal ‘‘certain business records’’ and that motion had been posted
in the Superior Court clerk’s office in order to give the public notice of the
sealing request. Several months later, following numerous requests by the
court and in response to the final deadline the court imposed, the defendant
filed a more specific list of the documents he sought to have sealed. The
court had explained, when setting that deadline, that it was ‘‘certainly open
to sealing specific documents. I do take the view that confidential business
information, particularly, in the nature of trade secrets or other confidential
information that would be harmful to the party if it were disclosed because
it could have business and financial consequences, I will seal that.
‘‘But I need to know what it is and I need to know why you want it sealed
because I need to make a finding that the individual interest and maintaining
the confidence of that information outweighs any public . . . interest [in]
having that information disclosed.
‘‘We’ve never had that hearing because you’ve never told me which specific
documents in the record you wish to have sealed.’’ Although we cannot
ascertain, on the basis of the record before us, whether that hearing ulti-
mately took place, we are satisfied, nonetheless, with the court’s compliance
with the procedures set forth in Practice Book § 25-59A, which governs the
sealing of documents in family matters. Moreover, our review of the record
does not reveal that plaintiff’s exhibit 473 was unsealed and, thus, we are
bound by the sealing order for purposes of our review of the claims on
appeal. See Practice Book §§ 77-2 and 77-4. We are therefore limited in this
respect to the findings the court made as to the terms of The Donald Netter
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Netter v. Netter

created by Edward Netter in 1992 for the benefit of
the defendant and his descendants. The defendant was
named the Family Trustee of The Donald Netter Fam-
ily Trust.
‘‘Under The Donald Netter Family Trust Agreement,
the trustees, other than the defendant, have the power
to pay or apply so much of the net income of the trust
or the principal of the trust fund to or for the use
of the defendant and his issue as they in their sole
discretion determine to be advisable for the comfort,
support and maintenance of the defendant and his issue.
‘‘The defendant, as the Family Trustee, has the power
to appoint additional trustees, to designate successor
trustees, and to revoke the designation of any successor
trustee. The defendant also has the power to remove
any acting trustee, provided that he may not exercise
such power more than three times in any ten year period
and that at least one half of the trustees shall be disinter-
ested trustees immediately after he has exercised such
power. The defendant exercised this power on March
18, 2013, when he appointed the South Dakota Trust
Company, LLC (South Dakota Trust), as Disinterested
Trustee, as defined in the trust agreement.
‘‘The defendant and South Dakota Trust created a
new entity, SDAS, LLC,8 into which all of the assets of
Family Trust Agreement. Neither party has challenged as part of this appeal
the court’s findings in these respects, or the propriety of the court’s having
made them. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof, 221
Conn. App. 475, 485, 302 A.3d 339 (‘‘claims of error not briefed are considered
abandoned’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
923, 304 A.3d 445 (2023).
8
The record reflects that the defendant appointed South Dakota Trust as
a Disinterested Trustee of The Donald Netter Family Trust on March 15,
2013, and that South Dakota Trust accepted the appointment on March 18,
2013. The defendant and South Dakota Trust also executed, on March 15
and 18, 2013, respectively, ‘‘The Donald Netter Family Trust Resolution by
Trustees to Form LLC and Fund LLC with All Trust Assets’’ (trust resolution).
The trust resolution authorized (1) ‘‘[t]he formation of SDAS, LLC in the
State of South Dakota’’; (2) ‘‘[t]he transfer of all assets in the name of the
Trust to SDAS, LLC’’; (3) ‘‘[the appointment of the defendant] as the Initial
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Netter v. Netter

The Donald Netter Family Trust were transferred. The
Donald Netter Family Trust was renamed The Six Cata-
racts Trust on May 13, 2018.
‘‘The Six Cataracts Trust owns SDAS, LLC. The defen-
dant is the sole manager of SDAS, LLC. He is also the
Investment Trust Advisor of The [Six Cataracts] Trust.
[The plaintiff’s expert] Marcum [LLP (Marcum)]
reported that, based on its review of documents pro-
duced by or on behalf of the defendant in discovery,
the defendant is the sole signatory for SDAS, LLC, when
making investments. As manager of SDAS, LLC, the
defendant can unilaterally vote the shares of Geneve
Holdings that The Six Cataracts Trust holds through its
ownership of SDAS, LLC.
‘‘Marcum determined that The Six Cataracts Trust,
through its ownership of SDAS, LLC, held assets with
a total fair market value of $122,678,483, comprised
of two brokerage accounts and investments in Trefoil,
Hawkes Bay, Geneve Holdings, and The Ann Holdings,
LLC, as of the valuation dates.9’’ (Emphasis added; foot-
notes added; footnote in original; footnotes omitted.)
Investment Trust Advisor . . . of the Trust to be the Manager of SDAS,
LLC’’ and (4) ‘‘[the defendant, as] Manager of SDAS, LLC and as the Initial
Investment Trust Advisor . . . to take any and all necessary actions to
change title of Trust assets to SDAS, LLC and to retain the Trust’s taxpayer
identification number in the name of SDAS, LLC treated as a disregarded
entity for income tax purposes.’’ The plaintiff’s expert, Elizabeth Ciccone;
see footnote 5 of this opinion; testified that the trust resolution, among
other things, gave ‘‘South Dakota, as opposed to Connecticut, control over
the LLC and the trust itself.’’ The court credited ‘‘Ciccone’s testimony over
twelve days of trial and the two Marcum expert reports, including the
exhibits to the reports, that were admitted into evidence: the Marcum Valua-
tion Report of [the defendant’s] Closely Held Business Interests (the Marcum
Business Interests Valuation Report) and the Marcum report of the Value
of the Underlying Assets Held by Trusts for the Benefit of [the defendant]
(the Marcum Trusts Assets Valuation Report).’’ (Footnote omitted.)
9
‘‘Marcum detailed the following holdings of The Six Cataracts Trust
through its ownership of SDAS, LLC, with a total value of $122,678,483:
Merrill Lynch #621 Brokerage, $1,067,685; UBS #8E Brokerage, $22,277,587;
0.70 percent interest in Trefoil-Garnet Capital Partners, LP, $1,095,557; 0.17
percent interest in Hawkes Bay Partners, LP, $991,380; 19 percent interest
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Netter v. Netter

The court described the other three trusts, The
DASSA Trust, The Scout Resources Trust and The Ann
Holdings Trust, as ‘‘self-settled trusts that the defendant
formed during the marriage with marital assets and
without the plaintiff’s knowledge.’’ The defendant
‘‘secretly created’’ these three trusts, the court found,
‘‘as the marriage deteriorated.’’ The court further
explained that the terms of the self-settled trust agree-
ments were ‘‘substantially similar’’ to each other.
Among other things, the defendant is the investment
trust advisor to and the sole beneficiary of each self-
settled trust. Moreover, under each trust agreement,
‘‘the trustees, other than the defendant, have the power
to pay or apply so much of the net income of the trust
or the principal of the trust fund to or for the use of
the defendant as they in their sole discretion determine
to be advisable for the health, education, comfort, sup-
port and maintenance of the defendant’’ and distribu-
tions ‘‘may only be made to the defendant with the
unanimous written approval of (i) the Disinterested
Trustee(s), (ii) each Family Trustee, if any; and (iii)
each Current Adult Beneficiary, if any.’’10 (Emphasis
added.) The defendant, as the sole beneficiary of each
trust, did have the right to appoint additional beneficiar-
ies in the event of his death, including his ‘‘Current
Spouse.’’ At the time the trusts were created, however,
in Geneve Holdings, $97,229,993; 0.25 percent interest in The Ann Holdings,
LLC, $16,282.’’
Elizabeth Ciccone testified that, with the ‘‘possible exception’’ of the Ann
Holdings interest, she was ‘‘not aware of any other asset being transferred
from [the defendant] individually into The Six Cataracts Trust.’’ Ciccone
‘‘only [had] documentation that shows [that] [the Ann Holdings interest] is
in there’’ but she did not ‘‘know how it came to be in there.’’
