Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

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Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

SAADIA BOUAZZA v. GEICO GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY
(AC 46494)
Bright, C. J., and Moll and Cradle, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court with respect to
its dismissal of the count of her complaint alleging bad faith against the
defendant insurance company. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp-
erly concluded that the litigation privilege applied and deprived the court
of subject matter jurisdiction. Held:

The trial court improperly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the
plaintiff’s bad faith claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as the
allegations of bad faith for conduct that occurred outside the judicial pro-
ceeding and prior to the commencement of the underlying litigation had
no connection or logical relation to any ongoing judicial proceeding and,
therefore, were not covered by the litigation privilege.

Argued October 15, 2024—officially released January 21, 2025

Procedural History

Action to recover underinsured motorist benefits
allegedly due under a certain automobile insurance pol-
icy issued by the defendant, and for other relief, brought
to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
Britain, where the court, Morgan, J., granted the plain-
tiff’s request for leave to amend her complaint to add
a second count alleging bad faith; thereafter, the court
granted the defendant’s request to bifurcate the trial,
and the case was tried to the jury before Morgan, J., on
the first count of the complaint; verdict for the plaintiff;
subsequently, the court granted the defendant’s motion
for remittitur; thereafter, the court granted the defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss the second count of the com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; subse-
quently, the court rendered judgment in part for the
plaintiff, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court.
Reversed in part; further proceedings.
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Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

Kevin C. Ferry, with whom was Monique Foley, for
the appellant (plaintiff).
Karen L. Dowd, with whom were Michael A. Lanza
and, on the brief, Joseph M. Busher, Jr., for the appellee
(defendant).
Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiff, Saadia Bouazza, appeals
from the judgment of the trial court with respect to its
dismissal of her claim of bad faith against the defendant,
Geico General Insurance Company. On appeal, the
plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly con-
cluded that the litigation privilege applied and deprived
the court of subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore,
improperly dismissed her claim of bad faith. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiff claims that (1) the litigation privilege
was not applicable in this case, (2) the parties should
have had an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to
the court ruling on this issue, (3) the court’s ruling fails
to articulate how the test set forth in Dorfman v. Smith,
342 Conn. 582, 271 A.3d 53 (2022), for determining
whether the litigation privilege applies, was met in this
case, and (4) the court improperly considered the offer
of compromise filed by the plaintiff in support of its
decision. We conclude that the court improperly
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the
litigation privilege and, accordingly, reverse in part the
judgment of the trial court.1
The following facts, either as set forth in the court’s
memorandum of decision or as undisputed in the
record, and procedural history are relevant to our reso-
lution of this appeal. On February 4, 2017, the plaintiff
was a passenger in a motor vehicle that was involved
in an accident with another vehicle. The driver of the
1
Because our resolution of this issue is dispositive of this appeal, we
need not address the merits of the plaintiff’s related claims.
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Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

