Housing Authority v. Singleton

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Housing Authority v. Singleton

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF STAMFORD
v. PAULINE SINGLETON ET AL.
(AC 47982)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Westbrook, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s judgment of possession for the
defendant tenant on count one of the seven count complaint in the plaintiff’s
summary process action. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court
failed to render a decision with respect to the remaining counts of the
complaint, which contained independent grounds for eviction. Held:

This court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as
the trial court rendered an express judgment only as to count one of the
complaint and, pursuant to Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank (328 Conn.
709), the trial court’s ruling on count one did not implicitly resolve the
remaining counts of the complaint, all of which alleged legally consistent
theories that, if proven, would support eviction of the defendant, and, thus,
the appeal was not taken from a final judgment.

Argued April 15—officially released July 15, 2025

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk,
Housing Session at Norwalk, where the defendant Jason
John Faust was defaulted for failure to appear; there-
after, the case was tried to the court, Cirello, J.; judg-
ment of possession for the named defendant; subse-
quently, the court, Cirello, J., denied the plaintiff’s
motion to reargue, and the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Appeal dismissed.
John A. Farnsworth, with whom were Robert L. Ris-
poli and G. Adam Schweickert, for the appellant (plain-
tiff).
Jane Kelleher, with whom were Madeleine Anderson
and, on the brief, Matthew Haine, for the appellee
(named defendant).
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Opinion

WESTBROOK, J. In this summary process eviction
action, the plaintiff, the Housing Authority of the city of
Stamford doing business as Charter Oak Communities,
appeals from the judgment of possession rendered by
the trial court in favor of the defendant Pauline Single-
ton on the basis of her special defense of equitable
nonforfeiture.1 The plaintiff claims that the court
improperly (1) failed to render a decision with respect
to counts two through seven of its complaint, which
contained independent grounds for eviction;2 (2) deter-
mined with respect to count one that the defendant had
proven her special defense of equitable nonforfeiture;
(3) failed to recognize that equitable nonforfeiture was
inapplicable as a matter of law because ‘‘federal law is
controlling regarding the relevant portions of the sub-
ject lease’’; and (4) concluded that the defendant had
proven her special defense of equitable nonforfeiture
‘‘as a factual matter.’’ Because we conclude that the
court failed to dispose of all counts of the complaint
brought against the defendant and, thus, that the appeal
was not taken from a final judgment, we dismiss the
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
1
Jason John Faust, an additional occupant of the subject premises, was
also named as a defendant in the underlying action. Faust was defaulted
for failure to appear and is not a participant in the present appeal. Accord-
ingly, all references to the defendant throughout this opinion are to Single-
ton.
2
The court’s purported failure to dispose of all counts of the complaint
directed at the defendant raises ‘‘jurisdictional alarm bells’’ as to whether
the court rendered an appealable final judgment and, thus, whether the
present appeal is jurisdictionally defective. Clinton v. Aspinwall, 344 Conn.
696, 698, 281 A.3d 1174 (2022); see also Practice Book §§ 61-2 through 61-4.
Accordingly, prior to oral argument, we asked the parties to file supplemental
briefs addressing whether the court’s judgment of possession in favor of
the defendant on count one of the complaint implicitly also disposed of
the remaining counts brought against the defendant pursuant to Meribear
Productions, Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 723–24, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018).
See id. (holding that court’s disposition of one count may implicitly dispose
of other counts premised on ‘‘legally inconsistent, but not legally consistent,
alternative theories’’).
