Karen v. Loftus

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Karen v. Loftus

CINDY L. KAREN v. WILLIAM P. LOFTUS
(AC 46184)
Clark, Seeley and Prescott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed following the trial court’s denial of her motion to
open the dissolution judgment to allow discovery on her claim that the
defendant had fraudulently procured an arbitration award that was incorpo-
rated into that judgment pursuant to statute (§ 46b-66). The plaintiff claimed
that the trial court incorrectly determined that she had failed to establish
probable cause to substantiate her fraud allegations. Held:

The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff’s
motion to open, even though it was filed outside the applicable statutory
(§ 52-420 (b)) time frame.

The trial court improperly denied the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment
based on fraud, as the plaintiff presented evidence of the defendant’s making
of false statements or his failure to disclose facts, which was sufficient to
establish probable cause to substantiate her claim of fraud, thereby war-
ranting discovery and further proceedings.
Argued January 29—officially released September 17, 2024

Procedural History

Action for the dissolution of a marriage, and for other
relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis-
trict of Fairfield, where the court, Hon. Gerard I. Adel-
man, judge trial referee, approved the stipulation of
the parties to enter into binding arbitration as to certain
disputed matters; thereafter, the arbitrator issued a
decision, and the court, Sommer, J., incorporated the
arbitrator’s decision into its judgment dissolving the
marriage and granted certain other relief in accordance
with the parties’ separation agreement; subsequently,
the court, Hon. Eddie Rodriguez, Jr., judge trial referee,
denied the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment, and
the plaintiff appealed to this court, Elgo, Suarez and
Palmer, Js., which reversed the trial court’s judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings; there-
after, the court, Truglia, J., denied the plaintiff’s motion
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Karen v. Loftus

to open the judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to this
court. Reversed; further proceedings.
Thomas J. Rechen, with whom were Charles D. Ray
and, on the brief, Gregory A. Hall, for the appellant
(plaintiff).
Anthony L. Cenatiempo, with whom, on the brief,
was Norman A. Roberts, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. This marital dissolution matter, which
requires the resolution of jurisdictional and merits
related issues arising from the arbitration of a specific
aspect of the parties’ prenuptial agreement, returns to
us for a second time. Following the dissolution of the
parties’ marriage, the plaintiff, Cindy L. Karen, has
endeavored to open that judgment for the limited pur-
pose of allowing discovery with respect to her claim
that the arbitration award, which subsequently was
incorporated into the dissolution judgment, was pro-
cured by fraud committed by the defendant, William P.
Loftus.1 In this appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court
improperly denied her motion to open the dissolution
judgment for the limited purpose of conducting discov-
ery after it concluded that she had failed to establish
probable cause that the arbitration award pertaining to
the financial ramifications of the defendant’s departure
from his employment with Merrill Lynch, and its subse-
quent incorporation into the dissolution judgment, was
obtained by fraud.2 The defendant disagrees with the
merits of the plaintiff’s claim and, additionally, contends
1
The defendant recently commenced a separate action against the plaintiff
alleging vexatious litigation on the basis of the plaintiff’s prosecution of the
motion to open that is the subject of this appeal. See Loftus v. Karen,
Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
A motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was granted by the trial court on
February 26, 2024.
2
See Oneglia v. Oneglia, 14 Conn. App. 267, 540 A.2d 713 (1988).
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Karen v. Loftus

that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
to consider the plaintiff’s motion to open because her
challenge to the arbitration award was not timely pursu-
ant to General Statutes § 52-420 (b). We are not per-
suaded by the defendant’s jurisdictional claim and agree
with the plaintiff that the court improperly concluded
that she had failed to establish probable cause as to
her fraud claim.3 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
denying the plaintiff’s motion to open and remand the
matter for further proceedings.
In our prior decision, we set forth the following rele-
vant facts and procedural history. ‘‘The plaintiff and
the defendant were married in June, 2007. Prior to the
marriage, on May 14, 2007, the parties entered into
a prenuptial agreement . . . . Paragraph 6 (B) of the
[prenuptial] agreement provides: If, at the time that an
action for dissolution of marriage, annulment or legal
separation is commenced, [the defendant] has left his
employment with Merrill Lynch under an arrangement
that is in any fashion tantamount to a sale of his interest
in Merrill Lynch, i.e. a transaction under which [the
defendant] receives any property, real or personal,
including but not limited to a sum of money, by way
of a sign-on bonus or otherwise, a premium bonus, and/
or restricted stock or other ownership interest (Sale
Proceeds), to work for another entity for any reason
3
The defendant also argues that we should not review the plaintiff’s claim
on the basis of inadequate briefing. Specifically, he contends that ‘‘[o]ther
than one reference . . . which did not include the elements of a fraud claim,
the plaintiff’s brief is devoid [of] any analysis of the fraud elements based
upon the evidence submitted in the hearing on the motion to open.’’ In her
reply brief, the plaintiff counters that her principal appellate brief adequately
addressed the ‘‘central issue of this appeal, which is whether [the plaintiff]
established probable cause that [the defendant] lied to the arbitrator,
resulting in an award that was based on his fraud.’’ (Emphasis omitted.)
We agree with the plaintiff. See, e.g., Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept.
of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 444, 35 A.3d 188 (2012); Lafferty v. Jones, 225
Conn. App. 552, 579 n.33, 316 A.3d 742 (2024); State v. Estrella J.C., 169
Conn. App. 56, 81 n.9, 148 A.3d 594 (2016).
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Karen v. Loftus

whatsoever, including his bringing a book of business
and/or a clientele and/or a book of other assets to a
prospective employer, then [the defendant] shall first
be entitled to set aside the value of $75,000, or $75,000
from the Sale Proceeds, and the balance of such Sale
Proceeds, whenever received or receivable by [the
defendant], shall be divided between [the defendant]
and [the plaintiff] according to the Allocation. . . . If
the Sale Proceeds have been invested in other assets,
the Parties shall maintain a record of all such invest-
ments, and each Party shall be entitled to the value of
such Sale Proceeds so invested and any proportional
gain or loss that is associated with such investment
according to the Allocation. . . .
‘‘In December, 2014, the plaintiff commenced a disso-
lution action against the defendant . . . . The parties
disagreed as to whether the defendant’s obligation to
pay the plaintiff pursuant to paragraph 6 (B) was trig-
gered by the specific circumstances surrounding the
defendant’s departure from his employment at Merrill
Lynch. Under this paragraph of the [prenuptial] agree-
ment, if the defendant’s departure from Merrill Lynch
was determined to be tantamount to a sale of his interest
in Merrill Lynch, the plaintiff would be entitled to one
half of the sale proceeds after the defendant set aside
$75,000. If the defendant’s departure from Merrill Lynch
was not tantamount to a sale, however, the plaintiff
would not receive any of the proceeds. On August 1,
2016, the parties entered into [an agreement that clari-
fied the specific schedule and amounts of monthly pay-
ments of the defendant’s alimony obligation4 and
4
Specifically, the parties agreed to the following: ‘‘The total amount of
the alimony due the plaintiff from the defendant is $1,500,000 ($8333 per
month times 15 years (180 months). The defendant paid the plaintiff alimony
beginning December, 2014, through and including July, 2016, in the amount
of $189,416. The defendant therefore owes the plaintiff $1,310,584 ($1,500,000
minus $189,416). Beginning on or before August 15, 2016, and on or before
the 15th of each month thereafter, the defendant shall pay the plaintiff $8333
per month through and including July, 2029 (156 months). The defendant’s
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requested that the court refer] the case to an arbitrator
for resolution of the issue of whether the defendant’s
departure from Merrill Lynch was a sale of his interest
in Merrill Lynch. On that same day, the court, Hon.
