Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC

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Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC

EDGEWOOD PROPERTIES, LLC v. DYNAMIC
MULTIMEDIA, LLC, ET AL.
(AC 46250)
Elgo, Suarez and Flynn, Js.

Syllabus

The defendants appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court
rendered for the plaintiff, who commenced this summary process evic-
tion proceeding. The defendants entered into a written lease agreement
with O with respect to certain residential property. O died and the
property was sold to the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff demanded that
the defendants vacate the property, the defendants refused to do so,
and the plaintiff served the defendants with notices to quit. After trial
commenced, the court denied the defendants’ motions in limine to pres-
ent evidence of an alleged settlement and to summarily enforce a settle-
ment agreement. Held:
1. This court concluded that, although the trial court improperly determined
that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment of possession of the property
based on lapse of time, the defendants were not entitled to relief with
respect to this claim: the only evidence of a written lease agreement
was the agreement between O and the defendants, an agreement that
ended, pursuant to its terms, when title to the property was transferred
to the plaintiff, and, accordingly, the trial court erred in finding the
existence of a rental agreement between the parties and the judgment
could not be sustained on the ground of lapse of time; moreover, the
plaintiff was entitled to judgment in its favor on the alternative ground
that the defendants’ privilege or right to occupy the property had expired,
as it was undisputed that the property was sold to the plaintiff and the
defendants remained in possession of the property.
2. The trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion in limine to present
evidence of a purported settlement agreement between the parties:
although the motion in limine described the evidence the defendants
wanted to present, it did not address the prejudice that could result, and
the court reasonably considered this motion in light of the defendants’
motion to enforce a purported settlement agreement and discussed the
propriety of the defendants’ decision to seek summary enforcement of
a settlement agreement, the existence of which was vehemently disputed
by the plaintiff, as well as the potential to disrupt the summary process
trial that had already commenced; moreover, the court noted that the
defendants had opportunities for settlement negotiations before trial and
reasonably concluded that, had a settlement been reached, a mediation
specialist would have reported the settlement to the court, that granting
the motion would have prejudiced the plaintiff, and that the focus should
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Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC
be on the need to avoid any undue delay in adjudicating the plain-
tiff’s action.
3. The defendants’ claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
their motion to enforce a purported settlement agreement was unavail-
ing; although the trial court improperly relied on the rule of practice
applicable to motions for summary judgment (§ 17-44), the defendants
were not entitled to relief because the court properly refused to hear
evidence of the alleged agreement, as the court’s authority to enforce
a settlement agreement may be exercised only when the terms are clear,
unambiguous and undisputed, and, in the present case, the existence
of a settlement agreement was in dispute, and the record did not include
any evidence of an enforceable agreement.
Argued November 8, 2023—officially released July 9, 2024

Procedural History

Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Housing Ses-
sion, where the plaintiff filed a substitute complaint;
thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Esperance-
Smith, J.; subsequently, the court, Esperance-Smith,
J., denied the defendants’ motions in limine and for
enforcement of a settlement agreement; judgment for
the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed to
this court. Affirmed.
Thomas A. Amato, for the appellants (defendants).
Jennifer E. Mira, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

SUAREZ, J. In this summary process action, the
defendants, Daniel A. Martin, Dynamic Multimedia,
LLC, and Badger Entertainment, LLC, appeal from the
judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, Edgewood Properties, LLC. On appeal, the
defendants claim that the trial court improperly (1)
determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment
of possession of the subject property based on lapse
of time, (2) denied their motion in limine to present
evidence of a purported settlement agreement reached
by the parties, and (3) denied their motion for summary
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Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC

enforcement of the purported settlement agreement.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The plaintiff commenced the underlying summary
process action against the defendants on September
10, 2021. In its substitute complaint dated October 13,
2021, the plaintiff alleged the following facts. On or
about November 21, 2018, Robert K. Olson entered into
a written lease agreement with the three defendants
for certain residential property in South Windsor.1
According to the terms of the lease agreement, upon
the sale of the property to a third party who was unre-
lated to Olson and the defendants, the defendants were
obligated to vacate the property, remove their belong-
ings therefrom, and leave the property in good and
clean condition. On or about March 3, 2020, Olson died
and the property became part of his estate. On or about
March 5, 2021, the executor of Olson’s estate sold the
property to the plaintiff for $100,000 and, by virtue
of an executor’s deed, conveyed the property to the
plaintiff. Following the conveyance, the plaintiff
demanded repeatedly that the defendants vacate the
property, and the defendants refused the plaintiff’s
demands. On August 3, 2021, the plaintiff served each
of the defendants with a notice to quit, thereby
informing the defendants that they were to vacate the
property by September 6, 2021.2
In count one of the substitute complaint, the plaintiff
alleged that it was entitled to possession of the property
on the ground that the defendants’ right or privilege to
occupy the property pursuant to the lease agreement
had expired following the conveyance to the plaintiff.
1
At trial, Martin testified that Olson was his grandfather and that he
operates Dynamic Multimedia, LLC, and Badger Entertainment, LLC, both
of which are marketing companies.
2
The reasons provided in the notices to quit, which were attached as
exhibit A to the plaintiff’s substitute complaint, were ‘‘lapse of time’’ and
‘‘the original right or privilege to occupy has expired.’’
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In count two, the plaintiff alleged that, ‘‘[w]hen the
defendants failed to vacate the [property] upon the ter-
mination of their lease term, the defendants’ tenancy
converted to a month-to-month lease’’ and that ‘‘[t]he
month-to-month lease has been terminated by lapse
of time.’’
In their answer, the defendants admitted that they
had entered into a lease agreement with Olson, and
they took possession of and continue to occupy the
property. The defendants otherwise denied the allega-
tions or left the plaintiff to its proof. By way of special
defense as to both counts, the defendants alleged the
plaintiff never acquired title to the subject premises
and it therefore lacked standing to commence and pros-
ecute the present action. In support of this defense, the
defendants alleged that Martin, a creditor of Olson’s
estate, had commenced a civil action against the execu-
tor of Olson’s estate challenging the ‘‘purported sale’’
of the property to the plaintiff. The defendants alleged
that Martin’s action was based on the theory that the
executor had not obtained adequate consideration in
the sale and set forth claims of breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, and a violation of the Connecticut Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, General Statutes § 52-552a et
seq. As to both counts of the substitute complaint, the
defendants also alleged, by way of separate special
defenses, that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. In its reply, the
plaintiff denied the defendants’ special defenses and,
pursuant to Practice Book § 10-57, pleaded several mat-
ters in avoidance of the affirmative allegations in the
defendants’ answer.
A court trial commenced on January 24, 2023, and
continued on February 3, 2023. During the plaintiff’s
case-in-chief, the court heard testimony from Rui Costa,
the plaintiff’s sole member. During the defendants’ case-
in-chief, the court heard testimony from Martin and
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Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC

Alexander W. MacDonald, a real estate appraiser. On
January 31, 2023, prior to the second and final day of
trial, the defendants filed a motion in limine seeking
permission from the court to ‘‘permit the defendants
to offer evidence regarding the formation and breach
of a settlement agreement into which the parties
entered one day prior to the commencement of trial
. . . .’’ The defendants also filed a motion seeking ‘‘sum-
mary enforcement’’ of what they described as a settle-
ment agreement between the parties. The court denied
both motions.