vehicle who caused the accident (tortfeasor) was
insured under a liability policy that provided coverage
of $20,000 per person/$40,000 per accident. The plaintiff
settled with the tortfeasor for all available limits of
coverage under the tortfeasor’s policy. At the time of the
accident, the plaintiff was insured under an automobile
liability policy issued by the defendant that provided
uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits in the
amount of $100,000 per person/$300,000 per occur-
rence.
On November 8, 2019, the plaintiff commenced a
single count action against the defendant seeking
money damages under her uninsured/underinsured
motorist policy with the defendant. On June 30, 2020,
the plaintiff filed an offer of compromise indicating
that she was willing to settle her claims against the
defendant for $50,000. This offer was not accepted by
the defendant. On April 5, 2022, the defendant filed an
offer of compromise in the amount of $20,000. This
offer was not accepted by the plaintiff.
On May 3, 2022, the day before jury selection was
scheduled to commence, the plaintiff filed a request for
leave to file an amended complaint seeking to add a
second count alleging bad faith. The court bifurcated
the trial, allowing the underinsured motorist claim to
proceed to trial as scheduled, and thereafter permitted
the plaintiff to amend her complaint over the defen-
dant’s objection. On May 13, 2022, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of
$2,262,000. On July 12, 2022, the trial court granted the
defendant’s motion for remittitur, reducing the verdict
to $79,000 in accordance with the express terms of
the underinsured motorist policy and General Statutes
§ 38a-336 (b).
On August 22, 2022, the defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the second count of the plaintiff’s complaint
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Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In its motion
and accompanying memorandum of law, the defendant
argued that it was entitled to immunity from suit with
respect to the plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the litiga-
tion privilege. On October 19, 2022, the plaintiff filed
an objection to the defendant’s motion to dismiss in
which she contended that the litigation privilege did
not apply and that she properly had raised allegations
of bad faith in count two of her complaint.
On March 27, 2023, following a hearing, the trial court
granted the defendant’s motion. In its decision, the
court stated that the allegations in the second count of
the amended complaint ‘‘all stem from the defendant’s
communications and conduct in negotiating the settle-
ment of the plaintiff’s [underinsured motorist] claim in
the course of and related to a judicial proceeding. Thus,
the plaintiff’s claim does not challenge the purpose
of any underlying litigation, but rather the defendant’s
conduct in negotiating the settlement of the plaintiff’s
[underinsured motorist] claim.’’ Accordingly, the court
concluded that, pursuant to Dorfman v. Smith, supra,
342 Conn. 582, the litigation privilege provided the
defendant with absolute immunity from the plaintiff’s
claim of bad faith/breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.2 Following the denial of
the plaintiff’s motion to reargue, the plaintiff filed the
present appeal.3
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improp-
erly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on the
2
‘‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has tended to use the terms ‘‘bad faith,’’ ‘‘lack
of good faith’’ and ‘‘breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing’’
interchangeably’ . . . and applies the same analysis to claims brought under
each of these terms.’’ (Citation omitted.) Capstone Building Corp. v. Ameri-
can Motorists Ins. Co., 308 Conn. 760, 794 n.34, 67 A.3d 961 (2013).
3
The trial court also denied the plaintiff’s motions for articulation asking
the trial court to articulate and to clarify its ruling granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss. The plaintiff did not seek review in this court of the trial
court’s denial.
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Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Specif-
ically, the plaintiff contends that, on the basis of the
facts alleged in the second count of the amended com-
plaint, the litigation privilege does not apply and, there-
fore, the defendant is not immune from the plaintiff’s
claim of bad faith. The plaintiff argues, as she did in
her opposition to the motion to dismiss, that her claims
are premised on an abuse of process, an exemption to
the litigation privilege. She also contends that she has
properly raised a claim of bad faith, outside of the
litigation privilege context, based on the allegations
in the amended complaint regarding the defendant’s
dilatory and unscrupulous behavior in the handling of
her claim. In response, the defendant contends that the
trial court correctly concluded that the plaintiff’s claim
of bad faith is barred by the litigation privilege.4
We initially set forth the standard of review applicable
to the plaintiff’s claim on appeal. ‘‘The litigation privi-
lege provides absolute immunity from suit and, there-
fore, implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
. . . When a . . . court decides a jurisdictional ques-
tion raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it . . . must
take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint,
including those facts necessarily implied from the alle-
gations, construing them in a manner most favorable
to the pleader. . . . Whether the litigation privilege
applies in a given case is a question of law subject to de
In its brief, the defendant has moved to strike pages 284 through 395 of
4

the plaintiff’s appendix, as well as any discussion in the plaintiff’s brief
regarding these pages, as these pages include items such as a deposition
transcript, medical records, and a medical special damages summary, which
were not submitted to the trial court in connection with the motion to
dismiss or referenced in the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss.
Because we limit our review to the allegations in the plaintiff’s amended
complaint that the trial court considered in ruling on the motion to dismiss,
we take no action with regard to the motion to strike raised in the defendant’s
brief. We likewise take no action with regard to the defendant’s motion to
strike statements of fact in the plaintiff’s brief that are not supported by
references to the record.
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novo review. . . . When deciding whether the privilege
applies, every presumption in favor of the court’s juris-
diction should be indulged. . . .
‘‘The litigation privilege is a long-standing [common-
law] rule that communications uttered or published
in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged so long as they are in some way pertinent to
the subject of the controversy. . . . The privilege . . .
applies to every step of the proceeding until [its] final
disposition . . . including to statements made in
pleadings or other documents prepared in connection
with [the] proceeding. . . . The privilege originated in
response to the need to bar persons accused of crimes
from suing their accusers for defamation. . . . [It] then
developed to encompass and bar defamation claims
against all participants in judicial proceedings, includ-
ing judges, attorneys, parties, and witnesses. . . . Sub-
sequently, the privilege was expanded to bar a variety
of retaliatory civil claims arising from communications
or communicative acts occurring in the course of a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, including, but not
limited to, claims for tortious interference, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and violations of
[the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA),
General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.] . . .
‘‘The policy underlying the [litigation] privilege is that
in certain situations the public interest in having people
speak freely outweighs the risk that individuals will
occasionally abuse the privilege by making false and
malicious statements. . . . Participants in a judicial
process must be able to testify or otherwise take part
without being hampered by fear of defamation [or other
retaliatory litigation]. . . . [In] determining whether a
statement is made in the course of a judicial proceeding
. . . the court must decide as a matter of law whether
the [alleged statement is] sufficiently relevant to the
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issues involved in . . . [the] proceeding, so as to qual-
ify for the privilege. . . . The test for relevancy is gen-
erous, and judicial proceeding has been defined liber-
ally to encompass much more than civil litigation or
criminal trials. . . .

‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has recognized a distinction
between attempting to impose liability [on] a participant
in a judicial proceeding for the words used therein
and attempting to impose liability [on] a litigant for his
improper use of the judicial system itself. . . . In this
regard, we have refused to apply absolute immunity to
causes of action alleging the improper use of the judicial
system. . . . Thus, we have held that the litigation priv-
ilege does not bar claims for abuse of process, vexatious
litigation, and malicious prosecution. . . . We have
done so because these claims seek to hold an individual
liable for . . . the improper use of the judicial process
for an illegitimate purpose, namely, to inflict injury [on]
another individual in the form of unfounded actions.
. . . We have treated these claims differently in part
because of restraints built into [them] by virtue of [their]
stringent requirements.’’ (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik,
349 Conn. 120, 136–39, 314 A.3d 583 (2024).

Mindful of the foregoing principles, we consider
whether the trial court in the present case properly
concluded that the litigation privilege provided the
defendant with absolute immunity from the plaintiff’s
claim of bad faith. In considering this issue, we initially
note that our Supreme Court has ‘‘recognize[d] an inde-
pendent cause of action in tort arising from an insurer’s
common law duty of good faith. . . . An implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing has been applied
by this court in a variety of contractual relationships,
including . . . insurance contracts . . . .’’ (Citations
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omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Buckman
v. People Express, Inc., 205 Conn. 166, 170, 530 A.2d 596
(1987); see also Capstone Building Corp. v. American
Motorists Ins. Co., 308 Conn. 760, 794 n.33, 67 A.3d 961
(2013) (‘‘[a]n independent cause of action for a bad
faith denial of policy benefits is well established’’).

In Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 582, our
Supreme Court considered the scope of the litigation
privilege in relation to alleged misconduct by an insur-
ance company. Id., 585. The court in that case concluded
that the plaintiff’s action against her insurance com-
pany, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company (Liberty
Mutual), to compel payment of underinsured motorist
benefits, in which she alleged, inter alia, that Liberty
Mutual had breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, was barred by the litigation privilege.5
Id., 585–86. In granting the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss in the present case, the trial court concluded that
‘‘[t]his case falls squarely within the majority’s decision
in Dorfman.’’6 Our analysis, therefore, must begin with a
review of the facts alleged in Dorfman and the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims in that case
were barred by the litigation privilege. We also must
consider Dorfman in light of our Supreme Court’s sub-
sequent decision in Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra,
349 Conn. 120, in which it declined to apply the litigation
5
In Dorfman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 227 Conn. App. 347, 322
A.3d 331 (2024), this court later determined that the plaintiff’s allegations
in a subsequent lawsuit concerning Liberty Mutual’s alleged bad faith plead-
ing in Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 582, properly asserted a cause
of action for vexatious litigation under the common law and pursuant to
General Statutes § 52-568. See Dorfman v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
supra, 406. Thus, this court ‘‘reject[ed] the defendant’s claim that an action
for vexatious litigation, whether under the common law or § 52-568, cannot
be based on allegedly false answers to a complaint in a prior action.’’ Id.
6
Justice Ecker authored a separate opinion concurring in part and dis-
senting in part from the majority opinion. See Dorfman v. Smith, supra,
342 Conn. 620 (Ecker, J., dissenting).
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Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

