In re C. Y.

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In re C. Y.

IN RE C. Y.*
(AC 47852)
Alvord, Cradle and Suarez, Js.**

Syllabus

The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment removing
him as guardian of his minor child and appointing the petitioners as coguardi-
ans of the child. The respondent claimed that the court abused its discretion
in determining, pursuant to statute (§ 45a-610 (3)), that there was clear and
convincing evidence to support its finding that the ground for removal of
the respondent’s guardianship rights had been satisfied. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the respondent as
guardian of the child, as the record contained sufficient evidence to support
the court’s finding that the petitioners proved by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the statutory ground for removal of the respondent as guardian
pursuant to § 45a-610 (3) and the best interests of the child standard pursuant
to statute (§ 45a-605) had been satisfied.
Argued January 14—officially released March 24, 2025***

Procedural History

Petition to remove the respondent as guardian of his
minor child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of New London, Juvenile Matters at Waterford,
and tried to the court, Hoffman, J.; judgment removing
the respondent as guardian of his minor child and
appointing the petitioner Cindy W. et al. as coguardians,
from which the respondent appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Matthew C. Eagan, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent).
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
*** March 24, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re C. Y.

David E. Schneider, Jr., assigned counsel, for the
appellees (petitioner Cindy W. et al.).
Ellin M. Grenger, attorney for the minor child.

