M. S. v. M. S.

************************************************
The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

2 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
M. S. v. M. S.

M. S. v. M. S.*
(AC 46005)
Alvord, Cradle and Suarez, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis-
solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
denying her postdissolution motion for contempt. In June, 2017, approxi-
mately three years after the judgment of dissolution, the court approved
an agreement of the parties setting the plaintiff’s child support obligation
at $2600 per month until June 30, 2019, and ordered that, after that date,
child support would be modified on the basis of the child support
guidelines. Thereafter, the defendant filed motions for modification and
for contempt, alleging that, although the parties had been directed to
recalculate child support payments on June 30, 2019, in accordance
with the guidelines, the plaintiff unilaterally had decreased his child
support payments in accordance with his own calculations. Subse-
quently, the court issued an order in March, 2021, which modified the
plaintiff’s child support obligations prospectively to $495 per week.
Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for contempt alleging, inter
alia, that the plaintiff was in contempt of the court’s June, 2017 order,
in that the $2600 monthly payment order had remained in effect until
the court’s March, 2021 order, that he had unilaterally reduced the
amount of his child support payments in July, 2019, and that he owed
an arrearage. The court denied the motion for contempt and entered
remedial orders limited to the plaintiff’s compliance with the March,
2021 order to pay $495 per week. The defendant claimed on appeal that
the court misinterpreted the June, 2017 order. Held that, although the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to find the plaintiff
in contempt, the court erred in failing to determine the amount of the
plaintiff’s arrearage attributable to his noncompliance with the June,
2017 child support order: the plaintiff was obligated to pay $2600 monthly
from July 1, 2019, until the court-ordered modification in March, 2021,
as the terms of the June, 2017 order contemplated a judicial determina-
tion of the plaintiff’s child support obligation following a consideration
of the child support guidelines; moreover, an interpretation of the June,
2017 order that would condone the plaintiff’s unilateral modification of

* In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as
amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,
Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person
protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective
order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through
whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 3
M. S. v. M. S.
his child support payments solely based on his understanding of the
guideline amount would be inconsistent with the purpose of child sup-
port and its governing statutory scheme and, thus, the plaintiff’s unilat-
eral modification in his child support payments prior to the court-ordered
modification violated the June, 2017 order; accordingly, this court
remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to identify properly
any arrearage owed to the defendant for the period between July 1,
2019, and the March, 2021 order and to establish the terms for the
payment of that arrearage.
Argued April 8—officially released July 2, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Stamford, where the court, Heller, J., rendered
judgment dissolving the marriage and granting certain
other relief in accordance with the parties’ separation
agreement; thereafter, the court, Colin, J., modified the
plaintiff’s child support obligation in accordance with
the parties’ agreement; subsequently, the court, M.
Moore, J., granted the defendant’s motion to modify
child support; thereafter, the court, McLaughlin, J.,
denied the defendant’s motion for contempt, and the
defendant appealed to this court. Reversed in part;
further proceedings.
M. S., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. In this postjudgment dissolution matter,
the self-represented defendant, M. S., appeals from the
judgment of the trial court denying her motion for con-
tempt. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court
improperly construed a child support order and found
that the plaintiff, M. S., did not owe an arrearage.1 We
1
The plaintiff did not file a brief in this appeal. Consequently, on January
11, 2024, this court issued an order stating that ‘‘the appeal shall be consid-
ered on the basis of the [defendant’s] brief, the record, as defined by Practice
Book [§] 60-4, and oral argument, if not waived by the [defendant] or the
court. Pursuant to Practice Book [§] 70-4, oral argument by the [plaintiff]
will not be permitted.’’ On April 2, 2024, the self-represented plaintiff filed
a motion to set aside the order and a request to mark over oral argument
scheduled for April 8, 2024, both of which were denied.
Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

4 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
M. S. v. M. S.

affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the
trial court.2
The following facts and procedural history are rele-
vant to our resolution of this appeal. The court, Heller,
J., dissolved the parties’ marriage on January 2, 2014.
At the time of the dissolution, the parties had three
minor children. The judgment of dissolution incorpo-
rated by reference the parties’ separation agreement
dated December 3, 2013 (separation agreement). The
separation agreement provided, inter alia, that the plain-
tiff would pay the defendant ‘‘child support pursuant
to the child support guidelines,’’ and stated a support
order in the amount of ‘‘approximately $1650’’ monthly.
It further provided that, ‘‘[a]s the parties are to ‘true
up’ their incomes net of taxes for purposes of calculat-
ing the payment of alimony from time to time as set
forth herein below, at the time those ‘true ups’ are
conducted, child support shall also be recalculated pur-
suant to the requirements of the . . . child support
guidelines.’’ Article XI of the separation agreement,
titled ‘‘True Up Calculation,’’ provided a semiannual
process by which the parties were required to
‘‘exchange necessary information regarding their
respective employment incomes and deductions to
allow for an accurate ‘true up’ of their combined net
employment incomes . . . .’’ An accountant would
then ‘‘determine for the parties whether monies paid
in the prior six months meet the criteria of an equal
division of net employment incomes.’’3
2
The defendant also claims on appeal that the court improperly denied
her motion to reargue. Because we reverse in part the judgment of the
court denying the defendant’s motion for contempt, we need not separately
address the defendant’s claim with respect to the denial of the motion for
reargument. See Moore v. Moore, 216 Conn. App. 179, 185 n.1, 283 A.3d
994 (2022).
3
Section 11.1 of the separation agreement provided: ‘‘The parties agree
that for each year the [plaintiff] is obligated to pay alimony and/or child
support to the [defendant] for her benefit and that of the children, the parties
shall exchange necessary information regarding their respective employ-
ment incomes and deductions to allow for an accurate ‘true up’ of their
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 3

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 5
M. S. v. M. S.

On April 5, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to
modify the parties’ separation agreement, alleging that
the ‘‘true up’’ process set forth therein for alimony and
child support was too burdensome, expensive, and
unclear. She represented that no ‘‘true up’’ had taken
place since the date of the dissolution and requested
that Article XI be stricken from the separation agree-
ment. Also on April 5, 2017, the defendant filed a motion
for contempt, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff, com-
mencing January 1, 2017, unilaterally had reduced his
combined child support and alimony payments from
the $2600 amount he had paid since January 1, 2014,
to $620.

On June 27, 2017, the court, Colin, J., approved an
agreement of the parties, which set the plaintiff’s child
support obligation at $2600 per month until June 30,
combined net employment incomes pursuant to the terms set forth above.
These true ups will be for the period ending June 30 of each year to be
completed no later than July 31 and December 31, to be completed no later
than January 30 of the following calendar year, thus giving sufficient time
to the chosen accountant to determine for the parties whether monies
paid in the prior six months meet the criteria of an equal division of net
employment incomes. In the event it is determined that there is either an
underpayment or overpayment of child support and/or alimony, the party
who owes the money to be paid will do so over the course of 90 days in
three, end of month installments. For example, for the June 30 calculation,
due July 31, the under/over payment would be satisfied on July 31, August
31 and September 30, and the under/over payment for the period ending
December 31, to be calculated by January 30, would be paid in three install-
ments on January 30, February 28 and March 31. In order for each party to
determine the accuracy of the calculations to be made, each shall submit
to the other within one business week after June 30 and December 31 true
copies of his or her year to date paystub information or written proof from
his or her employment of gross and net income received to date, as well
as any applicable W2’s, 1099’s and relevant information that would help the
[plaintiff] or [defendant] assess the accuracy of the calculations. The parties
also agree that if they select one accountant to assist them with these
calculations, then each shall pay said accountant 50% of the charges for
said accountant’s services to perform the requisite work. If they select
separate accountants, then each will be responsible for the cost of his or
her own accountant’s services.’’
Page 4 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

6 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
M. S. v. M. S.

