Gorbecki v. Shehu

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Gorbecki v. Shehu

JOHN GORBECKI ET AL. v.
KARL D. SHEHU ET AL.
(AC 47454)
Elgo, Wilson and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment for the defendants
on their complaint alleging, inter alia, vexatious litigation. The plaintiffs
claimed, inter alia, that the trial court improperly found that there was
probable cause for the prosecution of a prior action against the plaintiffs.
Held:

This court dismissed the appeal as moot, the plaintiffs having failed to
challenge one of the two grounds that the trial court expressly and correctly
identified as being independently sufficient to support its judgment for the
defendants.
Argued April 15—officially released August 12, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, vexatious
litigation, and for other relief, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the
action was withdrawn as against the defendant Heidi
Finke et al.; thereafter, the case was tried to the court,
Cordani, J.; judgment for the named defendant et al.,
from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Appeal
dismissed.
Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Suzanne B. Sutton, for the appellees (named defen-
dant et al.).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs, John Gorbecki and
Joseph Gorbecki, brought the civil action underlying
this appeal, which includes claims of statutory vexa-
tious litigation, common-law vexatious litigation, and
abuse of process, against the defendants Karl D. Shehu
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Gorbecki v. Shehu

and Shehu, LLC. Following a bench trial, the trial court
1

rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, from
which the plaintiffs now appeal. Having reviewed the
claims that are properly before us in this appeal, we
conclude that the appeal is moot because the plaintiffs
have failed to challenge an independent ground that
supports the judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
The following procedural history is relevant to this
appeal. In their revised complaint dated September 9,
2022, the plaintiffs alleged that, at all relevant times,
Shehu was a member of the Connecticut bar engaged
in the practice of law through his law firm, Shehu, LLC.
On or about November 15, 2013, the defendants, on
behalf of their clients, Heidi Finke and Jeffrey Windisch-
man, commenced a civil action (prior action) that included
claims against the plaintiffs in their individual capaci-
ties. The defendants, seeking more than one million
dollars in damages, alleged in the prior action that the
plaintiffs had engaged in tortious conduct related to
the sale of a truck by A Better Way Wholesale Autos,
Inc. (A Better Way). At all relevant times, John Gorbecki
was the president of A Better Way and Joseph Gorbecki
was its manager. On September 11, 2015, the defendants
attempted to unilaterally withdraw the prior action in
its entirety without the knowledge of their clients, but
the court rejected the withdrawal. On July 7, 2016, Attor-
ney Chris Nelson replaced the defendants as counsel for
Finke and Windischman in the prior action. Thereafter,
Nelson filed an amended complaint that included claims
against A Better Way but omitted claims brought against
the plaintiffs individually.
Relying on their allegations concerning the prior
action, the plaintiffs in count one of the present action
1
The plaintiffs also named Heidi Finke and Jeffrey Windischman as defen-
dants but later withdrew the claims brought against them. For clarity, we
refer to Karl D. Shehu and Shehu, LLC, collectively as the defendants and
individually by name where appropriate.
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set forth a statutory vexatious litigation claim under
General Statutes § 52-568. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants had commenced the prior action ‘‘without
probable cause and with malicious intent unjustly to vex
and trouble the plaintiffs.’’ In count two, the plaintiffs
brought a claim for common-law vexatious litigation.
The plaintiffs alleged that ‘‘[t]he defendants instituted
and prosecuted the [prior action] without probable
cause and with malicious intent.’’ In count three, the
plaintiffs brought a claim sounding in abuse of process
because ‘‘[the defendants] commenced and prosecuted
the [prior] action against the [plaintiffs] as individuals
in an improper manner and to accomplish a purpose
for which the judicial system [was] not designed. . . .
The purpose was to harass, bully, frighten and force A
Better Way to settle claims because by suing its officers,
[the defendants] sought to have the [plaintiffs] person-
ally pay for the actions of . . . [A Better Way].’’ The
defendants either denied the substantive allegations in
the complaint or left the plaintiffs to their proof. The
defendants, by way of special defenses applicable to
all three counts, alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted and
failed to mitigate damages, if any. The plaintiffs denied
the affirmative defenses.
Following a bench trial, the court issued a written
decision in which it rendered judgment for the defen-
dants. After setting forth its findings of fact and dis-
cussing the legal principles applicable to each of the
plaintiffs’ causes of action, the court stated: ‘‘The court
finds that the plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden
of proof on all three counts for two reasons, each of
which reasons is independently sufficient to support
entry of judgment for the defendants. First, the removal
of the individual claims against the plaintiffs in the
[prior action] through the voluntary filing of an
amended complaint does not qualify as a termination
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Gorbecki v. Shehu

