Giglio v. Ardohain

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Giglio v. Ardohain

CYNTHIA GIGLIO v. JANINE ARDOHAIN ET AL.
(AC 46379)
Elgo, Suarez and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff, who owned real property adjacent to that owned by the defen-
dant A and on which the defendant M resided, appealed from the trial court’s
judgment, rendered in favor of the defendants, A, M, and M’s business entity,
E Co. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined
that the defendants’ conduct had not created a private nuisance by unreason-
ably interfering with her use and enjoyment of her property. Held:

The trial court’s conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to establish her
claim of private nuisance was not clearly erroneous, as the court considered
all relevant factors in determining that intermittent noise from vehicles at
M’s residence and smoke from a woodstove there, which occasionally drifted
toward the plaintiff’s home, did not constitute an unreasonable interference
with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her property.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s request
for injunctive relief as part of her claim for private enforcement of city
zoning regulations against the defendants, the court having found that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate a sufficient causal connection between her
claims of harm and the defendants’ conduct.

Argued November 14, 2024—officially released July 15, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, nuisance,
and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the
judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where American
Marine Electronics, LLC, was added as a defendant;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Kavanewsky,
J.; judgment for the defendants, from which the plaintiff
appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Robert D. Russo, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Igor G. Kuperman and Stephan E. Seeger, for the
appellees (defendants).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
Giglio v. Ardohain

Opinion

ELGO, J. The plaintiff, Cynthia Giglio, appeals from
the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of
the defendants, Janine Ardohain, Sean McAleer, and
American Marine Electronics, LLC (AME).1 On appeal,
the plaintiff contends that the court improperly (1)
determined that the defendants’ conduct did not consti-
tute a private nuisance and (2) declined to grant injunc-
tive relief due to the defendants’ violation of certain
municipal zoning regulations. We affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
The following facts, either as found by the trial court
or as undisputed in the record, and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. At all rele-
vant times, the plaintiff owned real property known as
11 Rising Road in Norwalk, which is adjacent to the
property located at 9 Rising Road owned by Ardohain
and occupied by McAleer.2 In December, 2018, the plain-
tiff commenced the present action against the defen-
dants. Her operative second amended complaint con-
tained two counts seeking monetary damages and
injunctive relief as to each count. The first count, sound-
ing in private nuisance, alleged that smoke from a wood-
stove installed in a garage on the 9 Rising Road property,
as well as noise created by various trucks and commer-
cial activity, created a private nuisance that interfered
with the plaintiff’s ability to use and enjoy her property.
The second count, in which the plaintiff sought to
1
Ardohain owns certain real property at 9 Rising Road in Norwalk. Her
grandson, McAleer, resides at that property. McAleer operates and is the
sole member of AME. We refer to the defendants collectively throughout
this opinion, except when necessary to describe the actions of specific
persons or entities.
2
The plaintiff purchased the property at 11 Rising Road in 2007. In 2017,
Ardohain purchased the adjacent property for the purpose of providing a
home for McAleer, her grandson. McAleer has been the sole occupant of
the property since that time. Both of the subject properties are zoned for
residential use.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Giglio v. Ardohain

enforce certain city of Norwalk (city) zoning regula-
tions, alleged that McAleer’s activity in operating a com-
mercial business on the 9 Rising Road property and
installing a noncompliant woodstove constituted a vio-
lation of the regulations that necessitated injunctive
relief and damages.
A court trial was held over six days in 2021 and 2022,
at which the plaintiff, Ardohain, and McAleer testified.3
The plaintiff’s testimony spanned the first four days of
the trial. The plaintiff testified that she first complained
about the woodstove on December 31, 2017, and first
smelled smoke in her house on November 15, 2018. The
plaintiff claimed that ‘‘significant amounts’’ of smoke
entered her home as a result of the operation of the
woodstove on the 9 Rising Road property, causing
‘‘physical harm,’’ including respiratory issues that
required medical treatment. The plaintiff testified that
she was forced to rent a motel room at times to avoid
the smoke. The plaintiff also testified that she has ‘‘long-
standing allergic asthma’’ and is highly allergic to dust,
smoke, and mold. The plaintiff further testified that the
last time McAleer used the woodstove was in March,
2019. In addition, the plaintiff testified as to the noise
created by McAleer’s vehicles and the alleged commer-
cial activity taking place at the 9 Rising Road property.4
More than fifty exhibits were admitted into evidence,
3
We note that the plaintiff’s real estate appraiser testified as well. The
trial court did not credit the appraiser’s testimony as to the impact of the
defendants’ conduct on the value of the plaintiff’s property, and the plaintiff
does not challenge that factual finding on appeal.
4
In her testimony, the plaintiff acknowledged that noise from machine
tools on the 9 Rising Road property had ‘‘not been happening’’ recently.
The trial court was presented with evidence that the city had issued Ardohain
a citation for zoning violations on the 9 Rising Road property in June, 2018,
due to the storage of a commercial vehicle on the property. The court found
that the noise related to business equipment and the repairing of vehicles
‘‘eventually ceased in response to zoning enforcement activity against [McA-
leer].’’ The noise created by McAleer’s vehicle, which is the result of his
activity as a volunteer firefighter, is the only noise at issue in this appeal.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
Giglio v. Ardohain