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The following facts, which either were found by the
trial court or are undisputed in the record, and proce-
dural history are relevant to our disposition of this
appeal. In October, 2012, the defendant entered into a
lease with the plaintiff for an apartment at Stamford
Manor, a federally subsidized low income public hous-
ing complex in Stamford. The defendant subsequently
allowed her nephew, Jason John Faust, to live with her
in the apartment.3 Faust was not a party to the lease
nor was he listed on the lease as a family member of
the defendant who would be occupying the premises.4
In December, 2022, Faust sold drugs to undercover
Stamford police officers.5 As a result, the police
searched the defendant’s apartment and discovered var-
ious illegal drugs,6 a scale, packaging materials and
cash. Faust was arrested and charged with possession
of a controlled substance, sale of narcotics, possession
of narcotics with intent to sell, and operation of a drug
factory. Shortly thereafter, he was arrested a second
time for selling narcotics.7 The defendant was unaware
3
Faust told the police that he was the defendant’s nephew, and the court
refers to Faust as the defendant’s nephew in its decision. We note, however,
that, in the defendant’s posttrial brief to the court, she stated that Faust is
‘‘not blood related’’ but nonetheless was ‘‘considered . . . part of her fam-
ily.’’
4
Section 1 of the lease identifies the parties to the lease and provides in
relevant part: ‘‘It is agreed and understood that occupancy under the terms
of this lease is limited to the Tenant and his or her family as named above.
Unauthorized occupancy of the leased premises or any portion thereof is
a serious breach of this lease, which may lead to Tenant’s eviction.’’
5
According to the plaintiff, a police investigation into Faust had ‘‘started
due to a fentanyl overdose death by another resident of Stamford Manor
. . . and the police had credible information tying that death to [Faust].’’
6
The police recovered powder cocaine, crack cocaine, fentanyl, alprazo-
lam pills, and oxycodone pills.
7
Faust pleaded guilty in August, 2024, to operating a drug factory in
violation of General Statutes § 21a-277 (c). See State v. Faust, Superior
Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S. Faust was
sentenced to six years of incarceration, and his maximum release date is
November 22, 2028.
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that Faust was selling illegal drugs out of her apartment
or storing them there.
On March 27, 2023, following Faust’s arrests, the
plaintiff served the defendant and Faust with notices
to quit possession of the apartment. On May 4, 2023,
the plaintiff commenced the underlying eviction action.
The complaint contained seven counts alleging the fol-
lowing grounds for eviction. Count one alleged that
the defendant breached the lease by allowing Faust to
reside in the apartment without the permission of the
plaintiff and by allowing Faust ‘‘to engage in criminal
activity on the premises involving suspected drug use
and sales . . . .’’ Count two alleged that the defendant
and Faust ‘‘have conducted themselves in a manner
that violated General Statutes § 47a-11 (g) by . . . dis-
turb[ing] the neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of the
premises.’’8 Count three alleged that the defendant and
Faust violated § 47a-11 (g) because their conduct con-
stituted a nuisance pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-
329 in that their conduct substantially interfered with
the comfort or safety of other tenants or occupants of
Stamford Manor. Count four alleged that the defendant
and Faust violated § 47a-11 (g) because their conduct
amounted to a ‘‘serious nuisance’’ under General Stat-
utes § 47a-15 (C) in that it ‘‘present[ed] an immediate
and serious danger to [others’] safety.’’ Count five
alleged that the defendant and Faust ‘‘have conducted
themselves in a manner that constitutes a serious nui-
sance’’ under §§ 47a-11 (g) and 47a-15 (D) by allowing
8
General Statutes § 47a-11 (g) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] tenant
shall . . . conduct himself and require other persons on the premises with
his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not disturb his
neighbors’ peaceful enjoyment of the premises or constitute a nuisance, as
defined in section 47a-32, or a serious nuisance, as defined in section 47a-
15 . . . .’’
9
General Statutes § 47a-32 defines ‘‘nuisance’’ as including, but not limited
to, ‘‘any conduct [that] interferes substantially with the comfort or safety of
other tenants or occupants of the same or adjacent buildings or structures.’’
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the apartment ‘‘to be used for . . . the illegal sale of
drugs or, in the case of a housing authority, using any
area within 1500 feet of any housing authority property
in which the tenant resides for the illegal sale of drugs.’’10
Counts six and seven were directed against Faust only
and alleged, respectively, that he took possession of
the apartment ‘‘without lease, permission, right or privi-
lege to occupy the same’’ and that any possessory right
or privilege he may have acquired under an agreement
with the defendant had terminated.
