U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Melcon

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U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Melcon

U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, TRUSTEE
v. ISRAEL MELCON ET AL.
(AC 47211)
Elgo, Moll and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant property owners appealed from the trial court’s denial of
their second motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure rendered for
the plaintiff. The defendants had filed their first motion to open the judgment
of strict foreclosure on the defendants’ law day, which the court denied
that same day without explanation. The defendants did not appeal from the
denial of the first motion to open. The defendants claimed that the court
incorrectly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to open the
judgment of strict foreclosure on the ground that title already had vested
in the plaintiff, thereby rendering the defendants’ second motion to open
moot. Held:

The trial court improperly denied the defendants’ second motion to open,
as, pursuant to the rule of practice ((2023) § 61-11 (a)) and relevant case
law, vesting of title to the property could not occur during the twenty day
appeal period after the denial of the first motion to open, and, because law
days do not automatically reset after the conclusion of an appeal period in
which no appeal is filed, the court retained subject matter jurisdiction over
the motion because title had not yet vested in the plaintiff.

Argued January 15—officially released August 26, 2025

Procedural History

Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
erty owned by the named defendant et al., and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of New Britain, where the named defendant et al.
were defaulted for failure to plead; thereafter, the court,
Hon. Joseph M. Shortall, judge trial referee, granted
the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure
and rendered judgment thereon; subsequently, the
court, Hon. Joseph M. Shortall, judge trial referee,
denied the motion to open the judgment filed by the
named defendant et al., and the named defendant et al.
appealed to this court. Reversed; further proceedings.
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John A. Sodipo, for the appellants (named defendant
et al.).
Benjamin T. Staskiewicz, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion

ELGO, J. In this foreclosure action, the defendants
Israel Melcon and Antonia Melcon appeal from the judg-
ment of the trial court denying their August 21, 2023
postjudgment motion to open the judgment of strict
foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff, U.S. Bank National
Association.1 On appeal, the defendants claim that the
court incorrectly determined that it lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to open the judgment of strict foreclo-
sure on the ground that title already had vested in the
plaintiff, thereby rendering the defendants’ motion to
open moot.2 We agree with the defendants and, accord-
ingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural his-
tory are relevant to resolving the defendants’ claim.
The plaintiff brought this foreclosure action against the
defendants in January, 2020. The complaint alleged that
the plaintiff, a successor in interest with respect to the
mortgage of certain residential property in Rocky Hill
1
HOP Energy, LLC, also was named as a defendant based on its judgment
lien on the property, but did not appear in the foreclosure action and has
not participated in this appeal. We refer to Israel Melcon and Antonia Melcon,
who were self-represented through most of the underlying proceedings but
who are now represented by counsel, as the defendants throughout this
opinion. At all relevant times, U.S. Bank National Association has functioned
as trustee and successor in interest to Bank of America, National Association,
which was the trustee and successor by merger to LaSalle Bank National
Association, the trustee for Morgan Stanley Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-8XS.
For convenience, we refer to U.S. Bank National Association as the plaintiff
throughout this opinion.
2
On appeal, the defendants also claim that the court improperly denied
their motion to reconsider its denial of the motion to open the judgment.
In light of our conclusion that the court improperly denied the defendants’
motion to open, we need not reach that issue.
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owned by the defendants, had accelerated the note due
to default. In 2021, a default judgment was entered
against the defendants following their failure to plead.3
On August 1, 2022, the court rendered a judgment of
strict foreclosure with respect to the property and set
a law day of August 29, 2022. On November 18, 2022,
the plaintiff filed a claim for statutory stay, representing
that the defendants had filed a bankruptcy petition on
August 29, 2022, triggering a stay of the foreclosure
proceedings, and that the stay had been lifted by the
bankruptcy court in October, 2022.4 On January 26,
2023, the plaintiff moved to reset the law days and
reenter the judgment of strict foreclosure. The court
granted the plaintiff’s motion on April 3, 2023, rendered
a new judgment of strict foreclosure, and set a new law
day of May 1, 2023.

On April 24, 2023, pursuant to the standing orders of
the court, the plaintiff filed a notice of reentry and
modification of the judgment of strict foreclosure,
asserting that the law day for the defendants was May
1, 2023, and that, if they did not redeem their interest
in the property, title would vest with the plaintiff on
May 3, 2023. On May 1, 2023, the defendants filed a
motion to open the judgment and extend the law day
(first motion to open).5 In support of that motion, the
defendants filed an affidavit that stated that, although
From the inception of this foreclosure action until August, 2023, the
3

defendants were self-represented. From August 18, 2023, through this appeal,
the defendants have been represented by counsel.
