State v. Godbout

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State v. Godbout

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. DAVID A. GODBOUT
(AC 46567)
Elgo, Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction rendered by the
trial court following his plea of nolo contendere to the crime of disorderly
conduct. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that a certain statute (§ 54-94a)
and rule of practice (§ 39-18) governing pleas of nolo contendere were
unconstitutional because they violated the common-law presumption of
innocence. Held:

The defendant waived his claims that § 54-94a and Practice Book § 39-18
were unconstitutional, as his plea of nolo contendere operated as a waiver of
all nonjurisdictional defects and barred the later assertion of constitutional
challenges to pretrial proceedings, and neither of his claims of error chal-
lenged either the exercise of jurisdiction by the court or the voluntary and
intelligent nature of his plea.

This court declined to review the defendant’s inadequately briefed claims
that the charges against him lacked probable cause, that the trial court erred
in not complying with the requirements of Practice Book § 39-18, that the
court violated his due process rights by failing to hold a hearing on certain
postjudgment motions and that the judges who presided over his case acted
without authority.

The defendant’s claim that the trial court exceeded its authority by imposing
terms to his conditional discharge was moot, as it was undisputed that this
appeal was not heard until after his one year term of conditional discharge
had expired, and there was no practical relief this court could provide to
the defendant.
Argued September 17—officially released November 19, 2024

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crime of disorderly conduct, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of New London, geographi-
cal area number ten, where the defendant was pre-
sented to the court, K. Murphy, J., on a plea of nolo
contendere; judgment of guilty in accordance with the
plea, from which the defendant appealed to this court.
Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.
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State v. Godbout

David A. Godbout, self-represented, the appellant
(defendant).
Raynald A. Carre, Jr., deputy assistant state’s attor-
ney, with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Narducci,
state’s attorney, and Marissa Goldberg, assistant state’s
attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The self-represented defendant, David
A. Godbout, appeals from the judgment of conviction
rendered by the trial court following his plea of nolo
contendere to the charge of disorderly conduct in viola-
tion of General Statutes § 53a-182.1 On appeal, the
defendant claims that (1) General Statutes § 54-94a2 is
unconstitutional; (2) Practice Book § 39-183 is unconsti-
tutional; (3) the charges against him lacked probable
1
General Statutes § 53a-182 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) A person is
guilty of disorderly conduct when, with intent to cause inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, such person: (1)
Engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior; or (2)
by offensive or disorderly conduct, annoys or interferes with another person;
or (3) makes unreasonable noise . . . .’’
2
General Statutes § 54-94a provides: ‘‘When a defendant, prior to the
commencement of trial, enters a plea of nolo contendere conditional on the
right to take an appeal from the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion
to suppress or motion to dismiss, the defendant after the imposition of
sentence may file an appeal within the time prescribed by law provided a
trial court has determined that a ruling on such motion to suppress or motion
to dismiss would be dispositive of the case. The issue to be considered in
such an appeal shall be limited to whether it was proper for the court to
have denied the motion to suppress or the motion to dismiss. A plea of nolo
contendere by a defendant under this section shall not constitute a waiver
by the defendant of nonjurisdictional defects in the criminal prosecution.’’
3
Practice Book § 39-18 provides: ‘‘(a) In the discretion of the judicial
authority, the defendant may enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to
the information or complaint at arraignment or any later time, provided that
the judicial authority confirms in open court that the defendant has received
all discovery materials that he or she requested in writing pursuant to
Chapter 40 that are within the possession of the prosecuting authority. If
the defendant has not received all requested discovery, the judicial authority
shall confirm that the defendant and his or her counsel agree to waive any
right to receive further disclosure, before allowing the defendant to enter
the plea. Any such waiver shall not apply to the prosecuting authority’s
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State v. Godbout

