State v. Garrison

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State v. Garrison

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v.
ALEXANDER A. GARRISON
(AC 43796)
Moll, Suarez, and Prescott, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of assault in the first degree, the defendant appealed. He claimed,
inter alia, that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress
certain statements he made to police officers while he was in a hospital
receiving treatment for injuries he sustained in a physical altercation that
led to his arrest and conviction. This court reversed the judgment of convic-
tion and remanded the case for a new trial without addressing the other
claims the defendant raised in his appeal. On the granting of certification,
the state appealed to our Supreme Court, which determined that the defen-
dant had not been in custody during any of his interactions with the police
at the hospital and, therefore, his statements should not have been sup-
pressed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this court and
remanded the case to this court with direction to consider the defendant’s
remaining claims on appeal, including his claim that the admission of his
statements to the police violated his right to due process. Held:
The trial court did not improperly deny the defendant’s motion to suppress
his statements to the police officers, as the state sufficiently demonstrated
that the statements, under the totality of the circumstances, were voluntary
and, thus, their admission at trial did not violate his right to due process.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for sanctions against the state for its failure to comply with certain of the
court’s discovery orders and its failure to disclose alleged impeachment
evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) and Giglio v. United
States (405 U.S. 150).
This court declined the defendant’s request to exercise its supervisory
authority over the administration of justice to direct trial courts to conduct
a formal, on the record inquiry during pretrial hearings to ascertain whether
the state has exercised due diligence in locating evidence favorable to
defendants, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that this case presented
the rare circumstance in which traditional constitutional, statutory and pro-
cedural limitations were inadequate to protect the rights of the defendant
and the integrity of the judicial system.
Submitted on briefs October 7, 2024—officially released February 25, 2025

Procedural History

Information charging the defendant with the crimes
of assault in the first degree and tampering with physical
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evidence, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial
district of Tolland, where the court, Bhatt, J., denied
the defendant’s motion to suppress certain evidence;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Seeley, J.;
subsequently, the court, Seeley, J., granted the defen-
dant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to the
charge of tampering with physical evidence; judgment
of guilty of assault in the first degree, from which the
defendant appealed to this court, Prescott, Suarez and
Bishop, Js., which reversed the trial court’s judgment
and remanded the case for a new trial, from which the
state, on the granting of certification, appealed to the
Supreme Court, which reversed this court’s judgment
and remanded the case to this court for further proceed-
ings. Affirmed.
Erica A. Barber filed a brief for the appellant (defen-
dant).
Matthew C. Gedansky, state’s attorney, and Sarah
Hanna, former senior assistant state’s attorney, and
Jaclyn Preville, supervisory assistant state’s attorney,
filed a brief for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. This case returns to us on remand from
our Supreme Court. In State v. Garrison, 213 Conn.
App. 786, 278 A.3d 1085 (2022), rev’d, 350 Conn. 61, 323
A.3d 279 (2024), the defendant, Alexander A. Garrison,
appealed from the judgment of conviction, rendered
after a bench trial, of assault in the first degree in viola-
tion of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1). On appeal,
the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court
improperly denied his motion to suppress statements
he made to police officers while at a hospital because
those statements were the result of a custodial interro-
gation and he had not been advised of his rights pursu-
ant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S.
Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). State v. Garrison,
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supra, 789–90. We agreed with the defendant and further
concluded that he was harmed by the admission of
these statements. Id., 790. Accordingly, we reversed the
judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a
new trial without addressing the other claims raised by
the defendant in his appeal. See id., 790 n.1.
After granting the state’s petition for certification to
appeal, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
this court. State v. Garrison, 350 Conn. 61, 63, 323
A.3d 279 (2024). Specifically, it determined that the
defendant was not in custody during any of his interac-
tions with the police at the hospital, and, therefore, his
statements made at that time should not have been
suppressed. Id. Our Supreme Court then ordered us to
consider on remand the defendant’s remaining appel-
late claims.
The remaining issues on appeal are whether the trial
court improperly denied (1) the defendant’s motion to
suppress because, contrary to the determination of the
court, his statements to the police were not voluntary,
and therefore their admission at trial violated his right
to due process, and (2) his motion for sanctions in
which he claimed that the state had failed to comply
with the court’s discovery orders and its constitutional
obligation to disclose impeachment evidence pursuant
to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). We are not persuaded by these
claims and therefore affirm the judgment of conviction.1
The following facts, as recited by our Supreme Court,
and procedural history are relevant to the defendant’s
1
In his principal appellate brief to this court, the defendant also claimed
that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress because the
police officers ‘‘did not electronically record the full custodial interrogation
as required pursuant to General Statutes § 54-1o.’’ The defendant, however,
explicitly abandoned this claim in his reply brief and, thus, we need not
address it.
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remaining claims on appeal. ‘‘In June, 2018, the defen-
dant visited his close friend, Timothy Murphy, and Mur-
phy’s cousin, William Patten, who lived together in an
apartment located in Vernon. While drinking beer and
whiskey, Murphy, Patten, and the defendant watched
television, talked, and played their guitars in the living
room of the apartment. Eventually, they moved the
gathering outside in order to build a fire in a fire pit
on the lawn outside of the apartment. As the evening
went on, all three continued drinking beer and whiskey.