4
The defendants filed their bankruptcy petition on August 29, 2022, in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut. Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay against the assets of the defendants—
including the property in question in the present action—issued. The bank-
ruptcy court issued an order granting relief from the automatic stay on
October 19, 2022, thereby permitting the foreclosure action to proceed.
5
The defendants simultaneously filed a motion for an expedited hearing
on the motion to extend the law day, which also was denied that same day
by the court.
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they understood that they ‘‘no longer can stay in [their]
home,’’ they were attempting to orchestrate a sale of
the property to ‘‘people in [their] circle . . . .’’ The
defendants also pointed to their daughter’s ‘‘severe anx-
iety’’ as an additional good cause to extend the law day
as they ‘‘continue to rethink [their] future . . . .’’ The
motion was denied the same day, without explanation
by the court.6
On June 26, 2023, the plaintiff filed a motion for a
deficiency judgment that contained a proposed order
that stated, inter alia, that the court ‘‘finds that the
mortgaged property was not redeemed and that title to
said property vested in the plaintiff on May 3, 2023.’’
On August 21, 2023, now represented by counsel, the
defendants filed a second motion to open the judgment
(second motion to open), which is the subject of this
appeal. In that motion, the defendants argued that the
court’s denial of their first motion to open created a
new twenty day appeal period, rendering the passing
of the May 1, 2023 law day ineffective. The defendants
argued that, as a result of these events, title never vested
in the plaintiff.7 The plaintiff objected to the second
motion to open and argued, inter alia, that title had
vested on May 3, 2023.8
6
The court’s order denying the motion to open the judgment stated that
the defendants ‘‘need not vacate the premises until an execution of ejectment
is obtained by the plaintiff.’’
7
The parties mutually represent that the plaintiff recorded a certificate
of foreclosure on the land records on May 24, 2023, and subsequently pur-
ported to sell the property to a third-party purchaser.
8
The plaintiff argues on appeal that the court should have ‘‘dismissed the
[second] motion to open as being moot’’ rather than having denied the
motion, ‘‘based upon title already vesting and the trial court no longer
having jurisdiction. See Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn.
568, 569–70, 953 A.2d 868 (2008), and Thompson Gardens West Condomin-
ium Assn., Inc. v. Masto, 140 Conn. App. 271, 274, 59 A.3d 276 (2013).’’
Because we conclude that title did not vest and the court, therefore, retained
jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s observation that the motion should have been
dismissed—if such jurisdiction was, in fact, lacking—is academic.
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On September 18, 2023, the court denied the defen-
dants’ second motion to open. The court’s order stated:
‘‘The court denied the defendants’ [first] motion to open
on May 1, 2023. The defendants are correct that the
denial stayed the law day until the twenty day appeal
period expired. Because the defendants took no appeal,
no stay was in effect thereafter. By operation of law,
the new law day was May 22, 2023. Title vested in the
plaintiff on May 24, 2023. The court lacks authority to
open the judgment thereafter. General Statutes § 49-
15.’’9 The defendants then filed a motion to reconsider
and reargue, to which the plaintiff objected. In their
motion, the defendants argued that the court had failed
to consider ‘‘controlling law’’ when it denied the second
motion to open. More specifically, the defendants argued
that ‘‘there is no case law in this state’’ that supports
the court’s analysis that the appellate stay ‘‘somehow
automatically caused the law day to reset by itself.’’

In its objection, the plaintiff argued, inter alia, that
the court ‘‘clearly recognizes that the original law days
did not commence on May 1, 2023, as argued by the
defendants. The court’s order, then, contemplates that
law days are ineffective during an appeal period but,
by common sense implication at least, the order goes
on to articulate that the law days would recommence
upon the expiration of the twenty day appeal period
following the May 1, 2023 denial of the [first] motion
to open. In this way, the court has applied the law and
the defendants’ reliance upon some misapplication of
law is wholly inadequate to support reconsideration.’’

The court denied the defendants’ motion to reargue
and granted the motion to reconsider but declined to
9
General Statutes § 49-15 (a) (1) provides in relevant part that no judgment
of strict foreclosure ‘‘shall be opened after the title has become absolute
in any encumbrancer . . . .’’