2019 (June, 2017 order). The June, 2017 order further
provided that, after June 30, 2019, ‘‘child support will
be modified based on the [child] support guidelines.’’
The June, 2017 order also removed the ‘‘true up’’ pro-
cess and stated that all arrears regarding child support
and alimony were to be considered resolved.
On September 29, 2020, the defendant filed a motion
for modification. Therein, she alleged that, pursuant
to the June, 2017 order, the parties were directed to
recalculate child support in accordance with the child
support guidelines on June 30, 2019. The defendant
alleged that, despite the plaintiff’s salary having
increased in a manner that represented a substantial
change in circumstances, he had ‘‘self-calculated with-
out agreement what he claims to be his child support
obligation and made monthly payments that reflected
his own self-calculation.’’ The defendant claimed that
the plaintiff had decreased his monthly child support
payment contrary to the child support guidelines, he
owed $9600 in arrearages, and he refused to provide
documentation to support his self-calculation. Also on
September 29, 2020, the defendant filed a motion for
contempt, in which she reiterated her allegations that
the plaintiff unilaterally had decreased his child support
payment notwithstanding a substantial increase in his
earnings and that he had refused to provide documenta-
tion supporting his self-calculations. See footnote 8 of
this opinion.
On March 24, 2021, the court, M. Moore, J., issued a
memorandum of decision resolving the September,
2020 motion to modify (March, 2021 order). The court
modified the plaintiff’s child support obligation to $495
per week. The court ordered the child support to be
paid by immediate wage withholding and ordered the
plaintiff to pay the defendant directly until his paycheck
reflected the deduction.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 5

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 7
M. S. v. M. S.

On April 12, 2021, the defendant filed another motion
for contempt, in which she alleged that the plaintiff had
failed to make weekly child support payments following
the court’s March, 2021 order. The defendant also
alleged that the plaintiff was in contempt of the June,
2017 order, in that the $2600 monthly payment order
had remained in effect until the court’s March, 2021
order and the plaintiff unilaterally had reduced the
amount of his child support payment beginning in July,
2019, and further that he had accrued a child support
arrearage of $16,371.43.
On January 19, 2022, the court, McLaughlin, J., held
a hearing on the motion for contempt. Both parties, who
were self-represented, testified, and the court admitted
into evidence certain documents. On February 16, 2022,
the court issued a decision. The court first found both
the June, 2017 order and the March, 2021 order to be
clear and unambiguous. Regarding the June, 2017 order,
the court stated: ‘‘The defendant argued that the June,
2017 order required the plaintiff to continue paying
$2600 a month until the plaintiff sought a modification
from the court. The defendant is misreading the June,
2017 . . . order. The June, 2017 order requires the
plaintiff to pay child support in accordance with the
child support guidelines. There is no stated specific
amount. The plaintiff testified that he paid child support
up through the court’s March, 2021 order based on his
understanding of the child support guidelines amount.
The defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the plaintiff violated the June, 2017 . . .
order let alone that he violated the order wilfully. The
plaintiff is not in contempt of those orders.’’
Regarding the defendant’s claim that the plaintiff vio-
lated the March, 2021 order, the court stated: ‘‘Pursuant
to [this order], the plaintiff is to pay child support in
the amount of $495 by immediate wage withholding. At
the commencement of the March, 2021 order, there was
Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

8 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
M. S. v. M. S.

delay in the plaintiff paying the required child support
until the immediate wage withholding went into effect.
The parties attempted to resolve their dispute regarding
arrears of child support unsuccessfully. The plaintiff
testified that in December, 2021, he started a new job.
Whether there should be a modification of child support
based on the plaintiff’s new position is not before the
court. The immediate wage withholding in the amount
of $495 is still in effect.

‘‘There was considerable confusion between the par-
ties regarding the amounts of child support to be paid.
This confusion is animated because the parties do not
communicate in an effective manner. Based on the con-
fusion over the timing of the child support and the
amounts due and owing, the court finds no wilful viola-
tion of the court’s order. There is no contempt.’’

