Doe v. Fasold

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Doe v. Fasold

JANE DOE #1 v. KYLE FASOLD ET AL.
JANE DOE #2 v. KYLE FASOLD ET AL.
JANE DOE #3 v. KYLE FASOLD ET AL.
JANE DOE #4 ET AL. v. KYLE FASOLD ET AL.
JANE DOE #5 v. KYLE FASOLD ET AL.
JANE DOE #6 v. KYLE FASOLD ET AL.
JANE DOE #8 v. KYLE FASOLD ET AL.
(AC 47269)
Alvord, Elgo and Pellegrino, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs jointly appealed from the trial court’s rendering of summary
judgment, in each of seven cases, for the defendant town with respect to
the plaintiffs’ claims of negligence and negligent supervision. The plaintiffs
claimed that the court improperly rendered summary judgment in each case
despite the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a
work order request for maintenance made by a town employee created a
ministerial duty to perform that maintenance in a prescribed way, thereby
abrogating the town’s governmental immunity protection and exposing the
town to liability pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n) for its failure to complete
the requested maintenance. Held:

The plaintiffs failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact existed
with respect to the nature of the town’s duty because it was legally and
logically correct for the trial court to conclude that the acts and omissions
alleged in each complaint with respect to the requested maintenance were
discretionary in nature, rather than ministerial, and, accordingly, the court
properly determined that the town was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on its governmental immunity defense in each action.

Argued March 11—officially released August 5, 2025

Procedural History

Action, in each case, to recover damages for, inter
alia, invasion of privacy, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of New Britain, where the cases
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Doe v. Fasold

were consolidated; thereafter, in each case, the defen-
dant town of Plainville filed an apportionment com-
plaint; subsequently, in each case, the court, Morgan,
J., granted the motion for summary judgment filed by
the defendant town of Plainville and rendered judgment
thereon, from which the plaintiffs filed a joint appeal
to this court. Affirmed.

Ryan K. Sullivan, with whom were Julianne Lom-
bardo Klaassen, and, on the brief, Paul M. Iannaccone,
for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Thomas R. Gerarde, with whom was Eric E. Gerarde,
for the appellee (defendant town of Plainville).

Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiffs, three adults and four
minors, in seven underlying consolidated tort actions,1
appeal from the judgments of the trial court, Morgan,
J., rendered in favor of the defendant town of Plainville2
following the granting of its motions for summary judg-
ment as to the third and fourth counts of the plaintiffs’
1
The plaintiffs, Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, Jane Doe #3, Jane Doe #4 PPA
John Doe, Jane Doe #5 PPA John Doe, Jane Doe #6 PPA Jane Doe #7, and
Jane Doe #8 PPA Jane Doe #9, were granted permission to proceed under
pseudonyms due to the nature of the allegations in their complaints. ‘‘Per
proxima amici, or [PPA], means by or through the next friend, and is
employed when an adult brings suit on behalf of a minor, who was unable
to maintain an action on his own behalf at common law.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Marciniszyn v. Board of Education, 230 Conn. App. 592,
594 n.1, 330 A.3d 883 (2025).
2
The plaintiffs also named Kyle Fasold as a defendant in their actions,
and their claims against him are still pending in the trial court. Moreover,
in the actions commenced by Jane Doe #4 and Jane Doe #5, the court
granted the plaintiffs’ respective motions to cite in Angela Lastrina as a
defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiffs in those actions withdrew all claims
against Lastrina. Because Fasold and Lastrina are not parties to this appeal
from the partial summary judgments rendered by the trial court; see, e.g.,
Tryon v. North Branford, 58 Conn. App. 702, 703 n.1, 755 A.2d 317 (2000);
in this opinion, we refer to the town of Plainville as the defendant and to
Fasold by name.
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respective complaints in each action.3 The plaintiffs’
sole claim on appeal is that the court improperly ren-
dered summary judgments despite the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a work
order request for maintenance, made by an employee
of the defendant, created a ministerial duty to perform
the maintenance in a prescribed way, thereby abrogat-
ing the defendant’s governmental immunity protection
and exposing the defendant to liability pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes § 52-557n4 for its alleged failure to do so.
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of
the trial court.

