Pirri v. Chow

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Pirri v. Chow

EUGENIO PIRRI v. CHEN CHUNG CHOW ET AL.
(AC 46974)
Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Seeley, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the trial court’s judgment rendered in favor
of the substitute plaintiff, the executor of the plaintiff’s estate, on her claim
of adverse possession with respect to a portion of the defendant’s property.
The defendant claimed that the trial court clearly erred in finding that
the plaintiff had adversely possessed the disputed area under a claim of
right. Held:

Although the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff had installed a new fence
at the edge of the disputed area shortly after 1985 was clearly erroneous,
the error was harmless because the court made only a single reference in
its opinion to the fence being erected in 1985, it in no way suggested that
such fact was central to its analysis or impacted its findings as to other
facts, and the other evidence in the record demonstrated that the plaintiff
used the disputed area as his own without permission from the record owner
continuously from 1985 to 2018.

The trial court’s finding that the plaintiff possessed the disputed area under
a claim of right was not clearly erroneous because the evidence was suffi-
cient to support the finding, and it was not the role of this court to second-
guess the trial court’s credibility determinations or to reweigh conflicting evi-
dence.
Argued January 9—officially released March 25, 2025

Procedural History

Action seeking to quiet title to certain real property,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Stamford-Norwalk, where the defendant American
Mortgage Corporation, as trustee, was defaulted for
failure to appear; thereafter, Mong Chin Liu was substi-
tuted as the party defendant; subsequently, Rosaria
Pirri, executor of the estate of the plaintiff, was substi-
tuted as the party plaintiff; thereafter, the substitute
defendant filed a counterclaim; subsequently, the case
was tried to the court, Hon. Kevin Tierney, judge trial
* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
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Pirri v. Chow

referee; judgment for the substitute plaintiff, from
which the substitute defendant appealed to this court.
Affirmed.
Thomas M. Cassone, for the appellant (substitute
defendant).
Catherine R. Keenan, with whom, on the brief, was
Philip Russell, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).
Opinion

CRADLE, J. The substitute defendant, Mong Chin Liu,
appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered
in favor of the substitute plaintiff, Rosaria Pirri, execu-
tor of the estate of the plaintiff, Eugenio Pirri, on her
claim of adverse possession with respect to a portion
of the substitute defendant’s property (disputed area).1
On appeal, the substitute defendant claims that the trial
court clearly erred in finding that the plaintiff adversely
possessed the disputed area under a claim of right. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court, and
procedural history are relevant to this appeal. In Janu-
ary, 1985, the plaintiff purchased the real property
located at 31 Edgewood Avenue in Greenwich, which
he owned until his death in April, 2022.2 In December,
2018, Chen Chung Chow (defendant) purchased the real
property located at 52 Oak Ridge Street in Greenwich,
which abuts the rear yard area of the plaintiff’s property,
1
In the original complaint, the plaintiff named Chen Chung Chow and
American Mortgage Corporation, as trustee, as defendants. At that time,
Chow was the record owner of the disputed area. Thereafter, Chow quit-
claimed his interest in the real property to his wife, the substitute defendant,
and the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to substitute her as the party
defendant. On October 22, 2020, American Mortgage Corporation, as trustee,
was defaulted for failure to appear, and it has not participated in this appeal.
Accordingly, in this opinion, we refer to Chow alone as the defendant.
2
The plaintiff and his wife, the substitute plaintiff, jointly purchased 31
Edgewood Avenue on January 18, 1985. On February 11, 2000, the substitute
plaintiff quitclaimed her interest in the property to the plaintiff.
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from the estate of Netta F. Evans.3 Although the proper-
ties are adjacent, there is a ‘‘marked topographical
change between the Oak Ridge Street lot and the Edge-
wood Avenue lot.’’ Specifically, 31 Edgewood Avenue
sits atop a steep cliff, making it approximately forty
feet higher in elevation than 52 Oak Ridge Street. The
disputed area is a 1715 square foot, level tract of land
that is part of the rear portion of the 52 Oak Ridge
Street property but is ‘‘located at the top of [the] cliff’’
and, therefore, is topographically level with the 31 Edge-
wood Avenue property. Because of its elevation, ‘‘[t]he
disputed area is effectively landlocked from the remain-
der of the 52 Oak Ridge Street lot,’’ in that ‘‘the only
reasonable access to the disputed area is either through
the [plaintiff’s] property . . . or that of his immediate
Edgewood Avenue neighbor . . . .’’
After the plaintiff purchased 31 Edgewood Avenue,
he began using the property as the headquarters and
storage facility for his landscaping business.4 ‘‘Shortly
after his 1985 purchase, [the plaintiff] installed . . .
asphalt in the disputed area . . . utilizing his own
labor. Later . . . asphalt was installed professionally
by another contractor.’’ ‘‘The [plaintiff and the substi-
tute plaintiff] at their own cost and expense installed
a new iron type chain-link fence at the cliff edge of the
disputed area shortly after 1985.’’ They later installed
a new fence in the same area in 2019. Between January,
1985, and the plaintiff’s retirement from landscaping in
2018, the plaintiff used the disputed area ‘‘consistently
as a construction facility for [the plaintiff’s] landscaping
business’’ and to store various landscaping equipment
3
It is undisputed that Netta F. Evans owned 52 Oak Ridge Street prior
to the plaintiff’s purchase of 31 Edgewood Avenue in 1985 and until her
death in September, 2017.