Following the trial, the court issued an order in which
it rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In relevant
part, the order stated: ‘‘A summary process trial for
lapse of time was held on January 24, 2023, and Febru-
ary 3, 2023. At the hearing were [Costa] and [the] defen-
dant [Martin] and counsel for both parties.
‘‘After reviewing all the relevant pleadings, argu-
ments, testimony and exhibits, the court finds that the
plaintiff has proved by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence the following facts.
‘‘The service of the notice to quit, the termination
date, and service of the complaint were all timely and
made according to the relevant law. . . .
‘‘There was a rental agreement between the parties.
. . . The plaintiff is the owner or lessor of the subject
property. . . . The term of the written rental agree-
ment terminated. . . . The defendant[s] [are] still in
possession of the premises.
‘‘The court finds that the defendant[s] [have] not met
[their] burden of establishing [their] special defenses.
‘‘Now, therefore, the court enters judgment of posses-
sion in favor of the plaintiff. An execution may issue
immediately after the statutory stay.’’ The court thus
appears to have based its judgment on the cause of
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action sounding in lapse of time, not the cause of action
based on the allegation that the defendants’ right or
privilege to occupy the property pursuant to the lease
agreement had expired following the sale to the plain-
tiff. This appeal followed. Additional facts and proce-
dural history will be set forth as necessary.
I
First, the defendants claim that the court improperly
determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment
of possession of the subject property based on lapse
of time. We agree with the defendants, but we conclude
that the defendants are not entitled to any relief with
respect to this claim.
The defendants argue that the court’s decision was
based upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, namely,
that there was a rental agreement between the parties.3
The defendants further assert that the evidence demon-
strated that, following the conveyance of the property
to the plaintiff, they continued to occupy the property
as tenants at sufferance and, thus, the court erred as
a matter of law in granting the plaintiff relief on the
ground of lapse of time. According to the defendants,
lapse of time is not a legally cognizable theory to sup-
port the termination of a tenancy at sufferance.
We begin by setting forth our standard of review and
applicable legal principles. ‘‘Factual findings are subject
to a clearly erroneous standard of review. . . . It is well
established that [a] finding of fact will not be disturbed
unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence
and pleadings in the whole record. . . . A finding of
fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in
the record to support it . . . or when although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
3
In their answer to paragraph 1 of count one of the plaintiff’s substitute
complaint, the defendants admitted that, on or about November 21, 2018,
they entered into a written lease agreement with Olson.
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entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed . . . . Our
authority, when reviewing the findings of a judge, is
circumscribed by the deference we must give to deci-
sions of the trier of fact, who is usually in a superior
position to appraise and weigh the evidence. . . . The
question for this court . . . is not whether it would
have made the findings the trial court did, but whether
in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole
record it is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) J. M. v. E. M., 216 Conn. App. 814,
820–21, 286 A.3d 929 (2022). ‘‘When, however, the trial
court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary
and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally
and logically correct and find support in the facts as
they appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Housing Authority v. Neal, 211 Conn. App.
777, 783, 274 A.3d 257 (2022).
‘‘Summary process is a statutory remedy that enables
a landlord to recover possession from a tenant upon
the termination of a lease . . . . The purpose of sum-
mary process proceedings is to permit the landlord to
recover possession of the premises upon termination
of a lease without experiencing the delay, loss, and
expense to which he might be subjected under a com-
mon law cause of action. The process is intended to
be summary and is designed to provide an expeditious
remedy to a landlord seeking possession . . . . We
have recognized the principle that, because of the sum-
mary nature of its remedy, the summary process statute
must be narrowly construed and strictly followed. . . .
‘‘Summary process actions are governed by General
Statutes § 47a-23, which allows an owner or lessor to
issue a notice to quit only under certain conditions,
including: (1) when the lease terminates . . . by lapse
of time . . . . In a summary process action for lapse
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of time, the plaintiff landlord must prove, as part of its
prima facie case, that the term of the lease has expired.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Altama, LLC v. Napoli Motors, Inc., 181 Conn. App.
151, 158, 186 A.3d 78 (2018).4 A ‘‘tenant’’ is defined as
‘‘the lessee, sublessee or person entitled under a rental
agreement to occupy a dwelling unit or premises to the
exclusion of others or as is otherwise defined by law.’’
General Statutes § 47a-1 (l).
‘‘[Summary process] is preceded by giving the statuto-
rily required notice to quit possession to the tenant.
. . . Service of a notice to quit possession is typically
a landlord’s unequivocal act notifying the tenant of the
termination of the lease. The lease is neither voided
nor rescinded until the landlord performs this act and,
upon service of a notice to quit possession, a [leasehold]
is converted to a tenancy at sufferance.’’ (Citation omit-
ted.) Housing Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn. App. 150,
155, 535 A.2d 377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d
433 (1988).
‘‘A tenancy at sufferance arises when a person who
came into possession of [property] rightfully continues
4
There are various grounds for summary process actions. In basic terms,
when a landlord brings a summary process action based on ‘‘lapse of time,’’
it must demonstrate, among other statutory requirements, that it is entitled
to relief under the corresponding subparagraph of the summary process
statute, § 47a-23 (a) (1) (A), because a rental agreement has expired, but
the tenant remains in possession of the premises. General Statutes § 47a-
23 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘When the owner or lessor, or the owner’s
or lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or lessor’s attorney-at-law,
or in-fact, desires to obtain possession or occupancy of any land or building,
any apartment in any building, any dwelling unit, any trailer, or any land
upon which a trailer is used or stands, and (1) when a rental agreement or
lease of such property, whether in writing or by parol, terminates . . . (A)
By lapse of time . . . such owner or lessor, or such owner’s or lessor’s
legal representative, or such owner’s or lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact,
shall give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy
of such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, at least three days before
the termination of the rental agreement or lease, if any, or before the time
specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or
occupancy.’’
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in possession wrongfully after his right thereto has ter-
minated. . . . After a notice to quit has been served
. . . a tenant at sufferance no longer has a duty to pay
rent. He still, however, is obliged to pay a fair rental
value in the form of use and occupancy for the dwelling
unit. . . . Accordingly, use and occupancy payments
. . . are paid to a landlord by a tenant at sufferance
who occupies the [property] in the absence of a lease
agreement. . . . They are most frequently associated
with summary process proceedings to evict a tenant
because, after a notice to quit possession has been
served, a tenant’s fixed tenancy is converted into a
tenancy at sufferance.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Housing Authority v. Neal,
supra, 211 Conn. App. 783–84; see Waterbury Twin,
LLC v. Renal Treatment Centers-Northeast, Inc., 292
Conn. 459, 473 n.18, 974 A.2d 626 (2009) (‘‘[A]fter a
notice to quit possession has been served, a tenant’s
fixed tenancy is converted into a tenancy at sufferance.