The record before the court, viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs as the nonmoving parties,
reveals the following relevant facts and procedural his-
tory. From September, 2017, through approximately
March, 2020, the seven plaintiffs were either members
of and/or coaches for the Plainville Blue Dolphins Swim
Club (swim club)5 and/or lifeguards at the Plainville
3
The plaintiffs’ claims against Fasold, set forth in counts one and two of
their respective complaints, sound in invasion of privacy and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
4
General Statutes § 52-557n provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) (1) Except as
otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall be liable
for damages to person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts or
omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent
thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties . . . .
(2) Except as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state
shall not be liable for damages to person or property caused by: (A) Acts
or omissions of any employee, officer or agent which constitute criminal
conduct, fraud, actual malice or wilful misconduct; or (B) negligent acts or
omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official
function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law. . . .’’
Although § 52-557n has been amended since the events underlying this
case; see Public Acts 2023, No. 23-83, § 1; those amendments have no bearing
on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the
current revision of the statute.
5
The swim club was made an apportionment defendant in each underlying
action by the defendant, but it was not a party to the summary judgment
motions, and it is not participating in this appeal.
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High School (high school) pool. The swim club used
the aquatic facilities at the high school. Kyle Fasold
was a parent volunteer for the swim club and a board
member and/or vice president of its Parents’ Associa-
tion. The high school aquatic facilities included a pool,
recreation staff facilities, and locker rooms. The recre-
ation staff facilities shared a door with the girls’ locker
room and housed a recreation staff locker room/closet
area that had a door with a clear glass paned window
with a view directly into the girls’ locker room. That
window had been covered with poster boards, which
prevented the ability to see through it. At some point,
however, a square piece had been cut from the poster
boards, which left a small opening that allowed a view
into the girls’ locker room.

As a member of the swim club, Fasold had access
to the recreation staff locker room/closet area and, on
numerous occasions during the aforementioned time
period, he manipulated the covering on its window in
order to gain visual access to the girls’ locker room.
Using a cellular device and/or a digital camera, Fasold
took photographs and/or recorded videos of the plain-
tiffs, through that window, while they were in various
stages of undress and/or were toileting. Fasold’s actions
were discovered in or about February, 2020, after he
uploaded images with identifiable metadata to the Internet
and an investigation ensued. Fasold was charged with
crimes related to his actions, and he ultimately entered
into an agreement with the United States Attorney’s
Office for the District of Connecticut whereby he pleaded
guilty to certain of those charged crimes.

The defendant and its officers, agents, servants and/
or employees, owned, controlled, possessed, operated
and/or maintained the high school, and it allowed the
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swim club and its members to use and have access to the
high school’s pool and aquatic facilities. On February
5, 2018, Scott Martin, who was the custodial manager
for the defendant’s board of education, prepared a work
order that requested that ‘‘General Maintenance’’ be
performed at the high school ‘‘girls locker room/pool.’’
The ‘‘Description’’ section of the work order stated:
‘‘Cut and fit colored/textured plexiglass in door from
team coach office that leads to team locker room off
pool area. Time Available: anytime.’’ The request was
deemed a ‘‘Medium’’ priority and the ‘‘Req. Completion
Date’’ section of the form was left blank. Martin assigned
the work order request to Terry Archer, who was
employed by the defendant’s board of education as a
maintainer in the physical services department. Neither
Martin nor Archer was a policy maker or an executive
decision maker for the defendant.