Gerard I. Adelman, judge trial referee, accepted the
parties’ [agreement comprised of the statement regard-
ing the timing of alimony payments and their agreement
to arbitrate] and referred the issue of the defendant’s
departure from Merrill Lynch to an arbitrator.
‘‘The parties agreed to have C. Ian McLachlan, a
retired justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court, act
as the arbitrator of their dispute.5 Beginning on Febru-
ary 16, 2017, McLachlan held a two day hearing wherein
both parties testified. On April 27, 2017, McLachlan
issued a decision in which he concluded that the defen-
dant’s departure from Merrill Lynch was not tantamount
to a sale under the [prenuptial] agreement. In his memo-
randum of decision, McLachlan found that, in October,
2008, sixteen months after the parties were married,
the defendant and three colleagues left Merrill Lynch
and formed a business known as LLBH. Each partner
invested between $10,000 and $15,000 to start LLBH.
final monthly alimony payment in the amount of $2333 shall be paid to the
plaintiff on or before August 15, 2029.’’
5
The August 1, 2016 agreement to arbitrate provided in relevant part:
‘‘The parties join in asking this court to refer this case to the Honorable
Ian McLachlan (Ret.) to arbitrate and determine the applicability of article
6 of the prenuptial agreement to certain facts presented to Justice McLachlan
by each of the parties. The defendant shall be solely [responsible] for Justice
McLachlan’s fees. . . . Any orders entered pursuant to this paragraph . . .
shall be binding upon the parties and incorporated into the judgment of the
court. Each party acknowledges that (a) he or she is entering the agreement
to arbitrate voluntarily and without coercion; (b) the agreement to arbitrate
is fair and equitable under the circumstances; and (c) the agreement to
arbitrate does not include issues related to child support, visitation and cus-
tody.
‘‘Upon the court’s acceptance of the arbitration award . . . the court’s
orders regarding article 6 of the prenuptial agreement shall supersede the
prenuptial agreement and render it null and void after judgment for dissolu-
tion of the marriage is entered except as specifically set forth herein.’’
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Shortly after the business was formed, Focus Financial
(Focus) purchased an option to buy an interest in LLBH
for $2 million, which was shared equally among the
partners. Focus subsequently exercised its option, there
was a corporate reorganization, and Partner Wealth
Management, LLC, was created. When Focus exercised
its option, the defendant received $1,665,000 and 90,000
shares of Focus stock, as well as some options.
‘‘McLachlan further found that, at the time of the
[prenuptial] agreement, the defendant had certain bene-
fits incident to his employment with Merrill Lynch,
including restricted stock units, which he forfeited by
leaving Merrill Lynch. This practice of forfeiture was
very common in the financial services industry and was
one of the reasons that brokers were generally paid a
sign-on bonus when changing jobs by the new employer.
Additionally, brokers were being paid [by their new
employers] for their book of business which, in effect,
represented their customers. The plaintiff and the
defendant negotiated the [prenuptial] agreement, spe-
cifically paragraph 6 (B), to account for this possibility.
‘‘Additionally, McLachlan concluded that the evi-
dence did not support the plaintiff’s claim that the
defendant contemplated leaving Merrill Lynch at the
time the [prenuptial] agreement was made. The defen-
dant did not leave Merrill Lynch until sixteen months
after the date of the marriage, and there was no mention
of the defendant starting his own business in the [pre-
nuptial] agreement. Ultimately, McLachlan determined
that paragraph 6 (B) was drafted in contemplation of
the defendant leaving Merrill Lynch and going to a com-
petitor that would compensate him for both the employ-
ment benefits that he was forfeiting from Merrill Lynch
and the contracts and business that he would bring to
the new company. Instead, the defendant left Merrill
Lynch to start his own company and invested his own
money into the venture. An option to invest in that new
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venture was sold, and more than one year later, the
business created by the venture itself was sold.
According to McLachlan, this scenario is substantially
different than the situation where an employee leaves
a brokerage house and is compensated by the new
employer.’’ (Footnotes added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Karen v. Loftus, 210 Conn. App. 289, 291–94,
270 A.3d 126 (2022).
On May 12, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to confirm
the arbitration award, which the court subsequently
granted. On June 16, 2017, the trial court, Sommer, J.,
incorporated (1) the terms of the prenuptial agreement
with respect to the division of real estate, personal
property, debts and liabilities, (2) the August 1, 2016
agreement, which the court found to be fair and equita-
ble, regarding the timing of the defendant’s alimony
payments to the plaintiff, and (3) McLachlan’s arbitra-
tion award into a final judgment of dissolution. Id., 294.
On April 3, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to open
the dissolution judgment on the ground that the defen-
dant had made fraudulent representations and failed to
disclose material facts to McLachlan during the arbitra-
tion. Specifically, she claimed that the defendant’s con-
tentions that LLBH was a new business, and that busi-
ness was not sold to Focus when he and his partners left
Merrill Lynch, were ‘‘wholly contradicted by evidence
presented in a subsequent trial concerning the same
business . . . .’’ The plaintiff further alleged that the
defendant’s representations to McLachlan that (1) when
leaving Merrill Lynch, he did not contemplate taking
his contacts and clients with him to LLBH, (2) the defen-
dant and his partners did not contemplate an agreement
with Focus until after the May 14, 2007 execution of
the prenuptial agreement, and (3) the agreement and
transaction with Focus did not constitute a sale, were
materially false. ‘‘The essence of the plaintiff’s argument
in her motion to open is that the defendant testified
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falsely during the arbitration and that McLachlan relied
on the purportedly false testimony in concluding that
paragraph 6 (B) [of the prenuptial agreement] did not
apply to the defendant’s departure from Merrill Lynch
to form LLBH.’’ Karen v. Loftus, supra, 210 Conn.
App. 294–95.
After additional filings by the parties, the court, Hon.
Eddie Rodriguez, Jr., judge trial referee, held a hearing
on May 6, 2019, to consider the plaintiff’s motion to
open the dissolution judgment. Id., 296. The purpose
of this hearing was to determine whether a sufficient
basis existed to open the judgment for the limited pur-
pose of proceeding with discovery on the allegations
of fraud set forth by the plaintiff. See Spilke v. Spilke,
116 Conn. App. 590, 593–94 and n.6, 976 A.2d 69, cert.
denied, 294 Conn. 918, 984 A.2d 68 (2009); Oneglia v.
Oneglia, 14 Conn. App. 267, 269–70, 540 A.2d 713 (1988).
On September 25, 2019, the court denied the plaintiff’s
motion to open, stating in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he plaintiff
is mistakenly claiming a second bite at the apple. She
is attempting to open a judgment by filing a motion
which is well beyond [the] permissible four [month]
window to open civil judgments and she is claiming
fraud. The exception to opening judgments outside of
the initial four months does not apply to cases where
a party wants to [relitigate] issues already litigated and
decided. She seeks to reopen the judgment and obtain
a new trial based on what she attempts to characterize
as newly discovered evidence. However the evidence
she references as newly discovered is evidence which
was available during the arbitration and it would have
been cumulative of the evidence offered at the arbitra-
tion. The plaintiff’s claim fails because the evidence
relied upon was not in fact newly discovered evidence
and the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the evi-
dence could not have been discovered and produced
at the former trial by the exercise of due diligence.
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Also, it does not appear to this court that a different
result would be had at another trial.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Karen v. Loftus, supra, 210 Conn.
App. 296.
