In re Jacqueline K.

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In re Jacqueline K.

IN RE JACQUELINE K.*
(AC 47584)
Cradle, Clark and Sheldon, Js.
Syllabus
The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminat-
ing his parental rights with respect to his minor child. The father claimed,
inter alia, that the court improperly determined that he had failed to achieve
the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by the applicable
statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B)). Held:
The trial court properly concluded that the Department of Children and
Families made reasonable efforts pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1) to reunify
the respondent father with the child, as that determination was not clearly
erroneous and was supported by sufficient evidence.
The trial court’s determination that the respondent father failed to achieve
the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B) was not clearly erroneous and was supported by sufficient evidence.
The trial court’s finding that termination of the respondent father’s parental
rights was in the child’s best interest was not clearly erroneous.
Argued October 8—officially released December 18, 2024**

Procedural History

Petition by the Commissioner of Children and Fami-
lies to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New Britain, Juvenile
Matters, and tried to the court, Taylor, J.; judgment term-
inating the respondents’ parental rights, from which the
respondent father appealed to this court. Affirmed.
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
** December 18, 2024, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
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In re Jacqueline K.

James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, with whom were
Emily Graner Sexton, assigned counsel, and, on the
brief, Gail Oakley Pratt, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (respondent father).
Nisa Khan, assistant attorney general, with whom,
on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for
the appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

CRADLE, J. The respondent father, Matthew S., appeals
from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor
of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and
Families, terminating his parental rights with respect to
his daughter, Jacqueline K.1 On appeal, the respondent
claims that the court improperly concluded that (1)
the Department of Children and Families (department)
made reasonable efforts to reunify him with Jacqueline
pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (1); (2) he
failed to achieve the requisite degree of personal reha-
bilitation required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B); and (3) termi-
nation of his parental rights was in Jacqueline’s best
interest.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as set forth by the trial court,
and procedural history are relevant to our resolution
of the respondent’s claims on appeal. When Jacqueline
was born in August, 2021, she tested positive for cocaine
and fentanyl and consequently spent several weeks in
the neonatal intensive care unit. At the time of Jacque-
line’s birth, the respondent was incarcerated, in lieu of
bond, on charges stemming from his assault of Jacque-
line’s mother on July 3, 2021, while she was pregnant
1
The termination of the parental rights of Jacqueline’s mother has not
been challenged on appeal. Accordingly, all references to the respondent
are to the respondent father only.
2
The attorney for the minor child has filed a statement adopting the
appellate brief of the petitioner.
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In re Jacqueline K.

with Jacqueline. On August 30, 2021, the petitioner
3

obtained an order of temporary custody of Jacqueline.
On September 3, 2021, both parents appeared before
the court and agreed to the sustaining of the orders
of temporary custody. On that date, the court issued
specific steps for both parents and summarized those
specific steps on the record. The court ordered that the
respondent comply with several specific steps, includ-
ing steps that required him to keep all appointments
with the department; to take part in treatment recom-
mended by the department; to submit to substance
abuse evaluations and follow the recommendations
about treatment, including aftercare and relapse pre-
vention; to submit to random drug testing; not to use
3
The court found, and the record reflects, that, ‘‘[o]n July 4, 2021, [the
department] received a careline report from [Bristol Police] Officer [Taylor]
Sutton. Officer Sutton responded to the home after [Jacqueline’s mother]
had contacted the police informing them that an incident took place on July
3, 2021. [Jacqueline’s mother] reported [that the respondent] came over and
forced his way inside the home. [Jacqueline’s mother] alleged [that the
respondent] had hit her head until she was unconscious. Officer Sutton had
observed that [Jacqueline’s mother] had extensive bruises around her eye,
a lump on her head, and a swollen lip. Officer Sutton reported that, during
the event, [her son] came out of his bedroom and witnessed some of the
incident. [Jacqueline’s mother] informed Officer Sutton that she told [her
son] to go back to his room and he did. Officer Sutton reported that [Jacque-
line’s mother] was knocked unconscious and woke up an hour later and
saw [the respondent] pacing back and forth so she went back to sleep to
avoid a confrontation with [the respondent]. [Jacqueline’s mother] then
woke back up about 3 a.m. and did not know if [the respondent] was still
around. [Jacqueline’s mother] got [her son] and left the home to go and get
help. Officer Sutton reported there was also a protective order in place at
this time. Officer Sutton reported [that the respondent] was arrested and
charged with the following: assault in the third degree on a pregnant person,
breach of the peace in the second degree, violation of a protective order
and use of a motor vehicle without permission. Officer . . . Sutton reported
[that] there was a history of domestic violence between [Jacqueline’s mother]
and [the respondent]. Officer Sutton reported that [the respondent] was
admitted to Bristol Hospital on July 4, 2021, because he had passed out
behind the wheel of a car.’’ The court noted that there had been three
additional instances of intimate partner violence reported between the
respondent and Jacqueline’s mother prior to the July 3, 2021 incident.
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In re Jacqueline K.