privilege to conduct that occurred outside of a judicial
proceeding.7 Id., 140–41.
In Dorfman, the plaintiff alleged that she was
involved in a motor vehicle accident with an underin-
sured tortfeasor, Joscelyn M. Smith. See Dorfman v.
Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 586. The plaintiff thereafter
filed a claim with Liberty Mutual under the underin-
sured motorist provision of her insurance contract. Id.
As part of its investigation into the claim, Liberty Mutual
acquired the police report regarding the collision, the
plaintiff’s recorded statement and the recorded state-
ment of a witness to the accident who was not listed
in the police report; these materials all noted Smith’s
failure to stop at a stop sign. Id. Liberty Mutual’s investi-
gation into this claim revealed that Smith was 100 per-
cent liable for the accident, a fact that was noted in
the claim file. Id.
After Liberty Mutual notified the plaintiff that she
was required to submit an affidavit of no excess insur-
ance, the plaintiff commenced a breach of contract
action against Liberty Mutual to compel payment of
the underinsured motorist benefits. Id., 586–87. Liberty
Mutual hired attorneys to represent it in the action but
deliberately withheld from the attorneys its file notes
regarding the claim as well as the name, existence, and
recorded statement of the witness, even though it knew
that this information was necessary for the attorneys
to prepare accurate responses to the plaintiff’s com-
plaint and discovery requests. Id., 587. Liberty Mutual
pleaded in its answer to the complaint that it denied
or did not have sufficient information to admit the plain-
tiff’s allegations regarding the cause of the collision and
7
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 120, was decided by our
Supreme Court after the trial court in the present case issued its decision
dismissing count two of the plaintiff’s amended complaint. It is cited by the
plaintiff in her reply brief.
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her injuries and asserted a special defense of contribu-
tory negligence, even though it knew this to be false.
Id. Liberty Mutual also provided false responses to the
plaintiff’s discovery requests, including that it did not
know of the existence of any witnesses not listed in
the police report and whether any recorded statement
existed. Id.
Upon learning of Liberty Mutual’s conduct,8 the trial
court granted the plaintiff permission to amend her
complaint to include, inter alia, a claim of breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.,
588. The trial court thereafter granted Liberty Mutual’s
motion to dismiss the breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing count, concluding that,
because the claim was predicated on communications
and statements made in the course of and related to a
judicial proceeding, the litigation privilege applied and
barred this claim. Id., 589.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that her claim was
not barred by the litigation privilege because it was
premised on Liberty Mutual’s improper use of the
courts, which was the functional equivalent of a claim
of vexatious litigation, to which absolute immunity does
not apply. Id., 594. The plaintiff further contended that
her claim for breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing alleged conduct showing that Lib-
erty Mutual systematically abused the judicial process
and thereby improperly used the courts. Id., 596. In
considering whether the plaintiff’s claim was more akin
8
Liberty Mutual’s corporate designee admitted at a deposition that
‘‘ ‘[t]here was no basis in fact for [Liberty Mutual’s] accusation that [the
plaintiff] was in any way responsible for causing the accident’ and that
[Liberty Mutual] ‘had known that there was nothing [the plaintiff] could
have done to avoid the accident . . . .’ ’’ Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342
Conn. 587–88. The designee also admitted that Liberty Mutual was aware
that there was a witness to the accident who had made a recorded statement
but failed to disclose this information in its interrogatory responses. Id., 588.
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Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

to claims of vexatious litigation9 and abuse of process,10
to which the court had not afforded absolute immunity,
or to claims of fraud and defamation, to which the court
had afforded absolute immunity, our Supreme Court
stated that ‘‘[w]e have refused to apply absolute immu-
nity to causes of action alleging the improper use of
the judicial system but have applied immunity to claims
premised on factual allegations that challenge the
defendant’s conduct in a properly brought judicial pro-
ceeding when the cause of action does not require the
plaintiff to challenge either the purpose of the underly-
ing litigation or the purpose of a particular judicial
procedure.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. For
immunity to apply, the court explained, ‘‘it is not enough
for the plaintiff to allege that the misconduct at issue
constituted an improper use of the judicial system, but,
rather, the cause of action itself must challenge the
purpose of the underlying litigation or litigation con-
duct.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id., 596–97.
The court next indicated that, to determine the pur-
pose of an underlying judicial proceeding, it is neces-
sary to look at the elements of the claim itself. In this
9
‘‘In Connecticut, the cause of action for vexatious litigation exists both
at common law and pursuant to statute. . . . [T]o establish a claim for
vexatious litigation at common law, one must prove want of probable cause,
malice and a termination of suit in the plaintiff’s favor. . . . The statutory
cause of action for vexatious litigation exists under . . . § 52-568, and dif-
fers from a common-law action only in that a finding of malice is not an
essential element, but will serve as a basis for higher damages.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Northeast Building Supply, LLC v. Morrill, 224
Conn. App. 137, 150, 312 A.3d 138 (2024).
10
‘‘An action for abuse of process lies against any person using a legal
process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose
for which it was not designed. . . . Because the tort arises out of the
accomplishment of a result that could not be achieved by the proper and
successful use of process, the Restatement Second (1977) of Torts, § 682,
emphasizes that the gravamen of the action for abuse of process is the use
of a legal process . . . against another primarily to accomplish a purpose
for which it is not designed . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 494,
529 A.2d 171 (1987).
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regard, it noted that ‘‘[t]o constitute a breach of [the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], the
acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plain-
tiff’s right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably
expected to receive under the contract must have been
taken in bad faith.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 597. Upon review of these elements, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff’s claim did not challenge the
purpose of any underlying litigation. Id. It challenged,
rather, Liberty Mutual’s conduct in defending against
her underinsured motorist claim. Id. After examining
the case law and relevant public policies in light of
the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, the Supreme
Court concluded that, because the ‘‘plaintiff’s claim for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing [was] premised on false communications, [did]
not challenge the purpose underlying a judicial proceed-
ing, [was] more akin to a claim for defamation or fraud,
and may be addressed by other remedies . . . the trial
court properly [had] applied the litigation privilege.’’
Id., 612.11
11
In its decision, the court noted that, unlike a claim of vexatious litigation
or abuse of process, a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in general does not challenge the purpose of an underlying
judicial proceeding; see Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 597–98; and
that the plaintiff’s claim was ‘‘not designed to hold an individual liable for
the improper use of the judicial system but, rather, [was] designed to hold
an individual liable for improper conduct in fulfilling contractual obliga-
tions.’’ Id., 598. The court stated that the plaintiff’s claim ‘‘[had] more in
common with a defamation claim than with an abuse of process, vexatious
litigation, or malicious prosecution claim, thereby militating in favor of
applying the privilege.’’ Id., 600.
The court in Dorfman further noted that, in the context of a claim of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, ‘‘[b]ad faith
in general implies . . . actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead
or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some
contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights
or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive. . . . Bad faith means
more than mere negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose.’’ (Emphasis in
original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 606. The court stated that
this definition of bad faith demonstrated that the plaintiff’s claim was more
akin to a claim of fraud, to which the litigation privilege applies, stating:
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Bouazza v. Geico General Ins. Co.

