In re Maci S.

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In re Maci S.

IN RE MACI S.*
(AC 47485)
Alvord, Moll and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The respondent mother appealed from the judgment of the trial court ren-
dered for the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, termi-
nating her parental rights with respect to her minor child. She claimed, inter
alia, that the court improperly determined that she was unable or unwilling
to benefit from the reunification efforts of the Department of Children and
Families. Held:

The trial court properly concluded that the respondent mother was unable
or unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunification efforts, as the
evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the court’s finding by
clear and convincing evidence as required by statute (§ 17a-112 (j)).

Because this court concluded that the trial court properly found that the
respondent mother was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification
services, this court declined to review the mother’s claim regarding the
trial court’s alternative finding that the department made reasonable efforts
to reunify.

The trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent mother failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabili-
tation within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii).

The trial court properly determined that the termination of the respondent
mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child, as the court’s
finding was factually supported and legally sound and this court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
Argued October 10—officially released December 19, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
** December 19, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Maci S.

Court in the judicial district of Tolland, Juvenile Matters
at Rockville, where the respondent father was defaulted
for failure to appear; thereafter, the matter was trans-
ferred to the judicial district of Middlesex, Child Protec-
tion Session at Middletown, and tried to the court, Burg-
dorff, J.; judgment terminating the respondents’ parental
rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent mother).
Angela M. Fierro, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen-
eral, and Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, for the
appellee (petitioner).
Michelle A. Santos, assigned counsel, for the minor
child.
Opinion

FLYNN, J. The respondent mother,1 Dayna L., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating her parental rights with respect
to her minor child, Maci S. On appeal, the respondent
claims that the court improperly determined that (1)
she was unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunifi-
cation efforts of the Department of Children and Fami-
lies (department), (2) she failed to achieve a sufficient
degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to General
Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B),2 and (3) the termination
1
The parental rights of Joshua S., the biological father of Maci, also were
terminated. He has not appealed and all references in this opinion to the
respondent are to Dayna L. only.
2
The respondent also claims that the court improperly concluded that
she had abandoned Maci and had no ongoing parent-child relationship with
her. We decline to review those claims because the trial court needs to find
only one statutory ground to grant a petition to terminate parental rights
and, thus, we may affirm the court’s decision if we find that it properly
concluded that any one of the statutory circumstances existed. See In re
Jermaine S., 86 Conn. App. 819, 822 n.3, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273
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In re Maci S.

of her parental rights was in the best interest of Maci.3
We disagree with the respondent’s claims and, accord-
ingly, affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant. A neglect petition was filed on April 3, 2019, alleg-
ing that Maci had been denied proper care and attention
and had been permitted to live under conditions injuri-
ous to her well-being. A hearing was held on June 18,
2019, and the court, Westbrook, J., adjudicated Maci
neglected and ordered six months of protective supervi-
sion and specific steps. At a hearing held on November
22, 2019, the court adopted the agreement reached by
the parties that Maci’s father would have primary physi-
cal custody of Maci and decision-making authority with
respect to Maci and further ordered that protective
supervision be allowed to expire, as scheduled, on
December 18, 2019. A second neglect petition was filed
on October 23, 2020, alleging that Maci had been denied
proper care and attention and that she had been permit-
ted to live under conditions injurious to her well-being.
At a hearing on December 8, 2020, the court defaulted
the respondent and Maci’s father for failure to appear.
At a January 5, 2021 hearing, the court adjudicated Maci
neglected, and ordered that she be committed to the
care and custody of the petitioner, and ordered final
specific steps to facilitate reunification. At a January
6, 2022 hearing, the court approved a permanency plan
of termination of parental rights and adoption. A peti-
tion for the termination of the parental rights of the
respondent was filed on January 11, 2022. The respon-
dent was defaulted for failure to appear on February
Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). Because we conclude that the record discloses
that there was clear and convincing evidence that the respondent failed to
achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j)
(3) (B), we need not address her remaining claims concerning the statutory
grounds for the termination of her parental rights. See id.
3
Pursuant to Practice Book § 67-13, the attorney for the minor child filed
a statement adopting the brief filed by the petitioner.
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In re Maci S.