. . . A tenant at sufferance is released from his obliga-
tions under a lease. . . . His only obligations are to
pay the reasonable rental value of the property which
he occupied in the form of use and occupancy payments
. . . and to fulfill all statutory obligations.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.)); see also General Statutes
§ 47a-3c (‘‘[i]n the absence of agreement, the tenant
shall pay the fair rental value for the use and occupancy
of the dwelling unit’’); General Statutes § 47a-26b (pro-
viding for use and occupancy payments to be made,
upon motion, during pendency of summary process
action).5
5
‘‘The mere act of holding over does not create a new tenancy. . . .
Instead, the holdover tenant becomes a tenant at sufferance with no legal
right to possession.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted.) FJK Associates
v. Karkoski, 52 Conn. App. 66, 68, 725 A.2d 991 (1999). ‘‘A holdover tenant
will be considered either a tenant at sufferance if it merely holds over . . .
or a month-to-month tenant if the lessor continues to accept the lessee’s
monthly rental payments following the lease’s expiration.’’ (Citation omit-
ted.) Platt v. Tilcon Connecticut, Inc., 196 Conn. App. 564, 581 n.11, 230
A.3d 854, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 917, 230 A.3d 643 (2020). ‘‘Connecticut
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With respect to the court’s finding that ‘‘[t]here was
a rental agreement between the parties,’’ the defendants
argue, and our careful review of the evidence reflects,
that the only evidence of a written lease agreement
was the agreement entered into between Olson and the
defendants on November 21, 2018. The lease agreement
contains the following relevant provisions. Paragraph
1 states: ‘‘The term of this lease starts on November 1,
2018, and ends on the date that title to the house is
conveyed to a third party purchaser who is unrelated
to the landlord and tenant by consanguinity or affinity,
which act of conveyance excludes devolution of title
by devise or descent.’’ Paragraph 11 states: ‘‘When this
lease ends, [the defendants] will leave the house and
remove all [their] property and the property of others.
[The defendants] will leave the house in good and clean
condition, and [the defendants] will repair any damage
that was caused by [the defendants] or others.’’ Para-
graph 15 states: ‘‘If [Olson sells] the property, [Olson]
shall not have any further liability to [the defendants]
under this lease for any event that happens after [the
defendants] receive written notice that [Olson has] sold
the property. In addition, if [Olson sells] the property,
any security deposit that [the defendants have given
Olson] will be assigned to the new owner of the prop-
erty, and [Olson] shall not have any further liability to
law allows a holdover tenant to be considered as a tenant at sufferance . . .
or as a month-to-month tenant. . . . Our law, however, does not impose
the original lease terms upon parties who have not agreed that such terms
apply to a holdover tenancy.’’ (Citations omitted.) Meeker v. Mahon, 167
Conn. App. 627, 638 n.5, 143 A.3d 1193 (2016). ‘‘A tenancy at will exists
only when the occupation of the property is with the landowner’s consent,
continuing during the tenancy.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 669
Atlantic Street Associates v. Atlantic-Rockland Stamford Associates, 43
Conn. App. 113, 121 n.3, 682 A.2d 572, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 949, 686 A.2d
126 (1996), and cert. denied, 239 Conn. 950, 686 A.2d 126 (1996). A landlord
may engage in conduct, such as accepting payment of rent, that transforms
a tenancy at sufferance into a tenancy at will. See, e.g., Borst v. Ruff, 137
Conn. 359, 362, 77 A.2d 343 (1950).
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return the security deposit to [the defendants].’’ Para-
graph 18 states: ‘‘This lease shall be binding upon [the
defendants] and [Olson] and your and our respective
successors, heirs, executors and administrators.’’ Para-
graph 20 states: ‘‘The parties intend that this lease
instrument be binding on their respective heirs, benefi-
ciaries, executors, administrators, fiduciaries and
assigns.’’ The lease agreement did not include a hold-
over provision.
The plaintiff argues that it ‘‘stepped into the shoes
of [Olson] when it purchased the property, and there-
fore, the rights and obligations of the lease transferred
to [the plaintiff] upon that conveyance.’’ The plaintiff
argues that paragraph 20 ‘‘demonstrates the parties’
specific intent to have their future ‘assigns’ (i.e., pur-
chasers) be bound to the lease terms.’’ We conclude
that the plaintiff’s construction of the lease agreement
is unreasonable in light of the agreement as a whole.
‘‘In construing a written lease, which constitutes a
written contract, three elementary principles must be
kept constantly in mind: (1) The intention of the parties
is controlling and must be gathered from the language
of the lease in the light of the circumstances sur-
rounding the parties at the execution of the instrument;
(2) the language must be given its ordinary meaning
unless a technical or special meaning is clearly
intended; [and] (3) the lease must be construed as a
whole and in such a manner as to give effect to every
provision, if reasonably possible.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co. v.
Vaszil, 279 Conn. 28, 35–36, 900 A.2d 513 (2006).
‘‘[W]here there is definitive contract language, the deter-
mination of what the parties intended by their contrac-
tual commitments is a question of law. . . . [T]he inter-
pretation and construction of a written contract present
only questions of law, within the province of the court
. . . so long as the contract is unambiguous and the
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intent of the parties can be determined from the agree-
ment’s face. . . . Contract language is unambiguous
when it has a definite and precise meaning about which
there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Christian v. Gouldin, 72 Conn. App. 14, 20, 804 A.2d
865 (2002).
Paragraph 1 unambiguously reflects that the term of
the written lease agreement between Olson and the
defendants ended when the title of the property was
transferred to the plaintiff because the uncontroverted
evidence was that the plaintiff is a third-party purchaser
who is unrelated to the parties to the agreement by
consanguinity or affinity. In light of the plain and
unequivocal meaning of paragraph 1, to the extent that
other provisions of the lease agreement reflect an intent
to bind ‘‘respective successors, heirs, executors and
administrators’’ as well as ‘‘beneficiaries . . . fiduciar-
ies and assigns’’ to the terms of the lease agreement,
such provisions cannot reasonably be construed so as
to bind a third-party purchaser who is unrelated to the
parties by consanguinity or affinity.
The evidence does not reflect that, following Olson’s
death and the transfer of title to the plaintiff, the parties
had come to any understanding or agreement with
respect to the defendants’ continued possession of the
property. Costa testified as to his belief that, following
the sale of the property, the defendants ‘‘were to vacate
the property immediately.’’ Thus, Costa testified that,
following the purchase, he demanded that the defen-
dants leave the property and served them with notices
to quit. Martin testified that he did not come to any
agreement, whether oral or written in nature, with the
plaintiff concerning the defendants’ ongoing presence
at the property. There is no evidence in the record that,
after the written lease agreement ended, the parties
came to any agreement with respect to a new tenancy
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Edgewood Properties, LLC v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC

or the payment of periodic rent. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the plaintiff, as landlord, acquiesced in
the defendants’ continued possession of the property.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court’s
factual finding concerning the existence of a rental
agreement between the parties was in error.