The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on
May 30, 2023. She raised three special defenses. Her
first and second special defenses invoked the doctrine
of equitable nonforfeiture pursuant to which ‘‘[e]quita-
ble principles’’ can prevent an eviction if ‘‘(1) the ten-
ant’s breach was not [wilful] or grossly negligent; (2)
upon eviction the tenant will suffer a loss wholly dispro-
portionate to the injury to the landlord; and (3) the
landlord’s injury is reparable.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Boccanfuso v. Daghoghi, 337 Conn.
228, 239–40, 253 A.3d 1 (2020); see also Presidential
Village, LLC v. Phillips, 325 Conn. 394, 407, 158 A.3d
772 (2017) (although originally articulated as defense to
evictions for nonpayment of rent, doctrine of equitable
nonforfeiture may be applicable in eviction actions aris-
ing from violations of other lease terms). The defen-
dant’s third special defense provided that ‘‘[a]ny alleged
breach of the lease or tenant obligations under Connect-
icut General Statutes has been timely cured.’’
After a number of continuances, the matter was tried
in June, 2024. In her posttrial brief, the defendant argued
10
General Statutes § 47a-15 defines ‘‘serious nuisance’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘con-
duct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other
tenants or the landlord, or . . . using the premises or allowing the premises
to be used for . . . the illegal sale of drugs or, in the case of a housing
authority, using any area within fifteen hundred feet of any housing authority
property in which the tenant resides for the illegal sale of drugs.’’
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that Faust’s drug sales were not connected to her apart-
ment because Faust had ‘‘walk[ed] to the adjacent park’’
in order to carry them out.11 Moreover, she asserted
that she ‘‘was unaware that [Faust] was involved in
illegal drug related criminal activity’’ and that ‘‘she
thought [Faust] was going to the store for her to buy
Epsom salts’’ when he left the apartment to conduct
one of the sales to the undercover police officer. Finally,
the defendant argued that, if evicted, she would lose
her federally subsidized apartment and become home-
less and that such results ‘‘would be wholly dispropor-
tiona[te] to the harm sustained by the plaintiff . . . .’’
Specifically, she asserted that any harm suffered by the
plaintiff was no more than the ‘‘general adverse effect
[that] drugs have on our communities’’ and, therefore,
the ‘‘enormous loss she would suffer is wholly dispro-
portionate to the injury to the plaintiff’’ such that the
court should render a judgment of possession in her
favor.
In its posttrial brief, the plaintiff argued that the
defendant’s ignorance of Faust’s activities was irrele-
vant to whether she had violated the terms of her lease
and, also, that the doctrine of ‘‘equitable nonforfeiture
is inapplicable [in this case] and an end run around
federal law.’’ Furthermore, the plaintiff argued that the
harm to it, the greater community, its residents, and its
employees would far outweigh any harm to the defen-
dant.
The plaintiff also highlighted that, as part of settle-
ment negotiations with the defendant, it had offered
her the opportunity to transfer to one of the plaintiff’s
other properties and agreed to withdraw the eviction
action if she moved. The defendant, however, purport-
edly rejected this offer, and, according to the plaintiff,
11
There was testimony that the park was within 1500 feet of the apart-
ment complex.
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she should not be able ‘‘to reject an incredibly reason-
able compromise aimed at keeping her in subsidized
housing and then complain [in support of her equitable
nonforfeiture defense] that she is inequitably being
ejected from public housing . . . .’’ According to the
plaintiff, the sale of narcotics, especially fentanyl, posed
a very grave risk to the public, including death, and
‘‘[e]ven a single instance of unauthorized occupancy
or drug related criminal activity is enough to cause
irreversible and lasting harm to a community . . . .
Significant and lasting harm has been visited on [the
plaintiff] and its staff and other residents at Stamford
Manor as a result of the defendant’s actions (or inac-
tions) and those of [Faust].’’ Finally, the plaintiff reiter-
ated that ‘‘[t]he defense of equitable nonforfeiture is
inapplicable’’ because ‘‘it is preempted by federal law’’
and because, in light of the federal government’s public
policy ‘‘prohibit[ing] . . . the manufacture, sale, distri-
bution, use, or possession of controlled substances in
public housing . . . [t]here can be no countervailing
equities when [that] cardinal offense in housing has
taken place in a government subsidized community
. . . .’’
