Ringel v. Gottlieb

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Ringel v. Gottlieb

GERALD RINGEL ET AL. v. MARIA
GENEDINA GOTTLIEB
(AC 47321)
Moll, Cradle and Clark, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff property owners appealed from the trial court’s judgment defin-
ing the scope and location of an easement that granted the abutting defendant
property owner right-of-way access across the plaintiffs’ property to the
beach and waters of Long Island Sound. The plaintiffs claim, inter alia, that
the court improperly concluded that the warranty deed at issue clearly and
unambiguously reserved a general beach easement for the defendant’s use
of the plaintiffs’ property above the mean high water line. Held:

The trial court erred in concluding that the easement language in the war-
ranty deed was clear and unambiguous, as the definition of ‘‘beach’’ in our
case law is not consistent and both parties’ interpretations of the term
‘‘beach’’ were reasonable, and, therefore, the language in the deed was
ambiguous as to the easement’s location and scope.

The trial court erred in making findings on the basis of claims that the
defendant had withdrawn prior to trial, as the language of the parties’
stipulation clearly expressed an intent to abandon their respective claims
that the other party engaged in conduct that exceeded the scope of the
easement or impeded the defendant’s use of the easement, leaving only the
scope and location of the easement as the sole issue to be adjudicated, and
it was improper for the court to have ruled on issues beyond that.

Argued January 7—officially released July 22, 2025

Procedural History

Action seeking, inter alia, an injunction prohibiting
the defendant from using the plaintiffs’ property in a
manner that exceeds the scope of an easement on the
plaintiffs’ property, brought to the Superior Court in
the judicial district of Fairfield, where the defendant
filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the case was tried to
the court, Hon. Barry K. Stevens, judge trial referee;
judgment for the defendant on the complaint and on
* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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Ringel v. Gottlieb

the counterclaim, from which the plaintiffs appealed to
this court. Reversed; new trial.
Joel Z. Green, with whom, on the brief, was Linda
Pesce Laske, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
James M. Nugent, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

MOLL, J. In this property dispute, the plaintiffs, Ger-
ald Ringel and Wanda Ringel, appeal from the judgment
of the trial court, rendered after a bench trial, in favor
of the defendant, Maria Genedina Gottlieb. On appeal,
the plaintiffs claim that the court erred by (1) holding
that the warranty deed at issue clearly and unambigu-
ously reserved a general beach easement for the defen-
dant’s use of the plaintiffs’ property above the mean
high water line and (2) making findings and issuing
orders pertaining to claims that the defendant had with-
drawn prior to trial. We agree and, accordingly, reverse
the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history, as set
forth by the trial court or as are undisputed in the
record, are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
The plaintiffs own property located at 1205 Fairfield
Beach Road in Fairfield. The defendant owns property
located at 1206 Fairfield Beach Road in Fairfield.
‘‘Before the parties’ ownership [of their respective
properties], both the plaintiffs’ property and the defen-
dant’s property were owned by Joseph and Alice Bado-
lati. On July 2, 1969, the Badolatis executed a warranty
deed [(deed)] conveying 1205 Fairfield Beach Road to
the plaintiffs, while retaining ownership of 1206 Fair-
field Beach Road. . . . After this conveyance, the Bad-
olatis’ daughter, Carole Anne Quinn, acquired title to
and resided at 1206 Fairfield Beach Road. The defen-
dant acquired title to 1206 Fairfield Beach Road on
August 1, 2019, pursuant to an executor’s deed executed
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Ringel v. Gottlieb

by Kathleen Quinn, executor of the last will and testa-
ment of Carole Anne Quinn.’’ The deed contains an
easement, which provides: ‘‘The premises are conveyed
subject to the Grantors reserving for the benefit of
themselves, their heirs, successors, assigns, occupants
and tenants of premises across Fairfield Beach Road,
Fairfield, Connecticut, known as [1206]1 Fairfield Beach
Road, Fairfield, Connecticut, the title to which premises
is being retained by the Grantors herein an easement
over the westerly portion of the premises being con-
veyed herein. This easement [is] to be used as a Right-
of-Way for access to the Beach and Waters of Long
Island Sound. In addition, there is reserved to the Grant-
ors and their heirs, successors, assigns, occupants and
tenants full boating and swimming rights and other
normal uses.’’ (Footnote added.) Thus, ‘‘[t]he defen-
dant’s property abuts the plaintiffs’ property, and . . .
the plaintiffs’ property is burdened by an easement for
the benefit of the defendant’s property.’’