The work order request reflects, at the top of the
form, a ‘‘Completion Date’’ of February 8, 2018, and its
‘‘Status’’ reads ‘‘Closed Work Orders.’’6 The window in
the door, however, was not replaced with ‘‘colored/
textured plexiglass . . . .’’ Rather, a March, 2020
inspection of the high school girls’ locker room revealed
that a small square piece of black construction paper
had been taped to the poster boards to cover the hole
that previously had been cut therein.
6
The plaintiffs maintain, and the summary judgment evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to them suggests, that the work order request was
issued in response to a concern that a parent relayed to Kim Crowley,
who, at the time, was the assistant director of the defendant’s recreation
department, that the poster board that covered the window was torn and
that someone may have been manipulating it. Crowley then submitted an
‘‘order . . . to the school administration . . . the school facilities people’’
to have ‘‘the hole in the . . . covering of the window . . . repaired.’’ There
is no evidence in the record, however, regarding the nature of the work
order, the internal discussions, if any, that preceded its creation or the
duties and expectations of the custodial staff in relation thereto.
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On various dates between September, 2020, and
March, 2021, the plaintiffs brought actions for damages
related to Fasold’s conduct; see footnote 2 of this opin-
ion; and the court, Morgan, J., sua sponte consolidated
the actions. See Practice Book § 9-5.7 Each respective
complaint states claims against the defendant for negli-
gence pursuant to § 52-557n in count three and negligent
supervision in count four.8 The plaintiffs alleged, inter
alia, that they suffered injuries and losses arising from
Fasold’s ‘‘inappropriate and disturbing conduct’’ and
that those injuries and losses were caused by the negli-
gence and carelessness of the defendant because its
officers, agents, servants and/or employees ‘‘failed to
ensure that minor and adult females, including the plain-
tiff[s], had a safe, secure and private dressing area
. . . .’’