Opinion

SUAREZ, J. The respondent father, Carl Y., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor
of the petitioners, his sister, Cindy W. (Cindy), and her
husband, Jacob W. (Jacob),1 removing the respondent
as guardian of his minor child, C. Y., and appointing
the petitioners as coguardians of the child.2 On appeal,
the respondent claims that the court abused its discre-
tion in determining that there was clear and convincing
evidence to support its finding that the statutory ground
for the removal of the respondent’s guardianship rights
had been satisfied.3 We affirm the judgment of the court.
The record reveals the following undisputed facts
and procedural history. The child was born in Novem-
ber, 2007, to the respondent and Chelsea C. (Chelsea),
who were married at the time. The respondent and
Chelsea divorced in 2010, and the respondent became
the custodial parent of the child. The respondent mar-
ried Kimberly Y. (Kimberly) in December, 2017, and the
respondent, Kimberly, and the child began living in the
same household.
In May, 2020, the respondent and Kimberly asked the
petitioners to assume temporary guardianship of the
child. The petitioners agreed, and the child, then age
twelve, began to live with them around Mother’s Day,
1
All references herein to the petitioners are to Cindy and Jacob collec-
tively, and we refer to them individually by first name when appropriate.
2
The petitioners did not seek to remove the child’s mother, Chelsea C.,
as guardian of the child, and she is not participating in this appeal. All
references in this opinion to the respondent are to Carl Y. only.
3
Pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, the attorney for the minor child filed
a statement adopting the brief of the petitioners in this appeal.
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2020. On May 23, 2020, the petitioners and the respon-
dent entered into a voluntary agreement for the tempo-
rary guardianship of the child. On October 7, 2020, the
Probate Court granted the petitioners temporary guard-
ianship of the child for one year. After the expiration
of the court order, the child remained in the care and
custody of the petitioners. On December 31, 2021, the
petitioners and the respondent entered into a second
voluntary agreement concerning the temporary guard-
ianship of the child (December 31, 2021 agreement),
which, inter alia, provided for the respondent to provide
the petitioners with $100 per month in child support.
On February 17, 2022, the respondent filed a second
application with the Probate Court to renew the peti-
tioners’ guardianship of the child, which was granted
on March 15, 2022.
On March 24, 2022, the petitioners and the child were
planning to travel to New Hampshire for a long week-
end. The respondent initially did not object to the trip.
That night, however, the respondent arrived at the peti-
tioners’ home and demanded that the child have visita-
tion with him instead. When the child refused to go
with the respondent, he handed the petitioners a nota-
rized letter purporting to terminate their agreement for
the temporary guardianship of the child. The police
were summoned but would not compel the child to go
with the respondent against her will. On March 25, 2022,
the petitioners filed two petitions in the Probate Court:
one for immediate temporary custody of the child and
one for removal of the respondent as the child’s guard-
ian. The petition for removal alleged acts of parental
commission or omission, pursuant to General Statutes
§ 45a-610 (3),4 as the statutory basis for removal of the
4
General Statutes § 45a-610 governs the removal of parents as guardians
in probate proceedings and provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the Court of Probate
finds that notice has been given or a waiver has been filed, as provided in
section 45a-609, it may remove a parent as guardian, if the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence one of the following: (1) The parent consents
to his or her removal as guardian; or (2) the minor child has been abandoned
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respondent as the child’s guardian. The same day, the
Probate Court granted immediate temporary custody
of the child to the petitioners and scheduled a hearing
on the petitioners’ petition for the removal of the
respondent’s guardianship rights. On February 1, 2023,
pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-623,5 the respondent
moved to transfer the petition for the removal of guard-
ianship to the Superior Court. On April 25, 2024, the
court, Hoffman, J., held a hearing on the petition. On
June 17, 2024, the court issued an oral decision in which
it found ‘‘by clear and convincing evidence that the
petitioners have proved . . . grounds for removal of
[the respondent] as guardian, as to [§] 45a-610 (3)
. . . .’’ The court further found by clear and convincing
evidence ‘‘that the minor child has been denied the
by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern or responsibility for the minor child’s welfare;
or (3) the minor child has been denied the care, guidance or control necessary
for his or her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, as a
result of acts of parental commission or omission, whether the acts are the
result of the physical or mental incapability of the parent or conditions
attributable to parental habits, misconduct or neglect, and the parental acts
or deficiencies support the conclusion that the parent cannot exercise, or
should not in the best interests of the minor child be permitted to exercise,
parental rights and duties at the time; or (4) the minor child has had physical
injury or injuries inflicted upon the minor child by a person responsible for