On August 22, 2024, the court, Cirello, J., issued a
decision rendering a judgment of possession in favor
of the defendant with respect to count one of the com-
plaint. The court initially found ‘‘that the defendant
violated the terms of her lease agreement and, as such,
the plaintiff has proved the allegations in count one of
its complaint by a preponderance of the evidence.’’12
(Emphasis added.) In particular, the court specified
that the defendant had breached §§ 7 (a) and 9 (a) (1)
and (2) of the lease prohibiting unauthorized persons
The court expressly stated that Faust’s illegal activities violated § 1; § 7
12

(a), (b), (c), (d) and (f); § 9 (a) (1), (2), (3), (5), (10), (11) (i) and (ii) and
(13); and § 13 (b) (1) and (2) (i) and (ii) of the lease, as well as §§ 2 and
20 of the plaintiff’s Rules and Regulations of Tenancy.
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from occupying the premises as well as violating the
plaintiff’s regulations, the prohibition on use of the
premises for any illegal purpose, and the plaintiff’s ‘‘zero
tolerance’’ policy for ‘‘drug related criminal activity’’ as
set forth in §§ 7 (c) and (d) and 9 (a) (11) of the lease.
The court also found that the defendant had breached
§§ 7 (c) and 9 (a) (10) of the lease requiring her and
her guests not to impair the safety or quiet enjoyment
of other tenants. Without mentioning or discussing the
remaining counts of the complaint, the court stated
that it would ‘‘turn to the defendant’s second special
defense, which makes equitable arguments.’’

The court went on to describe the defendant as ‘‘a
four foot, eleven inch, sixty-seven year old frail woman
who is on Social Security disability. She has severe
arthritis and cannot walk without assistance. She needs
a double hip replacement and is currently receiving
housing assistance, which would be put in jeopardy if
evicted from these premises.’’ The court found that
the defendant’s breach of the lease ‘‘was not wilful or
grossly negligent’’ and that she ‘‘had no idea her nephew
Faust was selling drugs out of her apartment or storing
drugs in her apartment.’’ The court further found that,
‘‘[u]pon eviction, the [defendant] will suffer a loss
wholly disproportionate to the injury to the [plaintiff]’’
because she was, essentially, facing potential home-
lessness, ‘‘which would be devastating to [her] in her
current physical condition.’’ In contrast, the court found
that the plaintiff ‘‘demonstrated no ascertainable loss
if the defendant is allowed to remain’’ because it pre-
sented no evidence that ‘‘occupancy rates will decrease
or that [the plaintiff] suffered a monetary loss.’’ The
court concluded: ‘‘For the above noted reasons, the
court finds that the plaintiff proved each and every
element of count one of its complaint, but the defendant
also proved her second special defense for equitable
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relief. As such, judgment of possession shall enter in
favor of the defendant.’’
The plaintiff filed a timely motion to reargue in which
it raised essentially the same claims it now raises on
appeal, including that the court ruled only on count
one of the complaint. It requested, inter alia, that ‘‘the
court rule on the second through seventh counts of the
complaint.’’ The court denied the motion, stating in its
brief order that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate
that the original decision contained any alleged incon-
sistencies or misapprehension of the facts, or over-
looked a claim that should have been addressed or a
principle of law that would have controlling effect. This
appeal followed.