10
The court noted that each of these terms was defined in the respective
trust agreement and identified the defendant as the ‘‘Current Adult Benefi-
ciary’’ of each trust. The court also expressly identified the defendant as
the ‘‘Family Trustee’’ of The DASSA Trust, South Dakota Trust as the ‘‘Disin-
terested Trustee’’ of The DASSA and Ann Holdings Trusts, and South Dakota
Trust as the ‘‘trustee’’ of The Scout Resources Trust.
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Netter v. Netter

despite the fact that the parties had been married since
2005, the plaintiff did not qualify as a ‘‘Current Spouse’’
as that term was defined in the respective trust agree-
ments.11 The court found that, as of the date of their
respective valuations, The DASSA Trust, through its
ownership of DASSA, LLC,12 held assets with a total
fair market value of $34,660,977, The Scout Resources
Trust, through its ownership of Scout Resources, LLC,13
held assets with a total fair market value of $2,727,548,
and The Ann Holdings Trust, through its ownership of
Ann Holdings, LLC, held a brokerage account14 with a
value of $7,589,211.

The court ultimately concluded that ‘‘[t]he trust
assets [from each of the four trusts] are part of the
marital estate.’’ Applying Connecticut law and addressing
11
The DASSA Trust Agreement and The Scout Resources Trust Agreement,
which were both entered into in 2013, each define ‘‘Current Spouse’’ in
relevant part as a ‘‘spouse that, as applicable, (i) has been married to [the
defendant] . . . for no less than [twelve] years, (ii) has been generally living
with [the defendant] at the time of his death . . . and (iii) shall not have
been estranged from him . . . at the time of death.’’ The Ann Holdings
Trust Agreement, which was entered into in 2015, is identical except for
the requirement that the current spouse has to have been married to the
defendant ‘‘for no less than [fifteen] years.’’
12
The defendant is the sole member of DASSA, LLC, a South Dakota
limited liability company he formed on July 19, 2013. He transferred marital
assets to DASSA, LLC, thereafter.
13
The defendant is the sole member of Scout Resources, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company formed in 2011 and converted to a South Dakota
limited liability company on October 30, 2013. Scout Resources, LLC, holds
the former marital residence, the Round Hill Road property, as its pri-
mary asset.
14
The defendant is the sole member of The Ann Holdings, LLC, which
was initially formed on September 8, 2009, as The Ann, LLC, a Delaware
limited liability company. After changing its name and converting to an Ohio
limited liability company, The Ann Holdings, LLC, ultimately became a South
Dakota limited liability company in 2015. The brokerage account held the
remaining proceeds from the November, 2015 sale of a condominium apart-
ment located in New York City. A limited liability company controlled by
the defendant had purchased that property nineteen days after the parties
were married in 2005.
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Netter v. Netter

the four trusts collectively,15 the court reasoned that
‘‘[t]he defendant is the sole beneficiary of the three self-
settled trusts that he secretly created with marital assets
as the marriage deteriorated. He is the primary benefi-
ciary of The Six Cataracts Trust. With respect to each
of the trusts, he has the power to appoint additional
trustees, to designate successor trustees, and to revoke
the designation of any successor trustee. He also has
the power to remove the current trustee up to three
times in a ten year period—a power he exercised in
2013 in connection with The Six Cataracts Trust.’’ The
court further determined that ‘‘[n]o one other than the
defendant has the power to control the trusts and direct
the disposition of the trust assets’’ and proceeded to
conclude ‘‘that the defendant has a presently existing
property interest in the trusts and not a ‘mere expec-
tancy.’ . . . The trust assets are properly included in
the marital estate and subject to equitable distribution
pursuant to . . . § 46b-81.’’ (Citation omitted.)
The court also found that ‘‘[i]n the almost six years
of litigation, the plaintiff has incurred attorney’s fees
and expert fees totaling approximately $3.5 million.
Approximately $65,000 of those fees were incurred in
prosecuting motions for contempt.’’ (Footnote omit-
ted.) It further found that ‘‘the attorney’s fees charged
to the plaintiff in this dissolution action are reasonable
in view of the circumstances of this case . . . .’’ See
footnote 5 of this opinion.
15
The court had stated earlier in its decision that, ‘‘[a]lthough the court’s
construction of the trust agreements is governed by the law of the state of
South Dakota, ‘the ultimate question of whether the value of the entire
trust corpus [is] properly attributable to the defendant’s estate must be
determined under the law of this state.’ Tremaine v. Tremaine, 235 Conn.
45, 61 n.16, 663 A.2d 387 (1995).’’ We note, however, that the court did not
cite to or apply South Dakota law in its decision. The extent to which the
court construed the terms of the trust agreements prior to addressing the
‘‘ultimate question’’ as to whether the trust assets from the four trusts were
part of the marital estate is therefore unclear.
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In its orders, the court awarded sole legal custody
and primary physical custody of the then minor children
to the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to pay the
plaintiff $15,000 per month in child support. The court
further ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff
$40,000 per month as periodic alimony. Both of these
awards were predicated, at least in part, on the court’s
finding that the defendant had an annual earning capac-
ity of $2,500,000.
In awarding the plaintiff sole legal custody of the
children, the court found the seventh factor of the sev-
enteen factors listed in General Statutes § 46b-56 (c)16
to be ‘‘particularly compelling.’’ The court determined
that ‘‘the plaintiff has consistently supported the rela-
tionship between the children and the defendant,
including purchasing cards and gifts for him from the
children,’’ whereas the defendant ‘‘has done nothing
to ‘facilitate and encourage’ the children’s relationship
with the plaintiff. He has made clear . . . that he
believes that the plaintiff is not a capable parent, that
she is mentally ill, suffers from anorexia, and lacks
judgment, and that she engages in unusual conduct.’’
The court expressly noted, however, that ‘‘[t]here is no
support in the record for the defendant’s allegations
regarding the plaintiff. Neither Dr. [Arnold] Shienvold
[the court appointed evaluator] nor the guardian ad
litem share his views.’’
As part of its financial orders, the court ordered the
defendant to ‘‘make a lump sum property distribution to
the plaintiff in the total amount of $50,000,000,’’ payable
16
General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘In making or
modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section,
the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so, may
consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors
. . . (7) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage
such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders . . . .’’
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from the four trusts as follows: ‘‘(1) Payment from
The Six Cataracts Trust: The defendant shall pay the
plaintiff $15,000,000 from The Six Cataracts Trust no
later than February 23, 2023. Commencing on January
1, 2024, and continuing on January 1 every other year
thereafter, the defendant shall pay $500,000 from The
Six Cataracts Trust to the plaintiff until he has paid a
total of $25,000,000 to the plaintiff from the trust. . . .
‘‘(2) Payment from The DASSA Trust, The Scout
Resources Trust, and The Ann Holdings Trust: The
defendant shall pay the plaintiff $15,000,000 from the
three self-settled trusts—The DASSA Trust, The Scout
Resources Trust, and The Ann Holdings Trust—no later
than February 23, 2023. Commencing on January 1,
2024, and continuing on January 1 every other year
thereafter, the defendant shall pay $500,000 from the
three self-settled trusts to the plaintiff until he has paid
a total of $25,000,000 to the plaintiff from these trusts.’’
(Emphasis in original.)
‘‘Except for the lump sum property distribution to
the plaintiff . . . the defendant shall retain his interest
in The Six Cataracts Trust, The DASSA Trust, The Scout
Resource[s] Trust, and The Ann Holdings Trust.’’
With respect to personal property, the court awarded
the plaintiff ‘‘all personal property located in her apart-
ment on Greenwich Avenue, her personal property
located in the Round Hill Road property, and any other
personal property that is otherwise in her possession’’
and reiterated its previous order of June 9, 2021; see
footnote 1 of this opinion; that ‘‘the plaintiff shall have
access to the Round Hill Road property between the
hours of 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. for two days to remove her
personal property from the Round Hill Road property.’’
As part of its order, the court explained how the parties
should arrive at the two dates and who could be present
on those days.
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Specifically, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff shall be accompanied by
an off-duty Greenwich police officer when she is at
the Round Hill Road property to remove her personal
property. The Greenwich police officer shall remain at
the Round Hill Road property at all times while the
plaintiff is at the property. The plaintiff shall pay for
the services of the Greenwich police officer. The plain-
tiff may be accompanied by up to two other individuals
to assist her in removing her belongings, neither of
whom shall be Barbara Netter. These individuals shall
be permitted to enter the Round Hill Road property
with the plaintiff.