The defendants argue that the court’s clearly errone-
ous factual finding was harmful in that it led to the
court’s conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to relief
on the basis of lapse of time. The defendants assert,
and we agree, that they became tenants at sufferance
after their right to possess the property under the
November 21, 2018 lease agreement had terminated and
they continued to possess the property, without the
plaintiff’s approval. The defendants correctly argue that
the court’s judgment cannot be sustained on the ground
of lapse of time, for such ground is not a legally suffi-
cient ground to terminate a tenancy at sufferance. This
court has previously reasoned that a cause of action
based on lapse of time depends on the existence of a
lease or rental agreement between the parties codifying
an allotted time frame, for ‘‘[c]ommon sense dictates
that when a contractual rental agreement is no longer
in place, such an agreement can no longer be violated.’’
Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!! LLC, 133
Conn. App. 1, 24, 33 A.3d 848 (2012); see also, e.g.,
Kellish v. Rosenberg, Superior Court, judicial district
of Middlesex, Housing Session at Middletown, Docket
No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (July 1, 2019) (68 Conn. L. Rptr.
781, 783) (‘‘the defendants correctly argue that lapse of
time would be an inappropriate cause of action against
tenants at sufferance’’); Shough v. Hogan, Superior
Court, judicial district of New Haven, Housing Session,
Docket No. SPNH 9702-49735 (March 21, 1997) (19
Conn. L. Rptr. 450, 450–51) (‘‘[F]or lapse of time to be
a valid reason for the issuance of a notice to quit there
must [be] an underlying lease whether oral or written.
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Lapse of time is not a sufficient reason to terminate a
tenancy at sufferance. A tenancy at sufferance does not
involve a contract or a lease.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.)).6
Although we have concluded that the court made a
factual error and that its judgment based on lapse of
time cannot stand, that does not end our analysis as to
the proper outcome of the present case.7 We may affirm
the judgment of the court if it ‘‘reached the right result,
even if it did so for the wrong reason.’’ Kalas v. Cook,
70 Conn. App. 477, 485, 800 A.2d 553 (2002); see also
White v. Dept. of Children & Families, 136 Conn. App.
759, 767 n.5, 51 A.3d 1116 (‘‘[w]e may affirm the judg-
ment of the court on different grounds if we disagree
with the grounds relied on by the court’’), cert. denied,
307 Conn. 906, 53 A.3d 221 (2012).
As we discussed previously in this opinion, the plain-
tiff alleged, in count one of its substitute complaint, the
ground that the defendants’ privilege or right to occupy
the property had expired. In support of this count, the
plaintiff alleged the following facts: (1) on or about
November 21, 2018, the defendants and Olson entered
into a written lease agreement; (2) the terms of the
lease agreement provided that the lease was to end
when the property was sold to an unrelated third party;
6
To the extent that this court’s decision in FJK Associates v. Karkoski,
52 Conn. App. 66, 67, 725 A.2d 991 (1999), stands for the contrary proposition,
we observe that the court in FJK Associates held that lapse of time was
‘‘an adequate ground for termination under the facts of this case,’’ and we
deem it appropriate to limit its holding to the unique and distinguishable
facts before the court in that case. (Emphasis added.)
7
During oral argument before this court, the parties were asked to address
whether this court could affirm the judgment of the trial court on different
grounds if it agreed with the defendants with respect to the alleged error
raised in their first claim on appeal. The plaintiff’s counsel argued that the
judgment could be affirmed on the alternative legal ground on which they
had relied in count one of the plaintiff’s substitute complaint. The defendants’
counsel acknowledged that relying on this alternative ground was a possibil-
ity but did not acquiesce in that path being taken by this court.
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(3) the terms of the lease agreement required the defen-
dants to vacate the property upon the sale of the prop-
erty; (4) following Olson’s death, the executor of his
estate sold the property to the plaintiff; (5) despite the
plaintiff’s repeated demands, the defendants continue
to occupy the property; (6) the defendants were served
with notices to quit stating, in part, that their privilege to
occupy the property had expired; and (7) the defendants
continue in possession beyond the time designated in
the notices to quit. The plaintiff alleged that, upon the
sale of the premises to it, the defendants’ ‘‘right or
privilege to occupy the property . . . terminated
. . . .’’
The plaintiff, having relied in both its substitute com-
plaint and notices to quit on the ground that the defen-
dants’ right or privilege to occupy the property had
expired, was entitled to judgment in its favor on this
alternative legal ground. Although the court’s findings
of fact in this case are scant, it nonetheless found that
‘‘[t]he term of the written rental agreement terminated.’’
There was only one written rental agreement in evi-
dence, namely, the written lease agreement that Olson
had entered into with the defendants, which was admit-
ted into evidence as exhibit 2. There was no testimony
concerning another rental agreement for the property.
Moreover, the terms of the written rental agreement
are not in dispute. We have already discussed the provi-
sions in the lease agreement related to the term of
the lease and the defendants’ obligation to vacate the
property upon the sale of the property to an unrelated
third party. The evidence was undisputed that a sale
of the property occurred, and that Olson’s executor
conveyed the property to the plaintiff, an unrelated third
party, by means of an executor’s deed. Consistent with
this undisputed evidence, the court found that ‘‘[t]he
plaintiff is the owner or lessor of the subject property.’’
The evidence that the defendants remain in possession
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of the property beyond the time specified in the notices
to quit likewise was undisputed. The court found that
the defendants were ‘‘still in possession of the prem-
ises.’’
On the basis of those findings of the court that have
not been challenged in this appeal, as well as the undis-
puted evidence that we have discussed in our analysis,
we conclude that the plaintiff was entitled to relief
under the summary process statute pursuant to the
ground set forth in count one of the plaintiff’s substitute
complaint, namely, that the right or privilege that the
defendants enjoyed pursuant to their written lease
agreement with Olson had expired, but they continue
to occupy the property. See General Statutes § 47a-23
(a) (3).8 Having concluded that the court erred with
respect to one of its factual findings and its reliance
on § 47a-23 (a) (1) (A), we nonetheless conclude, on
the basis of count one of the substitute complaint, that
the court reached the correct result in rendering a judg-
ment of possession in favor of the plaintiff.
II
Next, we address the defendants’ remaining two
claims, which are interrelated. The defendants claim
that the court improperly denied their (1) motion in
limine to present evidence of a purported settlement
8
General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘When the owner
or lessor, or the owner’s or lessor’s legal representative, or the owner’s or
lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact, desires to obtain possession or occupancy
of any land or building, any apartment in any building, any dwelling unit,
any trailer, or any land upon which a trailer is used or stands, and . . . (3)
when one originally had the right or privilege to occupy such premises but
such right or privilege has terminated . . . such owner’s or lessor’s legal
representative, or such owner’s or lessor’s attorney-at-law, or in-fact, shall
give notice to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of
such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit, at least three days before
the termination of the rental agreement or lease, if any, or before the time
specified in the notice for the lessee or occupant to quit possession or
occupancy.’’
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agreement between the parties and (2) motion for sum-
mary enforcement of the purported settlement agree-
ment. We are not persuaded.