illegal drugs; to attend and complete an appropriate
domestic violence program; to secure and maintain ade-
quate housing and a legal income; to comply with pro-
tective orders; not to get involved with the criminal
justice system; and to visit with Jacqueline as often as
the department permitted. In addition to those steps,
the court identified the following goals for the respon-
dent: to create and maintain a safe, stable and nurturing
environment free from substance abuse and mental
health issues; to learn and demonstrate age appropriate
parenting, supervision, discipline and developmental
expectations of a child with special needs; to under-
stand the impact of unaddressed substance abuse issues
on children and to learn and utilize coping skills to
refrain from the use of substances; to understand the
impact of unaddressed mental health and intimate par-
enting violence issues on children and to learn and
utilize coping skills to maintain stability in the home;
and to maintain a nurturing relationship with Jacque-
line.
On January 5, 2022, Jacqueline was adjudicated
neglected and committed to the petitioner’s custody.
On that same date, the court issued final steps for both
parents. Those specific steps were essentially the same
as the specific steps issued by the court on September
3, 2021.4
4
The court ordered that the respondent comply with several of the same
specific steps ordered on September 3, 2021, including to cooperate with
the service providers recommended for parenting and individual counseling,
substance abuse assessment and treatment and intimate partner violence
services, such as inpatient treatment at Stonington Institute and additional
treatment as recommended, individual counseling and medication manage-
ment at Wheeler Clinic or the equivalent and a parenting education program
at Klingberg Family Centers or the equivalent. In addition to those standard
specific steps, the court ordered, inter alia, that the respondent make prog-
ress toward the following treatment goals: ‘‘[l]earn triggers for substance
abuse and alternative coping mechanism[s]’’; ‘‘[u]nderstand [the] impact of
substance abuse on children’’; ‘‘[u]nderstand [the] danger that intimate part-
ner violence presents to children’’; ‘‘[c]reate and maintain a safe and nurtur-
ing home environment free from substance abuse/mental health/intimate
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In re Jacqueline K.

On September 7, 2022, the petitioner filed a petition
to terminate the respondent’s parental rights on the
grounds that Jacqueline previously had been adjudi-
cated neglected and that the respondent had failed to
achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as
would encourage the belief that in a reasonable time,
considering her age and needs, he could assume a
responsible position in her life.5 A trial on the termina-
tion petition was held on February 27 and November
2, 2023, before the court, Taylor, J. The petitioner pre-
sented the testimony of Bristol Police Officer Spencer
Boisvert and department social worker Susana Lopez-
Kossbiel.6 The respondent testified and presented the
testimony of department social worker Jarrod Gormick.
On February 22, 2024, the court issued a memoran-
dum of decision in which it terminated the respondent’s
parental rights. The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that the department had made reasonable
efforts to reunify Jacqueline with the respondent and
that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit
from those reunification efforts. The court found that
the department had referred the respondent to various
programs and services but he was unable or unwilling
to benefit from those referrals, as more fully set forth
subsequently in this opinion.
The court also concluded that the respondent had
failed to achieve an appropriate degree of personal reha-
bilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a
partner violence’’; ‘‘[a]ttend all educational/medical/mental health provider
meetings for [Jacqueline]’’; ‘‘[d]evelop stronger parenting skills in the area
of [Jacqueline’s] mental health and educational needs and behavioral needs.’’
5
The petitioner also alleged in the petition that there was no ongoing
parent-child relationship between Jacqueline and the respondent. The peti-
tioner withdrew that allegation at trial.
6
Because the trial also included the petitions to terminate the parental
rights of Jacqueline’s mother with respect to Jacqueline and Jacqueline’s
half brother, the petitioner presented the testimony of another witness that
did not pertain to the respondent.
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In re Jacqueline K.