of the claims in favor of the plaintiffs.2 This is particu-
larly so where the prior [action] was ultimately settled
and withdrawn in exchange for a substantial payment
and the exchange of mutual general releases, and where
the plaintiffs here took part in the payments and releases.
Further, the court has found that [Shehu] did not act with
malice nor did he knowingly [or] wilfully abuse court
processes.
‘‘Secondly, the plaintiffs have failed to prove damages
with any reasonable reliability or particularity. Proof of
damages [is] necessary to succeed on all of the counts.’’
(Footnote in original.) With respect to the issue of dam-
ages, the court found as follows: ‘‘In this matter, the
plaintiffs have failed to prove any damages. The court
did not credit Mr. Joseph Gorbecki’s testimony that the
existence of the individual claims, as opposed to the
[prior action] itself in its entirety, injured his relation-
ship with banks. The plaintiffs further produced no
reliable evidence of attorney’s fees paid by the plaintiffs
in connection with the claims against the individuals.’’3
(Footnote omitted.) This appeal followed.
The plaintiffs set forth four distinct claims in the
statement of issues section of their principal appellate
brief. First, ‘‘[d]id the trial court err in finding that there
was probable cause for the prosecution of the prior
action against [the plaintiffs]?’’ Second, ‘‘[d]id the trial
court erroneously rule that a unilateral [withdrawal] of
2
‘‘The court notes that a voluntary amendment to a complaint in an
ongoing proceeding without more does not permanently terminate claims.
No final judgment was entered on the individual claims as a result of the
amended complaint.’’
3
The court also found that the testimony presented by the plaintiffs con-
cerning damages ‘‘was entirely generic, unsupported by anything other than
[Joseph] Gorbecki’s subjective opinion, and entirely unquantified.’’ The court
likewise found that the testimony of Joseph Gorbecki that the plaintiffs had
paid $18,000 or more in legal fees solely with respect to the claims brought
against them in their individual capacities ‘‘was unsupported by any docu-
mentary evidence, imprecise in its nature, and unreliable.’’
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Gorbecki v. Shehu

claims without consideration is [not a] favorable final
determination in regard to the plaintiffs’ vexatious liti-
gation claim?’’ Third, ‘‘[i]s the trial court’s holding that
the plaintiffs did not satisfy the favorable termination
rule contrary to the Supreme Court’s holding in
DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225 [597 A.2d
807] (1991)?’’ Fourth, ‘‘[d]id the trial court err in con-
cluding the plaintiffs did not prove damages?’’
A careful review of the body of the plaintiffs’ principal
appellate brief, however, reveals that the plaintiffs have
only addressed the merits of the claims pertaining to
probable cause and favorable termination. The plain-
tiffs did not challenge the merits of the trial court’s
determination that they did not prove damages with
any reasonable reliability or particularity. Accordingly,
we conclude that the plaintiffs have abandoned the
claim related to damages that appears solely in the
statement of issues portion of the brief. See, e.g., Stubbs
v. ICare Management, LLC, 198 Conn. App. 511, 529,
233 A.3d 1170 (2020) (deeming claim abandoned
because it was only referenced in statement of issues,
introduction, and heading of brief). ‘‘We repeatedly have
stated that [w]e are not required to review issues that
have been improperly presented to this court through
an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere
abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid aban-
doning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.
. . . [When] a claim is asserted in the statement of
issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in
the brief without substantive discussion or citation of
authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned. . . . For a
reviewing court to judiciously and efficiently . . . con-
sider claims of error raised on appeal . . . the parties
must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their
briefs.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thomas v.
Cleary, 229 Conn. App. 15, 35, 326 A.3d 1109 (2024).4
4
In their appellate brief, the defendants, in arguing that the judgment
rendered in their favor should be affirmed, relied on the court’s determina-
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Gorbecki v. Shehu