4
The plaintiff never lived in the residential home on the property, which he
used as ‘‘a multifamily rental house,’’ but ‘‘[t]he shed, garage and extensions
thereof located at the rear of 31 Edgewood Avenue directly on the property
line . . . were used by [the plaintiff] for his landscaping business.’’
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and supplies. The plaintiff and his employees parked
5

their vehicles in the disputed area ‘‘every business day
. . . .’’ Additionally, ‘‘[f]or a . . . portion of those
thirty-three years, the disputed area was jointly used
by [the plaintiff’s son] Eugenio Pirri, Jr. [(Pirri)],’’ for
his own landscaping business. The disputed area pro-
vided the only vehicle access to the rear lot of the
adjacent property, 27 Edgewood Avenue, which Pirri
leased and used for his landscaping business. ‘‘[Pirri]
and his employees, as well as suppliers, used that access
multiple times every day.’’
On July 10, 2019, the plaintiff commenced the under-
lying action against the defendant, alleging adverse pos-
session of the disputed area and seeking a judgment
quieting title thereto in his favor. The defendant asserted
as a special defense to the claim of adverse possession
that any use of his property alleged by the plaintiff was
‘‘permissive in nature.’’6 The defendant subsequently
quitclaimed title to 52 Oak Ridge Street to the substitute
defendant. On September 3, 2021, the plaintiff filed a
motion to substitute her as the party defendant, and,
on September 20, 2021, the court, Krumeich, J., ordered
that she be substituted as the party defendant without
objection. The case was tried remotely before the court,
Hon. Kevin Tierney, judge trial referee, over six days,
commencing on November 17, 2021, and concluding on
5
Specifically, ‘‘the following items were located within the disputed area:
fence posts, wheel barrows, lawn mowers, scaffolding to hold various items
of equipment, scrap wood, a snow blower, a leaf vacuum machine (giraffe),
small construction material, a plow, a leaf blower, grass seed, Belgian blocks,
a leaf vacuum, construction hardware, bricks, a skid skier machine with a
large exhaust system, multiple snow plows, construction material, equip-
ment to attach the snow plows to vehicles, worker’s vehicles, a mixer, road
salt, a pile of sand, a ladder, landscaping supplies, a bobcat vehicle, covers
and tarps for equipment, and salted winter sand.’’
6
The defendant also asserted as a second special defense that ‘‘[t]he
plaintiff comes to court with unclean hands’’ insofar as he had been using
the disputed area for ‘‘an illegal commercial purpose . . . .’’ This second
special defense was withdrawn prior to trial.
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January 6, 2023. Prior to the conclusion of trial, on
7

April 3, 2022, the plaintiff died.8 On October 20, 2022,
the court ordered that the substitute plaintiff, in her
capacity as executor of the plaintiff’s estate, be substi-
tuted as a party plaintiff without objection.9
Thereafter, the court rendered judgment quieting title
to the disputed area in favor of the substitute plaintiff.
In its September 20, 2023 memorandum of decision, the
court made the following factual findings. ‘‘When the
[plaintiff and the substitute plaintiff] first purchased 31
Edgewood Avenue in January, 1985, they believed that
the disputed area was a portion of their property . . . .
It was not until fifteen years [had] passed that [the
substitute plaintiff] found out that the disputed area’’
was not part of 31 Edgewood Avenue. ‘‘There was no
evidence of any interruption of [the plaintiff’s] uses
of the disputed area from January, 1985, to his 2018
retirement.’’ ‘‘[The plaintiff] never asked anyone for per-
mission to use the disputed area for his landscaping
business and the improvements he made in the disputed
area. . . . There is no evidence that [the defendant,
the substitute defendant, or Netta F. Evans, their prede-
cessor in title] ever expended any funds or made any
7
We note that the court stated in its memorandum of decision that ‘‘[t]he
trial was delayed due to periodic inaccessibility to the remote court machin-
ery, COVID[-19], and the death of [the plaintiff].’’
8
The plaintiff had testified as a witness on his own behalf but died prior
to the conclusion of his cross-examination by the substitute defendant’s
attorney. ‘‘Both [substitute] parties stipulated on the record [however] that
[the] court [could] consider the [plaintiff’s] direct and partial cross-examina-
tion testimony and all exhibits offered during [the plaintiff’s] trial examina-
tion.’’
9
The substitute pleadings filed by the parties were substantively the same
as the original pleadings. Specifically, the substitute plaintiff filed a substitute
complaint alleging adverse possession of the disputed area and seeking the
same relief as the plaintiff’s original complaint. The substitute defendant
subsequently filed an answer denying that allegation and asserted the same
special defense of permissive use as the defendant. In addition, the substitute
defendant for the first time counterclaimed and sought a judgment quieting
title to the disputed area in her favor.
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improvements to or on the disputed area . . . . All the
evidence indicates that the only persons who expended
any funds or labor to make improvements in the dis-
puted area were [the plaintiff and the substitute plain-
tiff].