including medical records, photographs and video
recordings of the smoke from the woodstove, and pho-
tographs and video recordings of McAleer’s various
vehicles.
McAleer testified that he is a volunteer officer with
two local fire departments and that he responds to
calls at all times of the day and night. McAleer further
testified that he does not use the woodstove because
he wants to be a good neighbor. McAleer also testified
that, after he learned about the plaintiff’s being both-
ered by the noise his truck created, he spent $1000 to
add mufflers to the exhaust system.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had not sustained her burden
to prove ‘‘that [McAleer’s] activities or conduct were
unreasonable.’’ As to the private nuisance claim, the
court found that any interference with the plaintiff’s
use and enjoyment of her property was such that it was
not in excess of ‘‘ ‘what a normal person of ordinary
habits and sensibilities’ ’’ would have been able to
endure. The court also concluded that the plaintiff could
not sustain her private zoning enforcement claim
because she had not shown any ‘‘credible, true harm’’
resulting from any zoning violations. The court deter-
mined that, ‘‘while the plaintiff testified and offered
evidence at great length concerning many maladies
which she claimed to have suffered because of the
violations, the court does not find such testimony and
evidence to be reliable and believable. There is a lack
of sufficient causal connection between any violations
and the plaintiff’s medical conditions.’’ The court thus
rendered judgment in favor of the defendants on both
counts, and this appeal followed.5
5
We note that the plaintiff filed a motion for articulation during the
pendency of this appeal. The trial court denied that motion, and the plaintiff
sought our review of that denial. We subsequently granted the plaintiff’s
request for review of that denial but denied the relief requested.
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Giglio v. Ardohain

I
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court erred in
concluding that the defendants’ conduct did not consti-
tute a private nuisance. The plaintiff argues that the
evidence adduced at trial established that McAleer’s
woodstove, which was installed in a garage at the rear of
the 9 Rising Road property and adjacent to the plaintiff’s
home, produced excessive smoke that invaded her
home, which made it impossible for her to sleep in her
bedroom and exacerbated her environmental allergies.
She alleges that the smoke had reached such an inten-
sity that she was admitted to the emergency department
of Norwalk Hospital for acute bronchospasm, and that,
at times, the smoke also caused her to flee her home
and rent a motel room. The plaintiff also argues that
the operation of commercial vehicles on the 9 Rising
Road property created noise that disturbs her sleep.6
The defendants counter that the court properly weighed
all the relevant factors in denying the plaintiff’s claim,
and that the plaintiff simply ‘‘disagrees with the trial
court’s ultimate conclusions as to the reasonableness
of [McAleer’s] use and the extent of harm (or lack
thereof) suffered by the plaintiff.’’ We agree with the
defendants.
The following additional facts are relevant to this
claim. The trial court found that the plaintiff had estab-
lished that the smoke from the woodstove as well as
the noise from the ‘‘conditions or activities taking place
on the defendants’ premises’’ caused ‘‘some measure
of interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment
of her own property.’’ The court then considered
whether and to what extent such interference with the
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her property was unrea-
sonable. The court found that, although McAleer was
6
The plaintiff alleges that, by her estimate, she has been awakened hun-
dreds of times since McAleer moved into the house next door in 2017 as a
result of his use of his vehicles when responding to fire alarms and alerts.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
Giglio v. Ardohain