4, 2022. On December 1, 2022, the court, Huddleston, J.,
approved a permanency plan of termination of parental
rights and adoption.
Maci was born in July, 2018, and has resided with
her paternal grandparents and extended family since
birth. The respondent initially resided in the home of
Maci’s paternal grandparents, but left the paternal
grandparents’ home in August, 2019, after overdosing
on heroin. The respondent has not visited with Maci
since July or August, 2019.4 Thereafter, the respondent’s
whereabouts were unknown for substantial periods of
time due to her failure to inform the department of
such information. The department made repeated and
consistent efforts to locate the respondent, including
using LexisNexis searches, obtaining her phone number
from text messages, determining when and where her
criminal court dates were scheduled, and contacting
known family members. At the time of trial, Maci had
no recollection of the respondent.
The respondent has a criminal history, including
charges for attempt to commit larceny, larceny, failure
to appear, breach of the peace, and violation of proba-
tion. The court found that ‘‘[the respondent] has a
severe opioid use disorder including severe cocaine
use and severe benzodiazepine use. She reported using
heroin in 2021 and experimented with cocaine, MDMA
(molly), and prescription drugs. She reported her sub-
stance of choice was cocaine and heroin which she
would take intravenously. [The respondent] reported
using fentanyl along with nonprescribed benzodiaze-
pines and cocaine in 2022 after which she was pre-
scribed methadone. She reports drinking alcohol and
4
The court stated that the respondent has not visited with Maci since
July 31, 2019, and, at another point, stated that she has not visited since
August 12, 2019, when she left the home of the paternal grandparents. We
conclude that whether the respondent last visited on July 31 or August 12,
2019, does not make a material difference in the outcome of this decision.
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using marijuana. [The respondent] tested positive for
fentanyl eight times in February, 2022, and norfentanyl
from February 1, 2022, to March 24, 2022, August 28,
2022, September 1, 2022, October 8, 2022, and seven
times from May 3, 2023, to July 14, 2023.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)
The respondent was referred for a clinical assessment
for the purpose of determining how best to proceed
with reintroducing her to Maci and to help her under-
stand the impact of her absence in Maci’s life, but the
respondent ‘‘has not yet engaged in that therapy’’ as of
the time of trial. The department made several attempts
to engage the respondent with the paternal grand-
mother to facilitate communication regarding reintro-
ducing Maci to the respondent, and the respondent
made minimal contact with the paternal grandmother,
blamed her for Maci being in her care and engaged in
erratic and threatening phone calls with the paternal
grandmother over a two year period. The respondent
made no effort to be involved in Maci’s daily life. On
March 13, 2023, the department facilitated a virtual ses-
sion between the respondent and Maci’s paternal grand-
mother to discuss parenting sessions with Maci, but
the respondent initially failed to log on and then experi-
enced technical difficulties during the session, thereby
preventing a productive session. At the next session
on May 15, 2023, concerns were raised regarding the
respondent’s having continued blaming the paternal
grandmother for being Maci’s caregiver. The respon-
dent met with Maci’s therapist on April 7, 2023, and
struggled with feedback concerning how her abandon-
ment of Maci impacted Maci’s emotional well-being and
her lack of knowledge of who the respondent is.
The respondent engaged in services at Coventry
House and Hallie House for substance abuse treatment.
She presented at Coventry House in February, 2022,
several months pregnant with another child, engaged in
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treatment and tested negative for all substances except
methadone, which had been prescribed to her. She
returned to Coventry House after the birth of her son
and was discharged to Hallie House in September, 2022.
At Hallie House, she was given a day pass for December
25, 2022, but she failed to return, failed to respond to
telephone calls, and, on December 26, 2022, fabricated
a story that her infant son had been hospitalized. She
returned to Hallie House on December 28, 2022, and
blamed car trouble for her failure to return sooner. At
Hallie House, she failed to comply with program rules,
failed to participate in case management sessions, failed
to comply with her treatment, and was unsuccessfully
discharged in January, 2023. The court found that the
respondent ‘‘continued to regularly test negative for
substances at Hallie House where she was tested daily
except for the period of time from December 25, 2022,
to December 28, 2022, when she failed to return.’’ She
then moved her substance abuse treatment to Rushford
where she was treated on a monthly basis. She was
placed on Suboxone. She missed an appointment sched-
uled for January 31, 2023, and failed to attend substance
abuse treatment sessions from December, 2022, until
April, 2023. She reported that she reengaged with Inter-
community, a treatment program for addiction, but
Intercommunity did not respond to the department’s
request for confirmation of compliance or transfer of
services. On May 3, 2023, the respondent submitted a
toxicology screen that was positive for Suboxone,
which she had been prescribed, and fentanyl metabo-
lites. The respondent denied substance use, but she
continued to test positive for fentanyl until July 20,
2023. She continues to engage with Intercommunity for
substance abuse treatment, is successfully engaged in
Suboxone treatment, and continues to submit weekly
negative toxicology screens.
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The respondent engaged with Proud Program and
worked with a recovery coach in a peer support pro-
gram for parents recuperating from opiate use disorder,
and her coach referred her to Narcotics Anonymous,
which the respondent attends several times per week.
She has been consistent with the program, has been
attending fairly regularly with some missed sessions,
but the program reported having some difficulty in
maintaining contact with the respondent. She tested
positive for fentanyl during her work with the program
in May and June, 2023.
The respondent began services with a provider called
Catherine’s Heart Counseling Services in April, 2023,
due to her desire to have a better relationship with Maci
and to maintain sobriety, but she ‘‘failed to successfully
engage in those services and was discharged on May
15, 2023.’’ She reengaged with the services in August,
2023, but attended only four sessions, and her case was
closed in November, 2023. The court found that the
respondent ‘‘reported a history of mental health issues
and began mental health treatment in 2002. She
reported that these issues were in response to her moth-
er’s addictions.’’ She began attending weekly individual
therapy at Small Victories for mental health treatment
on October 4, 2022, and began sessions with a new
therapist in April, 2023.
Following a trial, at which the respondent was repre-
sented by counsel, the court, Burgdorff, J., found, in the
adjudicatory phase, that there was clear and convincing
evidence that the department made reasonable efforts
to locate and reunify the respondent with Maci, but
that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit
from such services. The court also found by clear and
convincing evidence that Maci had been adjudicated
neglected and that the respondent had failed to rehabili-
tate sufficiently under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii), that the
respondent had abandoned Maci pursuant to § 17a-112
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(j) (3) (A), and that there was no ongoing parent-child
relationship under § 17a-112 (j) (3) (D). In the disposi-
tional phase of the proceedings, the court made findings
by clear and convincing evidence as to each of the
criteria set forth in § 17a-112 (k) and determined that
terminating the respondent’s parental rights was in
Maci’s best interest. Accordingly, the court rendered
judgment terminating the parental rights of the respon-
dent and appointing the petitioner as Maci’s statutory
parent. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be
set forth as necessary.
At the outset, we note that ‘‘[a] hearing on a termina-
tion of parental rights petition consists of two phases,
adjudication and disposition. . . . In the adjudicatory
phase, the court must determine whether the [peti-
tioner] has proven, by clear and convincing evidence,
a proper ground for termination of parental rights. . . .
Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed
by § 17a-112. . . . Because a respondent’s fundamen-
tal right to parent his or her child is at stake, [t]he
statutory criteria must be strictly complied with before
termination can be accomplished and adoption pro-
ceedings begun.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re A. H., 226 Conn. App. 1, 15, 317
A.3d 197, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 918, 317 A.3d 784
(2024).
I
The respondent first claims that the court improperly
concluded that she was unable or unwilling to benefit
from the department’s reunification efforts. We dis-
agree.
‘‘Section 17a-112 (j) (1) requires that before terminat-
ing parental rights, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that the department has made rea-
sonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the
child with the parent, unless the court finds in this
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In re Maci S.

proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to
benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding
is not required if the court has determined at a hearing
. . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . . . Thus,
the department may meet its burden concerning reunifi-
cation in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made
such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable
or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3)
by a previous judicial determination that such efforts
were not appropriate. . . . The trial court’s determina-
tion of this issue will not be overturned on appeal
unless, in light of all of the evidence in the record, it
is clearly erroneous. . . . [W]e review the trial court’s
subordinate factual findings for clear error. . . . We
review the trial court’s ultimate determination . . .
[that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification services] for evidentiary sufficiency
. . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Corey C., 198 Conn. App. 41, 58–59,
232 A.3d 1237, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 930, 236 A.3d
217 (2020).
A
The respondent argues that the court erred in finding
that she was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunifi-
cation efforts because, ‘‘[c]ontrary to the trial court’s
findings, when the [respondent] became aware that the
petitioner was reinvolved with her daughter’s life again,
the [respondent] was engaged in services for herself to
be a better parent . . . .’’ The respondent highlights
the progress she made and states that ‘‘[p]erhaps no
better demonstration of the [respondent’s] willingness
to engage in reunification services is the [respondent’s]
own reason for addressing her issues when she stated
that she committed herself to going into services on
January 26, 2022, so that she could better herself, be a
better parent for her children, and wanted to begin on
January 26 as a tribute to her mother (whose birthday
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In re Maci S.