***
‘‘There is no evidence that any of the three owners
of 52 Oak Ridge Street ever entered . . . the disputed
area or 31 Edgewood Avenue or ever asked any mem-
bers of the [plaintiff’s] family to use all or a part of the
disputed area.’’ (Citations omitted.) Accordingly, the
court found that ‘‘[the plaintiff] obtained title to the
disputed area by adverse possession in January, 2000.’’
The court further rejected the substitute defendant’s
special defense of permissive use, stating: ‘‘There is no
direct evidence of permission . . . by the prior title
owner of 52 Oak Ridge Street . . . Evans. Neither the
successor owner, [the defendant], nor the current title
owner, [the substitute defendant], ever executed any
documents that granted [the plaintiff] the personal right,
license, right-of-way or easement to use all or part of
the disputed area. There is no direct evidence of any
oral statements made by any of those three individuals
regarding permission extended to [the plaintiff] to any
portion of the disputed area. The evidence is silent as
to the issue of permission.’’ This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we set forth the legal princi-
ples relevant to the substitute defendant’s appeal. ‘‘[T]o
establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must
oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out
without interruption for fifteen years by an open, visible
and exclusive possession under a claim of right with
the intent to use the property as his own and without
the consent of the owner.10 . . . A finding of adverse
10
On appeal, the substitute defendant does not contest that the plaintiff
continuously possessed the disputed area for the required fifteen years, nor
does she challenge the court’s findings with respect to the open, visible,
and exclusive elements of adverse possession.
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possession is to be made out by clear and positive
proof. . . . The burden of proof is on the party claiming
adverse possession.’’ (Footnote added; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Caminis v. Troy, 300 Conn. 297,
311, 12 A.3d 984 (2011). ‘‘[C]lear and convincing proof
denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief
that is required to find the truth or existence of the
[fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief
that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution.
. . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in
the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts
asserted are highly probably true, that the probability
that they are true or exist is substantially greater than
the probability that they are false or do not exist.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v. Larocque, 302
Conn. 562, 576, 31 A.3d 1 (2011).
‘‘[A] claim of right does not necessarily mean that
the adverse possessor claims that [he or she] is the proper
titleholder, but that [he or she] has the intent to disre-
gard the true owner’s right to possession.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Eberhardt v. Imperial Con-
struction Services, LLC, 101 Conn. App. 762, 768, 923
A.2d 785, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 904, 931 A.2d 263
(2007). In other words, a claim of right requires that
the party seeking title through adverse possession must
‘‘[manifest] her unequivocal intent to use the property
as her own and without the consent of the owner.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 769. ‘‘An adverse
possessor may interrupt his or her continuous posses-
sion by acting in a way that acknowledges the superior-
ity of the real owner’s title. . . . [T]he possession of
one who recognizes or admits title in another, either
by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of
such other. . . . Occupation must not only be hostile11
11
‘‘The word hostile, as employed in the law of adverse possession, is a
term of art; it does not, despite some troublesome early cases, imply animos-
ity, ill will or bad faith. Nor is the claimant required to make express
declarations of adverse intent during the possessory period. . . . Hostile
possession can be understood as possession that is opposed and antagonistic
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in its inception, but it must continue hostile, and at all
times during the required period of fifteen years challenge
the right of the true owner . . . .’’ (Citation omitted;
footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Allen v. Johnson, 79 Conn. App. 740, 746, 831 A.2d 282,
cert. denied, 266 Conn. 929, 837 A.2d 802 (2003).
In determining whether a claimant has satisfied the
elements of adverse possession, ‘‘[t]he inquiry is neces-
sarily fact specific and context dependent. In evaluating
such claims, [t]he location and condition of the land
[at issue] must be taken into consideration and the
alleged acts of ownership must be understood as directed
to those circumstances and conditions. . . . Addition-
ally, in assessing whether hostility exists, the relation
that the [alleged] adverse possessor occupies with refer-
ence to the owner is important.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Dowling v. Heirs of Bond, 345 Conn.
119, 143–44, 282 A.3d 1201 (2022). ‘‘[When] there is no
proof of an express permission from the [record owner
of the property], on the one hand, or of an express claim
of right by the person or persons using the [property],
on the other, the character of the [use], whether adverse
or permissive, can be determined as an inference from
the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the
[use]. . . . A trier has a wide latitude in drawing an
inference that a [use] was under a claim of right.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Slack
v. Greene, 294 Conn. 418, 428, 984 A.2d 734 (2009).
Although evidence indicating a lack of permission is
relevant to whether a claimant has established use under
a claim of right, it is not incumbent on the claimant to
prove a lack of permission. See Lisiewski v. Seidel, 72
Conn. App. 861, 873, 806 A.2d 1121, cert. denied, 262
to all other claims, and that conveys the clear message that the possessor
intends to possess the land as his or her own.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803, 814, 927
A.2d 921, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907, 931 A.2d 265 (2007).
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Conn. 921, 812 A.2d 865 (2002), and cert. denied, 262
Conn. 922, 812 A.2d 865 (2002). ‘‘Such a rule would
often charge a party with proving a negative.’’ Id. Rather,
‘‘[w]hen the defendant raises permission by way of a
special or affirmative defense, the burden of proof rests
on the defendant . . . who must prove the special
defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Slack v. Greene, supra, 294
Conn. 435.