using the woodstove without a permit ‘‘at first,’’ he
‘‘promptly complied with zoning enforcement [by the
city] to remedy the condition.’’ The court also found
that, as a result of prevailing wind conditions, smoke
from the woodstove would occasionally drift toward
the plaintiff’s property. The court noted that this drift
was ‘‘hardly a foreseeable event’’ and was not within the
defendants’ control. The smoke was not an intensive,
pervasive and unsuitable intrusion into the plaintiff’s
property, especially given the character of the neighbor-
hood.’’
With respect to the noises McAleer’s vehicles created,
the trial court found that these were ‘‘intermittent bursts
of noises’’ that would ‘‘primarily occur when [McAleer]
responded to his volunteer firefighter duties . . . .’’7
Although the court acknowledged that these incidents,
which were caused by McAleer’s ‘‘hurried exits’’ from
the driveway, occurred at ‘‘odd hours of the day and
night,’’ it concluded, nonetheless, that McAleer had not
acted in ‘‘any manner calculated to vex or unduly annoy
the plaintiff.’’ The court further found that the noise
from commercial activity had ceased due to the city’s
zoning enforcement. See footnote 4 of this opinion.
The court concluded that, after considering all relevant
factors as to the claim of private nuisance, the plaintiff,
who was ‘‘acutely’’ sensitive, had not sustained her bur-
den of proof to demonstrate that the defendants’ activi-
ties or conduct were unreasonable.8 Due to the fact that
7
The trial court also found that the noise arising from the fact that McAleer
would entertain guests at his home was ‘‘not of any persistent, irregular or
excessive character to deem it unreasonable.’’ The court, similarly, noted
that noise related to the repair of vehicles and/or caused by equipment used
for commercial activity was cause for concern, but ‘‘that noise eventually
ceased in response to zoning enforcement activity against [McAleer].’’
8
We note that the trial court also found that the plaintiff had not suffi-
ciently demonstrated harm such that she could seek injunctive relief through
private zoning enforcement—a finding that clearly is related to her private
nuisance claim as well. See part II of this opinion.
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Giglio v. Ardohain

the plaintiff had not met her burden of establishing that
she had been subjected to an unreasonable interference
with the use and enjoyment of her property, the court
rendered judgment in favor of the defendants on
count one.
We next set forth the legal principles and standard
of review relevant to our resolution of this claim. ‘‘A
private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of anoth-
er’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.’’
4 Restatement (Second), Torts § 821D, p. 100 (1979).
The law of private nuisance springs from the general
principle that ‘‘[i]t is the duty of every person to make
a reasonable use of his [or her] own property so as to
occasion no unnecessary damage or annoyance to his
neighbor.’’ Nailor v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 117
Conn. 241, 245, 167 A. 548 (1933). ‘‘Determining unrea-
sonableness is essentially a weighing process, involving
a comparative evaluation of conflicting interests . . . .
Unreasonableness cannot be determined in the
abstract, but, rather, must be judged under the circum-
stances of the particular case.’’ (Citations omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Pestey v. Cushman, 259
Conn. 345, 352–53, 788 A.2d 496 (2002).
To recover damages in a private nuisance cause of
action, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant’s
conduct was the proximate cause of an unreasonable
interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of
his or her property. Id., 361. Such interference may be
either intentional or the result of a defendant’s negli-
gence. Id.; see also Gregorio v. Naugatuck, 89 Conn.
App. 147, 151–52 n.8, 871 A.2d 1087 (2005) (‘‘[A] plaintiff
must show that the defendant’s conduct was the proxi-
mate cause of an unreasonable interference with the
plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property. The interfer-
ence may be intentional or negligent, but it must be
unreasonable.’’). ‘‘Ultimately, the question of reason-
ableness is whether the interference is beyond that
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
Giglio v. Ardohain