‘‘The defendant may be present while the plaintiff is
at the Round Hill Road property. The children shall not
be present under any circumstances.’’ Moreover, ‘‘[t]he
defendant shall not photograph, record, or monitor by
security camera or other means of surveillance the
plaintiff’s removal of her personal property from the
Round Hill Road property. The defendant shall not inter-
fere with the plaintiff’s access to the Round Hill Road
property or to her personal property. The defendant
shall not remove, move, or hide any of the plaintiff’s
personal property to prevent her from removing it from
the Round Hill Road property.’’17
Finally, the court ordered that ‘‘[t]he defendant shall
obtain, pay for, and maintain a term life insurance policy
in the face amount of $5,000,000 for as long as the
defendant has a court-ordered obligation to pay ali-
mony, child support, and/or postsecondary educational
expenses’’ for the parties’ daughters, and it awarded
17
‘‘The court’s order largely mirrored its pendente lite access order, except
that it permitted the defendant to ‘be present while the plaintiff is at the
Round Hill Road property.’ ’’ Netter v. Netter, supra, 220 Conn. App. 498.
‘‘The pendente lite access order provided: ‘If the defendant is at home while
the plaintiff is retrieving her belongings from the Round Hill Road property,
he must remain in the pool house and shall not be in the residence.’ ’’ Id.,
498 n.6.
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the plaintiff $3,300,000 in attorney’s fees pursuant to
General Statutes § 46b-62,18 stating that ‘‘to order other-
wise would undermine these financial orders.’’
The defendant filed a motion for reargument, a sec-
ond motion for reargument and an amended motion for
reargument, each of which the plaintiff opposed. The
court denied the defendant’s motions for reargument.
The plaintiff filed a motion for clarification of the court’s
decision with respect to child support, which the court
granted. This appeal followed. Additional facts and pro-
cedural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
The defendant first claims that the court improperly
determined that the assets held by the four trusts were
part of the marital estate and subject to distribution
pursuant to § 46b-81. He argues that each trust is a
South Dakota spendthrift trust that is controlled by
‘‘South Dakota laws . . . which are very protective
against the claims of creditors’’ and is not part of the
marital estate because he does not have the authority
to distribute, or compel the distribution of, funds there-
from.
The plaintiff disagrees. Although she posits that ‘‘a
spendthrift trust is not considered an asset of the mari-
tal estate that the court may divide under . . . § 46b-
81, because distributions to the beneficiary are at the
trustee’s sole discretion,’’ she argues that the ‘‘three
self-settled trusts . . . are not spendthrift trusts’’ and
that, even though ‘‘The Six Cataracts Trust, is not a
self-settled trust . . . it nevertheless carries almost all
of the same provisions as the defendant’s three self-
settled trusts.’’ The plaintiff does not argue, however,
18
General Statutes § 46b-62 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) . . . [T]he
court may order either spouse . . . to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees
of the other in accordance with their respective financial abilities and the
criteria set forth in section 46b-82. . . .’’
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that The Six Cataracts Trust is not a spendthrift trust.
Rather, she maintains that the defendant ‘‘retains signif-
icant legal authority over all four of the trusts, power
sufficient for him to use a variety of procedures to
access the trust assets . . . [such that] the trusts are
not mere expectancies; they are part of the marital
estate for purposes of § 46b-81.’’ Alternatively, she
argues that, ‘‘even if the trusts were cognizable, the trial
court retained the power to enforce the compelling
public policies that were controlling law in Connecticut
when the three self-settled trusts were formed’’ by
including them in the marital estate for distribution.
We agree with the defendant that The Six Cataracts
Trust is a spendthrift trust that does not constitute
marital property for purposes of § 46b-81. We also agree
with the defendant that the three self-settled trusts are
spendthrift trusts, but we agree with the plaintiff that,
as self-settled spendthrift trusts, they violate the well
established public policy of Connecticut that applies
under the facts and circumstances of this case and,
consequently, we conclude that the court properly
determined that they are divisible marital property
under § 46b-81.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review and
the legal principles that are germane to our analysis.
Our Supreme Court recently clarified the standard of
review ‘‘that governs a trial court’s determination that
a particular asset or interest constitutes marital prop-
erty for purposes of § 46b-81, which presents a mixed
question of law and fact.’’ D. S. v. D. S., 351 Conn. 1,
9, 328 A.3d 111 (2025). To this end, ‘‘the standard of
review of a trial court’s determination whether an asset
is classified as property is de novo.
‘‘The trial court’s underlying factual findings, how-
ever, are reviewable under a clearly erroneous standard
and will be reversed only if they find no support in the
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record or the reviewing court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . .
Lastly, the question of how these determinations as to
any particular asset fit into the mosaic of all the trial
court’s financial orders is reviewable for abuse of dis-
cretion. . . .
‘‘Section 46b-81 provides in relevant part: (a) At the
time of entering a decree annulling or dissolving a mar-
riage . . . the Superior Court may assign to either
spouse all or any part of the estate of the other spouse.
***
(c) In fixing the nature and value of the property, if
any, to be assigned, the court, after considering all the
evidence presented by each party, shall consider the
length of the marriage, the causes for the annulment,
dissolution of the marriage or legal separation, the age,
health, station, occupation, amount and sources of
income, earning capacity, vocational skills, education,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of
the parties and the opportunity of each for future acqui-
sition of capital assets and income. The court shall also
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the
acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of
their respective estates.
‘‘Our legislature has not defined the term property
in § 46b-81, leaving courts to define it. In determining
the equitable distribution of resources under the stat-
ute, courts should engage in a three step process,
determining (1) whether the resource is property (clas-
sification), (2) what is the appropriate method for
determining the value of the property (valuation), and,
(3) what is the most equitable distribution of that prop-
erty between the parties (distribution). . . .
‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has articulated and refined a
two part test by which trial courts may determine, on
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Netter v. Netter

a case-by-case basis, whether a potential interest consti-
tutes divisible marital property under § 46b-81. In the
first part of the . . . test, we ask whether the holder
has a presently enforceable right [to receive the inter-
est] . . . based on contractual principles or a statutory
entitlement . . . . If the party has such a right, the
interest is part of the marital estate and is distributable
as property.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 10–12. The sec-
ond part of the test ‘‘involves a more fact intensive
analysis’’ that focuses ‘‘on the likelihood that the holder
eventually will acquire an enforceable right in the inter-
est, that is, whether the interest will likely vest or
whether the holder will otherwise acquire a definitive
right to it.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 12–13. In this
case, the court determined that ‘‘the defendant has a
presently existing property interest in the trusts and
not a ‘mere expectancy’ ’’ and that they were ‘‘properly
included in the marital estate and subject to equitable
distribution pursuant to . . . § 46b-81.’’

To assess the propriety of the trial court’s determina-
tion in this regard, we must first set forth certain legal
principles with regard to trusts. ‘‘A trust which creates
a fund for the benefit of another, secures it against the
beneficiary’s own improvidence, and places it beyond
the reach of his creditors is a spendthrift trust. Zeoli
v. Commissioner of Social Services, 179 Conn. 83, 88,
425 A.2d 553 (1979); see also General Statutes § 52-
321.19 [A] spendthrift trust is one that restricts both the
beneficiary’s ability to alienate his interest in the fund
19
‘‘General Statutes § 52-321 (a) provides: ‘If property has been given
to trustees to pay over the income to any person, without provision for
accumulation or express authorization to the trustees to withhold the
income, and the income has not been expressly given for the support of
the beneficiary or his family, the income shall be liable in equity to the
claims of all creditors of the beneficiary.’ ’’ Spencer v. Spencer, 71 Conn.
App. 475, 485 n.4, 802 A.2d 215 (2002).
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and his creditor’s ability to seize the property in satisfac-
tion of his debts; in contrast to other types of protective
trusts, a spendthrift trust in the technical sense exists
where there is an express provision forbidding anticipa-
tory alienations and attachments by creditors. 76 Am.