The plaintiff’s first claim on appeal is that the court
improperly rendered a judgment of possession in favor
of the defendant without considering and rendering a
decision with respect to counts two through seven of
its complaint, which contained independent grounds
for eviction.13 This claim, by implication, raises whether
13
To the extent that the plaintiff maintains that no judgment was rendered
on the sixth and seventh counts of the complaint, which were directed
against Faust only, we conclude that the court effectively rendered judgment
in favor of the plaintiff on all counts brought against Faust when it uncondi-
tionally granted the plaintiff’s motion that asked the court to default Faust
for failure to appear and for a judgment of possession against him. In other
words, no further adjudication of counts six and seven is necessary. Even
if that were not the case, Faust is incarcerated and no longer in possession
of the property, and therefore no practical relief can flow from any remand
for adjudication of the sixth and seventh counts. See U.S. Bank National
Assn. v. Doe, 203 Conn. App. 218, 219, 247 A.3d 672 (2021) (‘‘[b]ecause the
record reveals that the defendants are no longer in possession of the prop-
erty, this appeal is moot’’); see also Housing Authority v. Lamothe, 225
Conn. 757, 763–64, 627 A.2d 367 (1993) (‘‘[s]ummary process appeals are
particularly susceptible to becoming moot . . . [in light of the] well-settled
general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is an essential
requisite to appellate jurisdiction’’ (citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted)). Accordingly, our discussion regarding the final judgment
issue is limited to counts two through five, the only remaining counts brought
by the plaintiff against the defendant.
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the present appeal was taken from an appealable final
judgment due to the court’s having purportedly ren-
dered an express judgment only as to count one of the
complaint, which, in turn, implicates the subject matter
jurisdiction of this court. See Meribear Productions,
Inc. v. Frank, 328 Conn. 709, 717, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018)
(Meribear) (‘‘the lack of a final judgment is a jurisdic-
tional defect that [necessitates] . . . dismissal of the
appeal’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
footnote 2 of this opinion.
In response to our request for supplemental briefing
on this threshold jurisdictional issue, the defendant
argues that the court’s judgment in her favor on count
one implicitly also disposed of counts two through five
because she had raised her defense of equitable nonfor-
feiture, on which the court found she had prevailed
with respect to count one, as to all counts against her.
Therefore, the defendant asserts, the underlying judg-
ment of possession in her favor constitutes an appeal-
able judgment from which the plaintiff was entitled to
appeal. The plaintiff counters that, because all counts
of the complaint asserted against the defendant were
not adjudicated, including as to the applicability of any
equitable defense raised by the defendant with respect
to those counts, the court did not render an appealable
final judgment. Because we agree with the plaintiff that
there are as yet unresolved counts of the complaint,
we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.14
14
Because we dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
we cannot and do not reach the merits of the remaining issues raised by
the parties on appeal, including whether the doctrine of equitable nonforfei-
ture is applicable to and should bar eviction with respect to the unresolved
counts of the complaint. See Heyward v. Judicial Dept., 159 Conn. App.
794, 799, 124 A.3d 920 (2015) (‘‘[i]f there is no final judgment, we cannot
reach the merits of the appeal’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jay v.
A & A Ventures, LLC, 118 Conn. App. 506, 517, 984 A.2d 784 (2009) (‘‘equitable
determinations that depend on the balancing of many factors are committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court’’ (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Nothing in this opinion should be construed as suggesting any particu-
lar outcome with respect to the unresolved counts.
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We begin our discussion with well settled legal princi-
ples. ‘‘The jurisdiction of the appellate courts is
restricted to appeals from judgments that are final. . . .
The policy concerns underlying the final judgment rule
are to discourage piecemeal appeals and to facilitate
the speedy and orderly disposition of cases at the trial
court level. . . . The appellate courts have a duty to
dismiss, even on [their] own initiative, any appeal that
[they lack] jurisdiction to hear. . . .
‘‘A judgment that disposes of only a part of a com-
plaint is not a final judgment . . . unless the partial
judgment disposes of all causes of action against a
particular party or parties . . . or if the trial court
makes a written determination regarding the signifi-
cance of the issues resolved by the judgment and the
chief justice or chief judge of the court having appellate
jurisdiction concurs. . . .
‘‘Alternatively, the courts may deem interlocutory
orders or rulings to have the attributes of a final judg-
ment if they fit within either of the two prongs of the
test set forth in State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 31, 463
A.2d 566 (1983). . . . Under Curcio . . . interlocutory
orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling
(1) terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or
(2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further
proceedings cannot affect them. . . . The first prong
of the Curcio test . . . requires that the order being
appealed from be severable from the central cause of
action so that the main action can proceed independent
of the ancillary proceeding. . . . If the interlocutory
ruling is merely a step along the road to final judgment
then it does not satisfy the first prong of Curcio. . . .