In September, 2021, the plaintiffs commenced this
action against the defendant. On January 10, 2022, the
plaintiffs filed a second amended verified complaint
(operative complaint), in which they alleged that the
defendant used the easement in a manner that exceeded
the scope of the easement and constituted both a nui-
sance and a trespass on the plaintiffs’ property. The
defendant subsequenty filed (1) an answer in which
she denied the plaintiffs’ claims and (2) a counterclaim
seeking an injunction in which she alleged, inter alia,
that the plaintiffs ‘‘significantly impeded [her] use of
the easement and ha[d] severely interfered with [her]
ability to peacefully use and enjoy the beach.’’ On
The deed identified the dominant estate as 134A Fairfield Beach Road
1

in Fairfield. However, since the creation of the deed, the numbering of the
lots on Fairfield Beach Road has changed, and 134A Fairfield Beach Road
has become 1206 Fairfield Beach Road.
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November 15, 2022, the plaintiffs filed an answer deny-
ing the material allegations of the defendant’s counter-
claim. As the trial court, Hon. Barry K. Stevens, judge
trial referee, stated in its decision, ‘‘[b]oth parties [sought]
injunctive relief enjoining the conduct that they respec-
tively claim[ed] impair[ed] the proper or appropriate
use of the easement.’’
Prior to trial, the parties narrowed the disputed issues
by way of a stipulation, which states in relevant part:
‘‘The evidence at the trial in this action shall be limited
to documents and testimony that are relevant to the
court’s determination of the scope and interpretation
of the easement . . . .’’2 In pursuit of that goal, the
parties agreed that they would not present evidence
‘‘as to any conduct by any party, including their families,
guests, tenants and invitees, concerning any alleged
violations of the easement . . . .’’ The parties further
agreed that they ‘‘each acknowledge that they shall
respect and shall not interfere with the rights of the
parties to use and enjoy the plaintiffs’ property or any
right conferred by the easement, all as determined by
the court.’’ Thus, as the court stated, ‘‘the sole issue
presented for the court’s adjudication concern[ed] the
scope and location of the . . . easement.’’
On July 28, 2023, the matter was tried to the court.
The court admitted into evidence several exhibits and
heard testimony from several witnesses. Thereafter,
both parties filed posttrial briefs.
On January 11, 2024, the court issued a memorandum
of decision finding in favor of the defendant on the
plaintiffs’ operative complaint and her counterclaim.
The court agreed with the defendant that the language
2
The stipulation was agreed upon by the parties prior to trial and was
noted on the record at the start of trial. The court requested that the parties
file a written stipulation with the court. The written stipulation was filed
on August 1, 2023.
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in the deed pertaining to the easement, in clear and
unambiguous terms, ‘‘provide[d] a general right-of-way
over the westerly portion of the plaintiffs’ property for:
access to the beach; access to the waters of Long Island
Sound; full boating and swimming rights; and other
normal uses,’’ and further ‘‘provide[d] these rights in
general, unrestricted terms.’’ The court also rejected
the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the deed as ‘‘restrict[ing]
the defendant’s use of the beach and the waters of Long
Island Sound to the area that is ‘below the Mean High
Water line . . . .’ ’’ As the court summarized, ‘‘there
can be no real, bona fide dispute that the defendant has
what may be generally described as a beach easement,
which has the associated right to use the beach for
‘normal’ uses.’’ The court proceeded to determine that
‘‘the plaintiffs [had] failed to meet their burden of prov-
ing by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant ha[d] used the plaintiffs’ property ‘in a man-
ner that [exceeded] the scope of the easement’ as
alleged in paragraph five of the operative . . . com-
plaint. For these same reasons, the court [found] that
the plaintiffs [had] failed to prove that the defendant
ha[d] engaged in any conduct constituting a nuisance
or trespass as alleged in this complaint.’’ The court then
stated: ‘‘The court emphasizes that the limited issue
presented to the court for adjudication is the scope of
the easement. The court does not address any issues
as to whether the defendant has engaged in any activi-
ties that constitute an excessive or undue use of the
easement.’’ Finally, with respect to the defendant’s
counterclaim, the court stated that she had proved ‘‘by
a fair preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs’
conduct, premised on their position that the easement
provides the defendant access only to ‘the Beach and
Waters of the Long Island Sound below the Mean High
Water line,’ has operated as an impediment to her use
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and enjoyment of the easement as alleged in the coun-
terclaim.’’ As relief with respect to the defendant’s coun-
terclaim, the court ‘‘issue[d] an order enjoining the
plaintiffs from interfering with the defendant’s use of
the easement based on the scope of the easement as