reasonable time, considering Jacqueline’s age and needs,
he could assume a responsible position in her life. In
support of this conclusion, the court set forth the fol-
lowing facts. The respondent presented with issues
relating to mental health, substance abuse, parenting
deficits, domestic violence, criminal recidivism and a
failure to complete and benefit from counseling and
services. On November 10, 2021, the respondent was
admitted to Stonington Institute for inpatient substance
abuse treatment. Upon his admission to the program,
the respondent tested positive for methamphetamine,
cocaine and benzodiazepine. He was successfully dis-
charged from that program in December, 2021, and was
referred to Wheeler Clinic for aftercare. He failed to
follow up with Wheeler Clinic.7 When he was discharged
from Stonington Institute, the respondent did not make
himself easily available to the department, which made
it difficult to arrange in-person visitation with Jacque-
line. On February 2, 2022, the respondent was readmit-
ted to Stonington Institute for substance abuse treat-
ment. He was unsuccessfully discharged on March 4,
2022, when he left the program against medical advice.
He was again referred to Wheeler Clinic for aftercare
treatment and again failed to follow up with that refer-
ral. The department referred the respondent to a Father-
hood Engagement Program, from which he was unsuc-
cessfully discharged after attending only one session.
The department held administrative case reviews on
October 20, 2021, and April 13, 2022. The respondent
did not attend either of those meetings. At the time of
the termination trial, which began on February 27, 2023,
the respondent was incarcerated, serving a three year
sentence for burglary in the third degree, violation of
a protective order and operating a motor vehicle while
7
The respondent testified at trial that he was unable to do so because
he was under house arrest at that time.
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In re Jacqueline K.

under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.8 In 2023,
while he was incarcerated,9 the respondent completed
a program offered by the Victim Offender Institutional
Correctional Educational Services, which is designed
to ‘‘broaden inmates’ understanding and sensitivity to
the impact of their crime on others.’’ The respondent
also completed a domestic violence program during his
period of incarceration.
The court found that the respondent had failed to
comply fully with the specific steps requiring him to
maintain consistent contact with the department; to
take part in parenting, individual and family counseling
and make progress toward the identified treatment
goals; to follow recommendations as to substance abuse
treatment, including inpatient treatment, aftercare and
relapse prevention; not to use illegal drugs or abuse
alcohol; to get and maintain adequate housing and a
legal income; to comply with protective orders to avoid
domestic violence incidents; not to break the law and
to comply with any criminal court orders and follow
the conditions of probation; to visit the child as often
as permitted by the department; and to cooperate with
the service providers recommended for parenting, indi-
vidual and family counseling, substance abuse assess-
ment and treatment, and intimate partner violence ser-
vices.
The court concluded that the respondent ‘‘has been
unable to correct the factors that led to [Jacqueline’s]
8
In its memorandum of decision, the court incorrectly found that these
offenses had been committed during the time period within which the respon-
dent was subject to the specific step that he not get involved with the
criminal justice system. The court’s decision reflects, however, that it knew
the correct date that the respondent committed these offenses. Additionally,
we note that the record does reflect that the respondent was incarcerated
on April 1, 2022, on a failure to appear charge, which was within the time
period the respondent was subject to the specific steps.
9
The respondent was sentenced on the charges for which he is currently
incarcerated on January 9, 2023.
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In re Jacqueline K.

initial commitment . . . .’’ The court reasoned: ‘‘The
clear and convincing evidence reveals that from the
date of commitment through the date of the filing of
the [termination] petition, and continuing through the
time of trial, [the respondent] has not been available
to take part in his child’s life in a safe, nurturing, and
positive manner and based on his issues of mental health,
substance abuse, criminal recidivism, parenting deficits,
and a failure to complete and benefit from counseling
and services, [the respondent] will never be consistently
available to Jacqueline.

‘‘The credible evidence in this case clearly and con-
vincingly shows that [the respondent] has consistently
failed to be available for [Jacqueline] by virtue of his
failure to address his issues appropriately and in a timely
manner.

‘‘Unfortunately, the clear and convincing evidence
also shows that [the respondent] has failed to improve
his parenting ability to acceptable standards as far as
[Jacqueline’s] safety and emotional needs are concerned.

‘‘[The respondent] refused to comply with [the depart-
ment] and refused to comply with most of the referrals
[the department] made on his behalf. [The petitioner]
has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence,
that [the respondent] cannot exercise the appropriate
judgment necessary to keep Jacqueline safe and healthy
and to maximize her abilities to achieve. . . .

‘‘When one also considers the high level of care,
patience, and discipline that Jacqueline’s needs will
require from her caregiver, it is patently clear that [the
respondent] is not in a better position to parent his child
than he was at the time of Jacqueline’s commitment,
and he still remains without the qualities necessary to
successfully parent her. Effectively, [the respondent] is
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In re Jacqueline K.