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‘‘depart from that earlier ruling denying the defendants’
[second motion to open].’’10 The defendants then timely
filed their appeal from the court’s denial of their second
motion to open.11

Subsequently, this court, sua sponte, ordered the trial
court to articulate ‘‘the factual and legal basis for its
September 18, 2023 denial of the defendants’ [second
motion to open] wherein the court held that the law
day was reset to May 22, 2023 ‘[b]y operation of law.’ ’’
On February 29, 2024, the court filed an articulation,
in which it stated: ‘‘This court’s denial of the defendants’
motion to open on May 1, 2023, created an appellate
stay of twenty days that expired on May 21, 2023. As
a matter of law, therefore, no law day set within that
period would be valid, and once the appellate stay
expired, a new law day would be effective. Had the
defendants taken an appeal from the court’s denial,
the appellate stay would have remained in effect. They
failed to do so or to take any other action that might
arguably have extended the appellate stay beyond May
21, 2023. While the court might have set a new law day
when it denied the [first] motion to open, it was not
required to do so. In the absence of such an order, the
first law day, for the holder of the equity of redemption,
was the first Monday after the expiration of the appel-
late stay, that is, May 22, 2023. The defendants and a
10
The plaintiff’s certificate of foreclosure was filed on May 24, 2023. That
certificate of foreclosure stated that title had vested on May 3, 2023. In its
appellate brief, the plaintiff states that this certificate of foreclosure ‘‘does
not reference the correct date of vesting of title’’ and that the plaintiff ‘‘will
have a corrected document recorded after the completion of this appeal.’’
The plaintiff now asserts that title vested on May 24, 2023.
11
Our Supreme Court has held that the denial of a motion to open is
an appealable final judgment. See Connecticut National Mortgage Co. v.
Knudsen, 323 Conn. 684, 687 n.8, 150 A.3d 675 (2016) (‘‘[t]he denial of a
motion to open a judgment of strict foreclosure is an appealable final judg-
ment itself and distinctly appealable from the underlying judgment’’); see
also Practice Book §§ 61-11 and 63-1.
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junior lienholder having failed to redeem, title vested
in the plaintiff on May 24, 2023.’’12
On appeal, the defendants contend that the court
improperly denied their second motion to open.
According to the defendants, the court retained jurisdic-
tion to hear their motion when no party moved to reset
the law day following the expiration of the appellate
stay.
In response, the plaintiff concedes that ‘‘[t]his denial
by operation of law pursuant to Practice Book § 63-1
(a) created a new twenty day appeal period in which
the May 1, 2023 law day could not run. Because the
trial court did not set a new law day in its order, by
operation of law, the law day was stayed for that twenty
day appeal period before the law days once again could
run.’’13 The plaintiff correctly points out that the defen-
dants have not cited any ‘‘standing order, statute, Prac-
tice Book section or case law that requires the trial
court to reset law days after a denial of a motion to
12
On April 9, 2024, the defendants filed a motion for further articulation,
in which they sought clarification of the court’s use of the term ‘‘operation
of law,’’ noting that the court had provided ‘‘no legal authority that would
qualify as ‘operation of law.’ ’’ The defendants argued that there is no legal
basis to assert that the law day automatically resets without court action
and that the court did not so act by issuing any order or notice following
the May 1, 2023 ruling. The court denied the defendants’ motion for further
articulation, and the defendants then filed in this court a motion for review
of the trial court’s denial of the motion for further articulation. We granted
review but denied the relief requested.
13
Practice Book § 63-1 (a) provides: ‘‘Unless a different time period is
provided by statute, an appeal must be filed within twenty days of the date
notice of the judgment or decision is given. The appeal period may be
extended if permitted by Section 66-1 (a). If circumstances give rise to a
new appeal period as provided in subsection (c) of this rule, such new
period may be similarly extended as long as no extension of the original
appeal period was obtained. If a motion is filed within the appeal period
that might give rise to a new appeal period as provided in subsection (c)
of this rule, the appeal may be filed either in the original appeal period,
which continues to run, or in the new appeal period. As used in this rule,
‘appeal period’ includes any extension of such period obtained pursuant to
Section 66-1 (a).’’
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open a judgment of strict foreclosure.’’ Conceding that
courts ‘‘do periodically’’ and sua sponte order new law
days, the plaintiff nonetheless argues that ‘‘this practice
is not required under our rules of practice or any statu-
tory authority’’ and is, instead, ‘‘simply a courtesy’’ and
‘‘within the [court’s] discretion . . . .’’