such child’s health, welfare or care, or by a person given access to such
child by such responsible person, other than by accidental means, or has
injuries which are at variance with the history given of them or is in a
condition which is the result of maltreatment such as, but not limited to,
malnutrition, sexual molestation, deprivation of necessities, emotional mal-
treatment or cruel punishment; or (5) the minor child has been found to
be neglected or uncared for, as defined in section 46b-120. . . .’’
5
General Statutes § 45a-623 provides in relevant part: ‘‘Before a hearing
on the merits in any case under sections 45a-603 to 45a-622, inclusive, that
is contested, the Probate Court shall, on the motion of any party other than
a party who applied for the removal of a parent as a guardian . . . transfer
the case to the Superior Court in accordance with rules adopted by the
judges of the Supreme Court. . . . If the case is transferred and venue
altered, the clerk of the Probate Court shall transmit to the clerk of the
Superior Court . . . to which the case was transferred, the original files
and papers in the case.’’
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care, guidance, and control necessary for her physical,
educational, moral, [and] emotional well-being as [a
result] of acts of parental commission or omission
whether the acts are the result of physical or mental
incapacity of the parent or conditions attributable to
the parental habits, misconduct, or neglect, and the
parental acts or deficiencies support the conclusion
that the parent cannot exercise, or should not in the best
interests of the minor child be permitted to exercise
parental rights and duties at this time.
‘‘So, the court’s going to find that it’s in the best
interest of the child to do so. [The] court is basing that
on the . . . review of the testimony in this matter. The
court was very concerned about the allegations in . . .
[Cindy’s] description of [the child’s] distress after she
came to live with [the petitioners] concerning her stud-
ies, and the conditions which she was allowed to live
under.
‘‘And as far as the [discipline] situation was con-
cerned, it . . . appears to the court that when [the
respondent] was faced with a situation between his
present wife and [the child], he chose his present wife
over [the child]. And that was evident by the fact that
. . . [his wife] indicated that it was her or [the child].
[The respondent] . . . recognized the abilities of the
[petitioners] to be able to care for [the child].
‘‘And [the child], in the court’s opinion, is a remark-
able young lady. In [the] face of everything, she was
able to triumph and looks like she’s doing very well in
school. And the court feels that she needs to have going
forward . . . some permanence in her life where she
can consult with the [petitioners] as [to] her future
decisions and know that they have final decision-mak-
ing powers and that she is secure staying in their home.’’
On the basis of these subordinate findings, the court
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granted the petition to remove the respondent as guard-
ian of the child and appointed the petitioners as coguar-
dians of the child together with Chelsea. The court
further ordered that the child’s primary residence be
with the petitioners and that the petitioners would have
final decision-making authority over issues pertaining
to the child. This appeal followed.
Before reaching the merits of the respondent’s claim
on appeal, we briefly set forth the governing legal princi-
ples. ‘‘Our courts of probate have a limited jurisdiction
and can exercise only such powers as are conferred on
them by statute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Probate Appeal of Knott, 190 Conn. App. 56, 61,
209 A.3d 690 (2019). After an application for the removal
of a guardian is transferred from the Probate Court to
the Superior Court, ‘‘the Superior Court sheds its status
as a constitutional court of general jurisdiction and
assumes the status of a statutory Probate Court of lim-
ited jurisdiction.’’ In re Probate Appeal of Buckingham,
197 Conn. App. 373, 374, 231 A.3d 1261 (2020). ‘‘The
court may remove a parent as guardian only if it finds
by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of
the grounds enumerated in . . . § 45a-610 [has] been
proven by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Helen B., 50 Conn. App.
818, 827, 719 A.2d 907 (1998).
General Statutes § 45a-605 (a) provides in relevant
part that ‘‘[t]he provisions of sections 45a-603 to 45a-
622, inclusive, shall be liberally construed in the best
interests of any minor child affected by them . . . .’’
This provision ‘‘is a clear statement by the legislature
that in any proceeding to remove a parent as guardian
the crucial issue is the best interest of the child. . . .
Notably, [General Statutes] §§ 17a-112 and 45a-717,
which govern the termination of parental rights, are not
prefaced by such a declaration of legislative policy.
. . . Thus . . . a best interests of the child analysis
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. . . is relevant, and perhaps dispositive . . . in any
proceeding to transfer guardianship. . . . The best
interests of the child militate that the statute be interpre-
ted as it is written, so that a parent may be removed
as guardian, notwithstanding that he or she has main-
tained a reasonable degree of interest or concern for
a minor’s welfare, where the parent nonetheless has
failed to maintain a reasonable degree of . . . respon-
sibility for the minor’s welfare . . . .’’ (Citations omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Garrett’s Appeal
from Probate, 44 Conn. Supp. 169, 182, 677 A.2d 1000