The court entered a remedial order limited to the
plaintiff’s compliance with the March, 2021 order to
pay $495 per week in child support. For the forty week
period of March 24, 2021, through December 31, 2021,
the court found that the plaintiff owed a total of $19,800
in child support. The court credited the plaintiff’s calcu-
lations that he paid $18,315 for that period. Accordingly,
the court found that the plaintiff owed $1485 in child
support.4 On April 7, 2022, the defendant, then repre-
sented by counsel, filed a motion to reargue, claiming,
inter alia, that the court improperly had determined the
amount of the plaintiff’s child support arrearage. The
court held argument on the motion to reargue on July
19, 2022. On October 24, 2022, the court denied the
4
The court also adjudicated a July 15, 2021 motion for contempt filed by
the plaintiff with respect to the claiming of the children as dependents on
the parties’ tax returns. Although the court in its memorandum of decision
ordered a credit to the plaintiff’s child support arrearage, the court vacated
the credit in its ruling on the defendant’s motion to reargue.
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 7

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 9
M. S. v. M. S.

motion to reargue in part as to the issue in the present
appeal.5 This appeal followed.
The defendant claims on appeal that the court
improperly found that the plaintiff did not owe an
arrearage for the period of July 1, 2019, through March
24, 2021, based on the court’s misinterpretation of the
June, 2017 order.6 Specifically, she contends that, pursu-
ant to the June, 2017 order, the plaintiff’s $2600 monthly
child support obligation remained in place until modi-
fied by the court. Thus, she argues that the plaintiff’s
unilateral reduction in his monthly support payments,
prior to the court-ordered modification, violated the
June, 2017 order. We agree with the defendant.
The June, 2017 order was stated in the parties’ agree-
ment resolving the defendant’s motions for contempt
and modification, which agreement was approved by
and incorporated into the order of the court. An agree-
ment that has been incorporated into a postdissolution
order ‘‘must be regarded as a contract and construed
in accordance with the general principles governing
contracts. . . . When construing a contract, we seek
to determine the intent of the parties from the language
used interpreted in the light of the situation of the
parties and the circumstances connected with the trans-
action. . . . [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascer-
tained by a fair and reasonable construction of the
written words and . . . the language used must be
accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning
and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject
matter of the contract. . . . When only one interpreta-
tion of a contract is possible, the court need not look
5
The court, however, corrected its calculation of child support due to
include amounts owed but not paid for the three weeks prior to the hearing
on the motion for contempt. The court issued a corrected child support
arrearage determination of $2970.
6
The defendant does not raise any claim of error on appeal with respect
to the court’s ruling regarding compliance with the March, 2021 order.
Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

10 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
M. S. v. M. S.

outside the four corners of the contract. . . . Extrinsic
evidence is always admissible, however, to explain an
ambiguity appearing in the instrument. . . . When the
language of a contract is ambiguous, the determination
of the parties’ intent is a question of fact. . . . When
the language is clear and unambiguous, however, the
contract must be given effect according to its terms,
and the determination of the parties’ intent is a question
of law. . . .
‘‘A contract is unambiguous when its language is clear
and conveys a definite and precise intent. . . . The
court will not torture words to impart ambiguity where
ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity. . . .
Moreover, the mere fact that the parties advance differ-
ent interpretations of the language in question does not
necessitate a conclusion that the language is ambigu-
ous.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Parisi v. Parisi, 315 Conn. 370,
383, 107 A.3d 920 (2015).
Consistent with the foregoing principles, we begin
with the relevant language of the June, 2017 order. The
order first reflected the parties’ agreement to remove
the ‘‘true up’’ process contained within the parties’ sepa-
ration agreement. The order next stated that all arrears
regarding child support and alimony were to be consid-
ered resolved, with neither party owing an arrearage
as of June 30, 2017. The order then set the plaintiff’s
child support obligation at $2600 per month. Finally,
the order required the plaintiff to pay ‘‘to the defendant,
child support in the full monthly amount of $2600
through June 30, 2019. Thereafter, child support will be
modified based on the . . . child support guidelines.’’
The terms of the order expressly contemplate the
possibility of modification of the plaintiff’s child sup-
port obligation after June 30, 2019. Modification of child
support is governed by General Statutes § 46b-86 (a),
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 9

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 11
M. S. v. M. S.