Despite the substitute plaintiff’s burden to prove her
claim of adverse possession by clear and convincing
evidence, ‘‘our scope of review is limited. . . . Because
adverse possession is a question of fact for the trier
. . . the court’s findings as to this claim are binding
upon this court unless they are clearly erroneous in
light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record
as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
when there is no evidence in the record to support it
. . . or when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley, 102 Conn. App. 803,
809, 927 A.2d 921, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 907, 931 A.2d
265 (2007). ‘‘It is the exclusive province of the trier of
fact to weigh conflicting testimony and make determi-
nations of credibility, crediting some, all or none of any
given witness’ testimony. . . . Questions of whether to
believe or to disbelieve a competent witness are beyond
our review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kiniry
v. Kiniry, 299 Conn. 308, 329, 9 A.3d 708 (2010). ‘‘In
applying the clearly erroneous standard of review,
[a]ppellate courts do not examine the record to deter-
mine whether the trier of fact could have reached a differ-
ent conclusion. Instead, we examine the trial court’s
conclusion in order to determine whether it was legally
correct and factually supported. . . . This distinction
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accords with our duty as an appellate tribunal to review,
and not to retry, the proceedings of the trial court.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Connor v. Lar-
ocque, supra, 302 Conn. 575. ‘‘A trial court’s findings in
an adverse possession case, if supported by sufficient
evidence, are binding on a reviewing court . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mulle v. McCauley,
supra, 809.
Here, the substitute defendant raises several chal-
lenges to the court’s finding that the plaintiff’s posses-
sion was under a claim of right. We address each in turn.
I
The substitute defendant first claims that the court
clearly erred in finding that ‘‘[t]he [plaintiff and the
substitute plaintiff], at their own cost and expense,
installed a new iron type chain-link fence at the cliff
edge of the disputed area shortly after 1985.’’ The substi-
tute plaintiff concedes, and we agree, that there is no
evidence in the record to support this finding.12 Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the court’s finding with respect
to the erection of a fence shortly after 1985 was clearly
erroneous.13
12
We note that the substitute plaintiff argues that the erroneous finding
was ‘‘merely a scrivener’s error and the trial court was referring to the 2019
fence.’’ Her argument, although plausible, is unduly speculative. We are not
convinced that the record before us is sufficient to support such a conclusion.
13
The court found, and the record supports, that ‘‘[a] fallen down iron
fence had existed at the top of the cliff since [the plaintiff and the substitute
plaintiff] purchased the property on January 18, 1985.’’ The court also found,
and the record supports, that they installed a new fence along the edge of
the cliff in 2019.
Our thorough review of the record, however, has disclosed no evidence
indicating that the plaintiff and the substitute plaintiff had installed a new
fence in the disputed area at any time prior to 2019. Rather, the substitute
plaintiff testified: ‘‘[B]efore 1985, when we bought the house, there was a
chain-link fence that was not up. It was down on the ground, so it was
down there for so many years just like that . . . so it wasn’t replaced. It
wasn’t repaired, but that chain-link fence was down there.’’ She then con-
firmed that ‘‘[t]here was no chain-link fence installed upright [along the
edge of the cliff] between 1985 and 2019.’’ This testimony was corroborated
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This conclusion with respect to the court’s finding,
however, does not end our inquiry, as we must examine
the court’s clearly erroneous finding to determine whether
it was harmless. ‘‘[W]here . . . some of the facts found
[by the trial court] are clearly erroneous and others are
supported by the evidence, we must examine the clearly
erroneous findings to see whether they were harmless,
not only in isolation, but also taken as a whole. . . .
If, when taken as a whole, they undermine appellate
confidence in the court’s [fact-finding] process, a new
hearing is required.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Osborn v. Waterbury, 197 Conn. App. 476, 485,
232 A.3d 134 (2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 903, 242
A.3d 1010 (2021). The harmless error standard in a
civil case requires us to determine whether the court’s
clearly erroneous factual finding would likely affect the
result of the trial. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank,
National Assn. v. Lakner, 347 Conn. 476, 496, 298 A.3d
249 (2023).
The substitute defendant argues that the erroneous
finding was harmful because it constituted ‘‘the only
act attributed by the trial court to the plaintiff that, if
true, could have demonstrated’’ possession under a claim
of right. We are not persuaded. Between January, 1985,
and 2018, the plaintiff, along with his family and employ-
ees, consistently used the disputed area to store equip-
ment and supplies, for parking, to traverse the property,
and as a construction facility for his landscaping busi-
ness. The evidence reflects that the plaintiff and Pirri
exclusively maintained the disputed area, which included
clearing snow during the winter and removing leaves
during the fall. The plaintiff also installed asphalt within
by Roy Cary, a licensed land surveyor, who testified that, when he visited
31 Edgewood Avenue in 2017, there was no fence along the majority of the
cliff edge apart from a small section of chain-link fence, and when he
returned to the property in 2019, a new wire fence had been installed along
the cliff edge.