Jur. 2d, [Trusts § 121 (1992)]. Where by statute or the
trust terms it is provided that the interest of a benefi-
ciary is not to be available to his creditors, and the
court decisions in the state hold the provision valid
without limit or qualification, obviously creditors have
no rights or remedies as far as the trust property and
the beneficiary’s interest in it or the income thereof are
concerned. They are limited to collection from sums
after payment to the beneficiary, and to the products
of such payments and to nontrust property. G. Bogert,
Trusts & Trustees (2d Ed. Rev. 1992) § 227, p. 499.
‘‘The well-settled rule in this state is that the exercise
of discretion by the trustee of a spendthrift trust is
subject to the court’s control only to the extent that an
abuse has occurred . . . . Furthermore, Connecticut
bars creditors from reaching a distribution except, and
until, it be in the hands of the beneficiary. . . . No title
in the income passes to [the beneficiary] unless and
until it is appropriated to him by the trustee, and then
only to the amount determined by [the trustee].’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; footnote in original; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Spencer v. Spencer, 71 Conn. App. 475,
484–86, 802 A.2d 215 (2002).
Our Supreme Court has stated, as a general proposi-
tion, that ‘‘a spendthrift trust . . . is not considered an
asset of the marital estate that the court may divide
under . . . § 46b-81.’’ Powell-Ferri v. Ferri, 326 Conn.
457, 465, 165 A.3d 1124 (2017). If a spendthrift trust is
self-settled, however, the Connecticut Qualified Dispo-
sitions in Trust Act (Connecticut act), General Statutes
§ 45a-487j et seq., governs its validity. Enacted in 2019;
see Public Acts 2019, No. 19-137, § 99 through 108; the
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Connecticut act sets the parameters for establishing a
valid self-settled spendthrift trust, and authorizes the
use of such trusts, in Connecticut. Prior to this legisla-
tion, self-settled spendthrift trusts violated the public
policy of Connecticut and would not be allowed to
shield a settlor’s assets from his creditors. See Green-
wich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 219–20, 27
A.2d 166 (1942).20 ‘‘Moreover, Connecticut will not ‘. . .
enforce the law of another jurisdiction nor the rights
arising thereunder, which . . . contravene [Connecti-
cut] public policy.’ Dick v. Dick, 167 Conn. 210, 223–[24],
355 A.2d 110 (1974).’’ In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98, 101
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
Under the Connecticut act, however, a qualified dis-
position made by way of a written irrevocable trust
20
In Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, supra, 129 Conn. 211, our Supreme
Court explained that ‘‘[t]he attempt of a man to place his property in trust
for his own benefit under limitations similar to those which characterize a
spendthrift trust is a departure from the underlying basis for the creation
of such trusts. That aside, the public policy which sustains such trusts
when created for the benefit of another is, where the settlor is himself the
beneficiary, overborne by other considerations. In Johnson v. Connecticut
Bank, 21 Conn. 148, [158 (1851)], where we were considering the right of
the creditor of a beneficiary of a trust to secure satisfaction from the latter’s
right to the income, we stated: It is the policy of our law, that all the property
of a debtor should be responsible for his debts. And his equitable estate
may be taken, as well as his legal, provided it is subject to his [control];
and, subject to definite limitations, that has always been the policy of our
law. . . . To admit the validity of such trusts would open too wide an
opportunity for a man to evade his just debts to be permissible unless
sanctioned by statutory enactment. This is the reason why the overwhelming
weight of authority holds ineffective attempts to establish them. . . . But
when a man settles his property upon a trust in his own favor, with a clause
retaining his power of alienating the income, he undertakes to put his own
property out of the reach of his creditors, while he retains the beneficial
use of it. The practical operation of the transaction is, that he transfers a
portion only of his interest, retaining in himself a beneficial interest, which
he attempts by his own act to render inalienable by himself and exempt
from liability for his debts. . . . If such trusts were sustained, the owner
need only select as trustee a near kinsman or tried friend, on whom he may
rely for liberality, and thus indirectly accomplish what he cannot do directly.’’
(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, supra, 219–20.
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Netter v. Netter

with at least one qualified trustee that specifies that
Connecticut law applies to the trust’s validity, construc-
tion and administration and mandates spendthrift provi-
sions for the transferor or other beneficiaries may be
considered valid. See General Statutes § 45a-487k (10).
Moreover, the provisions of the Connecticut act may
be applied retroactively to ‘‘all trusts created before,
on or after January 1, 2020.’’ General Statutes § 45a-
487t (a) (1). If, however, ‘‘the court in which the judicial
proceeding [concerning trusts commenced before Janu-
ary 1, 2020] is pending finds that application of a particu-
lar provision of [the Connecticut act] would substan-
tially . . . prejudice the rights of the parties . . . [the
Connecticut act will] not apply and the superseded law
applies.’’ General Statutes § 45a-487t (a) (3). Thus, if a
self-settled spendthrift trust agreement does not satisfy
the Connecticut act’s requirements, or if a court finds
that sustaining a self-settled spendthrift trust would
substantially prejudice the rights of the parties, the law
as it existed in Connecticut prior to the legislation is
applicable; see General Statutes § 45a-487t (a) (3); and
the trust will be void as a matter of public policy.
With these principles in mind, we must construe the
terms of the respective trust instruments; see Spencer
v. Spencer, supra, 71 Conn. App. 481–82; and determine
whether the court properly considered the four trusts
to be assets of the marital estate that it had the authority
to divide under § 46b-81. ‘‘Because resolution of this
issue turns on construing trust language and applying
legal principles, it is subject to plenary review.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Marzaro v. Marzaro, 231
Conn. App. 85, 98, 333 A.3d 134, cert. denied, 351 Conn.
925, 333 A.3d 795 (2025).
A
We turn first to The Six Cataracts Trust, formerly
known as The Donald Netter Family Trust, which was
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Netter v. Netter

established by The Donald Netter Family Trust Agree-
ment.21 Ordinarily, we would begin by construing the
terms of the trust agreement itself. See id.; Spencer
v. Spencer, supra, 71 Conn. App. 481–82. As we have
previously noted, however, The Donald Netter Family
Trust Agreement is subject to a sealing order issued by
the trial court and, thus, we are not at liberty to do so.
See footnote 7 of this opinion.
We are guided, therefore, by the court’s unchallenged
findings that ‘‘The Six Cataracts Trust, formerly The
Donald Netter Family Trust, was created by [the defen-
dant’s father] Edward Netter in 1992 for the benefit of
the defendant and his descendants’’; (footnote omitted);
and that ‘‘[u]nder The Donald Netter Family Trust
Agreement, the trustees, other than the defendant, have
the power to pay or apply so much of the net income
of the trust or the principal of the trust fund to or for
the use of the defendant and his issue as they in their
sole discretion determine to be advisable for the com-
fort, support and maintenance of the defendant and
his issue.’’ (Emphasis added.) These findings support
the conclusion the defendant advocates and the plaintiff
does not dispute, namely, that The Six Cataracts Trust
is a spendthrift trust. More specifically, these findings
reflect that the settlor of The Donald Netter Family
Trust, the defendant’s father, Edward Netter, by
expressly authorizing the income of the trust to be given
for the support of the defendant beneficiary and his
family, intended to create an irrevocable spendthrift
21
We note that the court initially described each individual trust in four
separate subsections of its decision. The court then addressed the trusts
collectively in a fifth subsection entitled ‘‘The trust assets are part of the
marital estate’’; (emphasis in original); and articulated there its conclusion
that ‘‘the defendant has a presently existing property interest in the trusts
and not a ‘mere expectancy.’ ’’ We have determined, however, that the fact
that The Six Cataracts Trust is not self-settled, and The DASSA, Scout
Resources and Ann Holdings Trusts are self-settled, is a dispositive distinc-
tion that warrants separate consideration and analysis.
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trust that could not be reached by the defendant’s credi-
tors.22 See Spencer v. Spencer, supra, 71 Conn. App.
484–85; see also General Statutes § 52-321. ‘‘Because
the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant
[in this dissolution action], her status is that of a credi-
tor. . . . Thus, the plaintiff can reach neither the
income nor the principal [of The Six Cataracts Trust]
until it is distributed and in the hands of the defendant.’’
(Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) Spencer v. Spen-
cer, supra, 486; see also, e.g., Cooley v. Cooley, 32 Conn.
App. 152, 169, 628 A.2d 608 (judgment in dissolution
action established plaintiff’s status as creditor), cert.
denied, 228 Conn. 901, 634 A.2d 295 (1993).
Although the defendant argued in his corrected post-
trial brief that ‘‘The [Six Cataracts Trust] has significant
spendthrift provisions, subject to a paid Disinterested
Trustee with sole authority to withhold beneficiary dis-
tributions’’ and that ‘‘[a]s an expectancy, The Six Cata-
racts Trust is not a marital asset’’; (emphasis in original);
the court, apart from recognizing that The Six Cataracts
Trust is not a self-settled trust, did not address the
nature of the trust or the settlor’s intent. Instead, the
court focused on the defendant’s roles and actions as
investment trust advisor and sole manager of SDAS,
LLC, and found that ‘‘[n]o one other than the defendant
has the power to control [The Six Cataracts Trust] and
22
The defendant argues that, although Connecticut law governs the ulti-
mate question as to whether the trust assets are part of the marital estate,
South Dakota law, which is ‘‘very protective against the claims of creditors,’’
should govern the construction of the trust agreement. The court appeared
to agree. See footnote 15 of this opinion. We cannot ascertain, given the
restricted record, whether this is accurate. See footnote 7 of this opinion.
Even so, we note that in South Dakota, as in Connecticut, ‘‘[w]hen interpre-
ting a trust instrument, [the court] must ensure that the intentions and
wishes of the [settlor] are honored.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Plains Commerce Bank, Inc. v. Beck, 986 N.W.2d 519, 528 (S.D. 2023); see
also Spinnato v. Boyd, 231 Conn. App. 460, 472, 333 A.3d 818 (2025) (‘‘[t]he
cardinal rule of construction of all trusts . . . is to find and effectuate the
intent of the testator or settlor’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Netter v. Netter

direct the disposition of the trust assets.’’ The court
then relied on this finding to conclude that ‘‘the defen-
dant has a presently existing property interest in [The
Six Cataracts Trust] and not a ‘mere expectancy.’ ’’
The court’s unchallenged finding, however, that The
Donald Netter Family Trust Agreement establishes that
‘‘the trustees, other than the defendant, have the power
to pay or apply so much of the net income of the trust
or the principal of the trust fund to or for the use
of the defendant and his issue as they in their sole
discretion determine to be advisable for the comfort,
support and maintenance of the defendant and his
issue’’; (emphasis added); belies its conclusion, as does
the testimony of Elizabeth Ciccone, whose testimony
the court credited ‘‘over twelve days of trial,’’ that all
trust ‘‘distributions have to be approved by the disinter-
ested trustee,’’ South Dakota Trust. As such, the finding
on which the court based its conclusion that The Six
Cataracts Trust is part of the marital estate is a clearly
erroneous finding that is not supported by, and in fact
contradicts, the record, and it cannot stand. See D. S.
v. D. S., supra, 351 Conn. 10.
The Six Cataracts Trust, which the defendant’s father
established nearly thirteen years prior to the parties’
marriage, is a spendthrift trust that provides a fund for
the benefit of the defendant and his descendants. As a
spendthrift trust, it expressly affords the trustees other
than the defendant the sole discretion as to whether
and when to distribute funds and places those funds
beyond the reach of his creditors, including the plain-
tiff.23 See Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Services,
23
Although we note that Ciccone testified at trial that the trust resolution;
see footnote 8 of this opinion; ‘‘create[d] the role of the current adult benefi-
ciary which gives that person the power to approve or veto distributions’’
and that the defendant assumed that role, the trust resolution itself, which
was entered into evidence at trial, reflects no such thing. Regardless, as we
have stated previously, Ciccone also testified that all trust distributions must
be approved by the disinterested trustee, South Dakota Trust.
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supra, 179 Conn. 88. The defendant has no presently
enforceable right to receive the interest in the trust and
the court should not have considered it an asset of the
marital estate that it was authorized to divide under
§ 46b-81. See Powell-Ferri v. Ferri, supra, 326 Conn.
465.
B
We now turn to the ‘‘three self-settled trusts that [the
defendant] secretly created with marital assets as the
marriage deteriorated.’’ The DASSA Trust Agreement,
The Scout Resources Trust Agreement and The Ann
Holdings Trust Agreement each specify that ‘‘[t]he valid-
ity, construction and administration of this Trust shall
be governed and construed by the laws of the State of
South Dakota, and the courts thereof shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction to adjudicate all claims, actions or pro-
ceedings relating to this Trust Agreement.’’24 As such,
we agree with the defendant that South Dakota law
governs our interpretation of these trust agreements.
We emphasize, however, that, although our construc-
tion of the three self-settled trust agreements is gov-
erned by South Dakota law, the ultimate question of
whether they constitute property that is properly attrib-
utable to the marital estate must be determined by
applying Connecticut law.25 See Tremaine v. Tremaine,
235 Conn. 45, 61 n.16, 663 A.2d 387 (1995).
Under South Dakota law, ‘‘[t]he interpretation of a
trust instrument is a question of law reviewed de novo.
. . . When interpreting a trust instrument, [the court]
24
We note that, unlike The Donald Netter Family Trust Agreement, the
three self-settled trust agreements were not subject to sealing orders at trial.
25
In his principal brief to this court, the defendant expressly recognizes
the interpretation of the trust agreements under South Dakota law as ‘‘a
predicate [to] determining whether the trusts are includable in the marital
estate subject to equitable distribution as a marital asset pursuant to Con-
necticut law.’’
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must ensure that the intentions and wishes of the [set-
tlor] are honored. . . . To do so, [the court] first
look[s] to the language of the trust instrument’’ and,
‘‘[i]f the language of the trust instrument makes the
intention of the [settlor] clear, it is [the court’s] duty
to declare and enforce it.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Plains Commerce Bank, Inc.
v. Beck, 986 N.W.2d 519, 527–28 (S.D. 2023).
The defendant created The DASSA Trust on Septem-
ber 19, 2013, The Scout Resources Trust on December
14, 2013, and The Ann Holdings Trust on June 2, 2015.
The defendant is the sole beneficiary of each irrevoca-
ble trust and he is also the Investment Trust Advisor.
South Dakota Trust is the Disinterested Trustee of each
trust. Although the defendant had the authority to
appoint additional beneficiaries in the event of his
death, including his ‘‘Current Spouse,’’ and, although
the defendant created the trusts more than eight years
into the marriage, the plaintiff did not qualify as a ‘‘Cur-
rent Spouse’’ as that term was defined in the trust agree-
ments.
As the court found, ‘‘[u]nder [each] trust agreement,
the trustees, other than the defendant, have the power
to pay or apply so much of the net income of the trust
or the principal of the trust fund to or for the use of
the defendant as they in their sole discretion determine
to be advisable for the health, education, comfort, sup-
port, and maintenance of the defendant. [Each] trust
agreement provides that distributions may only be made
to the defendant with the unanimous written approval
of (i) the Disinterested Trustee(s), (ii) each Family
Trustee, if any; and (iii) each Current Adult Beneficiary,
if any.’’ (Emphasis added.)
In addition, each trust agreement includes a ‘‘Restric-
tions on Alienation’’ clause that states, in relevant part,
that ‘‘[n]either the [n]et [i]ncome nor the principal of
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any trust hereunder shall be alienable by any current
[b]eneficiary, either by anticipation, assignment or any
other method and the same shall not be subject to be
taken by his or her creditors (other than the Trustees)
by any process whatsoever . . . .’’ Finally, each trust
agreement expressly states that ‘‘[t]his Trust is intended
to be a South Dakota ‘Qualified Disposition Trust’ and
all transfers made to the Trust are intended to be ‘quali-
fied dispositions’ pursuant to Chapter 55-16 of South
Dakota Codified laws,26 now and as hereafter amended
from time to time and all provisions of this Trust shall
be interpreted, construed and administered pursuant
to this intention.’’ (Footnote added.)