The second prong of the Curcio test focuses on the
nature of the right involved. It requires the parties seek-
ing to appeal to establish that the trial court’s order
threatens the preservation of a right already secured
to them and that that right will be irretrievably lost
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and the [parties] irreparably harmed unless they may
immediately appeal. . . . Thus, a bald assertion that
[the appellant] will be irreparably harmed if appellate
review is delayed until final adjudication . . . is insuffi-
cient to make an otherwise interlocutory order a final
judgment. One must make at least a colorable claim
that some recognized statutory or constitutional right
is at risk.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Heyward v. Judicial Dept., 159 Conn. App.
794, 799–801, 124 A.3d 920 (2015).
It is well established that, ‘‘[u]nder Connecticut law,
a judgment that disposes of only a part of a complaint
is not final, unless it disposes of all of the causes of
action against the appellant.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Clinton v. Aspinwall, 344 Conn. 696, 704, 281
A.3d 1174 (2022); see also Practice Book §§ 61-2 and 61-
3. In certain situations, however, a trial court’s express
disposition of one count can also implicitly dispose of
other counts not directly addressed by the court in
rendering the judgment on appeal. In such cases, a final
judgment problem does not exist because all counts
effectively have been resolved.
The leading case discussing this aspect of our final
judgment jurisprudence is Meribear Productions, Inc.
v. Frank, supra, 328 Conn. 709. In Meribear, our Supreme
Court stated that, ‘‘[i]n assessing whether a judgment
disposes of all of the causes of action against a party,
this court has recognized that the trial court’s failure
to expressly dispose of all of the counts in the judgment
itself will not necessarily render the judgment not final.
Rather, the reviewing court looks to the complaint and
the memorandum of decision to determine whether
the trial court explicitly or implicitly disposed of each
count.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 718. Our Supreme
Court recognized that cases in which a plaintiff has
raised alternative theories of recovery by way of multi-
ple counts generally fall within two distinct categories.
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Id., 721. The first category ‘‘involves counts alleging
claims that are legally inconsistent, also referred to as
mutually exclusive, such that establishing the elements
of one precludes liability on the other15 . . . . In such
cases, it is fair to infer that a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff on one count legally implies a judgment in
favor of the defendant on the other count.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis in original; footnote added.) Id., 721–
22. ‘‘The second category involves claims that present
alternative theories of recovery for the same injury, but
are not legally inconsistent. In such cases, there is no
legal impediment to the trier of fact finding that the
plaintiff has established both claims, although the plain-
tiff can recover only once for the same injury. . . . In
such cases, when the court has found in favor of the
plaintiff on one count, this ruling does not imply as a
matter of fact or law whether the plaintiff has estab-
lished the defendant’s liability under the other count.’’
(Citations omitted.) Id., 722–23.
After discussing relevant case law and the purpose
and policy considerations underlying our final judgment
rule, our Supreme Court concluded: ‘‘[W]hen the trial
court disposes of one count in the plaintiff’s favor, such
a determination implicitly disposes of legally inconsis-
tent, but not legally consistent, alternative theories.
When a legally consistent theory of recovery has been
litigated and has not been ruled on, there is no final
judgment.’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 723–24.16
15
By way of example, counts sounding in breach of contract and promis-
sory estoppel are legally inconsistent or mutually exclusive. This is because,
whereas a plaintiff must prove the formation of a contract to recover on a
theory of breach of contract, recovery for promissory estoppel is limited
to circumstances in which an otherwise enforceable contract was not
formed, often due to lack of consideration. See Meadowbrook Center, Inc.
v. Buchman, 149 Conn. App. 177, 194, 90 A.3d 219 (2014).
16
It is worth repeating our Supreme Court’s admonition in Meribear that
‘‘whenever feasible, the far better practice would be for the trial court to
fully address the merits of all theories litigated, even those that are legally
inconsistent.’’ Meribear Productions, Inc. v. Frank, supra, 328 Conn. 724.