no better able to resume the responsibilities of parent-
ing at the time of filing the termination petition than he
had been at the time of [Jacqueline’s] commitment. . . .
‘‘Even if [the respondent] was finally capable of realiz-
ing and addressing his problems, it would be exceed-
ingly rash to expect him to be able to parent [Jacqueline]
at any time in the near future, if ever.
‘‘Unfortunately, the clear and convincing evidence
shows that Jacqueline’s needs for permanence and sta-
bility do not allow for the time necessary for [the
respondent] to attempt rehabilitation. Given the
[respondent’s] history associated with his mental health
issues, substance abuse issues, parenting deficits,
domestic violence, criminal recidivism and a failure to
complete and benefit from counseling, it is reasonable
to infer that he will remain besieged by those issues for
some extensive time and that he will not be physically
available to serve as a custodial resource for Jacqueline
during the time frame for rehabilitation contemplated
in § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (ii). . . .
‘‘Given the age, sensibilities, needs, and special needs
of [Jacqueline], and given [the respondent’s] failure and/
or inability to correct his issues, it would be unreason-
able to conclude that he would be able to achieve reha-
bilitation from his various issues so as to be able to
serve as a safe, responsible, and nurturing parent for
Jacqueline within a reasonable time.
‘‘Jacqueline needs a parent who is able to effectively
care for her now. She cannot wait for the remote possi-
bility that [the respondent] might overcome his mental
health issues, substance abuse issues, parenting defi-
cits, domestic violence, criminal recidivism and a failure
to complete and benefit from counseling and services
and acquire sufficient parenting ability to care for [Jac-
queline] one day in the future. Jacqueline is unable to
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In re Jacqueline K.

wait for [the respondent] to show that he has rehabili-
tated himself and is ready to assume his parental role.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In the dispositional phase of the proceedings, the
court made findings as to each of the criteria set forth
in § 17a-112 (k)10 and concluded that the termination
of the respondent’s parental rights was in Jacqueline’s
best interest. Accordingly, the court rendered judgment
terminating the respondent’s parental rights and
appointing the petitioner as Jacqueline’s statutory par-
ent. This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, we first set forth the follow-
ing relevant legal principles. ‘‘Proceedings to terminate
parental rights are governed by § 17a-112. . . . Under
10
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides in relevant part that, in determin-
ing whether to terminate parental rights under this section, ‘‘the court shall
consider and shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness,
nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the
parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with
the parent; (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made
reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms
of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual
or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled
their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of
the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s
person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control
of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed
significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent
has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the
foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which
the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to
reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to
incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the mainte-
nance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other
custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been
prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by
the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the
unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of
the parent.’’
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In re Jacqueline K.

[that provision], a hearing on a petition to terminate
parental rights consists of two phases: the adjudicatory
phase and the dispositional phase. During the adjudica-
tory phase, the trial court must determine whether one
or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental
rights set forth in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)] exists by clear and
convincing evidence. The [petitioner] . . . in petition-
ing to terminate those rights, must allege and prove
one or more of the statutory grounds. . . . Subdivision
(3) of § 17a-112 (j) carefully sets out . . . [the] situa-
tions that, in the judgment of the legislature, constitute
countervailing interests sufficiently powerful to justify
the termination of parental rights in the absence of
consent. . . . Because a respondent’s fundamental
right to parent his or her child is at stake, [t]he statutory
criteria must be strictly complied with before termina-
tion can be accomplished and adoption proceedings
begun. . . .

‘‘If the trial court determines that a statutory ground
for termination exists, then it proceeds to the disposi-
tional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial
court must determine whether termination is in the best
interests of the child. . . . The best interest determina-
tion also must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Autumn O., 218 Conn. App. 424, 430–31,
292 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1025, 294 A.3d
1026 (2023).

I

The respondent first contends that the court improp-
erly concluded that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify him with Jacqueline pursuant to § 17a-
112 (j) (1). The respondent argues that the court’s rea-
sonable efforts determination was based on clearly
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In re Jacqueline K.

erroneous factual findings and, consequently, was not
supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.11
‘‘Section 17a-112 (j) (1) requires that before terminat-
ing parental rights, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that the department has made rea-
sonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the
child with the parent, unless the court finds in this
proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to
benefit from reunification efforts provided such finding
is not required if the court has determined at a hearing
. . . that such efforts are not appropriate . . . . Thus,
the department may meet its burden concerning reunifi-
cation in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made
such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable
or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3)
by a previous judicial determination that such efforts
were not appropriate. . . . [I]n determining whether
the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify
a parent and a child . . . the court is required in the
adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis
of events preceding the date on which the termination
petition was filed. . . . This court has consistently held
that the court, [w]hen making its reasonable efforts
determination . . . is limited to considering only those
facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or
the most recent amendment to the petition . . . .
11
As noted herein, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (1), ‘‘[t]he [petitioner] must
prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that [the department] has
made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwill-
ing or unable to benefit from the reunification efforts. Section 17a-112 (j)
clearly provides that the [petitioner] is not required to prove both circum-
stances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Caiden B.,
220 Conn. App. 326, 361 n.22, 297 A.3d 1025, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 904,
301 A.3d 527 (2023). Because we conclude that the court properly found
that the department’s efforts to reunify the respondent with Jacqueline were
reasonable, a finding that is sufficient to satisfy § 17a-112 (j), we need not
address the merits of the respondent’s additional claim that the court erred in
finding that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
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In re Jacqueline K.