In its answers to each of the plaintiffs’ complaints,
the defendant denied the plaintiffs’ negligence allega-
tions and raised governmental immunity as a special
defense to the third and fourth counts. Thereafter, on
April 28, 2023, the defendant filed in each action a
motion for summary judgment. The defendant claimed
that it was entitled to judgment on counts three and
four of the plaintiffs’ complaints as a matter of law
7
Practice Book § 9-5 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Whenever there are
two or more separate actions which should be tried together, the judicial
authority may . . . upon its own motion, order that the actions be consoli-
dated for trial. . . .
‘‘(c) The court files in any actions consolidated pursuant to this section
shall be maintained as separate files and all documents submitted by counsel
or the parties shall bear only the docket number and case title of the file
in which it is to be filed.’’
8
The fourth counts of the complaints in the actions brought by Jane Doe
#4, Jane Doe #5, Jane Doe #6, and Jane Doe #8 allege that they are brought
pursuant to § 52-557n, whereas the fourth counts of the complaints in the
actions brought by Jane Doe #1, Jane Doe #2, and Jane Doe #3, do not
reference that statute. In all other material respects, however, the allegations
against the defendant in each action are identical.
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because (1) discretionary governmental act immunity
barred the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, (2) the plaintiffs
could not show that they were identifiable persons sub-
ject to imminent harm, as required to fall within the
relevant exception to governmental immunity, and (3)
the defendant could not be held liable for the inten-
tional, criminal acts of Fasold.9
On July 24, 2023, the plaintiffs filed memoranda in
opposition to the defendant’s motions for summary
judgment in their respective cases.10 Each plaintiff
argued that there were genuine issues of material fact
with respect to whether the defendant had violated
ministerial duties (1) to repair and maintain the glass
window in the storage room door and (2) to report
Fasold’s suspicious conduct. The plaintiffs further
argued that, even if the defendant’s alleged acts or omis-
sions were discretionary in nature, there remained gen-
uine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs
were identifiable persons subject to imminent harm
and, thus, whether an exception to governmental immu-
nity applied. The plaintiffs did not respond to or address
the defendant’s claim that it could not be held vicari-
ously liable for the intentional, criminal acts of Fasold.
On August 23, 2023, the defendant filed a reply memo-
randum in support of its motion for summary judgment
in each action, and it attached to each one an affidavit
of Robert E. Lee, the defendant’s chief executive officer
and town manager between 2017 and 2020. Lee averred
9
In support of each motion, the defendant submitted a memorandum of
law and sixteen exhibits, which included excerpts from several deposition
transcripts and an affidavit from Ben Dalena, who was employed by the
defendant as its assistant recreation director.
10
In support of their memoranda in opposition, each plaintiff submitted,
as an exhibit, an excerpt of her deposition transcript and the same thirteen
other exhibits, which included, among other things, excerpts from several
other deposition transcripts, a redacted police report, and a copy of the
February 5, 2018 work order request.
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in his affidavit that Martin and Archer were not policy
makers or executive decision makers for the defendant
at any time during their employment.11
On December 28, 2023, the court issued memoranda
of decision rendering summary judgments in favor of
the defendant on counts three and four of each com-
plaint. The court concluded, on the basis of the plead-
ings and the evidence submitted by the parties, that the
defendant was entitled to governmental immunity as a
matter of law. With respect to the work order, in particu-
11
The plaintiffs filed motions to strike ‘‘and/or disregard the defendant’s
reply brief[s] in resolving the merits of the . . . motion[s] for summary
judgment’’ on grounds that they were untimely filed and because they sought
to introduce new evidence and arguments that should have been raised in
the defendant’s initial filings. The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that
Lee’s affidavit constituted ‘‘new and untimely evidence’’ as to ‘‘whether
the February 8, 2018 work order constituted a ministerial duty,’’ that the
defendant should not be able to introduce and rely upon it and that the
court should not consider the merits of the replies. The court denied the
plaintiffs’ motions to strike, explaining that the ‘‘tardy filing[s] did not work
undue prejudice or injustice to the plaintiff[s]’’ and that the ‘‘reply brief[s]
appropriately respond[ed] to evidence and arguments made by the plain-
tiff[s] in [their] objection[s] to the defendant’s summary judgment
motion[s].’’ The plaintiffs have not challenged on appeal the court’s denial
of their motions to strike. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v.
Essaghof, 221 Conn. App. 475, 485, 302 A.3d 339 (claim raised by party at
trial is abandoned if it is not raised on appeal), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 923,
304 A.3d 445 (2023). Nevertheless, in their brief to this court, the plaintiffs
now characterize Lee’s affidavit as ‘‘[e]xtratextual evidence [that] is not
required for this court’s analysis and [claim that it] should not have been
relied on by the trial court.’’ As the plaintiffs raise this claimed error by the
trial court for the first time on appeal, after abandoning their challenge to
the court’s denial of their motions to strike, we will not review its merits.
See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof, supra, 489–90; see
also Capital for Change, Inc. v. Wall Street Associates, LLC, 232 Conn. App.
646, 655–56, A.3d (2025), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June 3, 2025)
(No. 240392). Moreover, this claim is inadequately briefed. See U.S. Bank
Trust, National Assn. v. Shuey, 232 Conn. App. 618, 620 n.2, A.3d
(2025) (‘‘We are not required to review issues that have been improperly
presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather
than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an
issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June 9, 2025) (No. 240395).
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lar, the court determined that it was ‘‘simply evidence
of the discretionary nature of the defendant’s duties
with respect to inspection, maintenance, and repairs,
rather than evidence of the existence of a ministerial
duty.’’12 This appeal followed.13 Additional facts will be
set forth as necessary.
Before turning to the plaintiffs’ claim on appeal, we
set forth the standard of review applicable to a trial
court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judg-
ment. ‘‘Practice Book § [17-49] provides that summary
judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
12
In rendering summary judgments, the court also concluded that there
was no genuine issue of material fact that (1) ‘‘none of the defendant’s
officials had reasonable cause to suspect or believe that Fasold was abusing
the plaintiffs or subjecting them to an imminent risk of serious harm and,
therefore, the mandatory duty to report [suspected harm pursuant to General
Statutes (Rev. to 2017) §§ 17a-101 and 17a-101a] was not triggered,’’ (2) ‘‘the
plaintiffs were not identifiable persons subjected to imminent harm’’ and,
thus, that exception to governmental immunity was not applicable, and (3)
‘‘Fasold’s conduct was intentional rather than negligent’’ and ‘‘the exclusion-
ary language of § 52-557n (a) (2) would shield the defendant from vicarious
liability to the plaintiffs’’ on the basis of such conduct. The plaintiffs have
not challenged on appeal the court’s conclusions in these regards, and we
deem any such claims abandoned. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, National
Assn. v. Essaghof, 221 Conn. App. 475, 485, 302 A.3d 339 (‘‘claims of error
not briefed are considered abandoned’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 923, 304 A.3d 445 (2023).
13
The court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motions for summary
judgment did not dispose of all the counts in each complaint, and counts
one and two against Fasold remain pending in each of the consolidated
actions. Even so, the court’s decisions ‘‘dispose[d] of all causes of action
in [the plaintiffs’ respective complaints] . . . brought . . . against [the
defendant],’’ such that they are final judgments. Practice Book § 61-3; see