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the disputed area on two separate occasions. The court
found, and the record supports, that the plaintiff never
asked for or received permission to use, maintain, or
improve the disputed area from any owner of 52 Oak
Ridge Street.14 The substitute defendant does not chal-
lenge the court’s findings regarding the plaintiff’s con-
sistent use and maintenance of the disputed area. Addi-
tionally, she has not claimed that she or any other owner
of 52 Oak Ridge Street ever tried to interfere with his
use, nor has she or any other owner attempted to use,
maintain, or access the disputed area themselves. Thus,
although the plaintiff did not erect a fence within the
disputed area shortly after 1985, the evidence demon-
strates that the plaintiff used the disputed area as his
own, without permission from the record owner, contin-
uously from 1985 to 2018. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court’s erroneous finding with respect to the
plaintiff’s erection of a fence was harmless.
The substitute defendant further claims, however,
that the court’s clearly erroneous finding ‘‘tainted its
interpretation of the remaining evidence’’ in that ‘‘there
can be no reasonable doubt that the trial court’s errone-
ous finding concerning the fence strongly influenced
its determination to ignore’’ other evidence favorable
to the substitute defendant. We conclude that her claim
is without merit. The substitute defendant fails to point
to any specific portions of the record that support her
claim,15 and our thorough review of the record has not
disclosed any. In fact, the court made a single reference
in its opinion to the fence being erected in 1985 and in
14
Although we note that the substitute defendant argues that other evi-
dence in the record reflects that the plaintiff in fact had permission from
the record owner to use the disputed area, we reiterate that the record
sufficiently supports the court’s finding that the plaintiff’s use was without
permission.
15
Rather, the substitute defendant merely speculates that the court’s deci-
sion to credit certain witnesses’ testimony could have been influenced by
its mistaken belief that the plaintiff had erected a fence shortly after 1985.
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Pirri v. Chow

no way suggested that that fact was central to its analy-
sis or impacted its findings as to other facts. Conse-
quently, our review of the record convinces us that the
court did not place significant emphasis on its finding
regarding the construction of the fence. Rather, the
court’s findings as to the plaintiff’s consistent and exten-
sive actual use of the property without the permission of
the substitute defendant or her predecessors in interest
fully support the court’s conclusion, regardless of whether
the plaintiff constructed a fence in 1985 shortly after
he acquired 31 Edgewood Avenue.
II
Next, the substitute defendant claims that the court
clearly erred in finding that the plaintiff’s possession
was under a claim of right in that the court ‘‘ignored and
otherwise implausibly explained away evidence that
easily should have overcome the clear and convincing
standard of proof that the [substitute] plaintiff needed
to attain . . . .’’ The substitute defendant advances this
argument with respect to several portions of the eviden-
tiary record. We address each in turn.
A
The substitute defendant first argues that the court
clearly erred in finding that the plaintiff’s use of the
disputed area was under a claim of right when the
evidence proved that the plaintiff, after commissioning
a survey of 31 Edgewood Avenue in 1987, ‘‘twice
expand[ed] and/or replac[ed] the outbuildings located
in the rear of [31 Edgewood Avenue] . . . right up to
the deeded property line and not beyond.’’16
16
In support of her claim, the substitute defendant appears to suggest
that the court, in reaching its conclusion that the substitute plaintiff satisfied
her burden in proving the elements of adverse possession, failed to consider
this evidence entirely. Specifically, she argues that the court ‘‘never even
mentioned the existence of the 1987 survey in its decision except to make
a passing reference . . . [to establish chain of title]’’ and that it ‘‘did not
discuss the rather detailed evidence that while the [plaintiff] expanded the
existing outbuildings . . . [he] did not place either of the structures in the
disputed area . . . .’’ (Citation omitted.)
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Pirri v. Chow

The following facts, as set forth by the trial court, are
relevant to this claim. ‘‘The shed, garage and extensions
thereof located at the rear of 31 Edgewood Avenue,
directly on the property line . . . were used by [the
plaintiff] for his landscaping business. Repairs to the
garage roof, the siding and an extension to the garage
were constructed by [the plaintiff] after 1985, which
required access to the disputed area for their construc-
tion. The garage roof was added in 1997. New siding
was placed on the shed to match the siding on the main
house at 31 Edgewood Avenue.17 Siding required the
contractors to access and use the disputed area during
the construction. When [the plaintiff] was asked on direct
examination on the first day of trial what was behind
the garage and shed, he immediately answered that he
considered it to be a part of the 31 Edgewood Avenue
In reviewing factual findings, ‘‘we make every reasonable presumption
. . . in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Reserve Realty, LLC v. Windemere Reserve, LLC, 346 Conn. 391, 414, 291
A.3d 64 (2023). ‘‘We cannot assume that the court’s conclusions were reached
without due weight having been given to the evidence presented and the
facts found.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moye v. Commissioner
of Correction, 168 Conn. App. 207, 229, 145 A.3d 362 (2016), cert. denied,
324 Conn. 905, 153 A.3d 653 (2017). Here, the court stated in its memorandum
of decision that its ‘‘conclusion as to the status of the disputed area and its use
is based upon surveys, deeds, aerial photographs, and [witness testimony].’’
Because the substitute defendant has failed to show otherwise, we presume
that the court properly considered all relevant evidence in making its factual
findings and reaching its conclusions.
17
The substitute defendant claims that the court’s factual finding with
respect to the addition of new siding on the shed was clearly erroneous.