The Supreme Court considered the application of the
litigation privilege again in Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik,
supra, 349 Conn. 120, an action brought by the plaintiff,
Deutsche Bank AG (Deutsche Bank), against the defen-
dants, Alexander Vik (Alexander) and his daughter Car-
oline Vik (Caroline), seeking damages resulting from its
efforts to collect an approximately $243 million foreign
judgment from a nonparty, Sebastian Holdings, Inc.
(SHI), which the plaintiff claimed was a shell company
controlled by Alexander. Id., 123. The plaintiff alleged
tortious interference with a business expectancy and
violation of CUTPA based on the defendants’ alleged
efforts to interfere with the order of a Norwegian court
requiring the sale of SHI’s shares in a Norwegian soft-
ware company (Confirmit) in partial satisfaction of
SHI’s debt to the plaintiff. Id. The trial court denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss the action, in which they
argued that the action was barred by the litigation privi-
lege. Id. This court reversed the judgment of the trial
court and directed that the action be dismissed in its
entirety. Id. Upon the granting of Deutsche Bank’s peti-
tion for certification to appeal, our Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of this court, concluding that
Deutsche Bank’s action was not barred by the litigation
privilege. Id., 124.
In its decision, the Supreme Court, citing Dorfman
v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 597 n.6, noted that ‘‘[t]he
litigation privilege does not apply to conduct [or com-
munications] not made in the course of a judicial pro-
ceeding . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn. 140. It fur-
ther stated in relevant part that ‘‘[t]he complaint
describes a multifaceted campaign by Alexander,
‘‘If a claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
may be premised on fraud in relation to a contract, and claims of fraud are
afforded absolute immunity, it is logical that the immunity likewise extends
to claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.’’ Id.
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undertaken between 2016 and 2020, to prevent the sale
of the Confirmit shares or, failing that, to depress the
sale price of the shares. As the plaintiff argues, many
of the tactics allegedly employed by him to accomplish
these goals occurred outside the context of any judicial
proceeding and are therefore not covered by the litiga-
tion privilege. . . . The claimed extrajudicial tactics
include installing family members and other close asso-
ciates on Confirmit’s board of directors, allegedly to
deplete the company’s assets; submitting a disingenu-
ous bid to acquire the Confirmit shares, allegedly to
deter other bidders; coordinating with [his father] to
have the plaintiff’s execution lien deregistered from the
VPS registry, allegedly to disrupt the sales process; and
forging and backdating a document purporting to grant
Caroline a right of first refusal to acquire the Confirmit
shares, allegedly to inject doubt and uncertainty into
the sales process, to deter bidders, and to drive down
the sale price. Because these activities have no connec-
tion or logical relation to any ongoing judicial pro-
ceeding, they are not covered by the litigation privi-
lege.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., 140.
With this background in mind, we now consider the
allegations of bad faith as set forth in the second count
of the plaintiff’s amended complaint in the present case
to determine whether they are barred by the litigation
privilege. The second count incorporated paragraphs 1
through 22 of the underinsured motorist claim set forth
in the first count. The first count set forth allegations
regarding the accident on February 4, 2017, the negli-
gence of the tortfeasor in causing the accident and the
injuries that the plaintiff sustained in the accident, as
well as the damages incurred as a result of the accident.
It also contained allegations that the plaintiff had settled
for all available limits of coverage against the tortfeasor,
that the settlement was inadequate to compensate the
plaintiff, and that her injuries and losses were the
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responsibility of the defendant pursuant to an automo-
bile liability policy issued by the defendant that pro-
vided uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits.
After incorporating these allegations, the second
count added new allegations of bad faith on the part
of the defendant.12 The new allegations included the
12
The second count contained the following new allegations:
‘‘27. On or about June 30, 2020, the plaintiff . . . filed an offer of compro-
mise for $50,000. That offer was not accepted by [the defendant] within
thirty days as [prescribed] by law.
‘‘28. On or about February 17, 2021, the plaintiff . . . sent the [defen-
dant’s] counsel a letter notifying it that the plaintiff’s claims far exceed the
defendant’s policy limits and her intent to pursue bad faith as well as recover