After several hours of drinking around the fire, Patten
and the defendant began arguing over the merits of
football and mixed martial arts. The argument led to a
physical altercation during which Patten and the defen-
dant pushed one another and fell to the ground. Upon
gaining an advantage over the defendant, Patten punched
the defendant in the face, injuring his nose and ending
the initial fight. Patten and the defendant got off the
ground and returned to sitting around the fire. After a
few minutes, the defendant, who was angry that Patten
had punched him, attacked Patten from behind. The
defendant stabbed Patten in his back, front shoulder
area, and arm with a Smith & Wesson folding knife that
he had been carrying in his waistband. Patten, who
did not realize that he was being stabbed, pulled the
defendant over his shoulder and kicked him away,
which ended the second altercation.
‘‘Patten then returned to the apartment and, realizing
that he needed medical attention, walked to the nearby
Rockville General Hospital (hospital). In order to obtain
treatment for his injured nose, the defendant also
walked to the hospital. The defendant arrived at the
hospital at approximately 9:42 p.m. and was wheeled
into an examining room, where a nurse evaluated him
and provided medical care. Consistent with hospital
policy, the defendant changed into a hospital gown,
and hospital staff placed his clothes into bags. After
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State v. Garrison

performing basic assessments of the defendant’s condi-
tion, the nurse ‘determined that he was alert, awake, and
oriented.’ Although tests confirmed that the defendant’s
blood alcohol content measured 0.217, he was able to
communicate effectively with the nurse and to respond
appropriately to her questions, and he was calm and
cooperative. The attending physician who was on duty
briefly interacted with the defendant and left a note for
the incoming attending physician that the defendant
could be discharged once he was clinically sober.
‘‘During the time that the defendant was at the hospi-
tal, he was questioned by and made statements to five
different Vernon police officers. . . . Those police offi-
cers collectively questioned the defendant for approxi-
mately one hour; they were not all present at once with
the defendant.
‘‘The first interaction . . . was with [Detective
Charles] Hicking. When Hicking entered the defendant’s
room, a nurse was present. Hicking asked the nurse for
permission to speak with the defendant, and the nurse
assented. The defendant then told Hicking his version
of what had occurred that evening, and Hicking asked
clarifying questions. The defendant told Hicking that
he had stabbed the victim but that it was in self-defense.
The interaction ended when nursing staff interrupted
Hicking in order to perform their duties. Later, Hicking
reentered the defendant’s hospital room with another
detective, but he did not interact with the defendant.
Hicking was dressed in plain clothes, and his weapon
was not visible to the defendant.
‘‘The defendant’s longest interaction was with [Thomas]
Bugbee, a patrol officer, who first entered the defen-
dant’s hospital room at 10:13 p.m. During the approxi-
mately thirty minute interaction, Bugbee took the defen-
dant’s sworn statement. Specifically, the defendant told
Bugbee, ‘I don’t flight, I fight,’ ‘I’m a peaceable person
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until you get in my face, then I’ll fuck you up,’ and ‘I
take shit from no one.’ While the defendant gave his
statement, medical personnel entered and exited the
hospital room freely and tended to the defendant. At
one point, medical personnel asked Bugbee if they
could treat the defendant during the interview; at that
time, Bugbee confirmed the defendant’s desire to con-
tinue the interview in the presence of the staff. As the
defendant continued to speak with Bugbee, a nurse
inserted an intravenous (IV) catheter into the back of
the defendant’s hand in order to draw blood. The defen-
dant’s IV was not attached to any machine or equipment
while he spoke with Bugbee. After putting the defendant
under oath and having him sign the statement, Bugbee
left the room. At approximately 12:09 a.m., Bugbee reen-
tered the defendant’s room to speak with him again.
During this brief conversation, Bugbee told the defen-
dant that he was free to go, as far as the police were
concerned, but that it was up to the hospital when he
could actually leave. At 12:26 a.m., Bugbee repeated
to the defendant that the police officers were done
speaking with him and that he could leave as soon as the
hospital released him. During all of these conversations,
Bugbee was in uniform with his weapon visible and his
badge displayed.
‘‘After briefly reviewing the statement that the defen-
dant had given to Bugbee, [David] Hatheway, a detective
sergeant, entered the defendant’s hospital room along
with both Sergeant Christopher Pryputniewicz and
Bugbee. Hatheway was wearing civilian clothes, but
his badge and weapon were visible to the defendant.
Hatheway interviewed the defendant about his version
of events, during which the defendant described the
stabbing and stated to the officers that he ‘take[s] shit
from no one.’ During the interaction, the defendant gave
the officers consent to seize and search his clothing,
which the medical staff previously had placed into bags.
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State v. Garrison

After concluding the interview, Hatheway relayed his
impressions to his superior officer and left the hospital.
‘‘Finally, the defendant spoke with [Michael] Patrizz,
who was the lead detective assigned to the case. Accom-
panied by Hicking, Patrizz entered the defendant’s hos-
pital room shortly after 12:30 a.m. and asked the defen-
dant to again provide his version of the events. At that
time, Patrizz was dressed in plain clothes with his
weapon and badge visible to the defendant. The defen-
dant told Patrizz that he had stabbed the victim in his
stomach area and upper chest area but that it was in
self-defense. After approximately five to ten minutes,
the defendant expressed annoyance at having to repeat
his story and indicated a desire to stop speaking. At
that point, Patrizz ended the interaction.
‘‘During each interaction with the police officers, the
defendant was never physically restrained. No officer
asked the medical staff to prolong the defendant’s treat-
ment. Although the defendant was intoxicated, he ‘was
coherent, alert, oriented, and able’ to understand his
circumstances and to communicate effectively. Apart
from his injured nose, medical examinations revealed
no other medical concerns. After becoming clinically
sober, the defendant was discharged from the hospital
at 2:25 a.m. At no point during any of their interactions
with the defendant at the hospital did the police advise
the defendant of his Miranda rights.
‘‘The police arrested the defendant the following day.