was on the 26th), so that she could become a better
mother and break the cycle of addiction.’’

Although the respondent highlights the strides she
has made since January 26, 2022, the termination of
parental rights petition was filed on January 11, 2022.
The court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make
its assessment based on events preceding the date on
which the termination petition was filed. See In re Lilly-
anne D., 215 Conn. App. 61, 81–82, 281 A.3d 521, cert.
denied, 345 Conn. 913, 283 A.3d 981 (2022); see also
Practice Book § 35a-7 (a). The court properly took into
account events preceding the January 11, 2022 filing of
the termination petition when making its determination
regarding the respondent’s inability and unwillingness
to benefit from reunification efforts. The court found
that the respondent was offered case management ser-
vices by the department, supervised visitation, sub-
stance abuse and mental health evaluations through
Wheeler Clinic, parenting support through The Village
for Families and Children’s Therapeutic Family Pro-
gram, and passes for taxis and public transportation.
The court noted that, although the respondent had
engaged in some services, she ‘‘clearly failed to make
sufficient progress in her ability to provide safe and
consistent care for Maci. She has also clearly failed
to take sufficient advantage of the multiple and well
tailored services offered and made available to her by
[the department] to improve her circumstances and has
demonstrated her unwillingness and/or inability to ben-
efit from reunification services as demonstrated by her
inconsistent participation in treatment services. She has
clearly not made sufficient progress with regard to her
identified treatment needs concerning her substance
abuse, mental health and parenting issues.’’ The evi-
dence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the
court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that
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In re Maci S.

the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts.

B

The respondent also argues that ‘‘the court erred in
finding that the [respondent] was unable to benefit from
services because, even though the [respondent] was
not involved toward the end of protective supervision
in 2019 and the petitioner did not hear from her until
January of 2022, when the [termination of parental
rights] default trial was scheduled . . . the petitioner
did not make reasonable efforts to locate the [respon-
dent] and engage her in services.’’ (Citation omitted.)
The court, in its analysis under § 17a-112 (j) (1), found
that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit
from the department’s reunification efforts and, alter-
natively, found that the department made reasonable
reunification efforts and used reasonable efforts to
locate the respondent. ‘‘[T]he [petitioner] must prove
[by clear and convincing evidence] either that [the
department] has made reasonable efforts to reunify or,
alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to
benefit from the reunification efforts. Section 17a-112
(j) clearly provides that the [petitioner] is not required
to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is
sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’ (Emphasis
in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Corey C., supra, 198 Conn. App. 66. We have concluded
in part I A of this opinion that the court properly found
that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit
from reunification services and this finding alone is
sufficient to satisfy § 17a-112 (j).5
5
We, nonetheless, note that the evidence in the record sufficiently sup-
ports the court’s findings that the department made reasonable efforts to
locate the respondent and that the department made reasonable efforts to
reunify the respondent with Maci.
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II
The respondent next claims that the court improperly
found that she failed to achieve a sufficient degree of
personal rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)
(ii). We do not agree.
The following legal principles and standard of review
are relevant. ‘‘Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient
personal rehabilitation is one of six statutory grounds
on which a court may terminate parental rights pursuant
to § 17a-112.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
G. Q., 158 Conn. App. 24, 25, 118 A.3d 164, cert. denied,
317 Conn. 918, 118 A.3d 61 (2015). Concerning the fail-
ure to achieve personal rehabilitation, § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B) (ii) provides in relevant part for the termination of
parental rights when the minor child is adjudicated
neglected and the parent of such child ‘‘has failed to
achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, con-
sidering the age and needs of the child, such parent
could assume a responsible position in the life of the
child . . . .’’ The standard for personal rehabilitation
in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) is not full rehabilitation. In re
Alejandro L., 91 Conn. App. 248, 260, 881 A.2d 450
(2005). At the same time, successful completion of the
petitioner’s expressly articulated expectations and the
court-ordered specific steps is not sufficient to defeat
the petitioner’s claim that the parent has not achieved
sufficient rehabilitation. Id. Rather, even if a parent has
made successful strides in her ability to manage her
life and may have achieved a level of stability within
her limitations, such improvements, although com-
mendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether,
within a reasonable period of time, she could assume
a responsible position in the life of her child. Id.
Our standard of review of the court’s finding regard-
ing personal rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3)
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In re Maci S.