found by the court . . . .’’ This appeal followed. Addi-
tional facts and procedural history will be set forth as
necessary.
I
The plaintiffs’ first claim on appeal is that the trial
court improperly construed the deed as clearly and
unambiguously creating a so-called beach easement in
favor of the defendant, as the owner of the dominant
estate, allowing use of the plaintiffs’ property above the
mean high water line. We conclude that the easement
language is ambiguous and, therefore, remand the case
for a new trial.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of
review and relevant legal principles. ‘‘It is well settled
that [a]n easement creates a nonpossessory right to
enter and use land in the possession of another and
obligates the possessor not to interfere with the rules
authorized by the easement. . . . [T]he benefit of an
easement . . . is considered a nonpossessory interest
in land because it generally authorizes limited uses of
the burdened property for a particular purpose. . . .
[E]asements are not ownership interests but rather priv-
ileges to use [the] land of another in [a] certain manner
for [a] certain purpose . . . . Except as limited by the
terms of the servitude . . . the holder of an easement
. . . is entitled to use the servient estate in a manner
that is reasonably necessary for the convenient enjoy-
ment of the servitude. . . . Likewise, [e]xcept as lim-
ited by the terms of the servitude . . . the holder of
the servient estate is entitled to make any use of the
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servient estate that does not unreasonably interfere
with enjoyment of the servitude. . . .
‘‘The use of an easement must be reasonable and as
little burdensome to the servient estate as the nature
of the easement and the purpose will permit. . . . Ordi-
narily when [judicial] opinions speak of the use of an
easement, it arises in right-of-way cases. Thus use fre-
quently involves the amount of traffic over the easement
or alterations to the land to make it passable. . . . This
is not to overlook, however, that [t]he owner of an
easement has all rights incident or necessary to its
proper enjoyment, [although] nothing more. . . .
‘‘Significantly, the full scope of the use to be made
of [an easement] requires evaluation of the purpose it
was to serve. . . . [A]ppellate case law . . . [has]
used the terms location, scope, and use somewhat inter-
changeably. . . . [Our Supreme Court has] read scope
and use as having similar meanings insofar as they
involve what [the] holder [of the easement] may do
with it, [and] the purposes for which it may be used.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, 221 Conn.
App. 657, 669–71, 303 A.3d 13 (2023), cert. denied, 348
Conn. 938, 307 A.3d 273 (2024).
‘‘Our scope of review as to the intent behind language
in a deed is plenary. . . . Although the intent to create
an easement by deed is therefore a question of law over
which our review is plenary . . . if the language of the
deed is incomplete or ambiguous regarding the location,
scope, or use of the easement, the trial court’s resolu-
tion of those issues represents a question of fact subject
to the clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . In
the absence of unambiguous or complete language in
the deed, therefore, determining the location, scope,
and use of an express easement is a fact-intensive
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inquiry properly subject to the clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review. . . .
‘‘Nevertheless, when faced with a question regarding
the construction of language in deeds, the reviewing
court does not give the customary deference to the trial
court’s factual inferences. . . . The meaning and effect
of the [language in the deed] are to be determined, not
by the actual intent of the parties, but by the intent
expressed in the deed, considering all its relevant provi-
sions and reading it in the light of the surrounding
circumstances. . . .
‘‘Our basic rule of construction is that recognition
will be given to the expressed intention of the parties
to a deed . . . and that it shall, if possible, be so con-
strued as to effectuate the intent of the parties. . . .
In arriving at the intent expressed . . . in the language
used, however, it is always admissible to consider the
situation of the parties and the circumstances con-
nected with the transaction, and every part of the writ-
ing should be considered with the help of that evi-
dence. . . .
‘‘In the construction of a deed or grant, the language
is to be construed in connection with, and in reference
to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of
the grant at the time the instrument is executed, and
the obvious purpose the parties had in view. . . . [I]f
the meaning of the language contained in a deed or
conveyance is not clear, the trial court is bound to
consider any relevant extrinsic evidence presented by
the parties for the purpose of clarifying the ambigu-
ity. . . .
‘‘Finally, we note that [t]he fact that servitudes are
intended to bind successors to interests in the land,
as well as the contracting parties, and are generally
intended to last for an indefinite period of time, lends
increased importance to the writing because it is often
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Ringel v. Gottlieb