The plaintiff then appealed to this court from the
denial of her motion to open, claiming that the trial
court had utilized an incorrect legal standard when it
rejected her claim. Id., 296–97. We agreed and identified
the proper standard as follows: ‘‘[T]he court was
required to make a preliminary determination of
whether there was probable cause to believe that the
judgment was obtained by fraud before it could con-
sider the merits of the claim. If the court found probable
cause to believe that the judgment was obtained by
fraud, then the court was required to conduct an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether, in fact, there was
fraud.’’ Id., 302. As a result of the trial court’s failure
to make this preliminary determination, we reversed
the judgment and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings. Id., 303.
Pursuant to our remand, the court, Truglia, J., held
a hearing on September 9, 2022, and January 4 and 5,
2023, for the purpose of determining whether probable
cause existed to open the judgment for the limited pur-
pose of proceeding with discovery as to the plaintiff’s
claim of fraud. After hearing testimony and considering
the submitted exhibits, the court orally denied the plain-
tiff’s motion, stating that it did not ‘‘see any fraud . . .
any fraud whatsoever [and that] [t]here’s no proof,
there’s no compelling evidence that [the defendant]
misled . . . McLachlan.’’ (Emphasis added.) On Feb-
ruary 1, 2023, the court issued a ‘‘statement of decision’’
that contained a brief synopsis of the case and con-
cluded that it had ‘‘found no evidence of fraud.’’ This
appeal followed.6 Additional facts will be set forth as
necessary.
6
On May 23, 2023, the plaintiff moved for an articulation of the denial of
her motion to open. The trial court denied this motion on June 6, 2023.
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Karen v. Loftus

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court
improperly concluded that she had failed to establish
probable cause that the arbitration award, which subse-
quently was incorporated into the judgment of dissolu-
tion, was obtained by fraud. Specifically, the plaintiff
argues that she presented ample evidence of the defen-
dant’s misrepresentations and failure to disclose mate-
rial facts and evidence to McLachlan that resulted in
the defendant’s fraudulently obtaining an arbitration
award in his favor. The defendant counters that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff’s
motion to open and, in the alternative, properly denied
the plaintiff’s motion to open. We disagree with the
defendant’s arguments and conclude that the court
improperly determined that the plaintiff had failed to
meet her preliminary burden of demonstrating that
probable cause existed to warrant discovery and an
evidentiary hearing as to her allegation of fraud.
I
Before considering the merits of this appeal, we must
first address the defendant’s claim that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s
motion to open the judgment. Specifically, he argues
that the plaintiff’s April 3, 2018 motion to open consti-
tutes an untimely attempt to vacate the April 27, 2017
arbitration award and that, consequently, the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to consider it pursuant to § 52-
420 (b). In her reply brief, the plaintiff responds that,
under the facts and circumstances of this case, where
the court incorporated the arbitration award into the
terms of a judgment of dissolution, General Statutes
§ 46b-66 (e) provides the basis for the trial court to
consider her motion and claim of fraud related to the
arbitration. We conclude that the court had subject
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for review with this court. On July
19, 2023, we granted review but denied the relief requested.
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Karen v. Loftus

matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff’s motion
to open.
We begin our analysis of this issue by setting forth
the relevant legal principles regarding the opening of
a dissolution judgment based on fraud. It is a well estab-
lished principle that a court has the inherent authority
to open a judgment, subject to certain limitations. See,
e.g., Jonas v. Playhouse Square Condominium Assn.,
Inc., 173 Conn. App. 36, 39, 161 A.3d 1288 (2017).
‘‘Within four months of the date of the original judg-
ment, Practice Book [§ 17-4] vests discretion in the trial
court to determine whether there is a good and compel-
ling reason for its modification or vacation.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) McGovern v. McGovern, 217
Conn. App. 636, 645–46, 289 A.3d 1255, cert. denied,
346 Conn. 1018, 295 A.3d 111 (2023); see also General
Statutes § 52-212a;7 Hebrand v. Hebrand, 216 Conn.
App. 210, 220–21, 284 A.3d 702 (2022).
This rule serves to further the compelling interest in
the finality of judgments. Strauss v. Strauss, 220 Conn.
App. 193, 203–204, 297 A.3d 581, cert. denied, 348 Conn.
914, 303 A.3d 602 (2023). ‘‘Finality of litigation is essen-
tial so that parties may rely on judgments in ordering
their private affairs and so that the moral force of court
judgments will not be undermined. The law favors final-
ity of judgments . . . . This court has emphasized that
due consideration of the finality of judgments is
important and that judgments should only be set aside
or opened for a strong and compelling reason. . . . It
7
General Statutes § 52-212a (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless other-
wise provided by law and except in such cases in which the court has
continuing jurisdiction, a civil judgment or decree rendered in the Superior
Court may not be opened or set aside unless a motion to open or set aside
is filed within four months following the date on which the notice of judgment
or decree was sent . . . .’’ Practice Book § 17-4 (a) essentially mirrors the
language of § 52-212a (a). See Fitzsimons v. Fitzsimons, 116 Conn. App.
449, 454–55, 975 A.2d 729 (2009).
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is in the interest of the public as well as that of the
parties [that] there must be fixed a time after the expira-
tion of which the controversy is to be regarded as settled
and the parties freed of obligation to act further in
the matter by virtue of having been summoned into or
having appeared in the case. . . . Without such a rule,
no judgment could be relied on.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 204; see also Bruno v. Bruno, 146
Conn. App. 214, 229, 76 A.3d 725 (2013).
Our appellate courts, however, have recognized that
§ 52-212a ‘‘does not abrogate the court’s common-law
authority to open a judgment beyond the four month
limitation upon a showing that the judgment was
obtained by fraud, duress or mutual mistake. . . . The
common-law reasons for opening a judgment seek to
preserve fairness and equity.’’ (Citation omitted; inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) Bruno v. Bruno, supra,
146 Conn. App. 230; see also Conroy v. Idlibi, 343 Conn.
201, 205, 272 A.3d 1121 (2022) (fraud is exception to
four month limitation for motion to open judgment);
Veneziano v. Veneziano, 205 Conn. App. 718, 726, 259
A.3d 28 (2021) (although motion to open normally must
be filed within four months of entry of judgment, motion
to open based on fraud is not subject to this limitation).
Our Supreme Court specifically has recognized that
a marital dissolution judgment based on a stipulation
between the parties may be opened if the stipulation,
and thus the judgment, was obtained by fraud. See, e.g.,
Reville v. Reville, 312 Conn. 428, 440–41, 93 A.3d 1076
(2014); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 275 Conn. 671, 685, 882
A.2d 53 (2005); Billington v. Billington, 220 Conn. 212,
217–18, 595 A.2d 1377 (1991).
We now turn to the defendant’s specific jurisdictional
claim, made for the first time in this appeal.8 He argues
8
A claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at
any time during the proceedings, including on appeal. See, e.g., Mention v.
Kensington Square Apartments, 214 Conn. App. 720, 727, 280 A.3d 1195
(2022); Parisi v. Niblett, 199 Conn. App. 761, 768, 238 A.3d 740 (2020).
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Karen v. Loftus

that the plaintiff’s challenge to the underlying arbitra-
tion award was untimely because she did not file an
application to vacate the award within thirty days of
the issuance of notice of the award. As a result, the
defendant contends that the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to open the judgment that incorpo-
rated the arbitration award pursuant to § 52-420 (b). As
factual support for this argument, he notes that McLach-
lan issued his award on April 27, 2017, which the court,
Sommer, J., then incorporated into the judgment of
dissolution on June 16, 2017, and that the plaintiff did
not move to open that dissolution judgment based on
her claim of fraud until April 3, 2018.