In this appeal, the plaintiffs have left unchallenged
one of the two grounds that the court expressly and
correctly identified as being independently sufficient
to support its judgment in favor of the defendants.
Faced with this deficiency, we must determine whether
we have subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal or
whether it should be dismissed as moot.5 ‘‘Mootness is
a question of justiciability that must be determined as
a threshold matter because it implicates [this] court’s
subject matter jurisdiction . . . . A determination
regarding . . . [this court’s] subject matter jurisdiction
is a question of law . . . [and, therefore] our review
tion that the plaintiffs had failed to prove damages. Thereafter, the plaintiffs,
in their reply brief, argued that they proved actual damages and, alternatively,
were entitled to nominal damages in connection with one or both of their
vexatious litigation causes of action. This analysis in the plaintiffs’ reply
brief is of no consequence to our determination that they have abandoned
the damages claim. An appellant may not raise arguments for the first time
in a reply brief. See, e.g., Lafferty v. Jones, 229 Conn. App. 487, 510 n.26,
327 A.3d 941 (2024) (‘‘[e]ven if some semblance of this claim can be gleaned
from the defendants’ principal appellate brief, we conclude that the defen-
dants have abandoned the claim as a result of their failure to brief it ade-
quately in their main brief and notwithstanding their attempt to expound
on it in their reply brief’’), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 923, 333 A.3d 105 (2025),
and cert. denied, 351 Conn. 923, 333 A.3d 106 (2025).
5
Even though we raised the issue of mootness sua sponte, we invited the
parties to be prepared to address the issue at oral argument. This court
sent the following notice to the parties: ‘‘The parties are hereby notified to
be prepared to address at oral argument on April 15, 2025, at 2 p.m., whether
this appeal is moot for failure to challenge each independent basis for the
trial court’s decision where the plaintiffs in their principal appellate brief
acknowledge but do not brief a claim regarding the trial court’s determina-
tion that the plaintiffs did not prove damages, which the trial court identified
as one of ‘two reasons . . . each of which . . . is independently sufficient
to support entry of judgment for the defendants.’ See Bongiorno v. J & G
Realty, LLC, 211 Conn. App. 311, 320–24 [272 A.3d 700] (2022).’’
At oral argument, counsel for the defendants argued that the appeal was
moot and that it would be appropriate for this court to either affirm the
judgment or dismiss the appeal. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that, under
a broad reading of Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown
of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123, 138–175, 84 A.3d 840 (2014), this court
has the discretion to consider the damages claim despite the fact that it
was not properly briefed. We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument.
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is plenary. . . . [I]t is not the province of appellate
courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the
granting of actual relief or from the determination of
which no practical relief can follow. . . . In determin-
ing mootness, the dispositive question is whether a suc-
cessful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant
in any way. . . .
‘‘Where an appellant fails to challenge all bases for
a trial court’s adverse ruling on [her] claim, even if this
court were to agree with the appellant on the issues
that [she] does raise, we still would not be able to
provide [her] any relief in light of the binding adverse
finding[s] [not raised] with respect to those claims. . . .
Therefore, when an appellant challenges a trial court’s
adverse ruling, but does not challenge all independent
bases for that ruling, the appeal is moot.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bongiorno
v. J & G Realty, LLC, 211 Conn. App. 311, 322, 272 A.3d
700 (2022).
In the present appeal, even if this court were to agree
with the plaintiffs on their properly briefed claims
regarding probable cause and favorable termination,
the judgment would still stand in light of the court’s
unchallenged determination that the plaintiffs failed to
prove damages with respect to all of their causes of
action. Thus, we are unable to afford the plaintiffs prac-
tical relief in connection with their other claims that
are properly briefed in this appeal. Accordingly, the
appeal is dismissed as moot.
The appeal is dismissed.