also Asnat Realty, LLC v. United Illuminating Co., 204 Conn. App. 313,
319 n.6, 253 A.3d 56 (decision that ‘‘disposed of all causes of action against
those particular defendants . . . constituted an appealable final judgment
under Practice Book § 61-3’’), cert. denied, 337 Conn. 906, 252 A.3d 366
(2021). The plaintiffs, therefore, have appealed from final judgments, and
this court has jurisdiction to hear their appeal.
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. . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the
trial court must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . The party seek-
ing summary judgment has the burden of showing the
absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which,
under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle
[it] to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party
opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary
foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact. . . . [I]ssue-finding, rather than
issue-determination, is the key to the procedure. . . .
[T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when
ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . . [Its]
function is not to decide issues of material fact, but
rather to determine whether any such issues exist. . . .
Our review of the decision to grant a motion for sum-
mary judgment is plenary. . . . We therefore must
decide whether the court’s conclusions were legally
and logically correct and find support in the record.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Washburne v. Mad-
ison, 175 Conn. App. 613, 620, 167 A.3d 1029 (2017),
cert. denied, 330 Conn. 971, 200 A.3d 1151 (2019).
We next set forth the well settled law of this state
regarding the liability of municipalities. ‘‘According to
our Supreme Court, [a] municipality itself was generally
immune from liability for its tortious acts at common
law . . . . [The court] also [has] recognized, however,
that governmental immunity may be abrogated by stat-
ute. . . . [Section] 52-557n (a) (1) provides in relevant
part: Except as otherwise provided by law, a political
subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to
person or property caused by: (A) The negligent acts
or omissions of such political subdivision or any
employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the
scope of his employment or official duties . . . . [Our
Supreme Court] previously [has] concluded that [t]his
language clearly and expressly abrogates the traditional
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common-law doctrine in this state that municipalities
are immune from suit for torts committed by their
employees and agents. . . .14
‘‘Subdivision (2) of § 52-557n (a) lists two exceptions
to the statutory abrogation of governmental immunity.
The exception relevant to this appeal provides: Except
as otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision
of the state shall not be liable for damages to person
or property caused by . . . (B) negligent acts or omis-
sions which require the exercise of judgment or discre-
tion as an official function of the authority expressly
or impliedly granted by law. . . . The statute, thus,
distinguishes between discretionary acts and those that
are ministerial in nature, with liability generally
attaching to a municipality only for negligently per-
formed ministerial acts, not for negligently performed
discretionary acts. . . .
‘‘The hallmark of a discretionary act is that it requires
the exercise of judgment. . . . In contrast, [m]inisterial
refers to a duty which is to be performed in a prescribed
manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion.
. . . In order to create a ministerial duty, there must
be a city charter provision, ordinance, regulation, rule,
policy, or any other directive [compelling a municipal
employee] to [act] in any prescribed manner. . . .
‘‘In general, the exercise of duties involving inspec-
tion, maintenance and repair of hazards are considered
discretionary acts entitled to governmental immunity.
. . . A municipality necessarily makes discretionary
policy decisions with respect to the timing, frequency,
14
‘‘Our Supreme Court has cautioned that ‘[s]tatutes that abrogate or
modify governmental immunity are to be strictly construed’ because if ‘a
statute is in derogation of common law or creates a liability where formerly
none existed, it should receive a strict construction and is not to be extended,
modified, repealed or enlarged in its scope by the mechanics of construction.’
. . . Rawling v. New Haven, 206 Conn. 100, 105, 537 A.2d 439 (1988).’’
DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn. App. 216, 223 n.5, 131 A.3d 771 (2016).
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method and extent of inspections, maintenance and
repairs. . . . Although the determination of whether
official acts or omissions are ministerial or discretion-
ary is normally a question of fact for the fact finder
. . . there are cases where it is apparent from the com-
plaint. . . . [W]hether an act or omission is discretion-
ary in nature and, thus, whether governmental immunity
may be successfully invoked pursuant to § 52-557n (a)
(2) (B), turns on the character of the act or omission
complained of in the complaint. . . . Accordingly,
where it is apparent from the complaint that the defen-
dants’ allegedly negligent acts or omissions necessarily
involved the exercise of judgment, and thus, necessarily
were discretionary in nature, summary judgment is
proper.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; foot-
note in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162 Conn. App. 216, 223–25, 131
A.3d 771 (2016).
In their complaints, the plaintiffs allege that the defen-
dant ‘‘failed to ensure that minor and adult females,
including the plaintiff[s], had a safe, secure and private
dressing area’’ at the high school. They claim that
Archer’s failure to maintain or repair the window in
the manner described in the work order ‘‘constitutes a
violation of a ministerial duty’’ because the work order
was a ‘‘directive that, by its clear language, compels
a municipal employee to act in a prescribed manner,
without the exercise of judgment or discretion.’’
(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
The defendant claims, in response, that the ‘‘work order
request is not a mandate of legal authority’’ but is,
rather, ‘‘evidence of the defendant’s officials exercising
judgment in handling a maintenance and repair issue.’’
(Emphasis omitted.) We agree with the defendant.
The work order itself provides the sole basis for the
plaintiffs’ claim that the defendant’s otherwise discre-
tionary duty to repair and maintain the window and
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provide them with ‘‘a safe, secure and private dressing
area’’ was ministerial in nature. The plaintiffs rely on
the ‘‘plain language’’ of the work order to support their
argument that it ‘‘prescribed the manner in which the
work was to be performed’’ and did not ‘‘afford . . .
Archer discretion in the way in which he was to remedy
the problem.’’ The work order, however, expressly per-
tains to ‘‘General Maintenance,’’ it lists Martin as the
‘‘Requester,’’ it had a ‘‘Request Date’’ of February 5,
2018, and there was no ‘‘Req. Completion Date,’’ thereby
leaving the time for performance open-ended and within
Archer’s discretion. Cf. Doe v. Madison, 340 Conn. 1,
32, 262 A.3d 752 (2021) (‘‘[s]pecificity is required in all
aspects of [a] directive’’).
Moreover, although the description of the requested
maintenance states ‘‘[c]ut and fit colored/textured plexi-
glass’’ into the window of the door to the recreation
staff locker room/closet area, the work order does not
state that Archer had no discretion in this regard, and
there is no other evidence in the record to support the
plaintiffs’ argument that he had none. Cf. Cole v. New
Haven, 337 Conn. 326, 342, 253 A.3d 476 (2020) (police
sergeant’s testimony, in combination with police
department’s general order and Department of Public
Safety’s statewide policy, established existence of min-
isterial duty as matter of law). Indeed, there is no evi-
dence regarding the nature of the work order, the inter-
nal discussions, if any, that preceded the work order’s
creation or the duties and expectations of the custodial
staff in relation thereto.15 To this end, there is no evi-
dence that the ‘‘Description’’ set forth in the work order
constituted ‘‘instructions’’ or a ‘‘directive,’’ as the plain-
tiffs argue, let alone evidence that the work order was
a mandate of legal authority that Archer failed to follow.
See Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1, 12, 243 A.3d 1064
15
In fact, there is no evidence, by way of deposition testimony or affidavits,
from Martin or Archer, themselves.
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Doe v. Fasold