the primary source of information available to a pro-
spective purchaser of the land. The language should be
interpreted to accord with the meaning an ordinary
purchaser would ascribe to it in the context of the
parcels of land involved. Searching for a particular
meaning adopted by the creating parties is generally
inappropriate because the creating parties intended to
bind and benefit successors for whom the written
record will provide the primary evidence of the servi-
tude’s meaning. . . . For this reason, [i]n determining
the scope of an express easement, the language of the
grant is paramount in discerning the parties’ intent.
. . . In addition, [a]ny ambiguity in the instrument cre-
ating an easement, in a case of reasonable doubt, will be
construed in favor of the grantee.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 673–75.
‘‘When considering whether an ambiguity exists in a
deed, a court does not decide which party has the better
interpretation, only whether there is more than one
reasonable interpretation of the . . . language at
issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Freidheim
v. McLaughlin, 217 Conn. App. 767, 782, 290 A.3d 801
(2023). A deed is ambiguous ‘‘[i]f we conclude that the
language allows for more than one reasonable interpre-
tation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
As was noted earlier in this opinion, the deed provides
in relevant part for the easement ‘‘to be used as a Right-
of-Way for access to the Beach and Waters of Long
Island Sound. In addition, there is reserved to the Grant-
ors and their heirs, successors, assigns, occupants and
tenants full boating and swimming rights and other
normal uses.’’ The court concluded that the scope of the
easement was clear and unambiguous because ‘‘there
is nothing unclear or novel about the use of the word
‘beach’ as [it is] used in th[e] easement. Interpreting
this language ‘with the meaning an ordinary purchaser
would ascribe to it in the context of the parcels of
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land involved’; Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC,
supra, 221 Conn. App. 674–75; the word beach may [be]
defined as the sandy area of land along the waterline
or the ‘land on the margin of the sea.’ Ballentine’s Law
Dictionary (3d Ed. [1969]) [p. 127]. In this particular
context, a more technical definition is that the word
‘beach’ refers to the sandy shore above mean high
water, because, under Connecticut law, the area
between the high and low water marks is owned by the
state. See Newkirk v. Sherwood, 89 Conn. 598, [605],
94 A. 982 (1915) (‘[t]he word ‘‘beach’’ may be used to
mean land between high and low-water mark[s], or it
may be used to include a sandy shore above mean high
water which is washed by storms and by exceptionally
high tides’); accord Mihalczo v. Woodmont, 175 Conn.
535, 538, 400 A.2d 270 (1978) (‘the land between high
and low-water marks remains in the state’); State v.
Knowles-Lombard Co., 122 Conn. 263, [265], 188 A. 275
(1936) (’[i]t is settled law in this [s]tate that the public,
whose representative is the [s]tate, is the owner of the
soil between high and low-water mark upon navigable
water where the tide ebbs and flows’).’’ The court also
determined that ‘‘there is nothing unclear or ambiguous
about the language of the easement providing access
and use of the beach and waters of Long Island Sound
for boating, swimming, and ‘other normal uses.’ To
explain conversely, the uses reserved through the ease-
ment exclude ‘abnormal’ uses that are uncharacteristic
with boating, swimming, or beach activities.’’
Although both sides argue that the easement language
is clear and unambiguous, they assert different interpre-
tations. The plaintiffs argue that the court erred in its
interpretation, as some of the ‘‘terms used in the deed,
including the word ‘Beach’, are recognized to have vary-
ing meanings, particularly when referring to a boundary
or other locus referenced in a deed. Further, the court’s
interpretation of the meaning of the words used in the
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Ringel v. Gottlieb