which the plaintiff should bear, under all of the circum-
stances of the particular case, without being compen-
sated.’’ Pestey v. Cushman, supra, 259 Conn. 362.
‘‘Whether the interference is unreasonable depends
upon a balancing of the interests involved under the
circumstances of each individual case. In balancing the
interests, the fact finder must take into consideration
all relevant factors, including the nature of both the
interfering use and the use and enjoyment invaded,
the nature, extent and duration of the interference, the
suitability for the locality of both the interfering conduct
and the particular use and enjoyment invaded, whether
the defendant is taking all feasible precautions to avoid
any unnecessary interference with the plaintiff’s use
and enjoyment of his or her property, and any other
factors that the fact finder deems relevant to the ques-
tion of whether the interference is unreasonable. No
one factor should dominate this balancing of interests;
all relevant factors must be considered in determining
whether the interference is unreasonable.’’9 Id., 361.
9
The plaintiff, for the first time on appeal, argues that McAleer’s status
as a licensee occupying the property at 9 Rising Road is a ‘‘ ‘relevant factor’ ’’
in determining whether his interference with her use and enjoyment of her
property was reasonable because, as an occupant at will, ‘‘[h]e has no
interest in the property he occupies.’’ This argument was not presented to
the trial court, and the defendants did not have an opportunity to address
it before the trial court. Nonetheless, citing to authority from other jurisdic-
tions, the plaintiff now argues that, because a licensee’s interest is slight,
any balancing of the interests should weigh in favor of any opposing party
who is an actual owner of property, meaning that ‘‘[a]ny infringement [on
the plaintiff’s enjoyment] should be actionable.’’ Although we acknowledge
that the plaintiff raised the issue of McAleer’s status as a licensee in her
posttrial reply brief, she made this argument only in response to the defen-
dants’ argument that Ardohain had no liability for McAleer’s actions, not
with respect to the relevant analysis undertaken by the court to determine
whether the interference created by McAleer’s actions was unreasonable.
Under these circumstances, we decline to address this argument, as it would
constitute trial by ambuscade. See Martin v. Todd Arthurs Co., 225 Conn.
App. 844, 854–55, 317 A.3d 98 (2024) (‘‘It is well established that an appellate
court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is not distinctly raised
at the trial level. . . . The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly
means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court the
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Giglio v. Ardohain

Further, ‘‘[t]he determination of whether the interfer-
ence is unreasonable should be made in light of the fact
that some level of interference is inherent in modern
society. There are few, if any, places remaining where
an individual may rest assured that he [or she] will be
able to use and enjoy his [or her] property free from
all interference. Accordingly, the interference must be
substantial to be unreasonable.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id.
Moreover, ‘‘while the reasonableness of a defendant’s
conduct is a factor in determining whether an interfer-
ence is unreasonable, it is not an independent element
that must be proven in order to prevail in all private
nuisance causes of action. The inquiry is cast more
appropriately as whether the defendant’s conduct
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s use and
enjoyment of his or her land rather than whether the
defendant’s conduct was itself unreasonable.’’ (Empha-
sis in original.) Id., 360.
‘‘Whether an interference is unreasonable is a ques-
tion of fact for the fact finder.’’ Boyne v. Glastonbury,
110 Conn. App. 591, 604, 955 A.2d 645, cert. denied, 289
Conn. 947, 959 A.2d 1011 (2008). ‘‘The trier of fact’s
determination of a question of fact will not be over-
turned unless it is clearly erroneous.’’ Berube v. Nagle,
81 Conn. App. 681, 696, 841 A.2d 724 (2004). ‘‘A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence
in the record to support it . . . or when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed. . . . Under
the clearly erroneous standard of review, a finding of
fact must stand if, on the basis of the evidence before
precise matter on which its decision is being asked. . . . The reason for
this rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has
not been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court or the opposing
party to address the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which is
unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.)).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
Giglio v. Ardohain