This case thus presents a question of first impression
as to whether an appeal period automatically, by opera-
tion of law, extends a previously established law day
without the court acting to set—and provide notice of—
a new law day. ‘‘Because the principal issue on appeal
concerns questions of law, namely, subject matter juris-
diction and the scope of the appellate stay provisions
in the rules of practice, our review is plenary.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Lending Home Funding
Corp. v. REI Holdings, LLC, 214 Conn. App. 703, 710,
281 A.3d 1 (2022) (Lending Home). When a trial court
‘‘draws conclusions of law . . . we must decide
whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct
and find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chamerda v. Opie,
185 Conn. App. 627, 637–38, 197 A.3d 982, cert. denied,
330 Conn. 953, 197 A.3d 893 (2018); see also In re Ava
W., 336 Conn. 545, 553, 248 A.3d 675 (2020) (‘‘[a] deter-
mination regarding a trial court’s subject matter juris-
diction presents a question of law, and . . . we exer-
cise plenary review’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).14
14
The plaintiff argues in its appellate brief that the applicable standard
of review is the abuse of discretion standard. Under that standard, a court’s
granting or denial of a motion to open a judgment is afforded great latitude,
and such an action by a trial court ‘‘will not be disturbed on appeal unless
it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel, 339 Conn.
366, 381, 260 A.3d 1187 (2021). Where a court, however, has determined,
as a matter of law, that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a motion
to open a judgment, as occurred in this case, our review of that legal
determination is plenary. See Pennymac Corp. v. Tarzia, 215 Conn. App.
190, 200 n.8, 281 A.3d 469 (2022).
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The following legal principles and rules of practice
are relevant to the defendant’s claim. ‘‘In Connecticut,
a mortgagee has legal title to the mortgaged property
and the mortgagor has equitable title, also called the
equity of redemption. . . . The equity of redemption
gives the mortgagor the right to redeem the legal title
previously conveyed by performing whatever condi-
tions are specified in the mortgage, the most important
of which is usually the payment of money. . . . Under
our law, an action for strict foreclosure is brought by
a mortgagee who, holding legal title, seeks not to
enforce a forfeiture but rather to foreclose an equity
of redemption unless the mortgagor satisfies the debt
on or before his law day. . . . Accordingly, [if] a fore-
closure decree has become absolute by the passing of
the law days, the outstanding rights of redemption have
been cut off and the title has become unconditional in
the plaintiff, with a consequent and accompanying right
to possession. . . . Thus, once the law day passes and
title vests in the [plaintiff], no practical relief is available
[p]rovided that this vesting has occurred pursuant to
an authorized exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court
. . . . In other words, § 49-15 (a) (1) . . . generally
prohibits mortgagors from obtaining practical relief
after the passage of the law days and, as a result, [ren-
ders] . . . postvesting motions to open a judgment
. . . moot. . . . On the other hand, it is well estab-
lished that law days that are set forth in a judgment of
strict foreclosure can have no legal effect if an appellate
stay is in effect because to give them legal effect would
result in an extinguishment of the right of redemption
pending appeal.’’15 (Citations omitted; internal quotation
15
Section 49-15 sets forth the conditions under which a party may move to
open a judgment of strict foreclosure. As this court previously has explained,
‘‘§ 49-15 prescribes only four conditions for opening a judgment of strict
foreclosure: (1) that the motion be in writing; (2) that the movant be a
person having an interest in the property; (3) that the motion be acted upon
before an encumbrancer has acquired title; and (4) that cause, obviously
good cause, be shown for opening the judgment.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Connecticut Housing Finance Authority v. McCarthy, 204 Conn.
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marks omitted.) Lending Home Funding Corp. v. REI
Holdings, LLC, supra, 214 Conn. 711–12; see also U.S.
Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel, 339 Conn. 366, 375,
260 A.3d 1187 (2021) (‘‘[i]n Connecticut, the passage of
the law days in an action for strict foreclosure extin-
guishes a mortgagor’s equitable right of redemption and
vests absolute title in the encumbrancer’’). ‘‘Law days
in a strict foreclosure cannot run if a motion to open
is filed during the appeal period but is yet to be ruled on.
. . . Law days are ineffective while the appeal period
is pending. To conclude otherwise would be tantamount
to depriving a party of judicial review and, therefore,
of due process of law.’’ (Citations omitted.) Continental
Capital Corp. v. Lazarte, 57 Conn. App. 271, 273–74,
749 A.2d 646 (2000). ‘‘Because of delays incident to the
legal process of appeal, the judgment of the trial court
[becomes] ineffective in an essential respect, and what
is in effect a new judgment [becomes] necessary. . . .