deed depends upon an arbitrary parsing of those words,
and a failure to attribute any meaning to the capitaliza-
tion of words and their use in the phrase, ‘the Beach
and Waters of Long Island Sound,’ that distorts their
meaning and is not consistent with the rules of construc-
tion applicable to deeds and easements, or with normal
usage.’’ Thus, the plaintiffs contend that this phrase, as
it was used in the deed, indicated an intent of the origi-
nal parties to the deed for the easement to be used
solely as a right-of-way for access to the area below
the mean high water line. The defendant argues to the
contrary that the easement’s ‘‘[i]nclusion of the specific
term ‘Beach’ in addition to the phrase ‘and the waters
of Long Island Sound’ evinces the grantors’ specific
intent that the easement is creating access to both the
water as well as the beach above the high-water mark.’’
In light of these conflicting arguments regarding the
location and scope of the easement, resolving the plain-
tiffs’ claim requires us to determine whether the term
‘‘Beach,’’ as it is used in the deed, is clear and unambigu-
ous. See Williams v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra,
221 Conn. App. 673–75. For the reasons that follow, we
conclude that the easement language allows for more
than one reasonable interpretation and is, therefore,
ambiguous. See Freidheim v. McLaughlin, supra, 217
Conn. App. 782.
The term ‘‘Beach’’ is not defined in the deed and,
therefore, we must look to the ordinary meaning of the
term. See id., 784. At the time when the deed was cre-
ated, Black’s Law Dictionary defined ‘‘beach’’ in rele-
vant part as: ‘‘the space between ordinary high and low
water mark . . . or the space over which the tide usu-
ally ebbs and flows. It is a term not more significant
of a sea margin than ‘shore.’ . . . In common parlance
designates that portion of shore consisting generally of
sand and pebbles, resulting usually from the action of
water, as distinct from upland, to which it often extends
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above normal high-water mark. . . . Beach is synony-
mous with ‘shore,’ ‘strand,’ or ‘flats.’ The term may also
include the sandy shore above mean high water which
is washed by storms and exceptionally high tides.’’
(Citations omitted.) Black’s Law Dictionary (4th Ed.
1968) p. 194. Additionally, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary
contemporaneously defined ‘‘beach’’ as the ‘‘[l]and on
the margin of the sea, lake, or river . . . the land lying
between the lines of high water and low water, land
over which, if a tidal stream or body of water is involved,
the tide ebbs and flows.’’ (Citation omitted.) Ballentine’s
Law Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969) p. 127. On the basis of
the foregoing definitions, the term ‘‘beach,’’ as it was
used in the deed, could reasonably be interpreted as a
reference to the area above the mean high water line
or as a reference to the area below the mean high
water line.
Our conclusion that there is more than one reason-
able interpretation of the term ‘‘beach,’’ as it was used
in the deed, is further bolstered by our case law, which
does not specify a precise and uniform definition of the
term. Our Supreme Court has held that ‘‘[t]he word
‘beach’ may be used to mean land between high and
low-water mark, or it may be used to include a sandy
shore above mean high water which is washed by
storms and by exceptionally high tides.’’ Newkirk v.
Sherwood, supra, 89 Conn. 605; see also Dawson v.
Orange, 78 Conn. 96, 119, 61 A. 101 (1905) (‘‘[t]he term
‘beach’ is used sometimes for the shore between high
and low water mark, and sometimes for a strip of land
lying next to and above such shore’’); Merwin v.
Wheeler, 41 Conn. 14, 26 (1874) (‘‘[t]he word ‘beach’
has no such inflexible meaning that it must denote land
between high and low water mark’’). The defendant
correctly notes that some cases suggest that ‘‘beach’’
specifically refers to the area above the mean high water
mark, whereas the area between the high and low water
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Ringel v. Gottlieb