the court and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from that evidence, a trier of fact reasonably could have
found as it did. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e
do not examine the record to determine whether the
[court] could have reached a conclusion other than the
one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable
presumption . . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Circulent, Inc. v. Hatch & Bailey Co., 217 Conn. App.
622, 630, 289 A.3d 609 (2023).
The plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously
focused on the foreseeability of the fact that smoke
from McAleer’s woodstove would invade her property.10
According to the plaintiff’s understanding of the court’s
reasoning, the court put undue emphasis on McAleer’s
intentions, as well as the foreseeability of the impact
of his actions on the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues that
the concepts of unreasonable use and unreasonable
interference are distinct, in that a reasonable use can,
nonetheless, constitute a private nuisance when it
unreasonably interferes with the use or enjoyment of
another person’s property. In essence, the plaintiff con-
tends that the court elided the distinction, resulting in
factual findings that were clearly erroneous.
We conclude that the trial court’s finding that the
plaintiff had not established her claim of private nui-
sance was not clearly erroneous. The court considered
all the relevant factors, including the nature of the
interfering use as well as the use and enjoyment of her
10
More specifically, the plaintiff argues that, because the ‘‘primary focus’’
in a private nuisance action is on the ‘‘impact’’ on the affected property,
‘‘logic leads to the conclusion that foreseeability should not be a ‘relevant
factor.’ ’’ The defendants respond that ‘‘[t]he relevant inquiry before the
court was whether it was foreseeable that the smoke would be blown in
the direction of the plaintiff’s home’’ and that the court’s commentary regard-
ing the foreseeability of the wind’s effect on the smoke emanating from the
woodstove was ‘‘a recognition that [McAleer] was not intentionally trying
to ‘smoke out’ the plaintiff from her home.’’
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Giglio v. Ardohain

property that was being invaded. As the court noted,
the woodstove was a permitted use, and the prevailing
wind patterns were out of the defendants’ control. The
plaintiff was also in control of the location of her bed-
room relative to the source of the smoke. The court
also considered the duration as well as the suitability
of the defendants’ conduct for the ‘‘character’’ of the
residential neighborhood, noting that the smoke would
‘‘occasionally’’ drift toward the plaintiff’s residence and
that the noise was ‘‘intermittent . . . .’’
The trial court further considered whether McAleer
took all feasible precautions to avoid any unnecessary
interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of
her property. The court’s observation that ‘‘prevailing
wind conditions’’ caused the smoke from the woodstove
to ‘‘occasionally drift’’ toward the plaintiff’s property is
‘‘hardly a foreseeable event’’ related to its understand-
ing of the character of the residential neighborhood
and that McAleer was not able to take any further,
feasible precaution to ensure that smoke would not
drift toward the plaintiff’s property. Although foresee-
ability is not an element of a cause of action for private
nuisance, we do not agree with the plaintiff that the
court’s mere use of the word ‘‘foreseeable’’ was improper
under the circumstances. We conclude that the court’s
reference to foreseeability, rather than being an improper
factor, was simply part and parcel of its overall delibera-
tion in balancing the equities.
Moreover, the trial court considered the applicable
zoning ordinances—as well as McAleer’s violations of
those ordinances—in determining that there was no
private nuisance. The court noted that, although the
woodstove had been installed without the required per-
mit and McAleer ‘‘had not installed some features neces-
sary’’ to obtain the required permit, he had nonetheless
‘‘promptly complied with [the city’s] zoning enforce-
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
Giglio v. Ardohain

ment orders to remedy the condition.’’ The court simi-
larly noted that, although it was ‘‘concerned about noise
complaints’’ resulting from McAleer’s actions in repairing
vehicles or other business equipment on the property,
which was ‘‘not a permitted use in [the] zone,’’ that
noise eventually ceased in response to the city’s zoning
enforcement.11 See footnote 4 of this opinion.
Although the trial court did find that there was some
interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of
11
The plaintiff devotes nearly ten pages of her principal appellate brief
in support of her argument that the woodstove ‘‘enlarged’’ or ‘‘changed’’ the
use of the garage at the 9 Rising Road property, in violation of applicable
zoning regulations. In attempting to prove these violations, the plaintiff also
filed a motion asking this court to take judicial notice of various local zoning
regulations. According to the plaintiff, ‘‘use and structure zoning violations
should be as a matter of law (per se) unreasonable (private nuisance).’’ The
plaintiff also argues that, even if we do not accept the theory that a zoning
violation constitutes per se a private nuisance, the existence of a zoning
violation should ‘‘reduce the [plaintiff’s] burden for establishing unreason-
able interference’’ in that ‘‘mere annoyance, discomfort and agitation
should suffice.’’
This court has firmly rejected the theory that zoning violations constitute
per se private nuisance. See Day v. Perkins Properties, LLC, 190 Conn.
App. 33, 34, 209 A.3d 718 (2019). The proper emphasis—in any analysis of
a claim sounding in private nuisance—is on the interference that the conduct
creates, rather than the nature of the activity itself. To hold that zoning
violations constitute per se private nuisance would upend our Supreme
Court’s determination that the proper emphasis in these cases is on interfer-
ence rather than conduct—something we cannot do. Private nuisance ‘‘is
concerned with conduct that interferes with an individual’s private right to
the use and enjoyment of his or her land.’’ Pestey v. Cushman, supra, 259
Conn. 357. A court may consider, however, local zoning regulations, along
with other factors, in determining whether a private nuisance exists. See,
e.g., Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 79, 527 A.2d 230 (1987) (‘‘[i]n deciding
whether a nuisance exists, a court will often find it necessary to interpret
the pertinent zoning regulations because the nuisance issue is intertwined
with the lawfulness of the conduct involved’’). We, therefore, also decline
the plaintiff’s invitation to conclude that ‘‘mere annoyance, discomfort and
agitation’’ should suffice, in any private nuisance action, to demonstrate
unreasonable interference. Put differently, the mere existence of a zoning
violation should not reduce the plaintiff’s burden of proof in an action
sounding in private nuisance—to demonstrate a substantial interference in
the use and enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property.
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Giglio v. Ardohain