The plain and unambiguous terms of these trust
agreements establish that the defendant intended to
create three South Dakota self-settled spendthrift
trusts. At the time the defendant established them, how-
ever, self-settled spendthrift trusts violated Connecticut
public policy as a matter of course and would not be
sustained. See Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, supra,
129 Conn. 219–20; In re Brooks, supra, 217 B.R. 101.
Moreover, although the Connecticut act sets parame-
ters for establishing valid self-settled trusts, authorizes
their use in Connecticut, and provides that its provi-
sions may be applied retroactively to ‘‘all trusts created
before, on or after January 1, 2020’’; General Statutes
§ 45a-487t (a) (1); the Connecticut act nonetheless
affords courts the discretion to apply the law it super-
seded if the ‘‘application of a particular provision of
[the Connecticut act] would substantially . . . preju-
dice the rights of the parties. . . .’’ General Statutes
§ 45a-487t (a) (3).
26
South Dakota’s Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act has authorized the
use of self-settled spendthrift trusts in South Dakota since its enactment in
2005. See S.D. Codified Laws §§ 55-16-1 to 55-16-16 (2025); M. Krogstad &
M. Van Heuvelen, ‘‘Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Examining the Effec-
tiveness of South Dakota Asset Protection Trust Statutes for Removing
Assets from a Settlor’s Gross Estate,’’ 61 S.D. L. Rev. 378, 378–79 (2016).
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In the present case, the court ultimately concluded
that the three self-settled spendthrift trusts were assets
of the marital estate after finding that ‘‘[n]o one other
than the defendant has the power to control the trusts
and direct the disposition of the trust assets’’ and that
the defendant had a presently existing property interest
in them. As with The Six Cataracts Trust, however, the
disinterested trustee, South Dakota Trust, must approve
any and all distributions from the trusts, and, thus, the
court’s finding that the defendant has exclusive control
over the three self-settled trusts and the distributions
therefrom cannot be sustained. See D. S. v. D. S., supra,
351 Conn. 10. Nevertheless, on the basis of our plenary
review of the record, we conclude that the court’s ulti-
mate determination that the three self-settled spend-
thrift trusts constitute divisible marital property with-
stands scrutiny. See id.
At the outset, we note that the respective trust agree-
ments do not satisfy the requirements set forth in § 45a-
487k (10) because each agreement provides that the
laws of South Dakota, not Connecticut, govern their
validity, construction and administration. As such, they
are not valid trust instruments within the context of
the Connecticut act.
Moreover, even if they were, the defendant estab-
lished each self-settled South Dakota trust during the
marriage and well before January 1, 2020, at a time
when Connecticut did not recognize the validity of self-
settled trusts. The court found that the defendant did
so ‘‘secretly . . . with marital assets as the marriage
deteriorated.’’ In fact, the court emphasized this finding
throughout its decision by stating three times that the
defendant had formed each self-settled trust ‘‘during the
marriage with marital assets and without the plaintiff’s
knowledge.’’ The court also made it clear that the defen-
dant had actually used ‘‘most of the marital assets’’
in doing so. The court further explained that ‘‘[t]he
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defendant constantly accused the plaintiff of being after
his money. He left her notes with a large ‘0’ on them.
He would wake her up while she was sleeping and
whisper in her ear, ‘How much do you want?’ He told
her that she would get nothing.’’27
Our review of the trial court’s decision, and these
unchallenged findings in particular, reveals that the trial
court was particularly concerned about the defendant’s
duplicitous efforts to place most of the marital assets
beyond the plaintiff’s reach by putting them in the three
self-settled South Dakota spendthrift trusts he created
when he knew the marriage was in trouble and that a
divorce was imminent. See Wheelabrator Bridgeport,
L.P. v. Bridgeport, 320 Conn. 332, 355, 133 A.3d 402
(2016) (interpretation of trial court judgment is question
of law). This concern is well founded, and it guides our
analysis.
It is well settled in Connecticut that ‘‘a trial court
may consider evidence that a spouse dissipated marital
assets prior to the couple’s physical separation, for pur-
poses of determining an equitable distribution of prop-
erty under § 46b-81, so long as the actions constituting
dissipation occur either: (1) in contemplation of divorce
or separation; or (2) while the marriage is in serious
jeopardy or is undergoing an irretrievable breakdown.
. . . [D]issipation in the marital dissolution context
requires financial misconduct involving marital assets,
such as intentional waste or a selfish financial impropri-
ety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the marriage.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Finan v. Finan, 287 Conn. 491, 499, 949 A.2d 468 (2008);
see also id., 500 n.6 (‘‘dissipation is [t]he use of an asset
27
The defendant does not challenge these factual findings as part of this
appeal. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof, 221 Conn.
App. 475, 485, 302 A.3d 339 (‘‘claims of error not briefed are considered
abandoned’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 348 Conn.
923, 304 A.3d 445 (2023).
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for an illegal or inequitable purpose, such as a spouse’s
use of community property for personal benefit when
a divorce is imminent’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).
Although the court based its ultimate conclusion that
the three self-settled trusts were part of the marital
estate on its determination that the defendant con-
trolled them and had a presently existing property inter-
est in them, the court also plainly considered the defen-
dant’s preseparation dissipation of marital assets when
fashioning its orders and rendering its decision. In our
view, this dissipation supports the conclusion that even
if the trusts satisfied the requirements of the Connecti-
cut act, which they do not, they would nonetheless be
void as a matter of public policy by virtue of the fact
that sustaining them and excluding their assets from
distribution would unfairly prejudice the plaintiff. See
General Statutes § 45a-487t (a) (3). For these reasons,
we conclude that the court properly determined that
the three self-settled trusts constitute divisible marital
property. See Dorfman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
227 Conn. App. 347, 425, 322 A.3d 331 (2024) (‘‘[i]t is
axiomatic that [an appellate court] may affirm a proper
result of the trial court for a different reason’’ (internal
quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 907,
330 A.3d 881 (2025), and cert. denied, 351 Conn. 907,
330 A.3d 882 (2025).
C
In light of our conclusion that the trial court improp-
erly treated the assets from The Six Cataracts Trust as
marital property and ordered that distributions there-
from should be used to satisfy one half of the
$50,000,000 lump sum property distribution payment it
ordered the defendant to make to the plaintiff with
funds from all of the trusts, we turn to the question of
the appropriate relief. ‘‘Individual financial orders in a
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dissolution action are part of the carefully crafted
mosaic that comprises the entire asset reallocation
plan. . . . Under the mosaic doctrine, financial orders
should not be viewed as a collection of single discon-
nected occurrences, but rather as a seamless collection
of interdependent elements. Consistent with that
approach, our courts have utilized the mosaic doctrine
as a remedial device that allows reviewing courts to
remand cases for reconsideration of all financial orders
even though the review process might reveal a flaw only
in the alimony, property distribution or child support
awards. . . .
‘‘Every improper order, however, does not necessar-
ily merit a reconsideration of all of the trial court’s
financial orders. A financial order is severable when it
is not in any way interdependent with other orders and
is not improperly based on a factor that is linked to other
factors. . . . In other words, an order is severable if
its impropriety does not place the correctness of the
other orders in question. . . . Determining whether an
order is severable from the other financial orders in a
dissolution case is a highly fact bound inquiry.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Wald v. Cortland-Wald,
226 Conn. App. 752, 775, 319 A.3d 769 (2024).
In the present case, the court found that the ‘‘defen-
dant controls assets worth in excess of $175,000,000,’’
and it fashioned its financial orders accordingly. Those
assets included the fair market value of the assets held
by the trusts which, collectively, was $173,551,753. The
assets of The Six Cataracts Trust comprised $122,678,483
of that amount. We have concluded in part I A of this
opinion, however, that The Six Cataracts Trust is a valid
spendthrift trust and that the defendant has no presently
enforceable right to receive the interest it holds. In other
words, the defendant does not control $122,678,483 of
the $175,000,000 that formed the basis for the financial
orders in this case.