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Housing Authority v. Singleton

Applying Meribear to the present case, we conclude
that the court’s judgment was not final for purposes of
appellate review. The court concluded that the plaintiff
had proven its allegations in count one by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The plaintiff’s complaint, how-
ever, raised four additional counts directed at the defen-
dant, each alleging a legally distinct ground for eviction,
albeit relying largely on the same underlying set of
operative facts. Prevailing or not prevailing on any one
count would not necessarily preclude recovery on
another. Whereas count one alleged violations of the
terms of the lease, counts two through five alleged
various statutory violations pursuant to §§ 47a-11 (g),
47a-15 and 47a-32. These additional counts fall squarely
within the second category discussed in Meribear
because they involve legally consistent theories of
recovery that, although litigated by the parties, were
not ruled on by the court.
Moreover, we do not agree with the defendant that
we can infer from the trial court’s conclusion that the
defendant’s equitable forfeiture defense barred the
plaintiff from prevailing on count one of the complaint
that it necessarily means that the court implicitly found
against the plaintiff on the remaining counts. ‘‘In
determining whether a defendant is entitled to equitable
relief from forfeiture of a tenancy . . . courts should
look to the test . . . in Fellows v. Martin, 217 Conn.
57, 66–67, 584 A.2d 458 (1991). . . . In Fellows, the
[Supreme Court] clarified that, under Connecticut law,
equitable defenses and counterclaims implicating the
right to possession are available in a summary process
proceeding. . . . The court in Fellows also made clear,
however, that [a] court of equity will apply the doctrine
of clean hands to a tenant seeking such equitable relief;
thus, a tenant whose breach was wilful or grossly negli-
gent will not be entitled to relief. . . . Accordingly,
Fellows established that an equitable nonforfeiture
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Housing Authority v. Singleton

defense can succeed only if (1) the tenant’s breach was
not [wilful] or grossly negligent; (2) upon eviction the
tenant will suffer a loss wholly disproportionate to the
injury to the landlord; and (3) the landlord’s injury is
reparable. . . . This enumerated test, formulated from
the holding in Fellows, is stated in the conjunctive, and,
therefore, the failure of any prong of that test means
that equitable relief is unavailable. . . . The burden of
establishing an equitable defense in a summary process
action falls on the party asserting that defense.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; emphasis altered; footnote omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Cathedral Green, Inc. v.
Hughes, 174 Conn. App. 608, 620–21, 166 A.3d 873 (2017).
The court’s analysis under the second and third
prongs of the Fellows test, which requires the court to
weigh the defendant’s potential losses against those of
the plaintiff and determine whether any loss to the
plaintiff is reparable, arguably would be substantially
the same regardless of the precise nature of the viola-
tion alleged as the basis for eviction. Even if we were
to assume this to be true, however, the court still would
need to analyze as to each of the unresolved counts
whether the plaintiff had proven the statutory violation
asserted and, if so, whether such violation was wilful
or grossly negligent. In addition, the court would need to
consider and resolve the plaintiff’s arguments regarding
whether equitable nonforfeiture is available as a
defense as to the statutory counts.
Finally, we note that the court’s partial judgment does
not fit within either of the two prongs of the test set
forth in State v. Curcio, supra, 191 Conn. 31. As to the
first prong, in light of our conclusion that there are
unresolved counts, the court’s judgment cannot be
viewed as terminating a separate and distinct proceed-
ing. As to the second prong, because the issue of posses-
sion remains unresolved, the court’s judgment did not
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Housing Authority v. Singleton

so conclude any rights of the parties that further pro-
ceedings cannot affect them. Additionally, neither party
has argued that they will suffer irreparable harm if
appellate review is delayed until there is a final adjudica-
tion of all counts.
In short, we agree with the plaintiff that, in accor-
dance with Meribear, the court’s ruling on count one
of the complaint, including its acceptance of the defen-
dant’s equitable defense, did not implicitly resolve
counts two through five, all of which alleged legally
consistent theories that, if proven, would support evic-
tion of the defendant.
The appeal is dismissed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.