mark is called the ‘‘shore.’’ See, e.g., Church v. Meeker,
34 Conn. 421, 424–25, 431 (1867). The lack of consis-
tency in our case law, however, as to whether the term
‘‘beach,’’ as a matter of law, refers to the area above
the mean high water line lends support to our conclu-
sion that the easement language is ambiguous.
The plaintiffs argue that the easement provides a
right-of-way solely for access to the land below the
mean high water mark. The plaintiffs contend that the
capitalization of the term ‘‘Beach’’ in the deed is signifi-
cant when reading the deed as a whole, as it demon-
strates an intent to refer specifically back to Fairfield
Beach, which was identified earlier in the deed3 and,
in their view, denotes a proper noun referring to the
area below the mean high water mark. The plaintiffs’
interpretation of the term ‘‘Beach’’ is also supported
by the easement’s inclusion of the second sentence,
reserving for the defendant ‘‘full boating and swimming
rights and other normal uses.’’ As the plaintiffs note,
it is significant that ‘‘the only two specific examples
3
The deed states in relevant part that the Badolatis ‘‘do give, grant, bargain,
sell and confirm unto the said GERALD RINGEL and WANDA RINGEL and
unto the survivor of them and unto such survivor’s heirs and assigns, ALL
THAT certain piece, parcel or tract of land together with the buildings
thereon, situated in the Town of Fairfield, County of Fairfield and State of
Connecticut, at Fairfield Beach, so called, designated as part of lot #10 on
a certain map on file in the Office of the Fairfield Town Clerk as Map No.
52 and more fully described as follows:
‘‘Beginning at the southeast corner of the premises herein described at
a point marking the intersection with the mean high water mark of the
waters of Long Island Sound of the divisional line between the premises
herein described and land now or formerly of Lorraine H. Testo and proceed-
ing thence west 25 feet more or less along the mean high water mark of
Long Island Sound to a point marking the intersection with said mean high
water mark of the divisional line between the premises herein described
and land now or formerly of Pauline R. Mullins: running thence northerly
along said land now or formerly of Pauline R. Mullins to the road line of
Fairfield Beach Road; running thence easterly 25± feet along said road line
of Fairfield Beach Road to a point; thence running southerly along land now
or formerly of Lorraine H. Testo to the point or place of Beginning. . . .’’
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provided of ‘normal uses’ involve water-dependent activi-
ties, and not uses that involve use of upland areas above
the mean high water line.’’ These examples suggest that
‘‘Beach’’ may have been intended to refer to the area
below the mean high water mark, where the easement
holder could engage in water-dependent activities. We
determine, therefore, that it is reasonable to conclude,
in ‘‘considering all [of the deed’s] relevant provisions
and reading it in the light of the surrounding circum-
stances’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) Williams
v. Green Power Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App.
673; that ‘‘Beach’’ was intended to refer specifically to
Fairfield Beach, meaning the area below the mean high
water mark.
In contrast, the defendant argues that the easement
allows her access to the area above the mean high water
mark because the ‘‘easement grants access to the Beach
and Waters of Long Island Sound in addition to ‘boat-
ing, swimming and other normal uses.’ It is obviously
phrased in the conjunctive.’’ (Emphasis in original.) The
defendant argues that, ‘‘[i]f indeed the easement was
meant to merely allow the [defendant] and [her] guests
to pass over the [plaintiffs’] property to the waters of
Long Island Sound, that could easily have been accom-
plished without mention of the specific term ‘Beach.’ ’’
As was noted previously in this opinion, in support of
her interpretation of the term ‘‘Beach,’’ the defendant
relies on cases in which this court and our Supreme
Court have suggested that the term ‘‘beach’’ refers to
the area above the mean high water mark. See Short
Beach Cottage Owners Improvement Assn. v. Stratford,
154 Conn. 194, 200, 224 A.2d 532 (1966); Church v.
Meeker, supra, 34 Conn. 424–25; Mandes v. Godiksen,
57 Conn. App. 79, 87–89, 747 A.2d 47, cert. denied, 253
Conn. 915, 754 A.2d 164 (2000). For the aforementioned
reasons, however, including the fact that our case law’s
definition of ‘‘beach’’ is not consistent, we conclude