(B) is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether
the trial court could have reasonably concluded, upon
the facts established and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect of the evi-
dence was sufficient to justify its conclusion. In re
Fayth C., 220 Conn. App. 315, 320, 297 A.3d 601, cert.
denied, 347 Conn. 907, 298 A.3d 275 (2023). In applying
this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner
most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial
court. Id.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that
the respondent ‘‘minimally complied with her specific
steps as ordered by the court on January 4, 2021. Despite
numerous attempts by [the department] to assist and
engage [the respondent], she failed to adequately
engage in, participate or benefit from substance abuse
and mental health treatment programs in order to suffi-
ciently address her substance use and mental health
issues. She failed to keep [the department] apprised of
her whereabouts on a regular basis and failed to main-
tain adequate housing and a legal income. [The respon-
dent], to her credit, did engage in some of her treatment
services but failed to consistently and successfully do
so. It is abundantly clear that she has not sufficiently
benefitted from those services as she continues to strug-
gle with her sobriety issues. Most concerning to the
court is her failure to visit with Maci since 2019 although
repeatedly encouraged by [the department] to do so.
[The respondent] has clearly failed to demonstrate the
desire and ability to adequately and safely parent Maci.’’
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent had not achieved sufficient personal
rehabilitation to the extent that she could assume a
responsible position in Maci’s life within a reasonable
period of time given Maci’s age and need for perma-
nency.
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There is ample evidence in the record to support the
court’s finding that the respondent failed to achieve a
sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation.6 The
respondent has not visited Maci since 2019, after an
incident wherein she overdosed on heroin at the home
of Maci’s paternal grandparents, and, thereafter, her
whereabouts were unknown to the department, despite
efforts to locate her, until she resurfaced sometime in
January, 2022. Thereafter, the respondent engaged in
services at Coventry House and was discharged to Hal-
lie House but failed to comply with her treatment at
Hallie House and was unsuccessfully discharged in Jan-
uary, 2023. She continued to test positive for fentanyl
numerous times in 2022 and 2023. Although she
attended Narcotics Anonymous several times per week
as of the time of trial, she tested positive during her
work in that program in May and June, 2023. She began
services at Catherine’s Heart Counseling Services due
to her desire to have a better relationship with Maci
and successfully maintain sobriety but failed to engage
in services and was discharged in May, 2023. Although
the respondent made some strides, the court noted that
she ‘‘has clearly not sufficiently benefitted from her
services, and any limited progress she has made is much
too little and much too late for Maci, especially in light
of her failure to visit with Maci since 2019.’’ In addition,
in assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not
whether the parent has improved her ability to manage
her own life but, rather, whether she has gained the
ability to care for the particular needs of her child. In
6
Although a trial court generally is limited to considering evidence of
events preceding the filing of the petition in the adjudicatory phase of a
termination proceeding; see Practice Book § 35a-7 (a); a trial court retains
discretion to consider events and behavior that occurred after the filing of
the termination petition to determine if the respondent had failed to achieve
sufficient personal rehabilitation to allow her to assume a responsible posi-
tion in her child’s life within a reasonable time. In re Yolanda V., 195 Conn.
App. 334, 346–47, 224 A.3d 182 (2020). In the present case, the court exercised
that discretion.
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In re Maci S.