The state charged the defendant with one count of
assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a)
(1) and one count of tampering with physical evidence
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-155.’’ (Footnotes
omitted.) State v. Garrison, supra, 350 Conn. 64–68.
The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the
statements that he had made to the officers while he
was at the hospital. The defendant asserted that the
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motion to suppress must be granted because (1) he was
subjected to custodial interrogation by the officers and
he had not yet been advised of his Miranda rights and
(2) regardless of whether he was in custody at the time,
his statements were not voluntary.
Over the course of three days, the trial court, Bhatt,
J., conducted an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s
motion to suppress. Following the conclusion of the
hearing, the court issued a memorandum of decision,
concluding that the defendant was not in custody when
he made the challenged statements and that the chal-
lenged statements were voluntary. Accordingly, the
court denied his motion to suppress.
The defendant subsequently elected a bench trial and
asserted that he had acted in self-defense. The court,
Seeley, J., granted the defendant’s motion for a judg-
ment of acquittal regarding the charge of tampering
with physical evidence, but found the defendant guilty
of the assault charge after concluding that the state had
disproven self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The
court sentenced the defendant to ten years of incarcera-
tion, execution suspended after seven years, and five
years of probation.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the
trial court to this court, claiming, among other things,
that the statements he made to the police at the hospital
were the result of a custodial interrogation and that,
because he had not been advised of his Miranda rights
before the statements were elicited, he was entitled to
have the statements suppressed. See State v. Garrison,
supra, 213 Conn. App. 807. This court unanimously con-
cluded that ‘‘a reasonable person in the defendant’s
position would have believed that he was not at liberty
to terminate the police questioning, that his freedom
of movement was restricted by the police . . . and that
[he] was in police custody to the degree associated
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with a formal arrest . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 827. This court further
concluded that the questioning of the defendant by the
police constituted interrogation for purposes of
Miranda and, therefore, that evidence of the statements
should have been suppressed. Id., 808, 827. After con-
cluding that the admission of the statements obtained
in violation of Miranda was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, this court reversed the defendant’s
judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a
new trial. See id., 840–41.
Our Supreme Court granted the state’s petition for
certification to appeal limited to the following issues:
(1) ‘‘Did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that
the defendant was in custody when he spoke with
investigating officers after admitting himself to the hos-
pital?’’ And (2) ‘‘[i]f the answer to the first question is
‘yes,’ did the Appellate Court correctly conclude that
the admission of the defendant’s statements while in
custody was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?’’
State v. Garrison, 345 Conn. 959, 959, 285 A.3d 52
(2022).
In a split decision, our Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of this court, concluding that the trial court
properly had determined, under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, that the defendant was not in custody dur-
ing any of his interactions with the law enforcement
officers at the hospital.2 State v. Garrison, supra, 350
Conn. 85. Our Supreme Court then remanded the case
to this court to consider the defendant’s remaining
2
In his dissenting opinion, Justice McDonald, joined by Justice Ecker,
stated: ‘‘Because the Appellate Court’s well reasoned opinion fully addresses
both of the certified issues in this appeal, it would serve no useful purpose
for me to repeat the discussion contained in that opinion. I therefore adopt
the Appellate Court’s opinion as the proper statement of the issues and the
applicable law and reasoning concerning both issues.’’ State v. Garrison,
supra, 350 Conn. 87 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
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issues on appeal. Id. Additional facts and procedural
history will be set forth as necessary to resolve these
claims.
I
The defendant claims that the court improperly
denied his motion to suppress the statements because,
contrary to the determination of the court, the defen-
dant’s statements to the police were not voluntary and,
thus, their admission at trial deprived him of due pro-
cess under the federal and state constitutions.3 Specifi-
cally, the defendant contends that the state failed to
establish that his statements were voluntary under the
totality of the circumstances because the record sup-
ports a conclusion that he was extremely intoxicated
while speaking to the police officers and that they used
coercive tactics to overbear his will to such extent that
his statements must be deemed involuntary. We are not
persuaded.
The trial court made the following findings of fact
with respect to this claim. ‘‘[T]he totality of circum-
stances . . . compels the conclusion that the defen-
dant’s various statements were voluntary and not the
product of an overborne will brought about by coercive
police activity. As noted, the video evidence is abun-
dantly clear that the defendant’s interactions with the
police were nothing but consensual and he was eager
to provide his version of events to the police. He repeat-
edly made spontaneous statements, going into detail,
3
The defendant has not raised a separate claim that the admission of his
allegedly involuntary statements was prohibited under our state constitution.
Because the defendant has not provided an independent state constitutional
analysis asserting greater protection under the state constitution, we analyze
his constitutional claim under the assumption that his constitutional right
to due process is coextensive under the state and federal constitutions. See
State v. Washington, 345 Conn. 258, 262 n.1, 284 A.3d 280 (2022); State v.
Robert S., 179 Conn. App. 831, 840 n.11, 181 A.3d 568, cert. denied, 328
Conn. 933, 183 A.3d 1174 (2018).
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and had to be asked several times to clarify information
and to slow down to enable officers to follow along.
He was not restrained in any way and, even though
intoxicated, his affect and manner did not reveal any
deficits in any understanding or the ability to recall and
relay information. Not once did he express a desire to
speak to a lawyer or indicate an unwillingness to speak
to the police, except at the very end of the night when
he indicated to . . . Patrizz that he no longer wanted
to discuss the events. Prior to that interaction, he had
at one point summoned . . . Bugbee to his room
because it was his mistaken belief that officers wished
to speak to him further and he wanted to answer their
questions. Unlike the defendant [in Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978)],
he was not tied to any tubes, needles or breathing appa-
ratus.4 He signed a consent to search form, listened to
. . . Bugbee’s verbal recitation of the written statement
and had the mental wherewithal to make changes to
that statement. He thanked . . . Bugbee for writing
down his version of events.