(2020) (‘‘[a] ministerial act is one which a person per-
forms in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment [or discre-
tion] upon the propriety of the action being done’’
(emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)).
This evidentiary lacuna is particularly significant in the
present case because, as our Supreme Court has recog-
nized, ‘‘there ordinarily is no legal directive mandating
the specific manner in which officials must perform
[inspection, maintenance and repair] tasks’’; Northrup
v. Witkowski, 332 Conn. 158, 170, 210 A.3d 29 (2019);
and the language of the work order upon which the
plaintiffs’ rely simply does not establish an exception
to this rule. See Doe v. Madison, supra, 340 Conn. 32
(‘‘descriptions of general practices or expectations that
guide an employee’s exercise of discretion do not create
a ministerial duty’’).

Furthermore, Martin and Archer were not policy mak-
ers or executive decision makers for the defendant.
Rather, they were employees, working for the defen-
dant’s board of education in its physical services depart-
ment. Martin was the ‘‘custodial manager,’’ and Archer
was a ‘‘maintainer . . . .’’ Although Martin had the
authority to create the work order and to assign it to
Archer, there is no evidence that Martin was not using
his discretion and engaging in day-to-day decision-mak-
ing regarding maintenance and repairs when he did so.
The mere fact that Martin delegated the task to Archer
by way of the work order in no way altered the task’s
discretionary nature. See, e.g., Grignano v. Milford, 106
Conn. App. 648, 657, 943 A.2d 507 (2008) (discretionary
duty is not rendered ministerial merely because munici-
pality codifies it as ordinance where nature of duty
remains unchanged). The work order reflected the dis-
cretionary nature of the defendant’s duties with respect
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Doe v. Fasold