The following additional procedural history is rele-
vant to both of these claims. On January 24, 2023, during
the defendants’ case-in-chief and near the conclusion
of the first day of the trial, Martin was asked about his
efforts to purchase the property from the plaintiff. The
plaintiff’s counsel objected on the ground that the ques-
tion was ‘‘dangerously approaching [the subject of] set-
tlement conversations.’’ The defendants’ counsel
responded, ‘‘[o]ur purported evidence . . . is to show
that there was a settlement agreement between these
two parties.’’ The court questioned why that topic was
relevant. The defendants’ counsel responded, ‘‘I was
going to say . . . if there was a settlement agreement
between the parties . . . and, if one party breaches it,
that’s actionable.’’ The following colloquy then
occurred:
‘‘The Court: Do you have the agreement?
‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: We . . . do have a
series of email communications. . . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor . . . this is
actually, this is a problem. I suggest you stop because
this is not—you’re making gross misrepresentations
now. There is no settlement agreement whatsoever.
‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Might I just finish my
argument first, Judge?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I’m concerned for you, so
that’s why I’m stepping in here.
‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: I’m saying, Judge, there
are a series of email communications between the par-
ties. And the submission to the plaintiff of a proposed—
a written contract that reflects the terms, except for
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one, that were agreed upon. Which was, then, agreed
upon later. And, our position is that there was a settle-
ment agreement . . . which is actionable. . . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: You are misrepresent—I
can’t even believe this is happening right now. I actually
can’t believe this is happening. . . . This is gross mis-
representation. And I would ask that all of this be
stricken from the record, Your Honor. There is zero
settlement agreement. There has been nothing—zero
communication between the parties, as you just indi-
cated.
‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: I think that the evidence
will disclose otherwise. And I think that is a question
for the court to adjudicate, whether or not there exists
sufficient evidence to support a settlement agreement.
If the court says no, there’s not. Fine. But that’s not a
situation where counsel can just argue that there’s no
evidence, without seeing or knowing . . . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: You’re—the court is well
aware that settlement discussions are privileged. You
can’t be discussing this right now. And all you’re doing
is delaying this trial . . . .
‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: We’re the ones that sug-
gested coming back here and completing [Martin’s] tes-
timony [during the first day of trial]. So, don’t accuse us.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, my objection
stands. If Your Honor can rule. And then we can proceed
with this. I don’t want to waste any more time. I’m . . .
dangerously close to suggesting a motion for sanctions
right now.
‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: This is not a question of
settlement negotiations. It is a settlement agreement.
. . .
‘‘The Court: So, if there’s an agreement . . . .
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‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: There is no agreement,
Your Honor. Nothing has been agreed to. Nothing has
been signed. That [is] misrepresentation alone, I move
for sanctions.
‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: If there is an agreement,
and a party breaches it, our case law supports a cause
of action for that. Now, if this court wants us to, or is
suggesting we bring a separate action for that and test
it elsewhere? That is actionable . . . it’s a cause of
action.
***
‘‘The Court: Is there a document that you’re seeking
to enter into evidence?
‘‘[The Defendants’ Counsel]: We do have a series of
documents, Judge. . . .
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: To the extent they were
part of any settlement negotiations to prevent this trial
and this colossal waste of time and money on behalf
of my client. Then it is completely excluded. It is pre-
cluded. I would file an oral motion in limine to preclude
it. I shouldn’t even need to. I can’t believe this is even
happening.’’
Thereafter, the plaintiff’s counsel made an oral
motion for judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. The defen-
dants’ counsel objected to the motion on the basis of
what he considered to be critical issues raised by way
of the defendants’ answer and special defenses. The
court denied the plaintiff’s oral motion for judgment
and continued the trial to another day.
On January 31, 2023, prior to the second day of trial,
the defendants filed a motion in limine asking ‘‘that the
court permit the defendants to offer evidence regarding
the formation and breach of a settlement agreement
into which the parties entered one day prior to the
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commencement of trial on January 24, 2023 . . . .’’ On
the same day, the defendants also filed a motion for
‘‘summary enforcement’’ of the alleged settlement
agreement. That motion stated: ‘‘[D]uring the period of
approximately October 20, 2022, to January 23, 2023,
the parties negotiated and formed an agreement by
which the plaintiff agreed to sell, and the defendant
Daniel A. Martin agreed to purchase, the premises sub-
ject of this action for the price of $300,000, subject to
the condition that [Martin] obtain a mortgage, with a
$50,000 nonrefundable deposit and no waiver by the
plaintiff of any prior use and occupancy claims that it
may possess against the defendants.
‘‘Wherefore the defendants pray that the court order
the parties to execute the written contract, incorporat-
ing the terms which the court finds to which they
agreed, for the purchase and sale of the subject prem-
ises.’’
In the memorandum of law submitted by the defen-
dants in support of their pending motions, they stated
that, if the court had permitted Martin to respond to
his attorney’s inquiry concerning his efforts to purchase
the property, ‘‘Martin would have testified that he and
the plaintiff exchanged written communications, which,
in the aggregate, would have demonstrated that the
parties had consummated a written agreement for the
purchase and sale of the subject premises. Such agree-
ment would have resolved the plaintiff’s claim for occu-
pancy.’’ The defendants also represented that, ‘‘[i]n the
present case, Martin made an offer to purchase the
premises, the plaintiff made a counteroffer, and the
plaintiff accepted it.’’ The defendants stated that, ‘‘[i]n
the present case, the plaintiff’s counsel, as the plaintiff’s
agent, authorized to negotiate on behalf of the plaintiff
and the party to be charged, signed the several email
correspondences which, in the aggregate, formed the
agreement to purchase and sell the subject premises.’’
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The defendants also stated that the plaintiff had
breached an agreement to settle the action, even though
the agreement was not memorialized in a written con-
tract that had been signed by both parties. The defen-
dants argued that ‘‘[t]he mere fact that the parties still
may have needed to accomplish the perfunctory tasks
of printing and signing the form contract the plaintiff
approved in no manner compromises the validity of the
agreement.’’
In response, the plaintiff filed an objection to the
defendants’ motion to enforce the alleged settlement
agreement, in which it disputed the alleged terms of
any agreement. Later, the plaintiff filed an amended
objection to the motion to enforce the alleged settle-
ment agreement. Therein, the plaintiff argued that the
defendants violated Practice Book § 17-44 by failing to
seek permission from the court to file the motion to
enforce, which it characterized as ‘‘a motion for sum-
mary judgment.’’ The plaintiff also argued that, if the
defendants’ motion to enforce was proper, it should be
denied because the court did not have the authority to
summarily enforce the alleged settlement agreement
because the defendants had not presented a written
settlement agreement that memorialized the purported
agreement on which the defendants relied, and the
plaintiff disputed its terms.