In other words, the law days are ineffective pending
the stay because to treat them otherwise would carry
out the judgment in violation of the stay.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) RAL Man-
agement, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 278 Conn. 672,
683, 899 A.2d 586 (2006).
‘‘[A] judgment of strict foreclosure may be opened
only upon a finding that the court lacked jurisdiction
over either the person or the case at the time the judg-
ment of strict foreclosure was entered. Anything less
would appear to be in direct contravention of the stric-
tures of § 49-15 (a) and our subsequent case law.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank National
App. 330, 339, 253 A.3d 494 (2021). Further, ‘‘[i]n order to be entitled to an
opening of a judgment pursuant to § 49-15, the movant bears the burden of
establishing the existence of good cause. . . . [G]ood cause for opening a
[judgment] pursuant to § 49-15 . . . cannot rest entirely upon a showing
that the original foreclosure judgment was erroneous. Otherwise that statute
would serve merely as a device for extending the time to appeal from the
judgment.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 340.
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Trust Co. v. Pardo, 170 Conn. App. 642, 652, 155 A.3d
764, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 912, 159 A.3d 231 (2017).16
No less importantly, we must keep in mind that ‘‘[t]he
law governing strict foreclosure lies at the crossroads
between the equitable remedies provided by the judi-
ciary and the statutory remedies provided by the legisla-
ture. . . . Because foreclosure is peculiarly an equita-
ble action . . . the court may entertain such questions
as are necessary to be determined in order that com-
plete justice may be done. . . . In exercising its equita-
ble discretion, however, the court must comply with
mandatory statutory provisions that limit the remedies
available to a foreclosing mortgagee. . . . It is our adju-
dicatory responsibility to find the appropriate accom-
modation between applicable judicial and statutory
principles. Just as the legislature is presumed to enact
legislation that renders the body of the law coherent
and consistent, rather than contradictory and inconsis-
tent . . . [so] courts must discharge their responsibil-
ity, in case by case adjudication, to assure that the
body of the law—both common and statutory—remains
coherent and consistent.’’ (Internal quotation marks
16
In Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pardo, supra, 170 Conn. App.
642, the court had set a law day of May 19, 2015. Id., 645. The defendant
filed a motion to open the judgment on May 12, prior to the law day, but
the motion was not heard until May 26—after the law day had passed, and
without any record of the defendant requesting a hearing on the motion to
open prior to the law day. Id., 652–53. As we noted then, ‘‘[a] critical factor
to be recognized in connection with a motion to reopen a judgment of strict
foreclosure is that the motion must be heard, and not merely filed, prior to
the vesting of title. . . . [W]e have not found any basis in the law for the
proposition that a mere challenge to jurisdiction tolls the running of the
law days.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. Crucially, in Pardo, the appeal period had
passed but the law day had not when the motion to open was filed. Id., 645.
The reason that such a motion must be heard in order to toll the passing
of the law day is that any denial of such a motion opens a new appeal
period. See Practice Book § 63-1 (a); Continental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte,
supra, 57 Conn. App. 273 (‘‘[l]aw days in a strict foreclosure cannot run if
a motion to open is filed during the appeal period but is yet to be ruled on’’).
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omitted.) Seminole Realty, LLC v. Sekretaev, 192 Conn.
App. 405, 416, 218 A.3d 198, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 905,
220 A.3d 35 (2019).
Several rules of practice are relevant to this claim,
including Practice Book (2023) § 61-11 (a), which allows
for an automatic stay of execution in noncriminal
cases,17 and Practice Book (2023) § 61-11 (g), which
governs the operation of an appellate stay within the
strict foreclosure context.18 These provisions, however,
17
Practice Book (2023) § 61-11 (a) provides: ‘‘Except where otherwise
provided by statute or other law, proceedings to enforce or carry out the
judgment or order shall be automatically stayed until the time to file an
appeal has expired. If an appeal is filed, such proceedings shall be stayed
until the final determination of the cause. If the case goes to judgment on
appeal, any stay thereafter shall be in accordance with Section 71-6 (motions
for reconsideration), Section 84-3 (petitions for certification by the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court), and Section 71-7 (petitions for certiorari by the United
States Supreme Court).’’ This language was changed in 2025. See Practice
Book § 61-11 (a). Relatedly, Practice Book (2023) § 63-1 (c) (1) provides in
relevant part that a new appeal period is created under certain conditions:
‘‘If a motion is filed within the appeal period that, if granted, would render
the judgment, decision or acceptance of the verdict ineffective, either a new
twenty day period or applicable statutory time period for filing the appeal
shall begin on the day that notice of the ruling is given on the last such
outstanding motion . . . .’’