cause; (4) the court erred in not complying with the
requirements of Practice Book § 39-18; (5) the court
violated his due process rights by failing to hold a hear-
ing on his postjudgment motions; (6) the judges who
presided over his case acted without authority; and (7)
the court exceeded its authority by imposing terms to
his conditional discharge.4 We affirm the judgment of
the court.
The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. On May 16, 2023, pursuant to
§ 54-94a, the defendant entered a plea of nolo conten-
dere to the charge of disorderly conduct. At the plea
hearing, the prosecutor set forth the factual basis for the
charge as follows: On December 26, 2018, the defendant
went to the office of the tax collector in East Lyme,
and ‘‘caused a scene’’ while demanding the tax clerks
waive certain fees for him. When his request was denied,
he became enraged and paced back and forth while
yelling obscenities at the clerks in a manner that caused
them to fear for their safety. The panic alarm was acti-
vated, summoning the police, who arrested the defen-
dant.
continuing obligation to disclose exculpatory information or materials pursu-
ant to Sections 40-3 and 40-11.
‘‘(b) A plea of nolo contendere shall be in writing, shall be signed by the
defendant, and, when accepted by the judicial authority, shall be followed
by a finding of guilty.’’
4
In his principal brief before this court the defendant frames the issues
raised on appeal as follows: ‘‘1. Practice Book [§] 39-18 (b) and [§] 54-94a
are unconstitutional
‘‘2. Court did not comply with Practice Book [§] 39-21
‘‘3. Court did not comply with Practice Book [§] 39-18
‘‘4. The trial court was presided over by people not appointed in sessions
of the General Assembly and have no apparent authority
‘‘5. The lack of hearings regarding motions violated due process rights of
[the] defendant
‘‘6. The imposition of conditions imposed was without authority.’’
We have reframed the defendant’s claims to more accurately reflect the
arguments set forth in his brief. See, e.g., Doe v. Quinnipiac University,
218 Conn. App. 170, 172–73 n.4, 291 A.3d 153 (2023).
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State v. Godbout

The court canvassed the defendant with respect to his
plea. Thereafter, the court accepted the plea, entered
a finding of guilty, and sentenced the defendant to a
term of ninety days of incarceration, execution sus-
pended, with one year of conditional discharge. As for
the special conditions of his discharge, the court
ordered the defendant to refrain from contacting the
victims in this case and to notify the local police depart-
ment before going to the town hall in East Lyme. This
appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural his-
tory will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant’s first two claims on appeal are that
§ 54-94a and Practice Book § 39-18 are unconstitutional.
Specifically, he asserts that these provisions violate the
common-law presumption of innocence. The state
argues that the defendant has waived these claims by
entering an unconditional plea of nolo contendere. We
agree with the state.

We begin by setting forth the following legal princi-
ples. ‘‘As a general rule, an unconditional plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, intelligently and voluntarily made,
operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and
bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to
pretrial proceedings. . . . Therefore, only those issues
fully disclosed in the record which relate either to the
exercise of jurisdiction by the court or to the voluntary
and intelligent nature of the plea are ordinarily appeal-
able after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Ross v. Commissioner of
Correction, 217 Conn. App. 286, 321, 288 A.3d 1055,
cert. denied, 346 Conn. 915, 290 A.3d 374 (2023).

In the present case, the defendant entered an uncon-
ditional nolo contendere plea. The court canvassed the
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State v. Godbout

defendant and ‘‘found [the plea] to be voluntary, under-
standably made with the assistance of competent coun-
sel.’’ The court further found that there was ‘‘a factual
basis for the plea,’’ and accepted the plea. The defen-
dant’s plea operates as a waiver of all nonjurisdictional
defects and bars the later assertion of constitutional
challenges to pretrial proceedings. Moreover, having
carefully considered the defendant’s argument, we con-
clude that neither of these two claims of error chal-
lenges either the exercise of jurisdiction by the court
or the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea.
Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has
waived these claims.
II
The defendant’s third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims
on appeal are that he was charged without probable
cause, that the court erred in not complying with the
requirements of Practice Book § 39-18, that the court
violated his due process rights by not holding a hearing
on his postjudgment motions, and that the judges who
presided over his case acted without authority. Having
thoroughly reviewed the defendant’s brief, we conclude
that these claims have been abandoned due to inade-
quate briefing, and, thus, we decline to review them.
We set forth the following relevant legal principles.
‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not required
to review issues that have been improperly presented
to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analy-
sis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in
order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief
the issue properly. . . . [When] a claim is asserted in
the statement of issues but thereafter receives only
cursory attention in the brief without substantive dis-
cussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be
abandoned. . . . For a reviewing court to judiciously
and efficiently . . . consider claims of error raised on
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State v. Godbout

appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth
their arguments in their briefs. . . .
‘‘In addition, briefing is inadequate when it is not only
short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized. . . .
We are mindful that [i]t is the established policy of the
Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented]
litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights
of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally
in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonethe-
less, [a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants
some latitude, the right of self-representation provides
no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630,
273 A.3d 271 (2022).
In the present case, the sections of the defendant’s
brief dedicated to his third, fourth, fifth, and sixth
claims do not set forth any meaningful analysis for this
court to consider. The four sections combined include
just one citation to the record and almost no citations
to applicable legal authorities. The portions of the brief
dedicated to the defendant’s third claim regarding lack
of probable cause, his fourth claim regarding the trial
court’s compliance with Practice Book § 39-18, and his
sixth claim regarding the judicial authority of the presid-
ing judges are conclusory, disorganized, and confusing.
The defendant frequently and abruptly changes topics
without any explanation of how they relate to each
other or the claims at hand. With respect to the defen-
dant’s fourth claim, the briefing is so disorganized and
confusing that we cannot determine whether his claim
of error is premised on the argument that the court’s
actions violated his constitutional due process rights
or impacted the voluntary and intelligent nature of his
plea. The defendant devotes less than two pages out
of his entire brief to his fourth claim and a mere four
sentences to his fifth claim. ‘‘Although the number of
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State v. Godbout

pages devoted to an argument in a brief is not necessar-
ily determinative, relative sparsity weighs in favor of
concluding that the argument has been inadequately
briefed.’’ State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 726, 138 A.3d
868 (2016).
We allow the defendant some latitude as a self-repre-
sented litigant. However, the sparsity and lack of sub-
stantive argument causes his brief to be ‘‘inadequate
for us to conduct any meaningful review of’’ these
claims. C. B. v. S. B., supra, 211 Conn. App. 631; see
id., 630–31 (declining to review claims due to inadequate
briefing where briefing was sparse, conclusory, disorga-
nized, and confusing). We, therefore, decline to
review them.
III
The defendant’s final claim is that the court exceeded
its authority by imposing terms to his conditional dis-
charge. We dismiss this portion of the appeal as moot.5
‘‘Mootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to
resolve. . . . It is a [well settled] general rule that the
existence of an actual controversy is an essential requi-
site to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of
appellate courts to decide moot questions, discon-
nected from the granting of actual relief or from the
determination of which no practical relief can follow.
5
After oral argument before this court, we issued the following supplemen-
tal briefing order: ‘‘As the defendant indicated at oral argument that he
has completed his period of conditional discharge, the parties are hereby
ordered, sua sponte, to file memoranda of no more than 1500 words on or
before October 10, 2024, addressing whether the portion of the defendant’s
amended appeal challenging the terms of his conditional discharge and July
10, 2023 decision denying his motion to modify his conditions should be
dismissed as moot. See State v. Boyle, 287 Conn. 478, 485–8[7], [949 A.2d
460] (2008).’’ On October 10, 2024, the state filed a brief asserting that the
defendant’s final claim is moot, as his term of conditional discharge has
expired. The defendant did not comply with the order.
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State v. Godbout

. . . An actual controversy must exist not only at the
time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pen-
dency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency
of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an
appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot. . . . [A] subject matter jurisdictional defect may
not be waived . . . [or jurisdiction] conferred by the
parties, explicitly or implicitly. . . . [T]he question of
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . .
and, once raised, either by a party or by the court itself,
the question must be answered before the court may
decide the case.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Booker, 220 Conn. App.
783, 792–93, 299 A.3d 1215, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 927,
304 A.3d 860 (2023). ‘‘Because mootness implicates sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, it presents a question of law
over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Shin, 193 Conn. App. 348, 372,
219 A.3d 432, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 943, 219 A.3d
374 (2019).
It is undisputed that the defendant was sentenced on
May 16, 2023, and that his one year conditional dis-
charge expired on May 16, 2024. This appeal was not
heard until September 17, 2024. Because his term of
conditional discharge has expired, there is no practical
relief that this court can provide to the defendant
regarding this claim. See, e.g., id., 372–74. Accordingly,
we conclude that the defendant’s final claim is moot.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the defen-
dant’s claim that the trial court exceeded its authority
by imposing terms to his conditional discharge; the
judgment is affirmed.