We disagree. In support of her claim, the substitute defendant acknowledges
that the substitute plaintiff testified on direct examination that new siding
had been added to the shed but argues that the substitute plaintiff ‘‘conceded
during cross-examination that the shed had in fact been replaced’’ rather
than repaired. We reiterate that ‘‘[i]t is the exclusive province of the trier
of fact to weigh conflicting testimony and make determinations of credibility,
crediting some, all or none of any given witness’ testimony.’’ (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Kiniry v. Kiniry, supra, 299
Conn. 329. Thus, we cannot conclude that the court clearly erred to the
extent that it accorded greater weight to the substitute plaintiff’s testimony
on direct examination.
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property.’’ (Footnote added.) Additionally, neither party
disputes that in 1987, the plaintiff commissioned a land
survey of 31 Edgewood Avenue.18 The plaintiff testified
that he had commissioned that survey ‘‘[t]o repair the
terrace.’’ When asked on cross-examination whether he
had looked at the 1987 survey, the plaintiff responded:
‘‘I don’t have a license. I don’t have experience in this,
and maybe I . . . didn’t school long enough to read the
numbers.’’ In response to a follow-up question regarding
whether he ‘‘could read the maps,’’ the plaintiff answered,
‘‘[n]o.’’
The substitute defendant argues that the plaintiff
‘‘likely knew of . . . Evans’ ownership of the disputed
area because of [his] own 1987 survey . . . .’’ It is evi-
dent, however, from the court’s findings, namely, that
the plaintiff believed he owned the disputed area and
that he had ‘‘limited use of English,’’ that the court
credited the plaintiff’s testimony that he was not aware
from the 1987 survey that Evans owned the disputed
area. The credibility of a witness is a matter exclusively
for the trier of fact, and, therefore, such credibility
determinations by the trial court are outside our limited
scope of review.
In addition, it does not appear from the record before
us that any witness testified as to the reason the out-
buildings were expanded in the manner that they were.
In the absence of such evidence, the substitute defen-
dant’s assertion that the plaintiff’s decision to expand
the outbuildings only to the deeded boundary disproves
the hostility of his possession is mere speculation.19
18
The 1987 survey was admitted as a full exhibit. Although the survey
did not show the disputed area, it depicted the boundary line between 31
Edgewood Avenue and 52 Oak Ridge Street.
19
We further note that this evidence is susceptible to reasonable inferences
other than the one endorsed by the substitute defendant, including that the
plaintiff’s reason for not expanding the outbuildings farther was to avoid
interfering with his other uses of the disputed area. We reiterate that the
plaintiff used the disputed area for storage, parking, and ‘‘as a construction
facility’’ for his landscaping business. In addition, the court found that the
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Moreover, even if the court had accepted the substitute
defendant’s interpretation of that evidence, it would
not have precluded the court from according greater
weight to contrary evidence. The court was presented
with ample evidence, as set forth in part I of this opinion,
indicating that the plaintiff used the disputed area under
a claim of right, including the plaintiff’s own testimony,
which the court credited, that he believed that he owned
the disputed area. In particular, we reiterate that the
court found, and the record supports, that the plaintiff
twice installed asphalt within the disputed area and did
not inform Evans or request her permission on either
occasion. Because this evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the court’s finding that the plaintiff used the dis-
puted area under a claim of right, the substitute defen-
dant’s claim fails.
B
Next, the substitute defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he trial
court erred by not accepting’’ the substitute plaintiff’s
‘‘admission’’ that any use of the disputed area was pur-
suant to a verbal agreement with Evans, as evidenced
by a 2019 police report that was admitted as a full
exhibit at trial. The following facts, as set forth by the
trial court, and procedural history are relevant to this
claim.
On June 15, 2019,20 Greenwich police officer Stephen
Podmokly was called to 52 Oak Ridge Street to resolve
only vehicle access to the adjacent lot leased by Pirri was ‘‘along the driveway
of 31 Edgewood Avenue . . . then between the garage and shed located at
the rear of the property onto the disputed area, and then a turn onto the
rear of [27 Edgewood Avenue] from the disputed area.’’
20
We note that the court initially stated in its memorandum of decision
that Podmokly was called to the property on June 19, 2019. Every subsequent
reference therein, however, stated that the call occurred on June 15, 2019.
Although neither party addresses this discrepancy, we conclude from our
review of the record that Podmokly was called to 52 Oak Ridge Street on
June 15, 2019, and that the court’s initial reference to June 19, 2019, was a
scrivener’s error.
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a property dispute. After arriving, Podmokly spoke with
the defendant and the substitute defendant and subse-
quently spoke with the substitute plaintiff over the phone.