By order of February 2, 2023, the court denied the
motion in limine. By order of the same date, the court
denied the motion for summary enforcement of the
alleged settlement agreement. The court noted that the
motion was ‘‘[d]enied based on the defendants’ failure
to comply with Practice Book § 17-44. At the outset of
the trial the next day, the defendants’ counsel made an
oral motion for a continuance on the ground that Martin
was unable to attend the proceeding. After conferring
with the parties’ counsel in chambers and hearing argu-
ment, the court, in open court, denied the motion. The
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defendants thereafter did not present further evidence,
and the court heard oral argument from both parties
with respect to the merits of the summary process
action.
After the defendants filed the present appeal, the
court, in response to a motion for articulation filed by
the defendants, set forth the reasoning for its denial of
the motion in limine. The court stated: ‘‘This matter
was scheduled for a summary process trial on January
24, 2023. The parties first met with a mediation special-
ist, on the same date, for the purposes of discussing
settlement negotiations and possibly entering into an
agreement prior to the commencement of trial. The
parties failed to enter into a settlement agreement after
spending a considerable amount of time in previous
mediations. Therefore, the matter was scheduled for
January 24, 2023, and, due to time constraints, the mat-
ter had to be scheduled for an additional day of trial.
At the conclusion of day one of trial, the [defendants’
counsel] attempted to enter what he deemed to be an
agreement between the parties while examining his
final witness. The plaintiff’s counsel objected on the
basis that the [defendants’ counsel] was attempting to
enter settlement negotiations into evidence. The defen-
dants’ counsel stated that there was no written agree-
ment to enter into evidence, rather, a set of emails
between counsel, that, when considered together would
constitute an agreement between the parties.’’
After describing the defendants’ motion in limine,
motion for summary enforcement of the alleged settle-
ment agreement, and the memorandum of law filed in
support of the motions, the court set forth law concern-
ing summary process actions generally. The court
noted, in particular, that a summary process action is
designed to ‘‘secure a prompt hearing and final determi-
nation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The
court then stated: ‘‘Practice Book § 15-3 provides that,
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[i]f a case has not yet been assigned for trial, a judicial
authority may, for good cause shown, entertain the
motion [in limine]. A motion in limine is intended to
allow the trial court to rule in advance of trial on the
admissibility and relevance of certain anticipated evi-
dence. . . . Further, it is within the court’s discretion
whether to consider a motion in limine. [Section 15-3
additionally provides that the judicial authority may
. . . deny the motion with or without prejudice to its
later renewal . . . .
‘‘In the present matter, the court denied the defen-
dants’ motion in limine after considering the multiple
opportunities for negotiation the parties had before the
commencement of trial on January 24, 2023, and the
fact that a mediation specialist would have reported an
agreement between the parties prior to the commence-
ment of trial on January 24, 2023. The court additionally
considered the prejudice that would have resulted to
the plaintiff by granting the defendants’ motion in limine
as a result of the defendants’ inopportune timing for
filing the motion in limine, as the majority of the trial
evidence had already been heard by the court.
‘‘Furthermore, on February 3, 2023, prior to the com-
mencement of the second date of trial, the court held
a status conference with the parties, where multiple
trial matters were discussed, specifically, the denial of
the defendants’ motions and the lack of a need to have
any additional hearings or delay regarding the second
day of the trial. Additionally, there was discussion
regarding the failure of [Martin] to appear [at the second
day of the trial] and the [counsel for the] defendants’
oral motion to continue, which was later denied on the
record. The trial proceeded without [Martin] present
on February 3, 2023.
‘‘For all these reasons, the court denied the defen-
dants’ motion [in limine].’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.)
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A
The defendants claim that the court improperly
denied their motion in limine to present evidence
related to the purported settlement agreement reached
by the parties. We disagree.
Motions in limine are governed by Practice Book
§ 15-3, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘The judicial
authority to whom a case has been assigned for trial
may in its discretion entertain a motion in limine made
by any party regarding the admission or exclusion of
anticipated evidence. . . . Such motion shall be in
writing and shall describe the anticipated evidence and
the prejudice which may result therefrom. All interested
parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard
regarding the motion and the relief requested. The judi-
cial authority may grant the relief sought in the motion
or such other relief as it may deem appropriate, may
deny the motion with or without prejudice to its later
renewal, or may reserve decision thereon until a later
time in the proceeding.’’ ‘‘[T]he motion in limine . . .
has generally been used in Connecticut courts to invoke
a trial judge’s inherent discretionary powers to control
proceedings, exclude evidence, and prevent occur-
rences that might unnecessarily prejudice the right of
any party to a fair trial. . . . The trial court’s ruling
on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a
showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . .
We will make every reasonable presumption in favor
of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it
for a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Thus, our]
review of such rulings is limited to the questions of
whether the trial court correctly applied the law and
reasonably could have reached the conclusion that it
did. . . . Even when a trial court’s evidentiary ruling
is deemed to be improper, we must determine whether
that ruling was so harmful as to require a new trial.
. . . In other words, an evidentiary ruling will result in
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a new trial only if the ruling was both wrong and harm-
ful. . . . Finally, the standard in a civil case for
determining whether an improper ruling was harmful
is whether the . . . ruling [likely affected] the result.
. . . Despite this deferential standard, the trial court’s
discretion is not absolute. Provided the defendant dem-
onstrates that substantial prejudice or injustice
resulted, evidentiary rulings will be overturned on
appeal [when] the record reveals that the trial court
could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) Connecticut Light & Power Co.
v. Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88, 128, 956 A.2d 1145 (2008).

As the plaintiff correctly observes, the defendants’
motion in limine described the anticipated evidence
they wanted to present, but the motion, and the memo-
randum of law accompanying the motion, did not
address the prejudice that could result therefrom. The
defendants’ arguments in connection with their motion
in limine focused on the importance of settlement agree-
ments and the court’s authority to enforce them, even
in the context of an underlying action. In the present
case, the court considered the motion in limine in light
of the motion to summarily enforce the alleged settle-
ment agreement, which was filed simultaneously with
the motion in limine. Noting that the defendants had
filed one memorandum of law in support of both
motions, the court addressed the context for the motion
in limine. Specifically, it discussed the propriety of the
defendants’ decision to seek the summary enforcement
of a settlement agreement—an agreement that was
vehemently disputed by the plaintiff—and the potential
to significantly disrupt the summary process trial that
had already commenced.9
9
The defendants’ memorandum of law, filed in support of both the motion
in limine and the motion for summary enforcement of the alleged settlement
agreement, itself conflated the issues raised in both of their motions.
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This court has recognized that ‘‘[m]atters involving
judicial economy, docket management [and control of]
courtroom proceedings . . . are particularly within
the province of a trial court. . . . Connecticut trial
judges have inherent discretionary powers to control
proceedings, exclude evidence, and prevent occur-
rences that might unnecessarily prejudice the right of
any party to a fair trial. . . . The [trial] court has wide
latitude in docket control and is responsible for the
efficient and orderly movement of cases. . . . The trial
court has inherent authority to control the proceedings
before it to ensure that there [is] no prejudice or inordi-
nate delay.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ill v. Manzo-Ill, 210 Conn. App. 364,
374, 270 A.3d 108, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 909, 273 A.3d
696 (2022).