‘‘[S]ubject matter jurisdiction involves the authority
of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy pre-
sented by the action before it. . . . [A] court lacks dis-
cretion to consider the merits of a case over which it
is without jurisdiction . . . . Furthermore, [j]urisdic-
tion of the [subject matter] is the power [of the court]
to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong. . . . A court
has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority
to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) A
Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, 338
Conn. 651, 658, 258 A.3d 1244 (2021); see also Bloom-
field v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
of America, Connecticut Independent Police Union,
Local 14, 285 Conn. 278, 286, 939 A.2d 561 (2008); Petru-
celli v. Travelers Property Casualty Ins. Co., 146 Conn.
App. 631, 640, 79 A.3d 895 (2013), cert. denied, 311
Conn. 909, 83 A.3d 1164 (2014). Stated differently, ‘‘[a]
court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if
it has competence to entertain the action before it.’’
Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185, 413 A.2d 819,
appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S. Ct. 20, 62 L. Ed.
2d 14 (1979).
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Under the circumstances in the present case, the
question of whether the court lacked jurisdiction over
the motion to open is a question of law because it
requires us to interpret the statutory provisions relied
on by the parties. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 200 Conn.
App. 180, 201, 238 A.3d 46, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 977,
241 A.3d 130 (2020); Malpeso v. Malpeso, 165 Conn.
App. 151, 165, 138 A.3d 1069 (2016). Moreover, we note
that there are no jurisdictional facts in dispute regarding
the defendant’s subject matter jurisdictional claim that
would require adjudication by the trial court. See, e.g.,
Sessa v. Reale, 213 Conn. App. 151, 158, 278 A.3d 44
(2022); cf. Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 652–53, 974
A.2d 669 (2009) (if question of jurisdiction is intertwined
with merits of case, court cannot resolve jurisdictional
question without evidentiary hearing).
We turn then to the relevant statutory provisions.
Section 52-420 (b) provides that ‘‘[n]o motion to vacate,
modify or correct an award may be made after thirty
days from the notice of the award to the party to the
arbitration who makes the motion.’’ Our Supreme Court
repeatedly has held that the trial court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over a motion not filed within this
thirty day time period. See, e.g., A Better Way Wholesale
Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, supra, 338 Conn. 659; Bloom-
field v. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers
of America, Connecticut Independent Police Union,
Local 14, supra, 285 Conn. 292–93. Stated differently,
‘‘[t]he only jurisdictional requirement in filing a motion
to vacate an arbitration award is that it be filed with
the trial court within thirty days of the moving party’s
notice of the arbitration award.’’ Middlesex Ins. Co. v.
Castellano, 225 Conn. 339, 345, 623 A.2d 55 (1993).
Our Supreme Court’s decision in Wu v. Chang, 264
Conn. 307, 823 A.2d 1197 (2003), warrants discussion
because the court in that case addressed whether an
arbitration award could be attacked outside the thirty
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day time period of § 52-420 (b) if the party alleges that
the award was obtained through fraud. In Wu, the par-
ties had formed several companies as vehicles for their
investments in hotel and condominium properties,
which ultimately led to financial losses. Id., 308. Dis-
putes arose, and the defendant commenced a civil
action against one of the plaintiffs, alleging improprie-
ties in his management of the companies. Id.
After an unsuccessful attempt at mediation, the par-
ties agreed to sell the assets of the companies and
have their respective shares conclusively determined
by binding, nonappealable arbitration. Id., 308–309. The
arbitrator determined that the respective share of each
party in the proceeds from the sale of assets would be
equal to their respective capital contributions. Id., 309.
Notice of the arbitration award was sent to the par-
ties. Id.
After receiving the arbitration award, the plaintiffs
filed an application to confirm the arbitration award
pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417.9 Id. The defen-
dant objected on the basis of fraud by one of the plain-
tiffs, and the court treated the defendant’s objection as
a motion to vacate the arbitration award10 under § 52-
9
General Statutes § 52-417 provides in relevant part: ‘‘At any time within
one year after an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration
notified thereof, any party to the arbitration may make application to the
superior court . . . for an order confirming the award. The court or judge
shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated,
modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419.’’
10
General Statutes § 52-418 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Upon the appli-
cation of any party to an arbitration, the superior court . . . shall make an
order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects: (1) If the
award has been procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) if there
has been evident partiality or corruption on the part of any arbitrator; (3)
if the arbitrators have been guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing upon sufficient cause shown or in refusing to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy or of any other action by which
the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) if the arbitrators have
exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
‘‘(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the award is required
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420. Id., 309–10. The court denied the defendant’s
11

motion to vacate, concluding that it lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction, as the motion had not been filed within
the thirty day period set forth in § 52-420 (b). Id., 310.
The defendant appealed, claiming that ‘‘the thirty day
limitation period set forth in § 52-420 (b) was tolled by
his claim of fraud and, consequently, the trial court
improperly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
entertain his motion to vacate.’’ Id.
Our Supreme Court first explained that the trial court
properly granted the plaintiffs’ timely motion to confirm
the arbitration award because the defendant’s motion to
vacate had not been filed within the thirty day limitation
period of § 52-420 (b). Id., 312. It then turned to the
defendant’s contention that fraud tolled this time
period. Id. In rejecting this argument, the court stated:
‘‘Chapter 909 of the General Statutes, General Statutes
§§ 52-408 through 52-424, controls arbitration in this
state whe[n] the common law is inconsistent with our
statutory scheme. . . . The statutory arbitration
scheme encompasses many aspects of the arbitration
process . . . . Thus, it is evident that the legislature’s
purpose in enacting the statutory scheme was to dis-
place many [common-law] rules. . . . The statutory
to be rendered has not expired, the court or judge may direct a rehearing
by the arbitrators. . . .’’
11
General Statutes § 52-420 provides: ‘‘(a) Any application under section
52-417, 52-418 or 52-419 shall be heard in the manner provided by law for
hearing written motions at a short calendar session, or otherwise as the
court or judge may direct, in order to dispose of the case with the least
possible delay.
‘‘(b) No motion to vacate, modify or correct an award may be made after
thirty days from the notice of the award to the party to the arbitration who
makes the motion.
‘‘(c) For the purpose of a motion to vacate, modify or correct an award,
such an order staying any proceedings of the adverse party to enforce the
award shall be made as may be deemed necessary. Upon the granting of
an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, a judgment or decree
shall be entered in conformity therewith by the court or judge granting
the order.’’
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framework governing the arbitration process expressly
covers claims of fraud. Specifically . . . § 52-418 (a)
requires a court to make an order vacating [an arbitra-
tion] award if it finds . . . [that] the award has been
procured by corruption, fraud or undue means . . . .
Under § 52-420 (b), however, a party seeking an order
to vacate an arbitration award on grounds of corruption,
fraud or undue means—or on any other ground set forth
in § 52-418—must do so within the thirty day limitation
period set forth in § 52-420 (b). In other words, once
the thirty day limitation period of § 52-420 (b) has
passed, the award may not thereafter be attacked on
any of the grounds specified in . . . § 52-418 . . .
including fraud. To conclude otherwise would be con-
trary not only to the clear intent of the legislature as
expressed in §§ 52-417, 52-418 and 52-420 (b), but also
to a primary goal of arbitration, namely, the efficient,
economical and expeditious resolution of private dis-
putes.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 312–13.