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‘‘In dissolution proceedings, the court must fashion
its financial orders in accordance with the criteria set
forth in . . . § 46b-81 (division of marital property),
[General Statutes] § 46b-82 (alimony) and [General Stat-
utes §] 46b-84 (child support). All three statutory provi-
sions require consideration of the parties’ amount and
sources of income in determining the appropriate divi-
sion of property and size of any child support or alimony
award.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Valentine v. Valentine, 149 Conn. App. 799,
802–803, 90 A.3d 300 (2014). Because it is uncertain
whether the court’s other financial orders will remain
intact after reconsidering the property distribution
orders in a manner consistent with this opinion, we
conclude that the entirety of the mosaic must be refash-
ioned. See Renstrup v. Renstrup, 217 Conn. App. 252,
285, 287 A.3d 1095, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 915, 290
A.3d 374 (2023). Accordingly, the court must consider
all the financial orders on remand, including the ali-
mony, child support28 and attorney’s fees awards, but
excluding the personal property distribution order for
the reasons set forth in part III of this opinion.
II
We next address the defendant’s claim that the court
abused its discretion by awarding the plaintiff sole phys-
ical and legal custody of the parties’ two then minor
children. Specifically, the defendant argues that the
court ‘‘incorrectly assigned unilateral fault to the [defen-
dant] and ignored [the plaintiff’s] parental deficiencies
by awarding sole legal custody of the minor children
to the [plaintiff] . . . .’’29 We disagree.
28
We note, in this regard, that, on remand, child support is to be determined
for both children, as both were minors at the time of the judgment and thus
both subject to the child support order the court issued at that time.
29
In making this claim, the defendant references, without citation, ‘‘the
memorandum of decision finding that [he] was a loving, attentive, responsi-
ble and respectful parent capable of arriving at joint child related decisions
with the [plaintiff] and capable of performing effective crisis management.’’
Our review of the court’s memorandum of decision reveals no such finding
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We begin by noting that, although both children were
minors at the time of judgment in this case, the parties’
older daughter has since reached the age of majority.
The propriety of the court’s order as it pertains to her,
therefore, is not at issue on appeal. See, e.g., A. A.-M.
v. M. Z., 225 Conn. App. 46, 54, 313 A.3d 1288 (2024)
(appeal challenging custody orders and access to child
was rendered moot when child attained age of eigh-
teen); Nowacki v. Nowacki, 144 Conn. App. 503, 508–
509, 72 A.3d 1245 (noting that orders with respect to
parties’ older child were not at issue on appeal because
he reached age of majority while appeal was pending),
cert. denied, 310 Conn. 939, 79 A.3d 891 (2013).
We now set forth the legal principles regarding a trial
court’s custody determination. ‘‘Orders regarding the
custody and care of minor children . . . are governed
by . . . § 46b-56, which grants the court broad discre-
tion in crafting such orders. . . . [Section] 46b-56 (a)
provides in relevant part: In any controversy before
the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor
children . . . the court may make . . . any proper
order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation
and support of the children if it has jurisdiction . . . .
Subject to the provisions of section 46b-56a, the court
may assign parental responsibility for raising the child
to the parents jointly, or may award custody to either
parent or to a third party, according to its best judgment
upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions
and limitations as it deems equitable. . . . (b) In mak-
ing . . . any order as provided in subsection (a) of this
section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents
shall be considered and the court shall enter orders
accordingly that serve the best interests of the child
and provide the child with the active and consistent
or any language that can reasonably be construed to support such a finding.
See Wheelabrator Bridgeport, L.P. v. Bridgeport, supra, 320 Conn. 355 (inter-
pretation of trial court judgment is question of law).
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involvement of both parents commensurate with their
abilities and interests. Such orders may include . . .
(3) the award of sole custody to one parent with appro-
priate parenting time for the noncustodial parent where
sole custody is in the best interests of the child . . . .
[Section] 46b-56 (c) directs the court, when making any
order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation
and support of children, to consider the best interests
of the child, and in doing so [the court] may consider,
but shall not be limited to, one or more of [seventeen
enumerated] factors. . . . The court is not required to
assign any weight to any of the factors that it consid-
ers. . . .
‘‘In reaching a decision as to what is in the best
interests of a child, the court is vested with broad discre-
tion and its ruling will be reversed only upon a showing
that some legal principle or right has been violated or
that the discretion has been abused. . . . As our
Supreme Court recently reiterated, [t]he authority to
exercise the judicial discretion [authorized by § 46b-56]
. . . is not conferred [on] [the state’s appellate courts],
but [on] the trial court, and . . . we are not privileged
to usurp that authority or to substitute ourselves for
the trial court.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) N. R. v. M. P., 227
Conn. App. 698, 714–16, 323 A.3d 1142 (2024); see also
F. S. v. J. S., 223 Conn. App. 763, 787–88, 310 A.3d 961
(‘‘[i]t is a rare case in which a disappointed litigant will
be able to demonstrate abuse of a trial court’s broad
discretion in [child custody] matters’’ (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 903, 323
A.3d 344 (2024).
The primary basis of the defendant’s claim on appeal
is that ‘‘[t]here was incontrovertible evidence that the
[plaintiff] was untruthful in her trial testimony and that
she behaved inappropriately with one or both of the
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minor children at times’’ and that ‘‘[t]here were no simi-
lar allegations leveled against [the defendant], yet the
court awarded sole legal custody to the [plaintiff].’’ The
court, however, expressly credited the plaintiff’s testi-
mony and the six main reasons she gave for the break-
down of the marriage, which were ‘‘the defendant’s
paranoia and suspicious behavior; his controlling and
abusive conduct; his sexually coercive behavior; his
inability to get along with others; his conviction that
[the plaintiff] was anorexic; and his gaslighting [the
plaintiff] and telling her she was crazy.’’ See Kohl’s Dept.
Stores, Inc. v. Rocky Hill, 219 Conn. App. 464, 485, 295
A.3d 470 (2023) (‘‘It is axiomatic that, [i]n a case tried
before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
specific testimony. . . . On appeal, we do not retry the
facts or pass on the credibility of witnesses.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)).
In addition, the court found the seventh factor of the
seventeen factors listed in § 46b-56 (c) to be ‘‘particu-
larly compelling.’’ As previously noted, this factor con-
cerns ‘‘the willingness and ability of each parent to
facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child
relationship between the child and the other parent as
is appropriate, including compliance with any court
orders . . . .’’ General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) (7). The
court determined that ‘‘the plaintiff has consistently
supported the relationship between the children and
the defendant, including purchasing cards and gifts for
him from the children,’’ whereas the defendant ‘‘has
done nothing to ‘facilitate and encourage’ the children’s
relationship with the plaintiff. He has made clear . . .
that he believes that the plaintiff is not a capable parent,
that she is mentally ill, suffers from anorexia, and lacks
judgment, and that she engages in unusual conduct.’’
The court expressly found, however, that there was ‘‘no
support in the record for the defendant’s allegations
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regarding the plaintiff.’’ Moreover, the court found that
the issue of the defendant’s ‘‘ ‘compliance with any
court orders’ ’’ warranted a separate discussion and
detailed that he had ‘‘repeatedly failed’’ in this regard.
The defendant has not challenged these findings on
appeal. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v.
Essaghof, 221 Conn. App. 475, 485, 302 A.3d 339, cert.
denied, 348 Conn. 923, 304 A.3d 445 (2023).
The court also found that the first, second and third
factors of § 46b-56 (c)30 were relevant. ‘‘While the plain-
tiff demonstrated throughout this litigation that she has
the capacity and disposition to understand and meet
the temperament and developmental needs of the chil-
dren and to protect their physical and emotional safety,
the defendant regularly disregarded their interests by
failing to respond to the plaintiff on a timely basis
regarding dates for medical and orthodontic appoint-
ments, even appointments that were time sensitive.’’
The defendant also has not challenged these findings
on appeal. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn.
v. Essaghof, supra, 221 Conn. App. 485.
Finally, the court considered the testimony of the
guardian ad litem, who ‘‘testified that the defendant
suffered from ‘paralysis by analysis,’ ’’ in that the defen-
dant would ‘‘analyze something to the point where we
don’t get a decision, or we get a decision that is so
greatly delayed that it adversely impacts the [chil-
dren],’’31 and expressed concerns about the ‘‘defen-
dant’s ability to be actively involved in the children’s
30
The first three factors listed in § 46b-56 (c) concern ‘‘(1) [t]he physical
and emotional safety of the child; (2) the temperament and developmental
needs of the child; [and] (3) the capacity and the disposition of the parents
to understand and meet the needs of the child . . . .’’