‘‘He was not seriously wounded and was not in danger
of losing consciousness at any point. He was not prohib-
ited from communicating with medical staff at any
point, nor were medical staff prohibited from tending to
him. No officer or medical personnel had any difficulty
communicating with the defendant, nor did he express
any difficulty understanding them or communicating
with them.
‘‘It is true that the defendant was intoxicated during
his interactions with the police. It is this intoxication
4
Our Supreme Court observed that, ‘‘[a]lthough the defendant had an IV
inserted into the back of his hand, there is nothing in the record to suggest
that the officers took advantage of what could have been a coercive situation
created by [the] physical restraint placed on the defendant for purposes of
medical treatment.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Garrison,
supra, 350 Conn. 75; see also id., 77–78.
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that prohibited him from leaving the hospital until 2:20
a.m. Further, he was never given Miranda warnings.
However, these two factors by themselves are insuffi-
cient to defeat a finding of voluntariness. The state has
met its burden of proof.’’ (Footnote added.)
We now turn to the legal principles that govern this
claim. ‘‘Irrespective of Miranda, and the fifth amend-
ment itself . . . any use in a criminal trial of an involun-
tary confession is a denial of due process of law. . . .
The state has the burden of proving the voluntariness
of the confession by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence. . . . [T]he test of voluntariness is whether an
examination of all the circumstances discloses that the
conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to
overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about
confessions not freely self-determined . . . . The ulti-
mate test remains . . . [i]s the confession the product
of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used
against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne
and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired, the use of his confession offends due process.
. . . The determination, by the trial court, whether a
confession is voluntary must be grounded upon a con-
sideration of the circumstances surrounding it. . . .
Factors that may be taken into account, upon a proper
factual showing, include: the youth of the accused; his
lack of education; his intelligence; the lack of any advice
as to his constitutional rights; the length of detention;
the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning;
and the use of physical punishment, such as the depriva-
tion of food and sleep. . . . Under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, however, in order
for a confession to be deemed involuntary and thus
inadmissible at trial, there must be police conduct, or
official coercion, causally related to the confession
. . . . In other words, there must be an essential link
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State v. Garrison

between [the] coercive activity of the [s]tate, on the
one hand, and a resulting confession by a defendant,
on the other . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) State v. Christopher S., 338 Conn.
255, 280–81, 257 A.3d 912 (2021); State v. Lueders, 225
Conn. App. 612, 642–43, 317 A.3d 69, cert. denied, 349
Conn. 920, 321 A.3d 402 (2024); see also State v. Madera,
210 Conn. 22, 39–40, 554 A.2d 263 (1989).
‘‘[T]here is considerable overlap between the factors
that courts should consider in determining whether a
defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes and the
factors that courts should consider in determining
whether a defendant’s statements were voluntary.’’
State v. Jackson, 304 Conn. 383, 421, 40 A.3d 290 (2012).
Finally, we note that ‘‘[w]hether a confession is involun-
tary because it was coerced rests upon factual determi-
nations regarding the circumstances surrounding the
defendant’s [statements]. . . . Although the ultimate
question of voluntariness is one of law over which our
review is plenary, the factual findings underpinning that
determination will not be overturned unless they are
clearly erroneous. . . . As in other cases in which the
factual findings implicate a defendant’s constitutional
rights and the credibility of witnesses is not the primary
issue, we will, however, undertake a scrupulous exami-
nation of the record to ensure that the findings are
supported by substantial evidence.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 419–20; State v. Lueders, supra,
225 Conn. App. 643–44.
On appeal, the defendant does not expressly assert
that any of the court’s factual findings are clearly erro-
neous. Instead, he argues that, because he was intoxi-
cated at the time he made the challenged statements
and the police used deceptive tactics by suggesting to
him that they believed his claim of self-defense, the
totality of the circumstances compels a conclusion that
his statements were not voluntary. We disagree.
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First, we emphasize that many of the determinations
made by our Supreme Court in rejecting the defendant’s
claim that he was in custody for purposes of Miranda
support a similar conclusion that his statements were
voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. See,
e.g., State v. Jackson, supra, 304 Conn. 420–21; State v.
Marrero-Alejandro, 159 Conn. App. 376, 396, 122 A.3d
272 (2015), appeal dismissed, 324 Conn. 780, 154 A.3d
1005 (2017). The defendant was not restrained by the
police in any manner and was ‘‘able to get up from
his hospital bed and walk around the room.’’ State v.
Garrison, supra, 350 Conn. 75. The questioning was
‘‘neither prolonged nor aggressive’’ and the defendant
spoke to the officers ‘‘spontaneously, eagerly and imme-
diately . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
74. Indeed, he thanked Bugbee for writing down his
statement and made changes to the statement that he
believed to be warranted. Id., 77. Moreover, the officers’
interactions with the defendant were not prolonged but
instead ‘‘were spaced out and totaled only about one
hour . . . .’’ Id., 75. The police did not limit or other-
wise condition the defendant’s access to medical care
on his compliance with their questioning. Id., 81. There
is no evidence that he was deprived of food or water,
or subject to the use of any other type of physical
punishment. See, e.g., State v. Adorno, 45 Conn. App.
187, 191, 695 A.2d 6, cert. denied, 242 Conn. 904, 697
A.2d 688 (1997).