It is not surprising that the timing and circumstances
surrounding the defendants’ motion in limine and the
motion to enforce that is inextricably related to the
motion in limine are at the forefront of the court’s
thoughtful articulation. The court reasonably consid-
ered the fact that the defendants’ counsel waited until
the conclusion of the first day of the trial to attempt
to introduce evidence of a purported settlement agree-
ment. Although the defendants asserted that an agree-
ment was reached on January 23, 2023, the defendants
did not file a motion in limine and a motion to enforce
until January 31, 2023, prior to the second day of trial.
The court noted that the defendants had ‘‘multiple
opportunities’’ for settlement negotiations prior to the
first day of trial and reasonably concluded that, had a
settlement been reached, a mediation specialist would
have reported such a settlement to the court in a timely
manner prior to the trial. The court also reasonably
concluded that granting the motion following the pre-
sentation of evidence would have prejudiced the plain-
tiff, which disputed the existence of any agreement.
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Finally, the court observed that, during a status confer-
ence on February 3, 2023, before the second day of trial
commenced, there appeared to be ‘‘the lack of a need
to have any additional hearings or delay regarding the
second day of the trial.’’
The defendants’ appellate arguments challenging the
court’s denial do not meaningfully refute the grounds
of the court’s ruling. The defendants argue that,
‘‘because the court refused to consider any evidence
regarding the settlement agreement, including the date
or time when the parties may have reached it, the court’s
reliance on the timing of the motion is unsupported by
any facts.’’ This argument overlooks the fact that, in
their motion for summary enforcement, the defendants
did not represent that the agreement they sought to
enforce was not the product of last-minute negotiations
that may have occurred during the trial itself. Instead,
the defendants represented that the purported agree-
ment had been negotiated and formed prior to the trial,
specifically, ‘‘during the period of approximately Octo-
ber 20, 2022, to January 23, 2023 . . . .’’ The defen-
dants’ counsel also represented during oral argument
before the court that the purported agreement was
memorialized in a ‘‘series of email communications’’
between the parties.10 This representation makes it
more likely that any negotiated settlement was the prod-
uct of a back-and-forth between the parties, rather than
a single conversation that occurred after the trial had
commenced. Accordingly, it was not ‘‘purely specula-
tive,’’ as the defendants suggest, for the court to have
concluded that the parties not only had multiple oppor-
tunities for negotiation, but that an agreement, if it
10
In their reply brief, the defendants represented that, ‘‘during the media-
tion session the plaintiff’s member denied the existence of any agreement,
thereby obviating the need of reporting a resolution [to the court].’’ This
representation amounts to further support for the trial court’s observation,
which the defendants challenge on appeal, that the parties had ample pretrial
opportunities to negotiate a settlement in this case.
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existed, occurred prior to the commencement of the
presentation of evidence.
We note that the court, in its articulation, appropri-
ately referred to the well settled principle that summary
process ‘‘is a special statutory procedure designed to
provide an expeditious remedy . . . . Summary pro-
cess statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determi-
nation . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The
defendants argue, without any basis in fact or law, that
‘‘conducting a summary enforcement hearing within the
context of a summary process trial should not consume
so much time as to eviscerate the summary nature of
such proceeding.’’ In light of the undisputed fact that
this action was commenced on September 10, 2021, and
the trial did not begin until January, 2023—approxi-
mately twenty-two months after the conveyance of the
property to the plaintiff—the court properly focused
on the need to avoid any undue delay in the adjudication
of the plaintiff’s action so as not to prejudice the plaintiff
in obtaining the relief to which it was entitled under
law. On the basis of all of the foregoing considerations,
we conclude that the court correctly exercised its dis-
cretion in denying the motion in limine.
B
The defendants claim that the court improperly
denied their motion for summary enforcement of the
purported settlement agreement. We disagree.
According to the defendants, the court abused its
discretion in denying their motion because the court
incorrectly relied on Practice Book § 17-44, a rule of
practice governing motions for summary judgment, not
motions for summary enforcement of a settlement
agreement. Moreover, the defendants argue ‘‘that, when
one party raises during the pendency of litigation the
matter of a putative settlement agreement among the
parties, the trial court may, and the defendants contend
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must, conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the parties formed such an agreement, and, if
so, the terms thereof. If the court finds the formation
of such an agreement, and the terms thereof are clear,
then the court should enforce specifically such agree-
ment . . . .’’ The defendants claim that the court
abused its discretion in ‘‘fail[ing] to afford the defen-
dants an evidentiary hearing, either during or separate
from the summary process trial, in which they could
have offered evidence concerning the establishment
and terms of [the purported] settlement agreement.’’
The following principles govern our review of this
claim. ‘‘A trial court has the inherent power to enforce
summarily a settlement agreement as a matter of law
when the terms of the agreement are clear and unambig-
uous. . . . Agreements that end lawsuits are contracts,
sometimes enforceable in a subsequent suit, but in
many situations enforceable by entry of a judgment in
the original suit. . . . Summary enforcement is not
only essential to the efficient use of judicial resources,
but also preserves the integrity of settlement as a mean-
ingful way to resolve legal disputes. When parties agree
to settle a case, they are effectively contracting for the
right to avoid a trial. . . . Nevertheless, the right to
enforce summarily a settlement agreement is not
unbounded. The key element with regard to the settle-
ment agreement in [Audubon Parking Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 225 Conn. 804,
812, 626 A.2d 729 (1993) (Audubon)]11 . . . [was] that
11
‘‘In Audubon, our Supreme Court shaped a procedure by which a trial
court could summarily enforce a settlement agreement to settle litigation
. . . . The court held that a trial court may summarily enforce a settlement
agreement within the framework of the original lawsuit as a matter of law
when the parties do not dispute the terms of the agreement. . . . [S]ee also
Reiner v. Reiner, 190 Conn. App. 268, 270 n.3, 210 A.3d 668 (2019) ([a]
hearing pursuant to Audubon . . . is conducted to decide whether the terms
of a settlement agreement are sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to
be enforceable as a matter of law . . .).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Krasko v. Konkos, 224 Conn. App. 589, 594 n.3, 314 A.3d 34 (2024).
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there [was] no factual dispute as to the terms of the
accord. Generally, [a] trial court has the inherent power
to enforce summarily a settlement agreement as a mat-
ter of law [only] when the terms of the agreement are
clear and unambiguous . . . and when the parties do
not dispute the terms of the agreement. . . . The rule
of Audubon effects a delicate balance between con-
cerns of judicial economy on the one hand and a party’s
constitutional rights to a jury and to a trial on the other
hand. . . . To use the Audubon power outside of its
proper context is to deny a party these fundamental
rights and would work a manifest injustice. . . .
‘‘A settlement agreement is a contract among the
parties. . . . In order to form a binding and enforceable
contract, there must exist an offer and an acceptance
based on a mutual understanding by the parties . . . .
The mutual understanding must manifest itself by a
mutual assent between the parties. . . . In other
words, [i]n order for an enforceable contract to exist,
the court must find that the parties’ minds had truly met.