(1994), aff’d, 237 Conn. 233, 676 A.2d 394 (1996).
We take this opportunity to clarify our standard of
review. The transfer of guardianship pursuant to § 45a-
610 ‘‘is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial
court. . . . We review the award to determine whether
that discretion has been abused and whether the trial
court, in the exercise of its discretion, has overlooked
or misapplied some established principle of pertinent
law.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) In re Helen B., supra, 50 Conn. App. 827–28. We
historically have reviewed for clear error both the
court’s subordinate factual findings and its determina-
tion by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory
grounds for the removal of guardianship rights have
been satisfied. See id., 827–29, 831. ‘‘A finding of fact
is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the
record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 829.
In In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 122 A.3d 1247
(2015), our Supreme Court clarified the standard of
review in child protection cases. It noted that clear
error historically had been the standard of review for
‘‘both the trial court’s subordinate factual findings and
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its determination that a parent has failed to rehabili-
tate,’’ and it ‘‘remain[ed] convinced that clear error
review is appropriate for the trial court’s subordinate
factual findings . . . .’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 587.
However, it also recognized that ‘‘[a] conclusion of fail-
ure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court’s
factual findings and from its weighing of the facts in
assessing whether those findings satisfy’’ the relevant
statutory requirements. (Emphasis in original.) Id. Our
Supreme Court determined that ‘‘the appropriate stan-
dard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is,
whether the trial court could have reasonably con-
cluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect
of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate
conclusion].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
588. We recognize that the appeal in In re Shane M. was
from a judgment terminating a respondent’s parental
rights pursuant to § 17a-112 and was not an appeal of
a judgment granting a removal of guardianship pursuant
to § 45a-610. Because the court’s ultimate determination
is similarly drawn from both its factual findings and its
weighing of the facts to assess whether the relevant
statutory requirements are satisfied, the standard artic-
ulated in In re Shane M. is equally applicable to actions
pursuant to § 45a-610.
‘‘Under [the evidentiary sufficiency standard of
review], the inquiry is whether the trial court could
have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that
the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient to
justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying
this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner
most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial
court. . . . [We do] not examine the record to deter-
mine whether the trier of fact could have reached a
conclusion other than the one reached. . . . In our
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review of the record for evidentiary sufficiency, we are
mindful that, as a reviewing court, [w]e cannot retry
the facts or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses.
. . . Rather, [i]t is within the province of the trial court,
when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence
presented and determine the credibility and effect to
be given the evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) In re Caiden B., 220 Conn. App.
326, 348–49, 297 A.3d 1025, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 904,
301 A.3d 527 (2023).
With that standard of review in mind, we now turn
to the respondent’s claim that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the court’s conclusion. Specifically, the
respondent argues that the court only relied on Cindy’s
hearsay testimony, which was admitted without objec-
tion and described statements made by the child and
Kimberly regarding events that occurred in May, 2020.
The petitioners counter that ‘‘there was ample evidence
[in the record] to support the . . . court’s finding that
the [respondent] should be removed as guardian
. . . .’’ We agree with the petitioners.
It is well settled that ‘‘[e]vidence admitted without
objection remains evidence in the case subject to any
infirmities due to any inherent weaknesses. . . . A fail-
ure to make a sufficient objection to evidence which
is incompetent waives any ground of complaint as to
the admission of the evidence. . . . If the evidence is
received without objection, it becomes part of the evi-
dence in the case, and is usable as proof to the extent
of the rational persuasive power it may have.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dufresne
v. Dufresne, 191 Conn. App. 532, 546–47, 215 A.3d 1259
(2019). The weight to be given to such evidence ‘‘is
solely within the province of the trial court.’’ Cotton v.
Cotton, 11 Conn. App. 189, 194, 526 A.2d 547 (1987). In
the present case, the respondent did not object to the
relevant portions of Cindy’s hearsay testimony. The
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court, therefore, in its discretion was entitled to rely
on this evidence to the extent it deemed it persuasive.
In the present case, Cindy testified that the respon-
dent and Kimberly had asked her and Jacob to assume
temporary guardianship of the child in early May, 2020,
and that they ‘‘said that they did not want [the child]
back, that she was a liar, that . . . her behavior was