all amounts due and owe[d] her above the policy pursuant to law.
‘‘29. On various dates thereafter from February 17, 2021, through the
present, the plaintiff . . . continually attempted to receive full payment for
the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim.
‘‘30. To date, the defendant has failed, refused and/or neglected to make
a reasonable offer on the plaintiff’s underlying underinsured motorist claim
all for cost saving measures to save money to the detriment of its unsured.
‘‘31. The plaintiff made diligent efforts to provide [the defendant] with all
of the medical records, bills, reports and other documentation the defendant
requested in order to properly evaluate the plaintiff’s claims. Upon informa-
tion and belief, the plaintiff complied with all of the defendant’s requests
for the information sought to evaluate the plaintiff’s claims.
‘‘32. Despite repeated demand, [the defendant] repeatedly refused to offer
a reasonable sum. This is despite the plaintiff’s repeated efforts to continually
furnish the defendant with all of the materials requested.
‘‘33. On or about November 20, 2019, [the plaintiff] was forced to file a
formal lawsuit against [the defendant].
‘‘34. At all times herein, [the defendant] has intentionally refused to
promptly adjust the [plaintiff’s] claims.
‘‘35. At all times herein, [the defendant] evaluated the plaintiff’s claims
in the same manner and method it would adjust all claims, despite its
contractual obligations to the plaintiff, to deal with her in a full faith and
fair dealing as an insured under its policy.
‘‘36. At all times herein, [the defendant] delayed the resolution of the
[plaintiff’s] claims and harassed her in an effort to deny full liability for
this matter.
‘‘37. At all times herein, [the defendant] has refused to settle the [plaintiff’s]
claims for a reasonable value.
‘‘38. At all times herein, [the defendant] has refused to negotiate the
[plaintiff’s] claims in good faith when the policy clearly provided coverage
under the facts of these claims and instead is offering less than a fair value
based on unjustified positions.
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defendant’s refusal to accept the plaintiff’s offer of com-
promise filed on June 30, 2020, and the defendant’s
refusal to make a reasonable offer on the plaintiff’s
underinsured motorist claim, despite repeated demands
and the plaintiff’s diligent efforts to provide the defen-
dant with all of the medical records, bills, reports, and
other documentation that the defendant requested in
order to properly evaluate the plaintiff’s claims. This
count alleged that, on November 20, 2019, the plaintiff
was forced to file a formal lawsuit against the defendant.
In paragraphs 34 through 39 of the amended com-
plaint, the plaintiff alleged that, ‘‘[a]t all times herein’’;
(emphasis added); the defendant intentionally refused
to promptly adjust the plaintiff’s claims, evaluated the
plaintiff’s claims in the same manner that it would adjust
all claims, despite its contractual obligations to her as
an insured under the policy, delayed the resolution of
the plaintiff’s claims and harassed her in an effort to
deny full liability for this matter, refused to settle the
plaintiff’s claims for a reasonable value, refused to nego-
tiate the plaintiff’s claims in good faith when the policy
clearly provided coverage and offered less than a fair
value based on unjustified positions, and delayed reso-
lution of the plaintiff’s claims and harassed her in an
effort to force her to accept less than was fair and to
profit from the plaintiff’s vulnerable position. Paragraph
40 of the amended complaint alleged that ‘‘[b]y the
aforesaid conduct, [the defendant] has breached an
implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, contrary to [its] obligations to deal with the plaintiff
in a fair and reasonable manner.’’ (Emphasis added.)
‘‘39. At all times herein, [the defendant] delayed the resolution of the
plaintiff’s claims and harassed the plaintiff in an effort to force her to accept
a sum less than was fair in settlement of her claim and to profit from the
plaintiff’s vulnerable position.
‘‘40. By the aforesaid conduct, [the defendant] has breached an implied
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing, contrary to [its] obliga-
tions to deal with the plaintiff in a fair and reasonable manner.’’
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We agree with the trial court that some of these allega-
tions relate to the defendant’s communications and con-
duct made during a judicial proceeding, such as the
allegations pertaining to the defendant’s refusals to
accept the plaintiff’s offer of compromise13 and to make
a reasonable offer on the plaintiff’s underlying underin-
sured motorist claim once the litigation had com-
menced. As in Dorfman, we conclude that these allega-
tions challenge the defendant’s conduct in defending
against the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim and