It is true that the defendant’s blood alcohol level was
elevated significantly during the time he was ques-
tioned. The court found, however, based in part on the
testimony of the defendant’s primary nurse, that the
defendant was ‘‘alert, awake, and oriented . . . .’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Garrison,
supra, 350 Conn. 79. Again, the defendant does not chal-
lenge as clearly erroneous this or any other factual
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State v. Garrison

finding. Moreover, as the court properly noted, intoxica-
tion alone may be insufficient to defeat a finding of
voluntariness. See, e.g., State v. Madera, supra, 210
Conn. 42. The defendant’s hospital records, which were
admitted into evidence, state that he was alert and
speaking coherently. The defendant was not so intoxi-
cated that he suffered from any mania, slipped in and
out of consciousness, or lacked an ability to understand
the questions he was being asked.5 See State v. Richard
S., 143 Conn. App. 596, 615–17, 70 A.3d 1110, cert.
denied, 310 Conn. 912, 76 A.3d 628 (2013); State v.
Russo, 3 Conn. App. 137, 144–46, 485 A.2d 1335 (1985);
see, e.g., State v. Andrews, 313 Conn. 266, 322–23, 96
A.3d 1199 (2014) (trial court may consider defendant’s
emotional state, intoxication, and mental disease to
determine whether confession is voluntary; court none-
theless found defendant’s claim of being under influ-
ence of drugs and in need of prescription medication
was not credible and, therefore, properly denied motion
to suppress statement as involuntary); Parsad v.
Greiner, 337 F.3d 175, 183–84 (2d Cir.) (court’s findings,
that defendant had consumed numerous alcoholic bev-
erages but he was not in such state of intoxication that
he could not understand what he was doing when he
made pre-Miranda statements, were not clearly errone-
ous, and fact that defendant was alcoholic was insuffi-
cient to render such statements involuntary), cert.
denied sub nom. Parsad v. Fischer, 540 U.S. 1091, 124
S. Ct. 962, 157 L. Ed. 2d 798 (2003).
Finally, it is important to recognize that the court did
not make any finding that the law enforcement officers
who spoke to the defendant used any coercive police
tactics. The only allegedly deceptive tactic on which
the defendant relies is Bugbee’s statement to him that
5
The defendant instead relies on facts not in evidence by citing to an
exhibit that was marked for identification only during the hearing on the
motion to suppress.
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he believed his claim of self-defense and he was unlikely
to be charged with a crime.6 Our Supreme Court has
recognized, however, that such vague, predictive state-
ments regarding how a suspect may be charged or
treated by prosecuting authorities are not inherently
coercive. See State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631, 680–81,
262 A.3d 44 (2021), cert. denied, U.S. , 142 S.
Ct. 873, 211 L. Ed. 2d 575 (2022). Moreover, even in
circumstances in which the police used multiple decep-
tive and coercive tactics, our Supreme Court has been
disinclined to conclude that such trickery necessarily
requires a conclusion that the defendant’s will was over-
borne. See id., 672–73; see also State v. Pinder, 250
Conn. 385, 423, 736 A.2d 857 (1999).
In sum, we conclude that the court properly con-
cluded that the state sufficiently demonstrated that the
defendant’s statements to law enforcement officers at
the hospital, under the totality of the circumstances,
were voluntary. Accordingly, we conclude that their
admission at trial did not violate the due process clause
of the federal constitution. The defendant’s claim that
the court improperly denied his motion to suppress,
therefore, fails.
II
The defendant next claims that the court improperly
denied his motion for sanctions in which he claimed
that the state failed to comply with the court’s discovery
orders and its constitutional obligation to disclose
impeachment evidence pursuant to Brady v. Maryland,
supra, 373 U.S. 87, and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 92 S. Ct. 763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972). Specifically,
the defendant asserts that the state improperly failed
to disclose (1) that a condition of the victim’s probation
6
In his principal appellate brief, the defendant noted that two other police
officers acknowledged their ‘‘familiarity with deceptive police interroga-
tion tactics.’’
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was that he consume no alcohol and (2) its agreement
or understanding with the victim that the state did not
intend to prosecute the victim for having violated his
probation in exchange for the victim’s cooperation in
the prosecution of the defendant. He also asks this
court to exercise its supervisory authority over the
administration of justice to assure compliance with the
state’s discovery obligations. We are not persuaded by
the defendant’s arguments regarding this claim.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to this claim. On the evening of the assault, the
defendant knew that the victim was on probation and
that a condition of his probation was to refrain from
using alcohol.7 Nevertheless, they spent time together
drinking alcohol inside the apartment and later around
a firepit. The defendant told the police officers while
at the hospital that he knew that a condition of the
victim’s probation was that he not consume alcohol
and the defendant’s statements in this regard are cap-
tured on the officers’ body worn camera footage. The
video was provided to the defendant’s counsel in
November, 2018, when the defendant first filed a discov-
ery request.
On December 4, 2018, the defendant filed supplemen-
tal discovery requests seeking a variety of information
and material relating to the victim, including any
records of conviction and documents related thereto,
probation, and Department of Correction records, and
‘‘[a]ny . . . treatment reports, evaluations, sentencing
materials, or other evidence in the state’s possession
. . . relevant to any defenses of [the defendant] or
impeachment of [the victim].’’ The state indicated that
it would comply, and, on December 21, 2018, the court
7
The victim had been sentenced to three years of incarceration, execution
suspended, and three years of probation on February 13, 2018. The conditions
of his probation prohibited him from possessing or using drugs or alcohol.
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ordered it to do so to the extent the records were
available.