which provides in relevant part that ‘‘any final order
for the periodic payment of . . . support . . . may, at
any time thereafter, be . . . modified by the court upon
a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances
of either party or upon a showing that the final order
for child support substantially deviates from the child
support guidelines established pursuant to section 46b-
215a, unless there was a specific finding . . . that the
application of the guidelines would be inequitable or
inappropriate. . . .’’ A self-calculation by the plaintiff
of the amount of his child support obligation based on
his understanding of the child support guidelines is
inconsistent with the plain language of the order refer-
encing modification. Accordingly, we conclude that the
only fair and reasonable construction of the order stat-
ing that ‘‘child support will be modified based on the
. . . child support guidelines’’ is an order contemplat-
ing a judicial determination of the plaintiff’s child sup-
port obligation following consideration of the child sup-
port guidelines, as required by statute. See General
Statutes § 46b-215b (a) (‘‘[t]he . . . guidelines issued
pursuant to section 46b-215a . . . shall be considered
in all determinations of child support award amounts’’).
Consideration of the language used interpreted in
light of the situation of the parties and the circum-
stances surrounding the issuance of the June, 2017
order also supports the conclusion that the $2600 pay-
ment was to remain in place until modified by the court.
The June, 2017 order resolved the motions of the defen-
dant for modification and contempt, which alleged that
the ‘‘true up’’ process set forth in the parties’ separation
agreement was unworkable and that the plaintiff unilat-
erally had reduced his child support payment. The June,
2017 order removed, by agreement of the parties, the
‘‘true up’’ process and stated that all past arrears regard-
ing child support and alimony were to be considered
resolved. To construe the June, 2017 order as permitting
Page 10 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

12 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
M. S. v. M. S.

the plaintiff to self-calculate his child support obligation
in accordance with his understanding of the child sup-
port guidelines cannot be reconciled with the removal
of the ‘‘true up’’ process following the parties’ inability
to cooperatively perform that process.
Additionally, an interpretation of the June, 2017 order
that would condone the plaintiff’s unilateral modifica-
tion of his child support payments solely ‘‘based on his
understanding of the child support guidelines amount’’
would be inconsistent with the purpose of child support
and its governing statutory scheme. ‘‘[A]lthough child
support orders are made and enforced as incidents to
divorce decrees . . . the minor children’s right to
parental support has an independent character, sepa-
rate and apart from the terms of the support obligations
as set out in the judgment of dissolution.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Kirwan v. Kirwan, 185
Conn. App. 713, 731, 197 A.3d 1000 (2018). ‘‘[T]he statu-
tory scheme regarding child support enforcement
evinces a strong state policy of ensuring that minor
children receive the support to which they are entitled.
. . . Both state and national policy has been, and con-
tinues to be, to ensure that all parents support their
children and that children who do not live with their
parents benefit from adequate and enforceable orders
of child support. . . . Child support is now widely rec-
ognized as an essential component of an effective and
comprehensive family income security strategy. . . .
As with any income source, the effectiveness of child
support in meeting the needs of children is, of necessity,
increased when payments are made regularly and with-
out interruption.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Kupersmith v. Kupersmith, 146 Conn.
App. 79, 92, 78 A.3d 860 (2013).
In the present case, neither party filed a motion for
modification of the plaintiff’s child support obligation
until the defendant filed motions for modification and
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 11

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 13
M. S. v. M. S.