her property, it did not find that interference to be
substantial enough to warrant an award of damages.
Put differently, the court concluded that the interfer-
ence with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of her prop-
erty caused by the defendants’ conduct was not unrea-
sonable. Therefore, because the record before us
contains ample support for this finding by the court, it
is not clearly erroneous. The plaintiff’s assertion that
the court erred in concluding that the defendants’ con-
duct did not constitute a private nuisance must there-
fore fail.
II
The plaintiff’s second claim is that the trial court
improperly failed to grant her injunctive relief to pri-
vately enforce certain zoning regulations due to the
zoning violations created by the operation of the woods-
tove on the 9 Rising Road property as well as the noise
allegedly created by ongoing commercial deliveries.12
Although the woodstove was originally installed with-
out the required permit from the city, the Norwalk
Building Department issued a certificate of compliance
in November, 2018 (almost one year after the installa-
tion of the woodstove), which approved the use of the
woodstove in the defendants’ ‘‘workshop’’ and specified
that the structure was not to be used as a garage. Never-
theless, the plaintiff claims that she is entitled to injunc-
tive relief because this is an expansion of the noncon-
forming structure and, hence, a zoning violation. The
12
The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the city’s inaction had caused her
to suffer irreparable damage and loss which could not be measured in
damages. She sought an order enforcing numerous zoning regulations related
to the following alleged activity on the part of the defendants and the city:
(1) the storage of noncompliant commercial vehicles on the property; (2)
the operation of an illegal business on the property; (3) the operation of a
boat marina on the property; (4) the operation of a woodstove installed in
noncompliance with the manufacturer’s installation instructions; (5) the
Norwalk Building Department’s improper issuance of the certificate of com-
pliance granted with respect to the woodstove; (6) the classification of the
structure where the woodstove is installed as a ‘‘workshop’’ without the
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
Giglio v. Ardohain

defendants contend that, regardless of whether there
were zoning violations, the plaintiff never demonstrated
harm such that relief was warranted. According to the
defendants, the court properly exercised its discretion
in denying the plaintiff’s demand for injunctive relief,
in that the court did not credit the plaintiff’s testimony
regarding the harm she allegedly suffered. We agree
with the defendants.
The following legal principles guide our analysis.
‘‘The issuance of an injunction is the exercise of an
extraordinary power which rests within the sound dis-
cretion of the court, and the justiciable interest which
entitles one to seek redress in an action for injunctive
relief is . . . founded on the imminence of substantial
and irreparable injury.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Karls v. Alexandra Realty Corp., 179 Conn. 390,
401, 426 A.2d 784 (1980). To be granted injunctive relief,
the plaintiff must establish ‘‘(1) that injury from failure
to grant an injunction is imminent; (2) the injury is
substantial; (3) the injury is irreparable and there is a
substantial probability that unless an injunction is
issued the party seeking it will suffer irreparable harm.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Steroco, Inc. v. Szy-
manski, 166 Conn. App. 75, 89, 140 A.3d 1014 (2016).
Moreover, ‘‘[e]ven where the danger of irreparable
injury is shown, the granting of an injunction is not
mandatory but within the sound discretion of the court.
Until it is shown that the court’s discretion was abused,
there can be no reversal of the court’s action in denying
the injunction.’’ Koepper v. Emanuele, 164 Conn. 175,
178, 319 A.2d 411 (1972).
The trial court, in its memorandum of decision,
grounded its rejection of the plaintiff’s claim on her
failure to demonstrate substantial and irreparable harm.
proper exemption having been granted; and (7) the alteration of the noncon-
forming garage structure via the installation of the woodstove.
Page 14 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