31
The court explained that the guardian ad litem ‘‘described the yearlong
delay in obtaining essential medical treatment for [the parties’ elder daugh-
ter] that was caused by the defendant.’’ To this end, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff testified
that the defendant would become overly involved in the children’s health
matters. She said they would see one specialist, then the defendant would
not like that specialist and demand a second opinion. After the defendant
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lives . . . .’’ Moreover, the guardian ad litem recom-
mended that the court award sole legal custody of the
children to the plaintiff.
These findings by the court, which are either unchal-
lenged or based on its credibility determinations, and
which are consistent with the testimony and recommen-
dations of the guardian ad litem; see N. R. v. M. P.,
supra, 227 Conn. App. 729–30; support the award of sole
legal custody to the plaintiff. ‘‘The defendant essentially
requests that we reweigh the evidence in his favor. [W]e
do not retry the facts or evaluate the credibility of
witnesses. . . . Accordingly, we are not persuaded
that the court abused its discretion in its custody
orders.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Pencheva-Hasse v. Hasse, 221 Conn. App. 113,
128–29, 300 A.3d 1175 (2023).
III
The defendant next claims that the court’s order that
the plaintiff shall be afforded access to the former mari-
tal home to retrieve her personal property therefrom
is ‘‘overly broad’’ and that it ‘‘must either be vacated
or constrained to be specifically limited to the kitchen,
[the plaintiff’s] desk area, and her personal closet.’’32
He argues that the order constitutes a ‘‘warrant’’ that
became involved, he would insist on finding a specialist that he liked.
According to the plaintiff, it was absolutely the defendant’s way or the high-
way.’’
32
We note that the defendant does not challenge the substantive propriety
of the court’s personal property distribution order itself. Rather, his claim
pertains solely to the parameters the court put in place for the plaintiff to
access the former marital home in order to retrieve her personal belongings.
Thus, the defendant has abandoned any challenge to the substance of the
personal property distribution order; see JPMorgan Chase Bank, National
Assn. v. Essaghof, supra, 221 Conn. App. 485; and the court’s exercise of
its discretion in distributing personal property to the plaintiff as part of its
financial orders is not at issue on appeal. See Casey v. Casey, 82 Conn.
App. 378, 389, 844 A.2d 250 (2004) (personal property distribution orders
are part of financial orders).
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fails to ‘‘describe with particularity the places within
the residence to be searched and the items the [plaintiff]
may take’’ and thus violates his rights under the fourth
amendment to the United States constitution and article
first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution. We disagree.
Although the defendant clothes his claim in constitu-
tional garb, ‘‘[p]utting a constitutional tag on a noncon-
stitutional claim will no more change its essential char-
acter than calling a bull a cow will change its gender.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rosenfeld v. Rosen-
feld, 115 Conn. App. 570, 579, 974 A.2d 40 (2009). Our
plenary review of the court’s order reveals nothing more
than a personal property distribution order that estab-
lishes the parameters by which the plaintiff is to remove
her personal property from the former marital resi-
dence. See Wheelabrator Bridgeport, L.P. v. Bridge-
port, supra, 320 Conn. 355. As such, we review the
defendant’s claim under an abuse of discretion stan-
dard.33 See D. S. v. D. S., supra, 351 Conn. 10.
‘‘[U]nder Connecticut law, courts are empowered to
deal broadly with property and its equitable division
incident to dissolution proceedings.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Powers v. Hiranandani, 197
Conn. App. 384, 409, 232 A.3d 116 (2020). ‘‘As our
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, judicial review
of a trial court’s exercise of its broad discretion in
domestic relations cases is limited to the questions of
whether the [trial] court correctly applied the law and
could reasonably have concluded as it did. . . . More-
over, the power to act equitably is the keystone to the
court’s ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of
circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a
33
We note, nonetheless, that, although the defendant cites article first,
§ 7, of the constitution of Connecticut in his brief, he has not included a
separate state constitutional analysis. Therefore, any separate state constitu-
tional claim would be abandoned. See State v. Lueders, 225 Conn. App. 612,
634 n.21, 317 A.3d 69, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 920, 321 A.3d 402 (2024).
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42 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Netter v. Netter

marriage.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fitzsi-
mons v. Fitzsimons, 116 Conn. App. 449, 458–59, 975
A.2d 729 (2009); see also Powers v. Hiranandani,
supra, 400. ‘‘In determining whether a trial court has
abused its broad discretion in domestic relations mat-
ters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor
of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 88,
995 A.2d 1 (2010).
The defendant claims that the court’s personal prop-
erty distribution order is overly broad because it ‘‘does
not describe or constrain the areas within the resi-
dence’’ the plaintiff can access and thus allows her to
‘‘enter any portion of the residence [she] want[s].’’ He
argues that ‘‘[t]he evidence before the . . . court was
that the items [the plaintiff] seeks to retrieve are located
in the residence’s kitchen, in, on or around her desk
and in whatever closet her clothes were in when she
left’’ and that the scope of the order should have been
limited to those areas. He further maintains that the
order ‘‘fails to particularly describe the items’’ that con-
stitute the plaintiff’s personal property.
In its decision, however, the court credited the plain-
tiff’s testimony ‘‘that the defendant gaslighted her by,
for example, moving items in the kitchen from where
she had left them, taking her jewelry out of its boxes,
putting a tricycle on her desk, and leaving odd notes
for her around the house. Even after this action was
commenced, the defendant deposited the plaintiff’s ali-
mony payment in her UBS account rather than in her
First Republic account without telling her. He directed
the guardian ad litem not to mention it, even though
the plaintiff thought that her alimony payment had not
been made.’’ Also, the court noted, the case had been
pending for ‘‘almost six years’’ by the time the court
ultimately rendered its decision. As such, even if it is
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Netter v. Netter

true that the locus of all of the plaintiff’s personal prop-
erty had at one time been confined to the areas the
defendant describes in his brief, it would not have been
reasonable, given his noted proclivities and the passage
of time, to conclude that those would be the only areas
in the residence where the plaintiff’s property currently
exists. In fact, the evidence presented in this case sug-
gests that the opposite is true, and the court’s order
necessarily accounts for this by specifying that ‘‘[t]he
defendant shall not interfere with the plaintiff’s access
to the Round Hill Road property or to her personal
property. The defendant shall not remove, move, or
hide any of the plaintiff’s personal property to prevent
her from removing it from the Round Hill Road prop-
erty.’’
With respect to specificity, the court awarded the
plaintiff all her ‘‘personal property located in her apart-
ment on Greenwich Avenue, her personal property
located in the Round Hill Road property, and any other
personal property that is otherwise in her possession.’’
This included the plaintiff’s ‘‘own clothing, jewelry, and
personal items such as books and memorabilia’’ as well
as the family photographs. These orders are sufficiently
clear and explicit, and they are appropriately tailored
to the facts and circumstances of this case.
We also note that the court properly balanced its
order by setting limits as to the time of access and
allowing the defendant to select the two dates he pre-
ferred from a list of six. Moreover, the plaintiff must
pay for the off-duty Greenwich police officer to be there
and the defendant’s mother, Barbara Netter, with whom
the defendant has a strained relationship, cannot
accompany the plaintiff to assist with the removal of
her belongings. Finally, whereas the court had relegated
the defendant to the pool house in its nearly identical
pendente lite access order; see footnote 17 of this opin-
ion; in its final order, it permitted the defendant to be
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Netter v. Netter

present, inside the residence, when the plaintiff collects
her property. We are not persuaded that the court
abused its discretion with respect to the parameters of
its order that the plaintiff have access to the former
marital residence to retrieve her personal belongings.
The judgment is reversed only as to the financial
orders and the case is remanded for a new trial on all
financial issues consistent with this opinion; the appeal
is dismissed as to the custody order insofar as it pertains
to the parties’ older child; the judgment is affirmed in
all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.