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that both of the parties’ interpretations of the term
‘‘Beach’’ are reasonable and, therefore, the easement is
ambiguous as to its location and scope.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial
court erred in concluding that the easement language
is clear and unambiguous. As a result, the court’s judg-
ment must be reversed and the case must be remanded
for a new trial to resolve the ambiguity as to the scope
and location of the easement. See Parisi v. Parisi, 315
Conn. 370, 386, 107 A.3d 920 (2015) (remanding to trial
court to resolve ambiguity in separation agreement
‘‘through a determination of [the original parties’] intent
after consideration of all available extrinsic evidence
and the circumstances surrounding the entering of the
agreement’’); see also, e.g., Williams v. Green Power
Ventures, LLC, supra, 221 Conn. App. 674 (‘‘[i]n arriving
at the intent expressed . . . in the language used . . .
it is always admissible to consider the situation of the
parties and the circumstances connected with the trans-
action, and every part of the writing should be consid-
ered with the help of that evidence’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id., 675 (‘‘[a]ny ambiguity in the instru-
ment creating an easement, in a case of reasonable doubt,
will be construed in favor of the grantee’’ (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)); Freidhem v. McLaughlin, supra,
217 Conn. App. 790 (‘‘[F]actual findings are a necessary
prerequisite to determine the scope and extent of [a
plaintiff’s] rights with respect to [an] easement. It is
well established that appellate courts are not triers of
fact and rely on the trial court’s findings and conclu-
sions related thereto.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.)).
II
The plaintiffs next claim on appeal that ‘‘[t]he trial
court erred in making findings and issuing orders based
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on allegations and claims that the defendant had with-
drawn prior to trial, including in finding that the plain-
tiffs had impeded the defendant’s use of the easement
and in issuing injunctive relief with respect thereto.’’
We agree in part.4
Preliminarily, we note that, although our resolution
of the plaintiffs’ first claim is dispositive of this appeal,
we will also address the plaintiffs’ second claim because
it is sufficiently likely to arise on remand. See Budlong &
Budlong, LLC v. Zakko, 213 Conn. App. 697, 714 n.14,
278 A.3d 1122 (2022) (‘‘[a]lthough our resolution of the
defendant’s first claim is dispositive of this appeal, we
also address the defendant’s second claim because it
is likely to arise on remand’’).
The following legal principles and standard of review
govern our resolution of this claim. ‘‘Any determination
regarding the scope of a court’s subject matter jurisdic-
tion or its authority to act presents a question of law
over which our review is plenary. . . . Generally, it is
clear that [t]he court is not permitted to decide issues
outside of those raised in the pleadings.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lynn v. Bosco,
182 Conn. App. 200, 213, 189 A.3d 601 (2018). When
interpreting a stipulation, ‘‘[u]nless the language is so
clear as to render its interpretation a matter of law,
the question of the parties’ intent in entering into a
stipulation is a question of fact that is subject to the
‘clearly erroneous’ scope of review.’’ Rosenfield v. Met-
als Selling Corp., 229 Conn. 771, 780, 643 A.2d 1253
4
The plaintiffs also claim that the court improperly allowed, over their
objections, evidence to be introduced by the defendant that was not relevant
to the sole issue to be adjudicated and exceeded the limitation on evidence
as stipulated by the parties. We need not delve into the merits of this claim
following our conclusion in part I of this opinion that the present action
must be remanded for a new trial. In light of our conclusion in part II of
this opinion, however, that the court improperly adjudicated claims that
were withdrawn prior to trial, we note that evidence that solely supported
such claims should not have been admitted over the plaintiffs’ objections.
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(1994). ‘‘Ordinarily . . . stipulations of the parties
should be adopted by the court. . . . If, for some rea-
son, the court cannot adopt the stipulation of the par-
ties, it should state its disapproval of the stipulation and
the reasons for its disapproval on the record.’’ (Citation
omitted.) Central Connecticut Teachers Federal Credit
Union v. Grant, 27 Conn. App. 435, 438, 606 A.2d 729
(1992).