After the case was placed on the firm jury list, the
defendant filed, inter alia, a ‘‘Motion to Complete Dis-
covery,’’ a ‘‘Motion for In Camera Review of Sealed
Documents,’’ and a ‘‘Memorandum in Support of Sub-
poena Duces Tecum.’’ In one or more of these filings
and proceedings related thereto, the defendant made
representations that indicated he was aware of the vic-
tim’s conviction history and that one or more of the
criminal incidences underlying the convictions involved
the victim’s using alcohol to the point of intoxication.
The defendant also indicated that he knew that the
conditions of the victim’s probation included restric-
tions on his consumption of alcohol.
On May 20, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for
sanctions in which he asserted that the state had vio-
lated the court’s December 21, 2018 discovery order and
had failed to comply with its constitutional disclosure
obligations set forth in Brady and Giglio. Specifically,
the defendant’s counsel argued, among other things,
that he had learned independently that a condition of
the victim’s probation was that he not consume alcohol
and that he was exposed to up to three years of incarcer-
ation if found to be in violation of his probation. The
defendant’s motion for sanctions also indicated that the
state had decided not to seek a warrant for a violation
of probation against the victim. The defendant sought
a dismissal of the prosecution or, alternatively, other
forms of relief including, but not limited to, the admis-
sion into evidence at trial of various records pertaining
to the victim’s criminal and substance abuse history.
Following oral argument8 on the defendant’s motion
for sanctions, the court issued a memorandum of deci-
sion denying the motion. With respect to the victim’s
8
The defendant did not present any witnesses with respect to the motion
but instead relied solely on an offer of proof and certain documents he had
attached to his motion.
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condition of probation, the court concluded that the
state had not disclosed it to the defendant during discov-
ery. Nevertheless, it concluded that it was unnecessary
to decide whether such facts were material within the
meaning of Brady because the information had not
been suppressed. As the court stated: ‘‘The defendant
himself was aware of the fact that the [victim] was not
permitted to consume any alcohol while on probation.
He [said] as much during his interactions with the police
[on] the night of the incident. Defense counsel was able
to confirm this by obtaining public records that listed
the [victim’s] conditions of probation. At the very least,
the defendant knew at the time of the filing of this
motion, the essential facts permitting him to take advan-
tage of [that] evidence. . . . [T]he information is now
known, by whatever source, to the defense. Evidence
in this matter has not yet commenced, and the defen-
dant has not shown how he has been prejudiced by this
untimely disclosure or how it will deprive him of a fair
trial. There is no Brady violation.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)
With respect to the state’s alleged failure to disclose
an agreement with the victim not to seek a violation of
probation warrant, the court stated: ‘‘[I]f there existed
an agreement or understanding—express or implied—
between the state, a probation officer, any law enforce-
ment agency, the [victim] or his lawyer that related to
any benefit, positive outcome or consideration offered,
suggested or implied to the [victim] in order to secure
his testimony against the defendant, the state would
be obligated to disclose that information. There is no
evidence that any such discussion has occurred
between any of the relevant parties. The claim is
denied.’’
In conclusion, the court determined that the ‘‘defen-
dant has not demonstrated that the evidence sought,
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State v. Garrison

to the extent that it exists and is favorable, was dis-
closed in an untimely fashion and that the untimely
disclosure has prejudiced him or deprived him of the
right to a fair trial.’’ The court did not explicitly address
the defendant’s claim that, even if the state’s discovery
conduct did not violate Brady and its progeny, sanc-
tions still should be imposed on the state as a result of
its noncompliance with the court’s discovery order.9
The defendant, however, failed to seek an articulation
from the court regarding that issue.
We turn then to the legal principles that govern the
defendant’s Brady claim. ‘‘In Brady [v. Maryland,
supra, 373 U.S. 86], the United States Supreme Court
held that [t]he defendant has a right to the disclosure
of exculpatory evidence under the due process [clause]
of . . . [the fourteenth amendment to] the United
States constitution . . . . State v. Floyd, 253 Conn. 700,
736–37, 756 A.2d 799 (2000).’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Andres C., 349 Conn. 300, 329, 315
A.3d 1014, cert. denied, U.S. , S. Ct. ,
L. Ed. 2d (2024). ‘‘In order to prove a Brady viola-
tion, the defendant must show: (1) that the prosecution
suppressed evidence after a request by the defense; (2)
that the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3)
that the evidence was material.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Floyd, supra, 736–37. ‘‘It is
well established that [i]mpeachment evidence as well
9
Practice Book § 40-5 provides: ‘‘If a party fails to comply with disclosure
as required under these rules, the opposing party may move the judicial
authority for an appropriate order. The judicial authority hearing such a
motion may enter such orders and time limitations as it deems appropriate,
including, without limitation, one or more of the following: (1) Requiring
the noncomplying party to comply; (2) Granting the moving party additional
time or a continuance; (3) Relieving the moving party from making a disclo-
sure required by these rules; (4) Prohibiting the noncomplying party from
introducing specified evidence; (5) Declaring a mistrial; (6) Dismissing the
charges; (7) Imposing appropriate sanctions on the counsel or party, or
both, responsible for the noncompliance; or (8) Entering such other order
as it deems proper.’’
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22 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
State v. Garrison

as exculpatory evidence falls within Brady’s definition
of evidence favorable to an accused.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id., 737; see also Giglio v. United
States, supra, 405 U.S. 153–54. ‘‘Whether the [defendant]
was deprived of his due process rights due to a Brady
violation is a question of law, to which we grant plenary
review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morant v.
Commissioner of Correction, 117 Conn. App. 279, 284,
979 A.2d 507, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 906, 982 A.2d 1080
(2009); see also State v. Andres C., supra, 329–30.