re Eric M., 217 Conn. App. 809, 829, 290 A.3d 411, cert.
denied, 346 Conn. 921, 291 A.3d 1040 (2023). The court
determined that the respondent continues to struggle
with sobriety and that, ‘‘[m]ost concerning,’’ was the
respondent’s failure to visit Maci since 2019 despite
repeated encouragement from the department to do so.
For the foregoing reasons, the court’s finding by clear
and convincing evidence that the respondent failed to
demonstrate the desire and ability to adequately and
safely parent Maci and failed to achieve sufficient per-
sonal rehabilitation within the meaning of § 17a-112 (j)
(3) (B) is sufficiently supported by the record.
III
The respondent last claims that the court improperly
determined that the termination of her parental rights
was in the best interest of Maci. We disagree.
We first set forth the relevant principles and the stan-
dard of review. ‘‘[A]n appellate tribunal will not disturb
a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights
is in a child’s best interest unless that finding is clearly
erroneous. . . . We do not examine the record to deter-
mine whether the trier of fact could have reached a
conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather]
every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the
trial court’s ruling. . . . In the dispositional phase of
a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis
appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to
the best interest of the child. . . . In the dispositional
phase . . . the trial court must determine whether it
is established by clear and convincing evidence that
the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is
not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this
decision, the court is mandated to consider and make
written findings regarding seven factors delineated in
. . . § 17a-112 [(k)]. . . . The seven factors serve sim-
ply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory
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In re Maci S.

prerequisites that need to be proven before termination
can be ordered. . . .
‘‘In addition to considering the seven factors listed
in § 17a-112 (k), [t]he best interests of the child include
the child’s interests in sustained growth, development,
well-being, and continuity and stability of [her] environ-
ment. . . . Furthermore, in the dispositional stage, it
is appropriate to consider the importance of perma-
nency in [a child’s life].’’ (Citation omitted; footnotes
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Autumn O., 218 Conn. App. 424, 442–44, 292 A.3d 66,
cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1025, 294 A.3d 1026 (2023).
‘‘[T]he balancing of interests in a case involving termi-
nation of parental rights is a delicate task and, when
supporting evidence is not lacking, the trial court’s ulti-
mate determination as to a child’s best interest is enti-
tled to the utmost deference. . . . Although a judge
[charged with determining whether termination of
parental rights is in a child’s best interest] is guided by
legal principles, the ultimate decision [whether termina-
tion is justified] is intensely human. It is the judge in
the courtroom who looks the witnesses in the eye, inter-
prets their body language, listens to the inflections in
their voices and otherwise assesses the subtleties that
are not conveyed in the cold transcript.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) In re Malachi E., 188 Conn. App.
426, 444–45, 204 A.3d 810 (2019).
The court made findings under each of the seven
statutory factors of § 17a-112 (k) before determining
by clear and convincing evidence that, under the totality
of the circumstances, termination of the respondent’s
parental rights was in the best interest of Maci. In so
finding, the court stated that it was ‘‘clear’’ that Maci
could not be returned to the respondent in the foresee-
able future, the respondent has not made sufficient
progress in addressing her long outstanding issues, she
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In re Maci S.