to inspection, maintenance and repairs, not the exis-
tence of a ministerial duty.
‘‘If we were to conclude otherwise, virtually any
attempt by a municipal agency to ensure that its discre-
tionary duties are regularly and properly carried out
would convert its discretionary duty into a ministerial
duty, thereby creating a disincentive for municipal agen-
cies to make such attempts and undermining the very
policy considerations that the doctrine governmental
immunity was intended to advance. See Violano v. Fer-
nandez, [280 Conn. 310, 319, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006)]
(‘[d]iscretionary act immunity reflects a value judgment
that—despite injury to a member of the public—the
broader interest in having government officers and
employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in
their official functions, unhampered by fear of second-
guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the bene-
fits to be had from imposing liability for that injury’
. . . ).’’ (Emphasis in original.) Northrup v. Witkowski,
supra, 332 Conn. 188.
On the basis of our plenary review of the pleadings
and the parties’ submissions, we conclude that the
plaintiffs have failed to establish that a genuine issue
of material fact exists with respect to the nature of the
defendant’s duty in this case. Because it was legally
and logically correct for the court to conclude that
the acts and omissions alleged in each complaint were
discretionary in nature, and not ministerial as the plain-
tiffs’ claim, the court properly determined that the
defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on its governmental immunity defenses in each of these
consolidated actions.
The judgments are affirmed.