Ultimately, our Supreme Court agreed with the rea-
soning of the trial court that a motion to vacate an
arbitration award based on any of the grounds set forth
in § 52-418, including fraud, must be filed within the
thirty day period in order for the court to have subject
matter jurisdiction. Id., 313–14. It is clear, therefore,
that a trial court in most cases lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to consider a motion to vacate an arbitra-
tion award based on a claim of fraud filed outside of
the thirty day time period of § 52-420 (b).12
12
See, e.g., A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. v. Saint Paul, supra, 338
Conn. 659 (expiration of limitation period of § 52-420 (b) deprives trial court
of subject matter jurisdiction over any ground to vacate arbitration award
even if such ground to vacate is raised in opposition to prevailing party’s
application to confirm award); Bloomfield v. United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers of America, Connecticut Independent Police Union, Local
14, supra, 285 Conn. 285–86 (thirty day limitation period of § 52-420 (b)
applies to application to vacate arbitration awards on public policy grounds);
Rosenthal Law Firm, LLC v. Cohen, 165 Conn. App. 467, 471, 139 A.3d 774
(thirty day limitation period to file motion to vacate arbitration award applies
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Salutary policy reasons typically support the strict
time requirements that limit a party’s ability to attack
an arbitration award. As a general rule, ‘‘[a]rbitration
is favored by courts as a means of settling differences
and expediting the resolution of disputes. . . . There
is no question that arbitration awards are generally
upheld and that we give great deference to an arbitra-
tor’s decisions since arbitration is favored as a means of
settling disputes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Clasby v. Zimmerman, 191 Conn. App. 143, 155, 213
A.3d 1144, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 919, 217 A.3d 1 (2019);
see also Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 4, 612 A.2d
742 (1992); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 186 Conn. App. 641,
645, 200 A.3d 1193 (2018). ‘‘The core principles of Con-
necticut’s arbitration law are set forth in . . . §§ 52-
408 through 52-424. . . . [Section] 52-417 provides that
in ruling on an application to confirm an arbitration
award [t]he court or judge shall grant such an order
confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modi-
fied or corrected as prescribed in [General Statutes §§]
52-418 and 52-419. . . . The trial court lacks any discre-
tion in confirming the arbitration award unless the
award suffers from any of the defects described in . . .
§§ 52-418 and 52-419.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
omitted; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Clasby v. Zimmerman, supra, 156–57.
Additionally, our Supreme Court has explained:
‘‘Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly con-
fined. . . . When the parties agree to arbitration and
establish the authority of the arbitrator through the
terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial
to grounds enumerated in § 52-418 as well as common-law ground such as
claimed violation of public policy), cert. denied, 322 Conn. 904, 138 A.3d
933 (2016); Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1588 v. Laidlaw Transit,
Inc., 33 Conn. App. 1, 4, 632 A.2d 713 (1993) (if motion to vacate, modify
or correct is not made within thirty day limitation period of § 52-420 (b),
award may not be attacked thereafter on any ground specified in § 52-418
or § 52-419).
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review of the award is delineated by the scope of the
parties’ agreement. . . . Because we favor arbitration
as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake
judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner
designed to minimize interference with an efficient and
economical system of alternative dispute resolution.
. . .
‘‘Where the submission does not otherwise state, the
arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal
questions and an award cannot be vacated on the
grounds that . . . the interpretation of the agreement
by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review
the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted,
will they review the arbitrators’ decision of the legal
questions involved. . . .
‘‘Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we
have . . . recognized three grounds for vacating an
award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of
a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public pol-
icy . . . [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more
of the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418.’’ (Emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Economos v.
Liljedahl Bros., Inc., 279 Conn. 300, 305–306, 901 A.2d
1198 (2006); see also Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hart-
ford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 86,
93–94, 868 A.2d 47 (2005). The plaintiff has not raised
a constitutional or public policy challenge to the arbitra-
tion award. Thus, in most contexts, the plaintiff’s ability
to raise her claim of fraud as to the arbitration process
would be closed after the expiration of the thirty day
period set forth in § 52-420 (b).
In proceedings such as the present case, however,
in which an arbitration award is incorporated into a
marital dissolution judgment rendered by the trial court,
competing policies exist that are inherent in the statutes
that apply to family matters. We start with a review
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of General Statutes § 46b-66. That statute governs the
approval of agreements by the parties to resolve their
marital dissolution proceeding. Subsection (a) of this
statute13 requires the trial court to determine, as a pre-
liminary matter, that a dissolution settlement agree-
ment is fair and equitable. Roos v. Roos, 84 Conn. App.
415, 419, 853 A.2d 642 (§ 46b-66 (a) specifically grants
court authority to incorporate by reference into its judg-
ment of dissolution separation agreement reached by
parties if it is determined to be fair and equitable), cert.
denied, 271 Conn. 936, 861 A.2d 510 (2004); see also
Costello v. Costello, 186 Conn. 773, 776, 443 A.2d 1282
(1982) (court has affirmative duty to ascertain whether
parties’ settlement agreement is fair, equitable, and has
been knowingly agreed upon). Subsection (c) provides
in relevant part that, ‘‘[i]f the court finds the agreement
fair and equitable, it shall become part of the court file,
and if the agreement is in writing, it shall be incorpo-
rated by reference into the order or decree of the court.
If the court finds the agreement is not fair and equitable,
it shall make such orders as to finances and custody
as the circumstances require . . . .’’ General Statutes
§ 46b-66 (c). This type of judicial review regarding the
private resolution of a dispute generally is not part of
the process for other types of civil litigation. See Brycki
v. Brycki, 91 Conn. App. 579, 587, 881 A.2d 1056 (2005)
(requirement that court must determine whether sepa-
ration agreement is fair and equitable described as
‘‘peculiar to settlement agreements in the area of fam-
ily law’’).
13
General Statutes § 46b-66 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[I]n any case
under this chapter where the parties have submitted to the court a final
agreement concerning the custody, care, education, visitation, maintenance
or support of any of their children or concerning alimony or the disposition
of property, the court shall inquire into the financial resources and actual
needs of the parties and their respective fitness to have physical custody
of or rights of visitation with any minor child, in order to determine whether
the agreement of the parties is fair and equitable under all the circum-
stances.’’
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We next turn to subsection (e) of § 46b-66,14 which
provides in relevant part: ‘‘The provisions of chapter
909 [§§ 52-408 through 52-424] shall be applicable to
any agreement to arbitrate in an action for dissolution
of marriage under this chapter . . . . An arbitration
award in such action shall not be enforceable until it
has been confirmed, modified or vacated in accordance
with the provisions of chapter 909 and incorporated into
an order or decree of court in an action for dissolution
of marriage between the parties. . . . An arbitration
award relating to a dissolution of marriage that is
incorporated into an order or decree of the court shall
be enforceable and modifiable to the same extent as
an agreement of the parties that is incorporated into
an order or decree of the court pursuant to subsection
(c) of this section.’’ (Emphasis added.)
Pursuant to this statutory language, the parties may
choose to use arbitration as a means to resolve some
or even all of the disputed financial and custody issues
relating to the dissolution of their marriage. If they
choose to do so, the court must first find that the agree-
ment to arbitrate was entered into voluntarily and is
14
We are cognizant that the pertinent provisions of subsection (e) of § 46b-
66 were enacted after the arbitration proceedings and the filing of the motion
to open in the present case. Number 21-104, § 21, of the 2021 Public Acts
amended § 46b-66, effective June 28, 2021, by, inter alia, moving subsection
(c) to subsection (e), and adding the following language: ‘‘An arbitration
award relating to a dissolution of marriage that is incorporated into an order
or decree of the court shall be enforceable and modifiable to the same
extent as an agreement of the parties that is incorporated into an order or
decree of the court pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.’’ General
Statutes § 46b-66 (e).
In our view, it is appropriate to rely on this provision in resolving the
present case because the statute simply clarifies, among other things, that,
if the parties’ final agreement to resolve their dissolution proceeding contains
an arbitration award embedded in that agreement, the parties’ agreement
is subject to the same review and approval process set forth in subsection
(c) of § 46b-66. Moreover, the legislature did not limit the applicability of
this provision only to final agreements entered into after the effective date
of the public act.