has not sufficiently availed herself of the services
offered by the department in order to improve her cir-
cumstances to the extent that she can play a responsible
role in Maci’s life, she has not been able to put Maci’s
interests ahead of her own, she is not able to provide
a safe, competent, and nurturing environment for Maci,
she is not able to provide Maci with the necessary
structure for her basic needs, she has not exhibited the
ability to address appropriately or understand Maci’s
needs, Maci has been committed to the petitioner’s care
since January 4, 2021, and has resided with her preadop-
tive foster parents for her entire life, and, most signifi-
cantly, the respondent has not visited with Maci since
2019 and is a ‘‘virtual stranger’’ to her. The court deter-
mined that, in light of the respondent’s ‘‘significant
ongoing issues, it is clearly not in Maci’s best interests to
wait additional time for [the respondent] to rehabilitate.
[The respondent has] had significant time and opportu-
nity to address [her] issues and comply with the services
required of [her] and [has] failed to do so.
‘‘The court has balanced the child’s intrinsic need for
stability, sustained growth, development, well-being,
and permanency against the potential benefits of main-
taining a connection with [the respondent]. . . . In
consideration of all these factors and after weighing
all of the evidence, the court finds that the clear and
convincing evidence has established that it is in the
best interests of Maci to terminate the parental rights
of [the respondent] to ensure that she has a secure and
safe placement so she can grow and mature to become
a productive child and adult in a healthy manner. She
has a strong bond with her foster mother and foster
family who are meeting all of her needs and with whom
she shares a mutual love and affection. Her foster par-
ents plan to adopt her if she becomes legally free for
her to do so. Maci needs the permanency and stability
her foster parents continue to provide for her which
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cannot be provided by [the respondent] within the fore-
seeable future. While [the respondent] appear[s] to love
[Maci], [the respondent’s] bond with her is minimal at
best.’’ (Citation omitted.)
The respondent argues that the court erred in
determining that it was in Maci’s best interest to termi-
nate her parental rights in light of her consistent engage-
ment with services, the progress she has made, and her
having cared for her newborn infant son.7 She further
contends that, ‘‘[e]ven though [she] will have to work
at reestablishing her relationship with her daughter, it
is in Maci’s best interest to allow [her] to do so because
Maci deserves the right to have a relationship with her
mother.’’
Although the respondent highlights the strides she
has made, whatever progress she arguably has made
toward rehabilitation is insufficient to reverse the
court’s factually supported best interest finding. See In
re Aubrey K., 216 Conn. App. 632, 663, 285 A.3d 1153
(2022), cert. denied, 345 Conn. 972, 286 A.3d 907 (2023).
‘‘As we have stated previously, the court’s inquiry in
the dispositional phase of the proceeding was properly
focused on whether termination of the respondent’s
parental rights was in the [child’s] best interest.’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The respondent’s
7
The relevant inquiry under § 17a-112 (j) requires the court to analyze
the parent’s rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular
child, and, although a court may consider a respondent parent’s history
with her other children to gain perspective on the respondent’s child caring
and parenting abilities to determine if she had achieved rehabilitation, such
a consideration is not dispositive of the court’s analysis. In re Serenity W.,
220 Conn. App. 380, 398, 298 A.3d 276, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 902, 300 A.3d
1166 (2023). A court reasonably may conclude that a respondent parent is
unable to assume a responsible position in the life of one child, even though
another child remains in that parent’s care. Id. Moreover, the court found
that the petitioner filed a neglect petition as to the respondent’s son on
October 3, 2023, due to the respondent’s relapse and lack of progress with
her treatment services.
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efforts to rehabilitate, although commendable, speak
to her own conduct, not the best interest of Maci. See id.
There is ample evidence in the record to support the
court’s determination that it was in the best interest of
Maci to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. After
the respondent overdosed on heroin in the home of
Maci’s paternal grandparents in August, 2019, she left
that home. She has not visited with Maci since July
or August, 2019, despite the fact that the department
encouraged her to engage in regular visitation with
Maci. The court found that Maci has a strong and posi-
tive emotional bond with her paternal grandparents
with whom she has resided since birth. The respondent
continued to test positive for fentanyl in 2022 and 2023.
The court found that the respondent has not maintained
sufficient income, housing, or insight to the extent that
she can demonstrate that she can provide Maci with
the care necessary to ensure that her needs are met.
This evidence supports the court’s finding that the
respondent has not made sufficient progress to be able
to safely parent Maci and that she has failed to improve
her ongoing issues to the extent that she could assume
a responsible role in Maci’s life in the foreseeable future.
On the record before us, we conclude that the court’s
finding as to Maci’s best interest is factually supported
and legally sound and we will not substitute our judg-
ment for that of the trial court.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.