16 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
Giglio v. Ardohain

The court found: ‘‘[T]he plaintiff has not shown any
credible, true harm as a result of any violations. . . .
[W]hile the plaintiff testified and offered evidence at
great length concerning many maladies which she
claimed to have suffered because of the violations, the
court does not find such testimony and evidence to be
reliable and believable. There is a lack of sufficient
causal connection between any violations and the plain-
tiff’s medical conditions.’’13 The court also did not credit
the plaintiff’s evidence as to the diminution of the value
of her property allegedly caused by the defendants’
activities. In so doing, the court concluded that, even
if zoning violations existed on the 9 Rising Road prop-
erty, the plaintiff had not satisfied her burden of estab-
lishing the requisite harm to maintain a private zoning
enforcement action against the defendants.14
13
We note that the plaintiff argues that ‘‘[t]he court erred when it ruled
that [the plaintiff’s] . . . use and enjoyment of her property and personal
well-being were materially not damaged, compromised, nor invaded by McA-
leer’s conduct.’’ According to the plaintiff, there ‘‘is no support in the evi-
dence for that finding . . . .’’ The plaintiff, who bears the burden of proof,
testified and introduced medical records in support of her claim that she
suffered harm. The court heard her testimony over four days and did not
find it to be credible as to the issue of causation. The plaintiff’s argument
that the record does not support the court’s finding that her testimony was
not credible is therefore misplaced. We reiterate ‘‘what has become a tired
refrain: Because it is the sole province of the trier of fact to assess the
credibility of witnesses, it is not our role to second-guess such credibility
determinations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Downing v. Dragone,
216 Conn. App. 306, 333, 285 A.3d 59 (2022), cert. denied, 346 Conn. 903,
287 A.3d 601 (2023).
14
We note that the trial court also considered that the plaintiff had notified
the appropriate city zoning officials, who substantiated some of her com-
plaints and took enforcement action against the defendants. A plaintiff,
however, is not required to seek enforcement by proper authorities before
commencing an action to privately enforce zoning regulations. As the court
noted correctly, private zoning enforcement actions are an exception to the
doctrine of administrative exhaustion. This court has observed, ‘‘property
owners specifically and materially damaged by the violation of zoning regula-
tions may bring private zoning enforcement actions directly to the Superior
Court, without first applying to municipal zoning authorities, as an exception
to the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.’’ Reichenbach v.
Kraska Enterprises, LLC, 105 Conn. App. 461, 468, 938 A.2d 1238 (2008).
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 15

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 17
Giglio v. Ardohain

On our review of the record, we conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. As stated pre-
viously in this opinion, the issuance of an injunction is
the exercise of extraordinary power. In the present
case, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate that she had suffered ‘‘any credible, true
harm as a result of any [zoning] violations.’’ Given these
factual findings, which are supported by evidence in the
record, we conclude that the court properly determined
that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a sufficient
causal connection between her claims of harm, includ-
ing her medical conditions, and the defendants’ con-
duct. The court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion
in denying the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

The reason for this exception to the doctrine of administrative exhaustion,
which grants courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear private zoning
enforcement claims, is precisely because, where specific and material harm
is being perpetrated upon a party, that party should be able to seek equitable
relief. See, e.g., Cummings v. Tripp, 204 Conn. 67, 76, 527 A.2d 230 (1987)
(concluding that subject matter jurisdiction existed where administrative
remedies had not been exhausted but that such exception requires ‘‘the
necessity for clear and precise allegations of specific and material claims
of damage in order to establish the threshold requirement for this exception
to the exhaustion doctrine’’).