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fair and equitable under the circumstances. If the court
permits the arbitration, that arbitration is conducted in
accordance with the provisions of chapter 909 of the
General Statutes. Finally, subsection (e) provides that
an arbitration award that is incorporated into an order
or decree of the court is enforceable and modifiable
to same extent as an agreement of the parties that is
incorporated into an order or decree of the court pursu-
ant to subsection (c) of § 46b-66. Therefore, arbitration
awards are subject to enforcement and modification
as any other aspect of the dissolution judgment. By
implication, because a judgment of dissolution may be
opened on the basis of fraud, an arbitration award in
this context may be opened outside of the thirty day
limit of § 52-420 (b) for fraud. Stated differently, unlike
arbitration awards in other civil contexts, arbitration
awards in dissolution matters must be made part of a
dissolution judgment pursuant to § 46b-66 (e) and may
be subject to modification or later attack under appro-
priate circumstances.
Principles of statutory construction further inform
our analysis. As §§ 46b-66 and 52-420 (b) relate to the
same subject matter, we presume that the legislature
intended to create a harmonious and consistent body
of law, and we must consider the broader statutory
scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.
See LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828, 837–38, 144
A.3d 373 (2016); see also Independent Party of CT—
State Central v. Merrill, 330 Conn. 681, 706, 200 A.3d
1118 (2019); Langello v. West Haven Board of Educa-
tion, 142 Conn. App. 248, 258, 65 A.3d 1 (2013). In doing
so, we conclude that the time limitation of § 52-420 (b)
does not apply in situations where an arbitration award
in a dissolution proceeding has been obtained by fraud
and made part of the dissolution judgment pursuant to
§ 46b-66 (e). A contrary result might permit such fraud
to invidiously invade and infect the court’s statutorily
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required determination regarding the fairness and equi-
table nature of a final agreement of the parties. In other
words, to allow an arbitration award obtained by fraud
discovered outside of the very short time limitation
imposed by § 52-420 (b) may severely undermine, if not
eviscerate, the judicial review requirements of § 46b-
66. As a result, such fraud may cause the corruption
of the other aspects of a court’s financial orders and
fracture the mosaic of the dissolution judgment in a
case in which the arbitration award is embedded in the
parties’ final agreement.
Further, in construing these statutes together, it is
important to remember that marital dissolution pro-
ceedings are essentially equitable in nature. Leonova v.
Leonov, 201 Conn. App. 285, 304, 242 A.3d 713 (2020),
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 906, 244 A.3d 146 (2021). For
example, in Foisie v. Foisie, 335 Conn. 525, 239 A.3d
1198 (2020), our Supreme Court described the opening
of a dissolution judgment for the purpose of reconsid-
ering financial orders on the basis of an allegation of
fraud as follows: ‘‘[I]n family matters, the court exer-
cises its equitable powers. . . . While an action for
divorce or dissolution of marriage is a creature of stat-
ute, it is essentially equitable in its nature. . . . The
trial court has considerable discretion to balance equi-
ties in a dissolution proceeding. . . . The power to act
equitably is the keystone to the court’s ability to fashion
relief in the infinite variety of circumstances which arise
out of the dissolution of a marriage. Without this wide
discretion and broad equitable power, the courts in
some cases might be unable fairly to resolve the parties’
dispute . . . . For that reason, equitable remedies are
not bound by formula but are molded to the needs of
justice. . . . [I]n some situations, the principle of pro-
tection of the finality of judgments must give way to
the principle of fairness and equity.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 543–44; see also
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Baker v. Baker, 187 Conn. 315, 323, 445 A.2d 912 (1982)
(trial court in dissolution of marriage action sits as
court of law and of equity). Simply stated, the only
remedy available to a defrauded party in a marital disso-
lution case is to have the court open and reconsider
the judgment as a matter of equity. Weiss v. Weiss, 297
Conn. 446, 467 n.15, 998 A.2d 766 (2010).
Marital dissolution cases also have unique require-
ments for full and frank disclosure of relevant informa-
tion between the parties and to the court. To achieve the
goal of private settlements, with judicial supervision, of
financial disputes between estranged marital partners,
reasonable settlements that have been knowingly
agreed upon are essential, and this can occur only when
the parties engage in full and frank disclosure to
ensure each side has all the essential information nec-
essary. Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, 275 Conn. 686–
87. As such, in dissolution proceedings, ‘‘[t]he presiding
judge has the obligation to conduct a searching inquiry
to make sure that the settlement agreement is substan-
tively fair and has been knowingly negotiated. . . .
Pivotal to the validity of such an inquiry is the absolute
accuracy of the financial information furnished by
the parties to one another and the court.’’ (Citations
omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Jucker v. Jucker, 190 Conn. 674, 676, 461 A.2d
1384 (1983); see also Dougan v. Dougan, 301 Conn. 361,
370–71, 21 A.3d 791 (2011); Baker v. Baker, supra, 187
Conn. 321–22.
Our Supreme Court has explained that the principle
of complete disclosure ‘‘is consistent with the notion
that the settlement of a marital dissolution case is not
like the settlement of an accident case. It stamps with
finality the end of a marriage. . . . Courts simply
should not countenance either party to such a unique
human relationship dealing with each other at [arm’s]
length. Whatever honesty there may, or should, have
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been during the marriage should at least be required
at its end.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Billington v. Billington, supra, 220 Conn. 221.
Further, this court has observed that, ‘‘[u]nlike civil
litigants who stand at arm’s length from one another,
marital litigants have a duty of full and frank disclosure
analogous to the relationship of fiduciary to beneficiary
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mensah v.
Mensah, 145 Conn. App. 644, 652, 75 A.3d 92 (2013).
These equitable concerns do not apply with the same
vigor to arbitration proceedings that occur in commer-
cial and other civil contexts.15
15
We acknowledge that our Supreme Court’s decision in Blondeau v.
Baltierra, 337 Conn. 127, 136, 252 A.3d 317 (2020), includes language that
could be read, in isolation, as inconsistent with our analysis in the present
case. In Blondeau, a marital dissolution action, the defendant appealed from
the judgment of the trial court granting the motion of the plaintiff to vacate
an arbitration award and denying the defendant’s corresponding motion to
confirm the arbitration award. Id., 133. The arbitration award, pursuant to
the submission, resolved various issues relating to the division of marital
assets and child support. Id., 132–33.
On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the Supreme Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over an appeal taken from an order vacating an arbitration
award that included issues related to child support. Id., 135. As the court
explained, ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument seizes on the proviso in
§ 46b-66 (c) stating that the arbitration statutes, including the right to appeal
under [General Statutes] § 52-423 of chapter 909, are applicable in a marital
dissolution action ‘provided . . . such agreement and an arbitration pursu-
ant to such agreement shall not include issues related to child support,
visitation and custody.’ The plaintiff contends, in other words, that § 46b-
66 (c) contains a condition precedent categorically excluding from the scope
of cases subject to appeal any trial court order vacating or confirming an
arbitration award that includes ‘issues related to child support, visitation
and custody.’ ’’ Id., 136.