As was previously stated, the parties narrowed the
issues in dispute at trial by way of the stipulation. The
stipulation provides in relevant part: ‘‘The parties agree
and acknowledge that the defendant, as the owner of
1206 Fairfield Beach Road, has the right to pass and
repass along the western boundary of the plaintiffs’
property at 1205 Fairfield Beach Road . . . . The par-
ties are in dispute as to whether the easement confers
upon the defendant, as the owner of 1206 Fairfield
Beach Road, any rights to use and occupy any other
portion of the plaintiffs’ property at 1205 Fairfield Beach
Road along the western boundary of the plaintiffs’ prop-
erty and, if any, the nature and extent of any such rights
. . . . The parties acknowledge that the plaintiffs claim
that the defendant has used the plaintiffs’ property at
1205 Fairfield Beach Road in a manner that exceeds
the rights conferred upon the defendant as the owner
of 1206 Fairfield Beach Road. Conversely, the defendant
claims that the plaintiffs have interfered with and pre-
vented the defendant from using the plaintiffs’ property
in violation of the easement claimed by the defendant
as the owner of 1206 Fairfield Beach Road . . . . There
shall be no evidence presented by the parties at trial
as to any conduct by any party, including their families,
guests, tenants, and invitees, concerning any alleged
violations of the easement . . . . The parties each
acknowledge that they shall respect and shall not inter-
fere with the rights of the parties to use and enjoy
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the plaintiffs’ property or any right conferred by the
easement, all as determined by the court.’’
Additionally, the parties stated on the record at the
start of trial that they were withdrawing their respective
nuisance claims. The following colloquy occurred
between the court and the parties’ respective counsel:
‘‘The Court: Question. There [were] allegations of
nuisance in the complaint. Based on the . . . stipula-
tion, the nuisance claim is being withdrawn, is that
correct or not?
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: Okay, noted for the record.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Just on the—just on the
scope of the easement—
‘‘The Court: Very good. . . . You didn’t say that
explicitly, but let’s get that explicitly on the record.
Thank you.
‘‘[The Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: And for the plaintiffs there
are allegations of nuisance as well and, once again,
the injunction we would seek would be to enforce the
easement as it is interpreted by the court.
‘‘The Court: All right. Very good.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: Same for the defendant,
Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: Very Good.’’
We conclude that the language of the stipulation is
so clear as to render its interpretation a matter of law.
See Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., supra, 229 Conn.
780. The parties clearly expressed an intent to abandon
their respective claims that the other party engaged in
conduct that (1) exceeded the scope of the easement
or impeded the defendant’s use of the easement, and
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(2) constituted a nuisance. This left the scope and loca-
tion of the easement as the sole issue to be adjudicated,
and to the extent that the court ruled on issues beyond
that, such rulings were improper.
Despite the stipulation, pursuant to which the parties
withdrew their claims pertaining to alleged misconduct
and nuisance, the court stated: ‘‘[T]he court finds that
the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the defendant
has engaged in any conduct constituting a nuisance or
trespass as alleged in this complaint. . . . As to the
defendant’s counterclaim, the court finds that the defen-
dant has proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that the plaintiffs’ conduct, premised on their position
that the easement provides the defendant access only
to ‘the Beach and Waters of Long Island Sound below
the Mean High Water line,’ has operated as an impedi-
ment to her use and enjoyment of the easement as
alleged in the counterclaim.’’ This was a clear deviation
from the stipulation, as the court ruled on issues that
were no longer before it, namely, whether the plaintiffs
or the defendant engaged in conduct constituting a vio-
lation of the easement or a nuisance. Moreover, in devi-
ating from the stipulation of the parties, the court did
not ‘‘state its disapproval of the stipulation and the
reasons for its disapproval on the record,’’ as is required.
See Central Connecticut Teachers Federal Credit
Union v. Grant, supra, 27 Conn. App. 438.
With respect to the plaintiffs’ discrete argument that
the court issued injunctive relief based on allegations
and claims that the defendant had withdrawn prior to
trial, we disagree. The court stated in relevant part:
‘‘Based on the court’s judgment in favor of the defendant
on her counterclaim, the court issues an order enjoining
the plaintiffs from interfering with the defendant’s use
of the easement based on the scope of the easement
as found by the court herein.’’ This order pertained
to the sole issue to be adjudicated by the court and,
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therefore, was not improper. As was noted, the parties
sought an injunction ‘‘to enforce the easement as it is
interpreted by the court,’’ which was what the court
ultimately granted.
In sum, we conclude that the court erred in making
findings based on claims that the defendant had with-
drawn prior to trial. The court’s order issuing injunctive
relief, however, pertained to the issue presented for
adjudication.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.