. . . If there has been a misunderstanding between the
parties, or a misapprehension by one or both so that
their minds have never met, no contract has been
entered into by them and the court will not make for
them a contract which they themselves did not make.
. . . Meeting of the minds is defined as mutual agree-
ment and assent of two parties to contract to substance
and terms. It is an agreement reached by the parties to
a contract and expressed therein, or as the equivalent
of mutual assent or mutual obligation. . . . This defini-
tion refers to fundamental misunderstandings between
the parties as to what are the essential elements or
subjects of the contract. It refers to the terms of the
contract, not to the power of one party to execute a
contract as the agent of another. . . .
‘‘A contract is not made so long as, in the contempla-
tion of the parties, something remains to be done to
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establish the contractual relation. The law does not
. . . regard an arrangement as completed which the
parties regard as incomplete. . . . In construing the
agreement . . . the decisive question is the intent of
the parties as expressed. . . . The intention is to be
determined from the language used, the circumstances,
the motives of the parties and the purposes which they
sought to accomplish. . . . Furthermore, [p]arties are
bound to the terms of a contract even though it is not
signed if their assent is otherwise indicated. . . .
‘‘Finally, [t]he fact that parties engage in further nego-
tiations to clarify the essential terms of their mutual
undertakings does not establish the time at which their
undertakings ripen into an enforceable agreement . . .
[and we are aware of no authority] that assigns so
draconian a consequence to a continuing dialogue
between parties that have agreed to work together. We
know of no authority that precludes contracting parties
from engaging in subsequent negotiations to clarify or
to modify the agreement that they had earlier reached.
. . . More important . . . [when] the general terms on
which the parties indisputably had agreed . . .
included all the terms that were essential to an enforce-
able agreement . . . [u]nder the modern law of con-
tract . . . the parties . . . may reach a binding agree-
ment even if some of the terms of that agreement are
still indefinite. . . .
‘‘In Vance v. Tassmer, 128 Conn. App. 101, 16 A.3d
782 (2011), appeal dismissed, 307 Conn. 635, 59 A.3d
170 (2013), this court considered whether, in summarily
enforcing a settlement agreement, a trial court had
exceeded the scope of the agreement . . . . In
reviewing that claim, this court explained that [i]t is
axiomatic that courts do not rewrite contracts for the
parties. . . . In determining whether the court went
beyond the scope of the settlement agreement . . . we
review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.
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. . . [T]he court’s authority in such a circumstance is
limited to enforcing the undisputed terms of the settle-
ment agreement that are clearly and unambiguously
before it, and the court has no discretion to impose
terms that conflict with the agreement. . . .
‘‘Discretion means a legal discretion, to be exercised
in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner
to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of
substantial justice. . . . Inherent in the concept of judi-
cial discretion is the idea of choice and a determination
between competing considerations. . . . When
reviewing claims under an abuse of discretion standard,
the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the
action of the trial court . . . . Under that standard, we
must make every reasonable presumption in favor of
upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for
a manifest abuse of discretion. . . . [Our] review of
such rulings is limited to the questions of whether the
trial court correctly applied the law and reasonably
could have reached the conclusion that it did. . . . It
goes without saying that the term abuse of discretion
does not imply a bad motive or wrong purpose but
merely means that the ruling appears to have been made
on untenable grounds.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis
omitted; footnote added; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Krasko v. Konkos, 224 Conn. App. 589, 604–607,
314 A.3d 34 (2024).
We agree with the defendants that the court improp-
erly relied on Practice Book § 17-44. By its terms, § 17-
44 applies to motions for summary judgment in which
a party seeks judgment as to ‘‘any claim or defense
. . . .’’ Here, there was no motion for summary judg-
ment before the court. The defendants’ motion was
captioned as a ‘‘Motion for Summary Enforcement of
Settlement Agreement.’’12 The substance of the motion
12
The court’s reliance on Practice Book § 17-44 may be attributable, in
part, to an unexplained mischaracterization of the defendants’ motion as a
‘‘Motion for Summary Judgment’’ on the Judicial Branch electronic filing
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and the memorandum of law accompanying it readily
reflects that the defendants did not seek judgment as
to any claim or defense in the summary process action
but, rather, that the defendants brought the motion to
compel compliance with a purported agreement to set-
tle the action. Specifically, in the motion, the defendants
sought an order for ‘‘the parties to execute the written
contract, incorporating the terms which the court finds
to which they agreed, for the purchase and sale of the
subject premises.’’

We conclude, however, that the court’s erroneous
reliance on Practice Book § 17-44 does not entitle the
defendants to relief with respect to this claim. The
defendants argue that the court abused its discretion
in denying their motion to enforce. They argue that the
court did so without holding a hearing to determine
the nature of the purported agreement and whether it
should be summarily enforced. In our consideration of
whether the court abused its discretion, we note that
the defendants sought only an articulation of the court’s
denial of their motion in limine, stating in their motion
for articulation with respect to the court’s ruling on the
motion in limine that, with respect to the denial of
their motion to enforce, the court’s order was ‘‘explicit
enough for appellate review.’’ Nevertheless, based upon
the court’s rationale for refusing to hear evidence relat-
ing to the motion for summary enforcement of the
alleged settlement agreement, there is no basis for con-
cluding that the court abused its discretion in denying
the motion to enforce.
system. Thereafter, the plaintiff amended its original and proper objection
to the motion with a motion captioned as an ‘‘Amended Objection to Motion
for Summary Judgment.’’ It is clear from the caption and body of the defen-
dants’ motion that it was a motion for enforcement of a settlement agree-
ment. We therefore reject the plaintiff’s argument in support of affirmance
to the extent that it is premised on its characterization of the defendants’
motion as a motion for summary judgment.
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As a review of the colloquy that took place at trial
reflects, the plaintiff’s counsel vehemently denied that
the parties had reached any mutual agreement to settle
the action. In this circumstance, even if the court had
decided that it would have been appropriate to consider
the merits of the defendants’ motion to enforce, the
plaintiff’s objection to the motion would have put before
the court the factual issue of whether a settlement
agreement existed in the first place. See, e.g., Krasko
v. Konkos, supra, 224 Conn. App. 608.
For the reasons already discussed in this opinion,
however, the court precluded the defendants from pre-
senting any evidence of the purported settlement agree-
ment. In part II A of this opinion, we upheld the court’s
exercise of its discretion in that regard. As a conse-
quence of both the defendants’ trial strategy of waiting
to raise the issue of a purported settlement agreement
until the end of the first day of the trial and the court’s
ruling to preclude the defendants from presenting evi-
dence related to the purported agreement, the record
before us does not afford us a basis upon which to
conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying
the motion to summarily enforce the purported agree-
ment. The court’s authority to enforce a settlement
agreement as a matter of law may be exercised only
when the terms are clear and unambiguous and not
in dispute. Here, the very existence of a settlement
agreement was in dispute. The record does not include
any evidence, let alone an offer of proof, with respect
to the existence of an enforceable agreement that was
comprised of clear and unambiguous terms. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the defendants have failed to
demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to enforce.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.