‘‘[I]t is well established that evidence is not consid-
ered to have been suppressed within the meaning of
the Brady doctrine if the defendant or his attorney
either knew, or should have known, of the essential
facts permitting him to take advantage of [that] evi-
dence. . . . State v. Skakel, 276 Conn. 633, 701, 888
A.2d 985, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1030, 127 S. Ct. 578, 166
L. Ed. 2d 428 (2006); see also State v. Guilbert, [306
Conn. 218, 272, 49 A.3d 705 (2012)] (same); Young v.
Commissioner of Correction, 219 Conn. App. 171, 189,
294 A.3d 29 (same), cert. denied, 347 Conn. 905, 297
A.3d 567 (2023). The rationale underlying this exception
to the state’s disclosure obligation under Brady is obvi-
ous: Brady is designed to assure that the defendant is
not denied access to exculpatory evidence known or
available to the state but unknown or unavailable to
him. . . . It is not intended either to relieve the defense
of its obligation diligently to seek evidence favorable
to it or to permit the defense to close its eyes to informa-
tion likely to lead to the discovery of such evidence.
. . . Thus, evidence will not be deemed to have been
suppressed by the state . . . if the [defendant] or the
[defendant’s] trial counsel reasonably was on notice of
[its] existence but nevertheless failed to take appro-
priate steps to obtain it.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v.
State, 222 Conn. App. 510, 533–34, 306 A.3d 5 (2023),
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cert. denied, 348 Conn. 944, 307 A.3d 910 (2024); see
also State v. Giovanni P., 155 Conn. App. 322, 343,
110 A.3d 442, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 909, 111 A.3d
883 (2015).
As we noted previously, the defendant commented
to the police on the night of the incident that he was
aware of the victim’s condition of probation that the
victim was not to use alcohol. Additionally, in the defen-
dant’s May 20, 2019 memorandum of law in support of
his motion for sanctions, he acknowledged that the
victim had two prior convictions that resulted from
conduct while he was intoxicated. The defendant’s
memorandum of law further stated: ‘‘A condition of
probation for his most recent . . . conviction is that
he not possess drugs or alcohol.’’ The defendant also
represented that, five days earlier, he had received tran-
scripts from the victim’s sentencing proceeding during
which the prosecutor requested, as a special condition
of probation, that the victim not use or possess any
drugs or alcohol. At the hearing on his motion for sanc-
tions, the defendant acknowledged that he had all of
the information he had sought and would be able to
prepare for the trial. On the basis of these facts, the
trial court, in denying his motion for sanctions, deter-
mined that the defendant was aware of the victim’s
condition of probation that he refrain from consuming
alcohol. Accordingly, the court found that this informa-
tion was not suppressed and, thus, a Brady violation
did not exist.
In his appellate brief, the defendant contends that
the evidence showed only that he suspected that the
victim was not permitted to drink alcohol due to the
condition of his probation. We disagree. The court
determined that the defendant was aware of the victim’s
condition of probation prior to trial. On the basis of
this undisputed factual finding that the defendant and
his counsel were aware of the conditions of the victim’s
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probation; see State v. Skakel, supra, 276 Conn. 702–703;
Reyes v. State, supra, 222 Conn. App. 535–36; the court
properly concluded that the defendant failed to estab-
lish a Brady violation.
The defendant also asserts that the state improperly
failed to disclose its agreement or understanding with
the victim that it did not intend to prosecute the victim
for having violated his probation in exchange for his
cooperation in the prosecution of the defendant. He
further contends that, as a result, his decision to waive
his right to trial by jury was unknowing and, therefore,
involuntary. We disagree.
‘‘[T]he Brady rule applies not just to exculpatory
evidence, but also to impeachment evidence . . .
which, broadly defined, is evidence having the potential
to alter the jury’s assessment of the credibility of a
significant prosecution witness. . . . Thus, our case
law has recognized that explicit agreements or under-
standings between a witness and the prosecutor or the
police must be disclosed . . . but [a]n unexpressed
intention by the state not to prosecute a witness does
not.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotations omitted.)
Spearman v. Commissioner of Correction, 164 Conn.
App. 530, 578–79, 138 A.3d 378, cert. denied, 321 Conn.
923, 138 A.3d 284 (2016); see also Gomez v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 336 Conn. 168, 182, 243 A.3d 1163
(2020) (under Brady and its progeny, state may not
suppress material, exculpatory evidence, including that
which tends to undermine credibility of state’s wit-
nesses).
‘‘The prerequisite of any claim under the Brady,
Napue [v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 3 L. Ed.
2d 1217 (1959)] and Giglio line of cases10 is the existence
10
‘‘Drawing from these cases, [our Supreme Court] has stated: [D]ue pro-
cess is . . . offended if the state, although not soliciting false evidence,
allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. . . . If a government witness
falsely denies having struck a bargain with the state, or substantially mischar-
acterizes the nature of the inducement, the state is obliged to correct the
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of an undisclosed agreement or understanding between
the cooperating witness and the state. . . . Normally,
this is a fact based claim to be determined by the trial
court, subject only to review for clear error. . . . [T]he
burden is on the defendant to prove the existence of
undisclosed exculpatory evidence.’’ (Citation omitted;
footnote added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Brown v. Commissioner of Correction, 228 Conn. App.
309, 314, 324 A.3d 144, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 927, 326
A.3d 250 (2024); see also State v. Smith, 313 Conn. 325,
348–49, 96 A.3d 1238 (2014) (same).