‘‘Our review of the court’s reasonable efforts determi-
nation is subject to the evidentiary sufficiency standard
of review. . . . Under this standard, the inquiry is
whether the trial court could have reasonably con-
cluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, that the cumulative effect
of the evidence was sufficient to justify its [ultimate
conclusion]. . . . When applying this standard, we
construe the evidence in a manner most favorable to
sustaining the judgment of the trial court. . . . The
court’s subordinate findings made in support of its rea-
sonable efforts determination are reviewed for clear
error. . . .
‘‘[We do] not examine the record to determine
whether the trier of fact could have reached a conclu-
sion other than the one reached. . . . In our review of
the record for evidentiary sufficiency, we are mindful
that, as a reviewing court, [w]e cannot retry the facts
or pass upon the credibility of the witnesses. . . .
Rather, [i]t is within the province of the trial court,
when sitting as the fact finder, to weigh the evidence
presented and determine the credibility and effect to
be given the evidence. . . .
‘‘Pursuant to § 17a-112, the department has the duty
to make reasonable efforts to reunite the child or chil-
dren with the parents. The word reasonable is the linch-
pin on which the department’s efforts in a particular
set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear
and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word
reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined
by our legislature or by the federal act from which the
requirement was drawn. . . . [R]easonableness is an
objective standard . . . and whether reasonable
efforts have been proven depends on the careful consid-
eration of the circumstances of each individual case.
. . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything rea-
sonable, not everything possible. . . . [O]ur courts are
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In re Jacqueline K.

instructed to look to the totality of the facts and circum-
stances presented in each individual case in deciding
whether reasonable efforts have been made.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re
Caiden B., 220 Conn. App. 326, 348–50, 297 A.3d 1025,
cert. denied, 348 Conn. 904, 301 A.3d 527 (2023).
‘‘The trial court’s determination of this issue will not
be overturned on appeal unless, in light of all of the
evidence in the record, it is clearly erroneous. . . . A
finding is clearly erroneous when either there is no
evidence in the record to support it, or the reviewing
court is left with the definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. . . . [E]very reasonable pre-
sumption is made in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Savannah Y., 172 Conn. App. 266, 273, 158 A.3d
864, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 925, 160 A.3d 1067 (2017).
In considering the respondent’s claim in the present
case, we note ‘‘the reality . . . that incarceration
imposes limitations on what the department and its
social workers can do and what services it can provide
for an incarcerated parent facing termination of his
or her parental rights. . . . The reasonableness of the
department’s efforts must be viewed in the context of
these limitations.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
In re Jadiel B., 228 Conn. App. 290, 298, 324 A.3d 211,
cert. denied, 350 Conn. 921, 325 A.3d 217 (2024).
In concluding that the department made reasonable
efforts to reunify, the court recounted that the depart-
ment offered several services to the respondent, includ-
ing administrative case reviews, casework services,
supervised visitation, transportation assistance and
referrals to substance abuse, domestic violence pro-
grams and parenting programs.
The respondent acknowledges that the department
‘‘made referrals on his behalf.’’ He nevertheless chal-
lenges the court’s finding that the department’s reunifi-
cation efforts were reasonable solely on the ground
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that ‘‘the monthly visits that were supposed to occur
did not occur with regularity, which was not reason-
able.’’ He argues that, ‘‘[w]hen [he] was incarcerated
shortly after Jacqueline’s birth, visits did not occur until
he was released and admitted to Stonington [Institute].’’
He also argues that the department failed to afford
visitation once he was incarcerated in April, 2022. He
contends that ‘‘[i]n-person visits at the prison were to
begin on June 2, 2022, but the case aide forgot to add
it to her calendar, so the visit did not occur. The next
visit was to be held on June 16, 2022, but that, too, had
to be rescheduled. . . . In-person visits actually began
in August, 2022.’’12 (Citation omitted.)
We disagree with the respondent’s allegation that the
department failed to afford him regular visitation with
Jacqueline. Although the respondent may not have been
afforded visitation while he was incarcerated shortly
after Jacqueline’s birth, the department commenced vir-
tual visits shortly thereafter, when the respondent was
admitted to Stonington Institute, and continued those
visits while the respondent was on house arrest. The
respondent testified that he was ‘‘on weekly Skype
video calls’’ with Jacqueline prior to his incarceration in
April, 2022. On May 31, 2022, the respondent confirmed
with the department that he would like monthly in-
person visits with Jacqueline at the correctional facility.
The department scheduled the first visit for June 2,
2022, but, as the respondent points out, that visit did
not occur due to an error by the case aide, so it was
12
The respondent also points to visits that he missed in June, July and
September, 2023, as evidence that the department’s reunification efforts
were not reasonable. Because he raises an argument relating to evidence
of events that were supposed to occur well beyond the September 7, 2022
date of the filing of the termination petition, they are not properly considered
in the adjudicatory phase of the termination proceedings. See In re Caiden
B., supra, 220 Conn. App. 348 (‘‘[w]hen making its reasonable efforts determi-
nation . . . [the court] is limited to considering only those facts preceding
the filing of the termination petition’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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rescheduled for June 16, 2022. As to the respondent’s
complaint that the June 16, 2022 visit did not occur as
scheduled, the record reflects that Jacqueline had a
fever on that day and the department tried to reschedule
it for June 23, 2022. The record does not reflect whether
the visit occurred on June 23, 2022. Even if the respon-
dent’s assertion was correct that regular visits did not
commence at the correctional facility until August,
2022, the record reflects that, as of June, 2023, the
respondent had enjoyed regular monthly visitation with
Jacqueline since that time.
Even if we were to conclude that the department
should have been more diligent in ensuring that the
respondent was afforded regular visitation, we cannot
conclude, in light of the entire record, given the services
offered to the respondent, as recounted in detail herein,
and the visitation that he was afforded, that the missed
visits rendered the department’s reunification efforts
less than reasonable. Our review of the evidence does
not leave us with the definite and firm conviction that
the court mistakenly found that the department had
made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent and
Jacqueline. We therefore reject the respondent’s claim
that the court’s reasonable efforts determination was
clearly erroneous and supported by insufficient evi-
dence.
II
The respondent next claims that the court improperly
concluded that he failed to achieve a sufficient degree
of personal rehabilitation. We disagree.
‘‘Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient personal
rehabilitation is one of [the] statutory grounds on which
a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to § 17a-
112. . . . In regard to the failure to achieve personal
rehabilitation, § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) provides, in relevant
part, for the termination of parental rights when the
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In re Jacqueline K.