18
Practice Book (2023) § 61-11 (g) provides: ‘‘Strict foreclosure—motion
rendering ineffective a judgment of strict foreclosure. In any action for
foreclosure in which the owner of the equity has filed, and the court has
denied, at least two prior motions to open or other similar motion, no
automatic stay shall arise upon the court’s denial of any subsequent con-
tested motion by that party, unless the party certifies under oath, in an
affidavit accompanying the motion, that the motion was filed for good cause
arising after the court’s ruling on the party’s most recent motion. Such
affidavit shall recite the specific facts relied on in support of the moving
party’s claim of good cause. If, notwithstanding the submission of such an
affidavit of good cause, the plaintiff contends that there is no good cause
to stay the court’s judgment of strict foreclosure pending resolution of the
appeal, the plaintiff may seek termination of the automatic stay by filing a
motion requesting such relief accompanied by an affidavit stating the basis
for the plaintiff’s claim. In the event such a motion to terminate stay is filed,
it shall be set down for argument and the taking of evidence, if necessary,
on the second short calendar next following the filing of the motion. There
shall be no automatic appellate stay in the event that the court grants the
motion to terminate the stay and, if necessary, sets new law dates. There shall
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do not address directly whether the expiration of an
appellate stay automatically operates to extend a law
day that has been previously set by the court.
In Lending Home Funding Corp. v. REI Holdings,
LLC, supra, 214 Conn. App. 703, this court considered
a similar set of circumstances, wherein the trial court
had concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to hear a motion to open and vacate a judgment of
strict foreclosure due to the vesting of title resulting
from the passing of the law day. Id., 707–709. We con-
cluded that when the law day ‘‘passed during the appel-
late stay period [it] could not have had the legal effect
of vesting absolute title in the plaintiff. . . . Accord-
ingly, the court’s determination that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the merits of the defendant’s . . .
motion to open the judgment of strict foreclosure was
improper. To hold otherwise would circumvent the
automatic stay provisions established by our rules of
practice.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 719–20.
Additional procedural history and analysis of the
Lending Home decision is helpful for resolving the
defendants’ claim. In Lending Home, the court denied
the debtor’s motion to open and also assigned a new
law day. Id., 706. Prior to that law day, the debtor filed
a motion to reargue the motion to open. Id. After the
passing of the law day, the court denied the motion to
reargue and sent notice to the parties. Id., 706–707.
Twelve days later, the foreclosing party filed a certifi-
cate of foreclosure on the appropriate land records and
also executed a quitclaim deed purporting to transfer
the property. Id., 707. Months later, the debtor filed
another motion to open, arguing that title never vested
in the foreclosing party and that the purported transfer
be no automatic stay pending a motion for review of an order terminating
a stay under this subsection.’’
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was therefore never effective. Id. The debtor claimed
that, because it had filed the motion to reargue within
the twenty day appeal period established by our rules
of practice, the law day ‘‘had no legal effect . . . .’’ Id.,
708. In essence, the debtor argued that there was good
cause to open the judgment—due to both the court’s
failure to ‘‘sua sponte reassign a legally effective law
day,’’ as well as the plaintiff’s ‘‘failure to move the court
to set a new law day outside the appeal period . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The court denied
the debtor’s motion on the ground that it was without
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion. Id., 709.
On appeal, this court interpreted Practice Book §§ 61-
11 (a) and 63-1, as well as our Supreme Court’s previous
authority, to conclude that the filing of the motion to
reargue extended the appellate stay period until the
point in time at which ‘‘the parties received notice of
the court’s ruling on that motion.’’ Id., 710. We held
that, because the law day fell within the extended appel-
late stay period, ‘‘it had no legal effect and could not
vest absolute title’’ in the foreclosing party. Id.; see also
Continental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte, supra, 57 Conn.
App. 273 (‘‘[l]aw days in a strict foreclosure cannot run
if a motion to open is filed during the appeal period
but is yet to be ruled on’’).19
19
We have also held that, when a party files a motion to open a judgment
of strict foreclosure outside of the appeal period, no automatic stay is in
place. See First National Bank of Chicago v. Luecken, 66 Conn. App. 606,
608, 785 A.2d 1148 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 915, 792 A.2d 851 (2002).