do not challenge the purpose of any underlying litiga-
tion. See Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 597. Pur-
suant to Dorfman, therefore, we conclude that any such
conduct and communications made during the course
of a judicial proceeding are protected by the litigation
privilege.
We disagree, however, that all of the allegations in
the second count, construed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, involved conduct or communications
made during the course of a judicial proceeding. Although
we recognize that the litigation privilege ‘‘extends
beyond statements made during a judicial proceeding
to preparatory communications that may be directed
to the goal of the proceeding’’; (internal quotation marks
omitted) Kenneson v. Eggert, 196 Conn. App. 773, 783,
230 A.3d 795 (2020); it is not clear that the allegation
regarding the defendant’s refusal to adjust the plaintiff’s
claim promptly, or the allegation regarding the defen-
dant’s evaluation of the plaintiff’s claim in the same
13
General Statutes § 52-192a, the statute governing offers of compromise
by a plaintiff, provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Except as provided in subsection
(b) of this section, after commencement of any civil action based upon
contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other
relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not earlier than one hundred eighty days
after service of process is made upon the defendant in such action but not
later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written
offer of compromise signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney, directed
to the defendant or the defendant’s attorney, offering to settle the claim
underlying the action for a sum certain. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
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manner that it would adjust all claims, involved conduct
during the course of a judicial proceeding. The same
is true for the allegations that the defendant delayed
resolution of the plaintiff’s claim and harassed her in
an effort to force her to accept a sum less than was
fair and to profit from the plaintiff’s vulnerable position.
Rather, these allegations extend beyond communica-
tions made during litigation and include allegations per-
taining to the defendant’s conduct during the claim
evaluation process prior to the initiation of the present
action. This conclusion is further supported by the alle-
gation in paragraph 33 of the amended complaint that
the plaintiff ‘‘was forced to file’’ the present action,
which implies that she was forced to do so due to the
defendant’s prelitigation bad faith.
Furthermore, it is difficult to discern whether the
reference to ‘‘[a]t all times herein’’ in paragraphs 34
through 39 of the amended complaint and the ‘‘aforesaid
conduct’’ referenced in paragraph 40 of the amended
complaint refer to conduct that took place as part of a
judicial proceeding or if the allegations refer to conduct
that occurred prior to the commencement of the judicial
proceeding. This is so because the second count of the
amended complaint incorporates paragraphs 1 through
22 of the underinsured motorist claim set forth in the
first count, in which the plaintiff alleges facts that
occurred prior to the commencement of the underlying
litigation. Viewed in this light, we disagree with the
defendant that the plaintiff’s allegations are grounded
solely in a disagreement that occurred during the litiga-
tion over settlement negotiations and fair value. Instead,
construing the allegations in the manner most favorable
to the plaintiff, and keeping in mind that every presump-
tion in favor of the court’s jurisdiction should be
indulged; see Deutsche Bank AG v. Vik, supra, 349 Conn.
137; we conclude that the allegations regarding the
defendant’s refusal to adjust the plaintiff’s claim promptly
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and the allegation regarding the defendant’s evaluation
of the plaintiff’s claim in the same manner that it would
adjust all other claims, as well as the allegations regard-
ing the defendant’s delay and harassment of the plain-
tiff, ‘‘have no connection or logical relation to any ongo-
ing judicial proceeding [and, therefore] are not covered
by the litigation privilege.’’ Id., 140; see also Nardozzi
v. Perez, 212 Conn. App. 546, 555, 276 A.3d 441 (2022)
(‘‘we see no reason to disregard this court’s precedent
and extend a privilege that exists expressly to foster
candor during the litigation process to conduct that
occurred separately from the parties’ . . . litigation’’);
Fiondella v. Meriden, 186 Conn. App. 552, 562–63, 200
A.3d 196 (2018) (litigation privilege is not applicable to
allegations not predicated on statements made during
course of litigation but based on defendants’ intentional
conduct that did not occur during judicial proceeding),
cert. denied, 330 Conn. 961, 199 A.3d 20 (2019).
Finally, in concluding that the plaintiff’s allegations