In rejecting the plaintiff’s argument in Blondeau, our Supreme Court first
generally observed that ‘‘[t]he fact that the arbitration at issue involves a
marital dissolution is of no consequence’’ and then noted that § 46b-66
(c) expressly provides that the arbitration statutes apply to arbitrations
occurring in the context of a marital dissolution action. Id. The Supreme
Court also noted that the final judgment in an arbitration proceeding gener-
ally is the order of the court vacating, modifying or confirming the arbitrator’s
award, regardless of whether the arbitration at issue involves a marital
dissolution. Id. Specifically, the court explained that ‘‘[t]he restriction con-
tained in § 46b-66 (c) [did] not operate as a categorical condition on a party’s
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For these reasons, we conclude that the thirty day
time limitation imposed by § 52-420 (b) does not apply
in the present case. A contrary conclusion would run
afoul of our ‘‘strong policy that the private settlement
of the financial affairs of estranged marital partners is
a goal that courts should support rather than under-
mine. . . . Our support of that goal will be effective
only if we instill confidence in marital litigants that we
require, as a concomitant of the settlement process,
such full and frank disclosure from both sides, for then
they will be more willing to [forgo] their combat and
to settle their dispute privately, secure in the knowledge
that they have all the essential information. . . . This
principle will, in turn, decrease the need for extensive
discovery, and will thereby help to preserve a greater
measure of the often sorely tried marital assets for
the support of all of the family members.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Reville v. Reville, supra, 312
Conn. 443–44. Furthermore, to shield a fraudulently
obtained arbitration award from challenge on the basis
of fraud after the passage of a mere thirty days would
discourage parties from engaging in these types of pri-
vate settlements. For these reasons, we conclude that
the court had subject matter jurisdiction to address
right of appeal but, instead, merely [limited] the enforceable scope of the
parties’ arbitration agreement and award under chapter 909.’’ Id.
In our view, and for several reasons, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Blondeau does not impact our resolution of the defendant’s claim that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s motion to
open the dissolution judgment. First, the claim in Blondeau involved an
attack on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court rather than, as
here, an attack on the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. Second,
the language of § 46b-66 on which the plaintiff in Blondeau based her claim
was subsequently repealed by the legislature. See footnote 14 of this opinion.
Finally, and most significantly, it does not appear that the arbitration award
at issue in Blondeau had been incorporated into a judgment of dissolution,
which § 46b-66 (e) now expressly requires. Accordingly, we conclude that
the procedural differences between Blondeau and the present case, as well
as the subsequent statutory changes and fundamental dissimilarities
between the claims, renders Blondeau inapposite.
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the plaintiff’s motion to open the dissolution judgment,
even though it was filed outside of the time frame set
forth in § 52-420 (b).
II
Having concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction
over the plaintiff’s motion to open, we now turn to the
merits of her appeal. The plaintiff claims that the court
improperly concluded that she had failed to establish
probable cause as to the existence of fraud that would
permit the court to open the judgment for the limited
purpose of conducting discovery on that claim. See
Spilke v. Spilke, supra, 116 Conn. App. 593–94; Oneglia
v. Oneglia, supra, 14 Conn. App. 269–70. Specifically,
she argues that, contrary to the court’s determination
that there was ‘‘no evidence’’ to support her fraud claim,
she presented sufficient evidence that established prob-
able cause to warrant further discovery and additional
proceedings. We agree with the plaintiff.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to our resolution of this claim. On April 3,
2018, the plaintiff moved to open the judgment on the
basis of fraud.16 The defendant filed a memorandum in
opposition and exhibits on December 11, 2018. The
plaintiff submitted a reply brief on January 11, 2019.
Following the first appeal and our remand for additional
proceedings; see Karen v. Loftus, supra, 210 Conn. App.
289; the court, Truglia, J., conducted a hearing over the
course of three days, September 9, 2022, and January
4 and 5, 2023, to determine whether the plaintiff met
16
The plaintiff requested the following relief in her motion to open: (1)
an order reopening the judgment; (2) an order awarding her 50 percent of
the defendant’s interest in LLBH and Partner Wealth Management, LLC,
pursuant to paragraph 6 (a) of the prenuptial agreement; (3) damages; (4)
interest; (5) attorney’s fees; (6) costs; (7) in the alternative, a new marital
dissolution trial; and (8) such other and further relief as the court deemed
just and equitable.
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her burden to move forward with discovery in connec-
tion with her motion to open. At the hearing, the plain-
tiff, the defendant, and Kevin Collins, the plaintiff’s
attorney during the arbitration, testified. Additionally,
because McLachlan was unavailable to testify, a tran-
script of his December 19, 2022 deposition was admitted
into evidence.
On January 5, 2023, at the conclusion of the hearing,
Judge Truglia stated that the plaintiff had failed to prove
that the defendant had misled McLachlan at the arbitra-
tion and therefore denied the motion to open. Approxi-
mately one month later, the court issued a ‘‘statement
of decision’’ that provided in relevant part: ‘‘The grava-
men of the plaintiff’s motion to open is that the defen-
dant made material statements during the arbitration
. . . that were false, and that the defendant knew were
false. The plaintiff alleges in her motion that [McLach-
lan] relied on these false statements in reaching a deci-
sion that was unfavorable to her. Had the defendant
not made false statements during the arbitration pro-
ceedings, the plaintiff further alleges, the outcome of
the arbitration would have been different. . . .
‘‘The court heard approximately nine hours of testi-
mony from both parties in this case and two other
witnesses over the three days of evidentiary hearing.
The court carefully reviewed and weighed the testimony
presented. The court also carefully reviewed all of the
exhibits submitted by the plaintiff in support of her
motion. The court found no evidence of fraud.’’ (Cita-
tion omitted; emphasis added.)
As an initial matter, we review the relevant legal
principles. ‘‘In Oneglia v. Oneglia, [supra, 14 Conn. App.
267], this court held that, in considering a motion to
open on the basis of fraud, a court must first make a
preliminary determination of whether there is probable
cause to believe that the judgment was obtained by
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fraud. Oneglia and its progeny are grounded in the
principle of the finality of judgments. . . . [T]he final-
ity of judgments principle recognizes the interest of the
public as well as that of the parties [that] there be fixed
a time after the expiration of which the controversy
is to be regarded as settled and the parties freed of
obligations to act further by virtue of having been sum-
moned into or having appeared in the case. . . . With-
out such a rule, no judgment could be relied on. . . .
Oneglia carefully balanced that interest in finality with
the reality that in some situations, the principle of pro-
tection of the finality of judgments must give way to
the principle of fairness and equity. . . . The court in
Oneglia thus ratified the gatekeeping mechanism
employed by the trial court, whereby a court presented
with a motion to open by a party alleging fraud in a
postjudgment dissolution proceeding conducts a pre-
liminary hearing to determine whether the allegations
are substantiated. . . . [I]f the plaintiff was able to sub-
stantiate her allegations of fraud beyond mere suspi-
cion, then the court [properly] would open the judgment
for the limited purpose of discovery, and would later
issue an ultimate decision on the motion to open after
discovery had been completed and another hearing
held. . . . This preliminary hearing is not intended
to be a full scale trial on the merits of the [moving
party’s] claim. The [moving party] does not have to
establish that he [or she] will prevail, only that there
is probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim.’’
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Kuselias v. Zingaro & Cretella, LLC, 224 Conn. App.
192, 195–96 n.2, 312 A.3d 118, cert. denied, 349 Conn.
916, 316 A.3d 357 (2024).
Stated differently, ‘‘a party seeking to obtain discov-
ery related to allegedly fraudulent conduct that tran-
spired prior to the entry of judgment must, consistent
with the aforementioned precedent, (1) move to open
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that judgment and (2) demonstrate to the trial court
that the allegations of fraud are founded on probable
cause. Absent such evidence, the court lacks authority
to permit postjudgment discovery on such matters.’’