In the present case, the court specifically found that
there was no evidence of any discussion between the
state and the victim regarding an agreement or under-
standing, express or implied, pertaining to ‘‘any benefit,
positive outcome, or consideration offered, suggested
or implied to the [victim] in order to secure his testi-
mony against the defendant . . . .’’ Stated differently,
the defendant has not set forth any evidence demonstra-
ting that the state agreed, in exchange for the victim’s
cooperation, not to prosecute the victim for violating
his probation by consuming alcohol on the night of his
stabbing. The defendant has not challenged this finding
on appeal. In the absence of such an agreement or
understanding, this argument must fail.
Next, the defendant argues that the court improperly
failed to sanction the state following its violation of the
court’s discovery orders. ‘‘Practice Book § 40-5 gives
broad discretion to the trial judge to fashion an appro-
priate remedy for noncompliance with discovery. . . .
misconception. . . . Regardless of the lack of intent to lie on the part of
the witness, Giglio and Napue require that the prosecutor apprise the court
when he knows that his witness is giving testimony that is substantially
misleading. . . . A new trial is required if the false testimony could . . .
in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Smith, 313 Conn. 325, 348–49, 96 A.3d
1238 (2014).
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[T]he primary purpose of a sanction for violation of a
discovery order is to ensure that the defendant’s rights
are protected, not to exact punishment on the state for
its allegedly improper conduct. As we have indicated,
the formulation of an appropriate sanction is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court. . . . In
determining what sanction is appropriate for failure to
comply with [court-ordered] discovery, the trial court
should consider the reason why disclosure was not
made, the extent of prejudice, if any, to the opposing
party, the feasibility of rectifying that prejudice by a
continuance, and any other relevant circumstances.
. . . As with any discretionary action of the trial court,
appellate review requires every reasonable presump-
tion in favor of the action, and the ultimate issue is
whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as
it did. . . . In general, abuse of discretion exists when
a court could have chosen different alternatives but has
decided the matter so arbitrarily as to vitiate logic, or
has decided it based on improper or irrelevant factors.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Jackson, 334 Conn. 793, 810–11, 224 A.3d 886
(2020); see also State v. Hargett, 196 Conn. App. 228,
256–58, 229 A.3d 1047 (2020), aff’d, 343 Conn. 604, 275
A.3d 601 (2022).
In denying the defendant’s motion, the court did not
expressly address his argument that sanctions against
the state were warranted under our rules of practice
for its failure to comply with the discovery orders. In
declining to afford him any of the requested relief, the
court implicitly denied this aspect of the defendant’s
May 12, 2019 motion for sanctions. In concluding that
the court did not abuse its discretion, we first note that
a trial court is not required to impose sanctions for every
violation of a discovery order. See State v. Billings, 217
Conn. App. 1, 47, 287 A.3d 146 (2022), cert. denied,
346 Conn. 907, 288 A.3d 217 (2023). Additionally, the
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defendant’s counsel admitted that, as of the hearing on
his motion for sanctions, he was in possession of all
the materials that he had sought and would be able to
prepare fully for trial. On appeal, the defendant has
failed to demonstrate that the decision not to impose
sanctions on the state constituted an abuse of the
court’s discretion. Finally, this court does not presume
error by the trial court. See State v. Herman K., 212
Conn. App. 592, 605, 275 A.3d 1233, cert. denied, 344
Conn. 902, 277 A.3d 136 (2022); State v. James K., 209
Conn. App. 441, 465, 267 A.3d 858 (2021), aff’d, 347
Conn. 648, 299 A.3d 243 (2023). For these reasons, we
reject the defendant’s argument that the court improp-
erly failed to impose sanctions on the state for violating
its discovery order.
Finally, the defendant asserts, as an independent
basis for reversal, that we should exercise our supervi-
sory authority to assure the state’s compliance with its
disclosure obligations. Specifically, he contends that we
should ‘‘direct trial courts to conduct a formal inquiry
on the record with prosecutors during pretrial hearings
to ascertain whether the state has exercised due dili-
gence in locating favorable evidence and whether such
evidence has been disclosed to the defense.’’ We con-
clude that the use of our supervisory authority over
the administration of justice is not warranted in the
present case.
‘‘It is well settled that [a]ppellate courts possess an
inherent supervisory authority over the administration
of justice. . . . Under our supervisory authority, we
have adopted rules intended to guide the lower courts
in the administration of justice in all aspects of the
criminal process. . . . The exercise of our supervisory
powers is an extraordinary remedy to be invoked only
when circumstances are such that the issue at hand,
[although] not rising to the level of a constitutional
violation, is nonetheless of utmost seriousness, not only
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State v. Garrison

for the integrity of a particular trial but also for the
perceived fairness of the judicial system as a whole.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Langston, 346 Conn. 605, 637, 294 A.3d 1002
(2023), cert. denied, U.S. , 144 S. Ct. 698, 217 L.
Ed. 2d 391 (2024); see also State v. Moore, 169 Conn.
App. 470, 487, 151 A.3d 412 (2016) (supervisory powers
are not last bastion of hope for every untenable appeal
or form of free-floating justice untethered to legal prin-
ciple), appeal dismissed, 334 Conn. 275, 221 A.3d 40
(2019).
The defendant has failed to demonstrate that this
case presents the rare circumstance in which traditional
constitutional, statutory, and procedural limitations are
inadequate to protect the rights of the defendant and
the integrity of the judicial system. See State v. Lock-
hart, 298 Conn. 537, 576, 4 A.3d 1176 (2010); see also
State v. Jose V., 157 Conn. App. 393, 408–409, 116 A.3d
833, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 916, 117 A.3d 854 (2015).
We conclude, therefore, that this case does not merit
the extraordinary remedy requested by the defendant.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.