child (i) has been found . . . to have been neglected,
abused or uncared for in a prior proceeding . . . and
the parent of such child has been provided specific
steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the
parent . . . and has failed to achieve such degree of
personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief
that within a reasonable time, considering the age and
needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsi-
ble position in the life of the child . . . .
‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B) (i)] refers to the restoration of a parent to [his]
former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . .
[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not
whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage
[his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the
ability to care for the particular needs of the child at
issue. . . . An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation
requires us to obtain a historical perspective of the
respondent’s child-caring and parenting abilities. . . .
Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the par-
ent must show more than any rehabilitation. . . . Suc-
cessful completion of the petitioner’s expressly articu-
lated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the
petitioner’s claim that the parent has not achieved suffi-
cient rehabilitation. . . . [E]ven if a parent has made
successful strides in [his] ability to manage [his] life
and may have achieved a level of stability within [his]
limitations, such improvements, although commend-
able, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within
a reasonable period of time, [he] could assume a respon-
sible position in the life of [his] children.’’ (Citations
omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Fayth C., 220 Conn. App. 315, 318–19,
297 A.3d 601, cert. denied, 347 Conn. 907, 298 A.3d
275 (2023).
‘‘We review the trial court’s subordinate factual find-
ings for clear error, and review its finding that the
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respondent failed to rehabilitate for evidentiary suffi-
ciency. . . . In reviewing that ultimate finding for evi-
dentiary sufficiency, we inquire whether the trial court
could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts estab-
lished and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient
to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . [I]t is not the
function of this court to sit as the [fact finder] when
we review the sufficiency of the evidence . . . rather,
we must determine, in the light most favorable to sus-
taining the verdict, whether the totality of the evidence,
including reasonable inferences therefrom, supports
the [judgment of the trial court] . . . . In making this
determination, [t]he evidence must be given the most
favorable construction in support of the [judgment] of
which it is reasonably capable. . . . In other words,
[i]f the [trial court] could reasonably have reached its
conclusion, the [judgment] must stand, even if this court
disagrees with it. . . .
‘‘When a child is taken into the [petitioner’s] custody,
a trial court must issue specific steps to a parent as
to what should be done to facilitate reunification and
prevent termination of parental rights. . . . Specific
steps provide notice and guidance to a parent as to what
should be done to facilitate reunification and prevent
termination of [parental] rights. . . . Specific steps are
a benchmark by which the court will measure the
respondent’s conduct to determine whether termina-
tion is appropriate pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B).
. . . [T]he failure to comply with specific steps ordered
by the court typically weighs heavily in a termination
proceeding.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Deboras S., 220 Conn. App. 1,
30–32, 296 A.3d 842 (2023).
In claiming that the court’s findings were clearly erro-
neous, the respondent does not contend, for the most
part, that there was no evidence in the record to support
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In re Jacqueline K.