Podmokly’s written incident report stated in relevant
part: ‘‘The undersigned spoke with [the substitute plain-
tiff], the owner of 31 Edgewood [Avenue] who related
[that] they have used [the disputed area] and taken care
of it for the last [thirty-five] years. That there was a
verbal agreement with the previous homeowner of 52
Oak Ridge [Street]. [The substitute plaintiff] related
[that] she was advised by her attorney that [the disputed
area] was in fact her property and [she] would go to
court if necessary.’’21
At trial, Podmokly testified with respect to the report
and his recollection of the incident. Additionally, the
substitute plaintiff testified regarding her alleged state-
ment in the report concerning ‘‘a verbal agreement with
the previous homeowner of 52 Oak Ridge [Street].’’ She
stated that, in 2016 or 2017, she and the plaintiff met
with Attorney Patrick R. Gil to discuss acquiring title to
the disputed area from Evans.22 The substitute plaintiff
21
We note that the substitute plaintiff objected to the admission of her
statements in the police report at trial on the ground that they were inadmissi-
ble hearsay because she was not a record owner of 31 Edgewood Avenue
at the time that she spoke with Podmokly. The court overruled her objection
and admitted her statements pursuant to § 8-3 (1) (G) of the Connecticut
Code of Evidence, which provides as an exception to the hearsay rule ‘‘a
statement made by a predecessor in title of the party, provided the declarant
and the party are sufficiently in privity that the statement of the declarant
would affect the party’s interest in the property in question.’’ The substitute
plaintiff does not challenge the court’s ruling on appeal, and we therefore
do not address it.
22
The court noted in its memorandum of decision that Gil had represented
the plaintiff in a ‘‘prior litigation between the [plaintiff] and . . . Evans
. . . . It commenced . . . October 24, 2017. That court record was not
offered in evidence although there was some testimony from [the substitute
plaintiff] regarding that litigation. The lis pendens from that . . . litigation,
dated November 28, 2017, was in evidence.’’ Gil was not called by either
party as a witness, and the court found that ‘‘[n]either [the plaintiff nor the
substitute plaintiff] testified credibly as to the nature of any conversation
between . . . Gil and . . . Evans.’’ The court also found, however, that
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explained that her statement regarding ‘‘a verbal agree-
ment’’ reflected in the report was in reference to an
agreement that Gil had reached with Evans wherein
Evans agreed to transfer the disputed area to the plain-
tiff upon her death.23
In its memorandum of decision, the court stated:
‘‘[Podmokly] at trial admitted that he had no indepen-
dent recollection of what [the substitute plaintiff] told
him other than what is in the June 15, 2019 written
report . . . . [He] did admit that he did not ask [the
substitute plaintiff] the specifics about the so-called
verbal agreement contained in [his police report]. . . .
‘‘[The substitute plaintiff] had some knowledge at the
time that she spoke to [Podmokly] on June 15, 2019,
that . . . Gil had reached an understanding with . . .
Evans that the disputed area . . . was going to be
transferred to [the plaintiff’s] title upon the death of
. . . Evans. Such an agreement was never reduced to
writing . . . . This was the ‘agreement’ that [the substi-
tute plaintiff] was referring to in her telephonic conver-
sation with [Podmokly]. Neither [the plaintiff nor the
substitute plaintiff] ever entered into any verbal agree-
ment directly with . . . Evans. [The substitute plain-
tiff] testified that she did inform [Podmokly] . . . that
[the plaintiff’s] lawyer had been involved in the agree-
ment, not [herself or the plaintiff] individually.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted.)
‘‘[the plaintiff] credibly testified that his health was the reason that the
lawsuit against . . . Evans was withdrawn.’’ The court further found, with
respect to the prior action, that the plaintiff and the substitute plaintiff first
authorized Gil to contact Evans in 2016, sixteen years after the plaintiff’s
adverse possession rights to the disputed area had vested in 2000.
23
Specifically, the substitute plaintiff testified: ‘‘[Gil] had the conversation
with . . . Evans. [Gil] . . . had an agreement with . . . Evans that she
was going to transfer the property to us before she died. I never spoke to
. . . Evans. I never had a conversation, and I never said that she gave me
permission. She gave [Gil] the permission. She told [Gil] that she was going
to transfer the property to us before she died, but I never had the conversa-
tion with her, and I never said that . . . Evans gave me the permission.’’
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It is thus apparent from its memorandum of decision
that the court, in weighing the conflicting evidence
before it, credited the substitute plaintiff’s testimony
with respect to what she meant by ‘‘a verbal agreement
. . . .’’24 Her testimony was consistent with the plain-
tiff’s testimony, which the court credited, that he had
never spoken to Evans. The substitute defendant, in
arguing that the court should have accepted her inter-
pretation of the evidence, essentially urges us to second-
guess the court’s credibility determinations and reweigh
conflicting evidence, which we cannot do. Consequently,
we cannot conclude that the court’s finding as to what
the substitute plaintiff meant when talking to Podmokly
was clearly erroneous.