The rule in foreclosure by sale situations functions similarly: ‘‘[I]n a foreclo-
sure by sale, although the right of redemption is extinguished upon the
court’s approval of the foreclosure sale, a motion to open a judgment approv-
ing that sale, properly filed within the appeal period, acts as a stay of the
proceedings to enforce or carry out the judgment. The mortgagor’s right of
redemption, therefore, survives the appeal period to the extent that the
order may not be enforced until the appeal period has elapsed. To rule
otherwise would take away a mortgagor’s right to effectively appeal from
the judgment approving the sale. By way of analogy, a court’s approval of
the sale in a foreclosure by sale is like the running of law days in a strict
foreclosure matter in that it serves as the operative act which extinguishes
the mortgagor’s right of redemption and can deprive the court of subject
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The defendants argue that Lending Home, if not dis-
positive of the present case, is highly instructive.
According to the defendants, the plaintiff’s contention
that the law days automatically reset upon a denial of a
motion that opens a new appeal window is incompatible
with our conclusion in Lending Home. Put differently,
if the plaintiff is correct that the law day resets after
an appeal period ends, then the trial court in Lending
Home would have lacked jurisdiction to consider a
motion to open, filed months after notice to the parties
of the court’s denial of the motion to reargue the motion
to open. As the defendants argue, underlying the holding
in Lending Home is the presumption that the law days
do not reset automatically: ‘‘If it is true [as the plaintiff
contends] that law days automatically reset by them-
selves after the expiration of the appeal period, then,
arguably, the law days would have been extended auto-
matically in the Lending Home case to take effect
twenty-one days after the [ruling on the motion].’’
We note that the setting of law days is not merely
incidental to a judgment of strict foreclosure. ‘‘In a
foreclosure action, the judgment must either find the
issues for the defendant or determine the amount of
the debt, direct a foreclosure and fix the law days.’’
Morici v. Jarvie, 137 Conn. 97, 103, 75 A.2d 47 (1950).
In a strict foreclosure, then, the fixing of law days is
an essential part of the judgment. Our Supreme Court,
for instance, determined that it was improper for the
trial court to open the judgment during the pendency
of an appellate stay merely to change the law days.
See RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates,
supra, 278 Conn. 682.
Relying on RAL Management, Inc., the defendants
argue that ‘‘the [court] cannot leave the judgment of
matter jurisdiction to open or set aside that judgment when such a motion
is filed outside of the appeal period.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank
of Minnesota, N.A. v. Morgan, 98 Conn. App. 72, 81, 909 A.2d 526 (2006).
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foreclosure with ineffective law days in abeyance. At
minimum, a new judgment is required.’’ See RAL Man-
agement, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, supra, 278
Conn. 683 (‘‘[b]ecause of delays incident to the legal
process of appeal, the judgment of the trial court
[becomes] ineffective in an essential respect, and what
is in effect a new judgment [becomes] necessary’’ (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). As our Supreme Court
has observed, ‘‘the law days are ineffective pending the
stay because to treat them otherwise would carry out
the judgment in violation of the stay. It necessarily
follows, therefore, that if the law days have no legal
effect and necessarily will lapse pending the appeal;
see Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan,
[216 Conn. 341, 348, 579 A.2d 1054 (1990)]; any change
to those dates pending appeal similarly have no effect.
Indeed, the rules of practice anticipate such a circum-
stance by providing specific authority for the trial court
to set new law days if the court’s judgment is affirmed
on appeal. See Practice Book § 17-10.’’20 (Footnote omit-
ted.) RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates,
supra, 683–84.
Although the plaintiff acknowledges that vesting can-
not occur during the appeal period, it contends that
Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, supra,
216 Conn. 341, stands for the proposition that only when
an appeal is filed during the appeal period does the
judgment become ineffective. In other words, according
to the plaintiff, the law day must be reset only when
an appeal is timely filed. According to this logic, after
20
We note that Practice Book § 17-10 provides: ‘‘If a judgment fixing a
set time for the performance of an act is affirmed on appeal by the Supreme
Court and such time has elapsed pending the appeal, the judicial authority
which rendered the judgment appealed from may, on motion and after due
notice, modify it by extending the time.’’ Although there is an important
distinction between an appeal period in which no appeal has been filed and
an appellate ruling that affirms a judgment after a time that had been fixed
by the judgment has lapsed, this rule highlights the importance of due notice.