the court’s findings, but, rather, he argues that there
was evidence in the record that may have supported a
determination that he substantially complied with most
of his specific steps.13 In support of this claim, the
respondent argues that the court’s findings ‘‘do not tell
the whole story.’’ In so arguing, the respondent essen-
tially asks this court to reweigh the evidence presented
at trial and consider it in a light favorable to him. ‘‘This
we will not do, as it is not the function of a court of
review to retry the facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Olivia W., 223 Conn. App. 173, 188 n.12,
308 A.3d 571 (2024).
Moreover, although a different view of the evidence
might support the respondent’s argument that he
attempted to comply with the specific steps to the best
of his ability within the constraints imposed by his
incarceration, the court acknowledged the respondent’s
limited progress but nevertheless concluded that the
respondent failed to rehabilitate. See In re Fayth C.,
supra, 220 Conn. App. 319 (although parent’s successful
strides to manage his life are commendable, they are
not dispositive on issue of whether, within reasonable
period of time, he could assume responsible position
in life of his children). To the extent the respondent
seeks to excuse his noncompliance with the court-
ordered specific steps, that noncompliance was, at best,
an inevitable result of his incarceration or being on
house arrest, both circumstances for which the respon-
dent was solely responsible due to his criminal conduct.
The record also reflects that, other than his completion
of Stonington Institute’s substance abuse treatment pro-
gram in 2021, the respondent failed to complete any treat-
ment programs during the period of time when he was
not incarcerated.
13
The respondent also argues that ‘‘it is important to note that [the court]
appears to have applied an incorrect standard when assessing the petitioner’s
burden . . . [when it] stated that ‘the critical issue for this court is whether
the [respondent] had achieved the rehabilitation sufficient to render him
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We also reject the respondent’s challenge to the court’s
finding that he is in no better position now to assume
a responsible position in Jacqueline’s life than when
she was committed. He argues that when Jacqueline
was committed, he had several criminal charges pend-
ing and he was using drugs. Of course, at the time
of the termination trial, the respondent no longer had
several charges pending because by then he had been
convicted of and sentenced for those charges, although
he still had more than one year remaining to serve on
his sentence. Also, it is reasonable to infer that, by
virtue of his incarceration, he was no longer abusing
drugs at the time of trial. Although this may be con-
strued as progress in terms of the respondent making
personal strides, that purported progress is not the
result of the respondent’s compliance with the depart-
ment’s referrals for services.14 For instance, the respon-
dent emphasizes that he has ‘‘stay[ed] clean’’ since his
last positive drug test upon his admission to Stonington
Institute in November, 2021.15 ‘‘[S]taying clean’’ is not
the equivalent to completing treatment programs. The
respondent testified that he had been abusing drugs
since he was in high school. The fact that the respondent
able to care for his child.’ ’’ It is clear from a reading of the entirety of
court’s decision that it knew and applied the correct legal standard.
14
The respondent also emphasizes the programs he completed while incar-
cerated in 2023 as evidence of his rehabilitation. His reliance on these
programs is misplaced in that he completed them well after the September
7, 2022 adjudicatory date.
15
The respondent contends that his November, 2021 positive drug test
should not have been used against him because the final specific steps were
not issued until January 5, 2022. The respondent ignores the fact that specific
steps were first issued on September 3, 2021, and included that he refrain
from the use of illegal drugs. Additionally, although there was no evidence
of any additional positive drug tests, the record likewise does not reflect
that he was tested during the times that he was not incarcerated or at
Stonington Institute. Additionally, when the respondent was readmitted to
Stonington Institute in February, 2022, he was diagnosed with cannabis and
crack cocaine dependence, whereas he was diagnosed with only cocaine
dependence when he was admitted in November, 2021.
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allegedly ‘‘stay[ed] clean’’ during the limited time during
Jacqueline’s life when he was not incarcerated does not,
in itself, demonstrate that he will be able to do so when
he is released from prison.
On the basis of our thorough review of the record,
we are not left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made in this case. We therefore
conclude that the court’s findings were not clearly erro-
neous and the respondent’s challenge to the evidentiary
sufficiency of the court’s determination that he failed to
achieve the requisite degree of personal rehabilitation
required by § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) is unavailing.
III
Finally, the respondent claims that the court errone-
ously found that termination of his parental rights was
in Jacqueline’s best interest. We disagree.
In assessing Jacqueline’s best interest, the court con-
sidered and made written findings as to each of the
factors enumerated in § 17a-112 (k). The court reiter-
ated its findings that the department offered timely,
appropriate and comprehensive services to the respon-
dent to facilitate his reunification with Jacqueline, but
that he was unable and/or unwilling to benefit from
those services. The court found, inter alia, that the
respondent was aware of his issues and deficits and
had received specific steps addressing those issues, but
he failed to comply with several of those steps. The
court further found that the respondent had been unable
and/or unwilling to make realistic and sustained efforts
to conform his conduct to acceptable parental stan-
dards or to serve as a safe, nurturing and responsible
parent for Jacqueline. The respondent complied with
certain services offered by the department, but his abil-
ity to care for Jaqueline remained poor in that he had
failed to gain insight into the efforts needed in order
to become a safe, nurturing and responsible parent. The
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court found that Jacqueline had a bond with her foster
mother and a visiting bond with the respondent. The
court explained that ‘‘[t]o ask Jacqueline to wait for [the
respondent] to be released from jail, establish himself in
the community, successfully complete his rehabilitative
programs and show himself to be a safe, responsible
and nurturing parent is asking this child to wait too
long for something which may never come to pass,
based upon [the respondent’s] history.’’ The court con-
cluded: ‘‘Having balanced the individual and intrinsic
needs of . . . Jacqueline for stability and permanency
against the benefits of maintaining a connection with
the respondent . . . the clear and convincing evidence
in this case establishes that [Jacqueline’s] best interest
cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal
relationship to the respondent . . . .’’ Accordingly, the
court concluded that the termination of the respon-
dent’s parental rights was in Jaqueline’s best interest.

‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of paren-
tal rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts
from the conduct of the parent to the best interest of
the child. . . . It is well settled that we will overturn
the trial court’s decision that the termination of parental
rights is in the best interest of the [child] only if the
court’s findings are clearly erroneous. . . . The best
interests of the child include the child’s interests in
sustained growth, development, well-being, and conti-
nuity and stability of [his or her] environment. . . . In
the dispositional phase of a termination of parental
rights hearing, the trial court must determine whether
it is established by clear and convincing evidence that
the continuation of the respondent’s parental rights is
not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this
decision, the court is mandated to consider and make
written findings regarding seven factors delineated in
[§ 17a-112 (k)]. . . . The seven factors serve simply as
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In re Jacqueline K.

guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequi-
sites that need to be proven before termination can be
ordered. . . . There is no requirement that each factor
be proven by clear and convincing evidence. . . .
‘‘[A]n appellate tribunal will not disturb a trial court’s
finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s
best interest unless that finding is clearly erroneous.
. . . On appeal, our function is to determine whether
the trial court’s conclusion was factually supported and
legally correct. . . . In doing so, however, [g]reat
weight is given to the judgment of the trial court because
of [the court’s] opportunity to observe the parties and
the evidence. . . . We do not examine the record to
determine whether the trier of fact could have reached
a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . [Rather]
every reasonable presumption is made in favor of the
trial court’s ruling. . . . [T]he balancing of interests
in a case involving termination of parental rights is
a delicate task and, when supporting evidence is not
lacking, the trial court’s ultimate determination as to a
child’s best interest is entitled to the utmost deference.
. . . Although a judge [charged with determining
whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s
best interest] is guided by legal principles, the ultimate
decision [whether termination is justified] is intensely
human. It is the judge in the courtroom who looks the
witnesses in the eye, interprets their body language,
listens to the inflections in their voices and otherwise
assesses the subtleties that are not conveyed in the
cold transcript.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Javonte B., 226
Conn. App. 651, 659–61, 318 A.3d 1095 (2024).
‘‘In addition to considering the seven factors listed
in § 17a-112 (k), [t]he best interests of the child include
the child’s interests in sustained growth, development,
well-being, and continuity and stability of [his or her]
environment. . . . Furthermore, in the dispositional
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stage, it is appropriate to consider the importance of
permanency in children’s lives.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Ava M., 223 Conn. App. 590, 604,
309 A.3d 383, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 962, 312 A.3d
38 (2024).
In support of his challenge to the court’s best interest
determination, the respondent argues that ‘‘many of the
§ 17a-112 (k) factors should have been found in his
favor had the court made findings in accordance with
the evidence. The factual findings in this case were sloppy
and were biased in favor of the petitioner, with no
consideration for the facts that weighed in favor of the
respondent.’’ In support of this argument, the respon-
dent reiterates his claims that the court erred in deter-
mining that the department made reasonable efforts
to reunify him with Jacqueline and that he failed to
rehabilitate. We have addressed and rejected those
claims and need not address them further here.
Notably, the respondent does not challenge the
court’s findings that Jacqueline needs stability, continu-
ity, and permanency in her life and that the respondent
is unable to provide those things. On the basis of our
review of the record, we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made in this
case. We therefore reject the respondent’s claim that
the court’s best interest determination was clearly erro-
neous.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.