C
Finally, the substitute defendant argues that the depo-
sition testimony of Pirri demonstrated that Evans had
given the plaintiff permission to use the disputed area.25
24
The substitute defendant further argues that the court’s finding that the
substitute plaintiff, in June, 2019, was referencing an agreement with Gil is
belied by the fact that ‘‘the [plaintiff] and . . . Evans were unable to reach
such an agreement . . . prior to [Evans’] death’’ in September, 2017. (Cita-
tion omitted.) In weighing the evidence before it, however, the court deter-
mined that the substitute plaintiff merely had ‘‘some knowledge’’ of that
action. (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the court emphasized that the substitute plaintiff had testified,
and the police report indicates, that she told Podmokly that her attorney
had advised her that the disputed area is in fact her property. In assessing
her testimony, the court further considered a May 28, 2019 letter from Gil
to the defendant and the substitute defendant, which was admitted as a full
exhibit, that stated in relevant part: ‘‘This office represents [the plaintiff],
a neighbor and abutting land owner to the rear of the property at 52 Oak
Ridge [Street]. . . . It is clear to me that [the plaintiff] has satisfied the
requirements for adverse possession of [the disputed] area. . . . We
attempted to reach a fair settlement of that lawsuit with the prior owner
but were unsuccessful. My client temporarily withdrew the lawsuit with the
hopes that he could negotiate a fair settlement with the future owner of
the property.’’ In crediting the substitute plaintiff’s testimony, the court found
that Gil’s letter ‘‘is not inconsistent with the . . . limited facts possessed
by [the plaintiff and the substitute plaintiff] regarding the ‘agreement.’ ’’
25
The substitute defendant points specifically to the following portions
of Pirri’s deposition testimony: (1) he ‘‘probably met’’ Evans four times and
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By way of background, the substitute defendant called
Pirri as a witness at trial, and, at several points during
Pirri’s direct examination, the court admitted portions
of his deposition testimony for impeachment purposes
as prior inconsistent statements. On appeal, the substi-
tute defendant claims that the court reviewed Pirri’s
deposition testimony and inconsistent trial testimony
but ‘‘dismissed it entirely.’’26
The substitute defendant’s claim, however, is belied
by the court’s memorandum of decision, in which it
thoroughly addressed Pirri’s deposition and trial testi-
mony. Specifically, it noted that Pirri’s deposition testi-
mony ‘‘conflicted with some portion of his trial testi-
mony’’ but concluded that ‘‘[t]he fact that [Pirri’s] state-
ments made in a pretrial deposition conflict with his
trial testimony goes to his personal credibility but other-
wise [is] not relevant and binding on [the substitute
plaintiff’s] claims of adverse possession.’’ Moreover, the
court specifically addressed each portion of Pirri’s
deposition testimony cited by the substitute defendant
on appeal and found that much of it either was incom-
plete or too vague ‘‘to be persuasive on the proof of
permission . . . .’’27 In any case, even if the court had
‘‘became kind of friendly with her’’; (2) Evans ‘‘knew and . . . was fine
with [the plaintiff] using the [disputed area]’’; (3) the plaintiff ‘‘probably had
a few discussions [with Evans] possibly’’; and (4) ‘‘later on in the 2000s,’’
the plaintiff became interested in purchasing the disputed area from Evans.
26
In support of her claim, the substitute defendant incorrectly argues that
‘‘[i]t [was] . . . not [her] burden of proof to prove permission’’ because ‘‘it
[was] the [substitute] plaintiff’s burden to prove a claim of right and a hostile
and adverse use by clear . . . and convincing evidence.’’ As stated herein,
the substitute plaintiff was not required to prove a lack of permission; rather,
the substitute defendant, pursuant to her special defense, had the burden
to prove permission by a preponderance of the evidence. See Slack v. Greene,
supra, 294 Conn. 435.
27
With respect to Pirri’s deposition testimony that the plaintiff ‘‘probably
had a few discussions’’ with Evans about the disputed area, for example,
the court stated: ‘‘There was no direct evidence that [the plaintiff], who had
difficulty speaking English, ever had a specific businesslike meeting with
. . . Evans on the subject of the disputed area. [Pirri] never testified that
he saw them together. The dates or circumstances of any meeting were
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found Pirri’s deposition testimony to be credible and
probative on the issue of permission, it is evident from
its memorandum of decision that it accorded greater
weight to the plaintiff’s own testimony than to any
potentially conflicting testimony by Pirri.28 It is axiom-
atic that we must defer to factual findings made by the
trial court on the basis of its assessment of witnesses’
credibility and its weighing of conflicting evidence
where, as we conclude here, such findings are sup-
ported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, we conclude
that the court’s finding that the plaintiff possessed the
disputed area under a claim of right was not clearly
erroneous.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

missing [from] this testimony. It would be speculation to find that those
meetings, if they occurred, took place within the fifteen year [statutory]
period [for adverse possession].’’
28
We emphasize that Pirri’s deposition testimony directly conflicted with
the plaintiff’s testimony, which the court credited, that he never had a
conversation with Evans or any other owner of 52 Oak Ridge Street and
that he never sought or received permission from anyone to use the disputed
area, which was further corroborated by the substitute plaintiff’s testimony.
In considering Pirri’s deposition testimony, the court stated that ‘‘[n]o evi-
dence was produced that . . . [Pirri] had the authority to bind [the plaintiff]
by any statements [he] made . . . to . . . Evans at any time. . . . Inconsis-
tent statements by a person with no authority from the principal cannot
bind the principal merely because their statements are not credible due
to inconsistencies.’’ Accordingly, because the court credited the contrary
testimony of the plaintiff, it concluded that ‘‘[t]he [substitute] defendant
cannot rely [on] any portion of [Pirri’s] testimony or inconsistent deposition
answers to sustain her burden to prove . . . [that] Evans gave permission
to [the plaintiff] during the fifteen [year statutory period]’’ to use the dis-
puted area.