regarding the breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing were barred by the litigation privi-
lege in Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 582, the
court made clear that the plaintiff’s claim was premised
on the communication of false statements during liti-
gation. The court stated that ‘‘the plaintiff never argued
to the trial court—and has not argued before this
court—that she premised any of her claims on conduct
that occurred outside the course of a judicial proceed-
ing. Rather, she consistently has argued that, during
the underlying litigation, the defendant made recovery
as difficult as possible and improperly used the courts
to avoid paying her the full amount of benefits owed.’’
(Emphasis added.) Id., 597 n.6. The court further stated
that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, like a defama-
tion claim, is premised on the communication of false
statements during litigation’’; (emphasis added) id.,
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600; and that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff clearly premises her claim
in this action on false statements made in pleadings
and other documents filed in relation to the breach of
contract claim in the underlying action.’’ Id., 601.
In the present case, by contrast, in addition to claim-
ing that her allegations were premised on an abuse of
process, the plaintiff argued in her opposition to the
defendant’s motion to dismiss that she had ‘‘properly
brought a bad faith claim for the invidious motive and
actions of the defendant in withholding the plaintiff’s
funds rightfully due and owing her under the policy of
insurance with the defendant.’’14 In her brief to this
court, the plaintiff points out that this case does not
involve improper communications, pleadings or con-
duct throughout trial but, rather, ‘‘systemic abuse of
the plaintiff’s claim, forcing her into the judicial system
and all the way through an arduous trial.’’15 (Emphasis
14
The plaintiff also contended, in part, that ‘‘[the defendant] deliberately
employed delay tactics and refused to expeditiously evaluate her claims
despite knowledge that she had suffered permanent injuries and would need
substantial future care . . . . Its deliberate delay in adjusting the claim
followed by numerous attempts to offer the plaintiff less than the value
rightly due and owed to her under the policy she paid premiums to the
defendant for were based on money saving/profit maximizing and self-inter-
ested motives. These actions by the defendant constitute the ways the
defendant breached its covenant of fair dealing to its insured, the plaintiff.’’
15
In Dorfman v. Smith, supra, 342 Conn. 582, the plaintiff similarly claimed
that the defendant’s conduct, inter alia, ‘‘compelled the plaintiff to resort
to litigation to obtain her benefits . . . .’’ Id., 595. The conduct referenced in
Dorfman, however, was clearly related to the underlying judicial proceeding.
Specifically, the court stated: ‘‘The plaintiff alleged that the defendant falsely
responded to the complaint, including by asserting a special defense the
defendant knew had no basis in fact, as well as falsely responding to interrog-
atories and discovery requests. As a result, [the plaintiff alleged that] the
defendant used intentional misstatements, intentional misrepresentations,
intentionally deceptive answers, and violated established rules of conduct
in litigation, and knowingly and intentionally engaged in dishonest and
sinister litigation practices by taking legal positions that were without
factual support in order to further frustrate [the plaintiff’s] ability to receive
benefits due [to her] under her contract.’’ (Emphasis added; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Id.
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added.) She contends that she ‘‘has properly raised a
claim for bad faith, outside of the litigation privilege
context, based on the allegations surrounding the defen-
dant’s dilatory and unscrupulous behavior in the han-
dling of her claim.’’ Unlike the plaintiff in Dorfman,
therefore, the plaintiff in the present case clearly
argued, in both the trial court and to this court, that the
allegations of bad faith involved conduct that occurred
outside the course of a judicial proceeding.
In light of the foregoing and considering the applica-
ble case law and policies underlying the litigation privi-
lege, we disagree with the trial court’s determination
that, with regard to the allegations of bad faith for
conduct that occurred outside the judicial proceeding
and prior to the commencement of this litigation, the
defendant was immune from this action. We conclude,
rather, that these allegations are not covered by the
litigation privilege and, therefore, that the trial court
improperly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The judgment is reversed only with respect to the
granting of the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the
case is remanded for further proceedings according to
law; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.