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the appeal period had lapsed—without an appeal having
been filed by the defendants subsequent to the court’s
denial of their first motion to open—‘‘the law days
started to run pursuant to operation of law.’’ We are
not persuaded.
In Sullivan, the trial court had rendered a judgment
of strict foreclosure against a nonappearing, defaulted
debtor and had set law days of February 29 through
March 4, 1988. See Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank
v. Sullivan, supra, 216 Conn. 344. On February 8, a
lienholder filed a motion to open and modify the judg-
ment of strict foreclosure, which was not heard until
after the passing of the law days. Id. On the final law
day, the junior lienholder redeemed its interest in the
property. Id.
Thereafter, the defaulted debtor filed an appearance
and a motion to open the judgment and to set new law
days. Id., 344–45. Following the court’s denial of all
pending motions, the defaulted debtor appealed from
the denial of its motion to open. Id., 345. On appeal,
our Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘the trial court
should have granted the [defaulted debtor’s] motion to
open the judgment of strict foreclosure and remand[ed]
the case with direction to open the judgment and to
order a foreclosure by sale.’’ Id. The court relied, in
part, on the fact that the lienholder, by filing a motion
to open within the appeal period of the judgment, had
rendered the law day ineffective. As the court stated,
the effect of the filing of the lienholder’s motion to
open was ‘‘to stay the enforceability of the foreclosure
judgment’’ until the motion was decided. Id., 347. In
other words, even though it was not the lienholder who
filed the appeal, it was the lienholder’s motion to open,
filed within the appeal period, that rendered ineffective
the law days. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention in
the present case, Sullivan supports our conclusion that
a law day must be reset once it is rendered ineffective
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by an appellate stay. Sullivan also underscores the obvi-
ous point that notice of the law day protects not only
the debtor but subsequent lienholders.
To be clear, neither this court nor our Supreme Court
has held that law days reset automatically.21 As we have
explained previously in this opinion, the law day in a
strict foreclosure action is predicated on the right of
redemption, which, in the absence of notice, would be
eviscerated. It is well established that ‘‘law days that
are set forth in a judgment of strict foreclosure can
have no legal effect if an appellate stay is in effect
because to [do so] would result in an extinguishment
of the right of redemption pending appeal.’’ Sovereign
Bank v. Licata, 178 Conn. App. 82, 91 n.11, 172 A.3d
1263 (2017). We cannot endorse any result that permits
a law day to pass silently. ‘‘Law days are ineffective
while the appeal period is pending. To conclude other-
wise would be tantamount to depriving a party of judi-
cial review and, therefore, of due process of law.’’ Con-
tinental Capital Corp. v. Lazarte, supra, 57 Conn. App.
273–74; see also U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Rago, 216
Conn. App. 200, 206, 284 A.3d 629 (2022) (holding that
‘‘the court erred in making updated findings sua sponte
and without providing to the parties adequate notice
and an opportunity to be heard’’).
On the facts of this case, as well as our review of
the relevant statutes, rules of practice, applicable case
law, and the principles of equity that undergird the
foregoing, we conclude that law days do not automati-
cally reset after the conclusion of an appeal period
in which no appeal is filed. Here, the self-represented
defendants, upon receiving notice that the court had
denied their motion to open on May 1, 2023, nonetheless
had no notice from the court as to whether or how this
21
We observe that the Rules Committee of the Superior Court remains
free to amend the text of the relevant rules as it deems appropriate.
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would impact their law day and right of redemption.
The court’s subsequent articulation of its order does
not clarify the situation—stating only that the court
‘‘might’’ have changed the law day. Moreover, the record
reflects that the plaintiff also was confused as to when
title had vested—a confusion that lingers through the
present appeal.22 In order to fulfill its equitable purpose,
a law day cannot pass silently, without all parties having
proper notice. Our system of laws simply cannot coun-
tenance such a result.
We conclude that the court retained subject matter
jurisdiction because title did not vest in the plaintiff on
May 24, 2023. For that reason, the court improperly
denied the motion to open on that basis.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for the purpose of making a new finding as to the
amount of the debt, for the setting of new law days,
and for other proceedings according to law.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

22
The plaintiff’s actions suggest that it lacked clarity as to whether title
had vested on May 3, 2023, as the plaintiff averred in its objection to the
defendants’ second motion to open, in its motion for a deficiency judgment
and on the certificate of foreclosure, or on May 24, 2023, as the plaintiff
claims on appeal in light of the court’s February 29, 2024 articulation. See
footnote 10 of this opinion.