awful. [The child] was constantly talking back to them
and . . . Kim[berly] specifically said that if we take
her, we are taking her until she is eighteen and that
she is not allowed to come back to the house.’’ Cindy
further testified that the child did not begin to live with
her until a few weeks later when the child and the
respondent arrived at the petitioners’ home after an
argument with Kimberly. Cindy testified that, after their
arrival, the respondent told her ‘‘that the argument was
about [the child] and that Kim[berly] [could] no longer
stand her in the home, and that it was either [Kimberly]
or [the child] but it had to end. [The child] had to be
removed.’’
Moreover, Cindy testified that, shortly after the child
first came to stay with her, the child told her that
‘‘[s]he’d talked back to Kim[berly], and she was made
to stand in the corner. And she would get up in the
morning, and she would stand in the corner. They would
eat breakfast. Once they were done, she could come
out and eat breakfast. Then she would have to go stand
back in the corner. And this repeated throughout the
whole day for . . . each meal. And she said that went
on for two to three weeks.’’
Cindy further testified that the respondent had only
‘‘[o]ccasionally,’’ ‘‘[s]poradically,’’ and ‘‘inconsistently’’
visited the child since the temporary guardianship
began and stated that the respondent was invited to
the child’s eighth grade graduation ceremony, but he
did not attend. Cindy further indicated that, despite the
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December 31, 2021 agreement, the respondent, from
the time that the child came to live with the petitioners
until the hearing, gave the petitioners between only
$400 and $600 in child support.
In addition, Cindy testified that, prior to the tempo-
rary guardianship, the child was seeing a counselor that
‘‘she loved and adored, and because of that fact, [the
respondent] spoke to her and said she is not allowed
to have somebody that she is comfortable with because
she won’t get what she needs out of it and switched
her’’ to a different counselor. Cindy also testified that,
in February, 2022, the child participated in an intake
interview with Megan Renshaw, another counselor, and
‘‘at the intake [the respondent] and Kim[berly] were
very adamant about being present in the room with
[the child] while the counselor spoke to her. . . . [T]he
counselor said no, initially, that she wanted to speak
with [the child]. [The respondent and Kimberly] seemed
very upset about that. [The respondent and Kimberly]
also wanted [the child’s] MyChart information,6 and [the
child] refused to give that to them. They got very upset
about that as well.’’ (Footnote added.) Cindy testified
that when the petitioners tried to collaborate with the
respondent on medical appointments, the respondent
‘‘would cancel them and set his own, so it was very
difficult.’’ In addition, the respondent would ‘‘[change]
doctors’’ without informing the petitioners or con-
sulting with the petitioners with respect to whether the
child had a need for such an appointment.
Moreover, the court heard testimony from Aimee
Arrowsmith, an investigator for the Department of Chil-
dren and Families, who prepared an updated removal
of guardianship study, dated May 11, 2023. In her study,
6
MyChart is a patient portal system that allows for sending messages
between a medical provider and a patient. See, e.g., Schenarts v. Greenwich
Hospital, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2024 WL 3771530, *9 (Conn. Super.
August 9, 2024).
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Arrowsmith stated that, since the petitioners had
assumed temporary guardianship of the child, the
respondent had engaged in visitation ‘‘inconsistently.’’
Arrowsmith further stated that while the child was still
living with the respondent, the respondent had engaged
in ‘‘discipline [that] was not appropriate for [the child],
given her age at that time.’’ Arrowsmith opined that
‘‘[i]t is unreasonable to make [the child] ([then age
fifteen]) leave the home where she has had some stabil-
ity in her life including school and in the community.’’
Finally, Arrowsmith testified that the child ‘‘would like
to remain where she is. She is doing very well there
and is comfortable and feels safe there . . . .’’
The court also heard testimony from the respondent.
The respondent admitted that, since the temporary
guardianship began in 2020, he had been arrested twice:
once in April, 2021, which resulted in charges for breach
of the peace in the second degree and threatening in the
second degree, and again in August, 2022, for disorderly
conduct. Additionally, when asked whether he was
aware that temporary guardianships are supposed to
last approximately one year, and expire accordingly,
with the hope of reunification after, and whether he
thought it was appropriate for the temporary guardian-
ship to continue until the child reached the age of major-
ity, the respondent said yes.
Construing the evidence in the manner most favor-
able to sustaining the judgment of the court, as we
must, we conclude that the record contains sufficient
evidence to support the court’s finding that the petition-
ers proved by clear and convincing evidence that the
statutory ground for removal of the respondent as
guardian pursuant to § 45a-610 (3), as well as the best
interests of the child standard of § 45a-605, had been
satisfied. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did
not abuse its discretion in removing the respondent as
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In re C. Y.

guardian of the child and appointing the petitioners
coguardians of the child.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.