contempt in September, 2020. It is undisputed that the
plaintiff did not continue to make monthly payments
of $2600 for the period of July 1, 2019, through March
24, 2021, but rather, as the court found, he ‘‘paid child
support up through the court’s March, 2021 order based
on his understanding of the child support guidelines
amount.’’7 In its March, 2021 order resolving the defen-
dant’s motions for modification,8 the court modified
the plaintiff’s child support obligation to $495 weekly
prospectively. Because the plaintiff was obligated to
pay $2600 monthly from July 1, 2019, until the modifica-
tion in March, 2021, the plaintiff’s reduced payments
during that time period were not in compliance with
the terms of the June, 2017 order, and the court erred
in failing to determine the amount of the arrearage
attributable to the plaintiff’s noncompliance with the
child support order.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial
court in part as to the defendant’s motion for contempt
and remand the matter for further proceedings thereon,
limited to a new hearing to identify properly any arrear-
age owed to the defendant for the period of July 1,
7
Although the court did not make factual findings as to the amount of
child support paid by the plaintiff for the period of July 1, 2019, through
March 24, 2021, the court admitted into evidence a copy of an email written
and sent by the plaintiff to the defendant. The email stated: ‘‘So from July
2019 through Nov 2019 I made a mistake in payment and only paid $1,600
a month. Then for Dec 2019, I realized this and made the correct payment
of $1,800. Then in Dec, I made a payment for $1,000 which would cover the
5 months of being short the $200 each month. Then July 2020, I made an
additional payment for $4,275 because I made more than I projected when
we were doing the support calculations for 2019. So that is a total of $14,075
for the half year of 2019, July-Dec 31, 2019. That is $2,345 a month Total
for 2020 $21,600. That is $1,800 a month.’’
8
During the hearing on the motion for contempt at issue in this appeal,
the plaintiff argued that the claim for arrearages accumulated prior to the
March, 2021 order implicitly had been rejected in the court’s March, 2021
order based on the absence of any finding of an arrearage for that time
period. The court rejected that argument, responding that the March, 2021
order did not ‘‘speak to arrearages for the prior years.’’
Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

14 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1
M. S. v. M. S.

2019, through March 24, 2021, and to establish the terms
for payment of that arrearage. See Casiraghi v. Casi-
raghi, 200 Conn. App. 771, 786 n.15, 241 A.3d 717 (2020)
(‘‘[e]ven in the absence of a finding of contempt, a trial
court has broad discretion to make whole any party
who has suffered as a result of another party’s failure
to comply with a court order’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).9
The judgment is reversed in part as to the defendant’s
motion for contempt and the case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion; the judg-
ment is affirmed in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

9
The defendant also claims on appeal, in the alternative, that the court
erred in failing to find the plaintiff in contempt. ‘‘[C]ivil contempt is commit-
ted when a person violates an order of court which requires that person in
specific and definite language to do or refrain from doing an act or series
of acts. . . . In part because the contempt remedy is particularly harsh
. . . such punishment should not rest upon implication or conjecture, [and]
the language [of the court order] declaring . . . rights should be clear, or
imposing burdens [should be] specific and unequivocal, so that the parties
may not be misled thereby. . . . To constitute contempt, it is not enough
that a party has merely violated a court order; the violation must be wilful.
. . . It is the burden of the party seeking an order of contempt to prove,
by clear and convincing evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive
to the alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor’s wilful noncompliance
with that directive.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Puff v. Puff, 334 Conn. 341, 364–65, 222 A.3d 493 (2020).
‘‘A good faith dispute or legitimate misunderstanding of the terms of
an alimony or support obligation may prevent a finding that the payor’s
nonpayment was wilful. This does not mean, however, that such a dispute
or misunderstanding will preclude a finding of wilfulness as a predicate to
a judgment of contempt. Whether it will preclude such a finding is ultimately
within the trial court’s discretion. It is within the sound discretion of the
court to deny a claim for contempt when there is an adequate factual basis
to explain the failure to honor the court’s order.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 529, 710 A.2d 757 (1998).
In the present case, the plaintiff advocated, and the trial court accepted,
an interpretation of the June, 2017 order that condoned the plaintiff’s self-
calculation of his child support obligation in accordance with his understand-
ing of the child support guidelines. The court found that the defendant failed
to prove a violation of the order, ‘‘let alone that he violated the order
0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13

0 Conn. App. 1 ,0 15
M. S. v. M. S.

wilfully.’’ Although we disagree with the trial court’s construction of the
June, 2017 order, in light of the misunderstanding over the terms of that
order, the defendant has not shown that the court abused its discretion in
declining to find the plaintiff in contempt. Accordingly, the scope of the
remand is limited to a new hearing to identify properly any arrearage and
to establish the terms for payment of that arrearage.