Brody v. Brody, 153 Conn. App. 625, 634, 103 A.3d 981,
cert. denied, 315 Conn. 910, 105 A.3d 901 (2014); see
also Nolan v. Nolan, 76 Conn. App. 583, 585, 821 A.2d
772 (2003). This is because, until the judgment has been
opened, there is no active civil matter, discovery is
permitted only when there is a cause of action pending,
and ‘‘there is no such thing as postjudgment discovery
in a vacuum.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Bruno v. Bruno, supra, 146 Conn. App. 231.
Next, we identify the applicable standard of review.
Generally, our decisions have applied a discretionary
standard of review to the denial of a motion to open.
‘‘Our review of a court’s denial of a motion to open
[based on fraud] is well settled. . . . In an appeal from
a denial of a motion to open a judgment, our review is
limited to the issue of whether the trial court has acted
unreasonably and in clear abuse of its discretion. . . .
In determining whether the trial court abused its discre-
tion, this court must make every reasonable presump-
tion in favor of its action. . . . The manner in which
[this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed so
long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cimino v. Cimino,
174 Conn. App. 1, 5, 164 A.3d 787, cert. denied, 327
Conn. 929, 171 A.3d 455 (2017).
In this appeal, however, the specific legal issue raised
by the plaintiff warrants the application of a less defer-
ential standard of review. Here, the plaintiff claims that
the trial court improperly determined that she had failed
to establish probable cause to substantiate her fraud
allegations. Our Supreme Court has stated that
‘‘[w]hether particular facts constitute probable cause is
a question of law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
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Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261
Conn. 673, 682, 804 A.2d 823 (2002); Paranto v. Ball,
132 Conn. 568, 571, 46 A.2d 6 (1946). Accordingly, we
apply the plenary standard of review to the plaintiff’s
claim. See Rousseau v. Weinstein, 204 Conn. App. 833,
853, 254 A.3d 984 (2021); see also State v. Smith, 344
Conn. 229, 244, 278 A.3d 481 (2022); Falls Church
Group, Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, 281 Conn.
84, 94, 912 A.2d 1019 (2007); Nowak v. Environmental
Energy Services, Inc., 218 Conn. App. 516, 530, 292 A.3d
4 (2023).
With our standard of review in mind, we turn to
the relevant legal principles regarding the standard of
probable cause. We acknowledge that most of the cases
that have addressed the existence of probable cause in
the context of a motion to open based on fraud have
not discussed the standard itself in much detail. Accord-
ingly, we look to the use of probable cause in other
contexts for guidance. ‘‘Our Supreme Court has deter-
mined that [p]robable cause is a standard widely used
to validate a preliminary impairment of a broad range
of personal and property rights, from the suspension
of professional licenses to the issuances of warrants
for seizure and arrest. . . . A hearing in probable cause
is not intended to be a full scale trial on the merits of
the [moving party’s] claim. The [moving party] does not
have to establish that he [or she] will prevail, only that
there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the
claim. . . . The court’s role in such a hearing is to
determine probable success by weighing probabilities.
. . . The legal idea of probable cause is a bona fide
belief in the existence of the facts essential under the
law for the action and such as would warrant a [person]
of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the
circumstances, in entertaining it. . . . Probable cause
is a flexible common sense standard. It does not
demand that a belief be correct or more likely true
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than false.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Malave v. Ortiz, 114 Conn. App. 414, 426, 970
A.2d 743 (2009);17 see also Spilke v. Spilke, supra, 116
Conn. App. 594 n.6; Goree v. Goree, Superior Court,
judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FA-
XX-XXXXXXX-S (May 26, 2022).
17
The Superior Court in Malave v. Ortiz, Superior Court, judicial district
of New Haven, Docket No. FA-XX-XXXXXXX-S (March 19, 2007) (43 Conn. L.
Rptr. 148), aff’d, 114 Conn. App. 414, 970 A.2d 743 (2009), set forth a thorough
discussion of the probable cause standard as applied in various family,
administrative, civil and criminal contexts. ‘‘Running throughout all the cases
describing the probable cause standard are certain constants. The standard
is described, on the one hand, as a modest one; 36 DeForest Avenue, LLC
v. Creadore, 99 Conn. App. 690, [698], 915 A.2d 916 (2007); more than mere
belief, suspicion or conjecture; Heussner v. Day, Berry & Howard, LLP,
94 Conn. App. 569, [577, 893 A.2d 486, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 912, 899 A.2d
38] (2006); no matter how sincere; but substantially less than proof beyond
[a] reasonable doubt necessary for conviction; State v. Clark, 255 Conn.
268, 291–94, 764 A.2d 1251 (2001); and not as demanding as proof by a fair
preponderance of the evidence. Newtown Associates v. Northeast Struc-
tures, Inc., 15 Conn. App. 633, 636–37, 546 A.2d 310 (1988). The United
States Supreme Court has described probable cause as a fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). [The
Appellate] Court has repeatedly emphasized, in a variety of contexts, that
probable cause is a flexible [commonsense] standard. 36 DeForest Avenue,
LLC v. Creadore, supra . . . 695 (application to discharge [mechanic’s]
lien); Morris v. Cee Dee, LLC, 90 Conn. App. 403, 411 [877 A.2d 899] (prejudg-
ment remedy) [cert. granted, 275 Conn. 929, 883 A.2d 1245 (2005) (appeal
withdrawn March 13, 2006)]; Donenfeld v. Friedman, 79 Conn. App. 64, [68,
829 A.2d 107] (2003) (application for discharge of lis pendens); Ezikovich
v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, [57 Conn. App. 767,
771, 750 A.2d 494] (finding of reasonable cause regarding discrimination or
retaliation necessary before [c]ommission may undertake certain actions)
[cert. denied, 253 Conn. 925, 754 A.2d 796 (2000)]. The most frequent articula-
tion of the probable cause standard in Connecticut cases is that [t]he legal
idea of probable cause is a bona fide belief in the existence of the facts
essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant a [person]
of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circumstances, in
entertaining it. . . .
‘‘The court’s role in such a hearing is to determine probable successes
by weighing probabilities. . . . In judging the probabilities, a court must
weigh the evidence, assess the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses,
and evaluate exhibits offered. Evidence offered by the party subject to that
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We next turn to the evidence offered by the plaintiff
in support of this standard. We first recognize that the
fraud inquiry was made more difficult because no tran-
script exists from the arbitration proceeding, as it was
not held on the record. We must, therefore, rely on
other documents, including the defendant’s April 3, 2017
arbitration brief, the arbitration decision itself, the testi-
mony from the motion to open hearing, and McLach-
lan’s December 19, 2022 deposition, to determine
whether the plaintiff has met her burden to establish
probable cause as to the existence of fraud.
The issue at the February 16 and 17, 2017 arbitration
concerned the interpretation of paragraph 6 (B) of the
prenuptial agreement and whether the defendant had
‘‘left his employment with Merrill Lynch under an
arrangement that is in any fashion tantamount to a
‘sale’ of his interest in Merrill Lynch, i.e. a transaction
under which [the defendant] receives any property,
real or personal, including but not limited to a sum
of money, by way of a ‘sign-on’ bonus or otherwise, a
premium bonus, and/or restricted stock or other owner-
ship interest (‘Sale Proceeds’), to work for another
entity for any reason whatsoever, including his bring-
ing a book of business and/or a clientele and/or a book
of other assets to a prospective employer, [and, if so]
then [the defendant] shall first be entitled to set aside
the value of $75,000, or $75,000 from the Sale Proceeds,
and the balance of such Sale Proceeds, whenever
received or receivable by [the defendant], shall be
divided between [the defendant and the plaintiff].’’
(Emphasis added.)
In the defendant’s arbitration brief, he claimed that
neither his prior employment at Merrill Lynch nor his
standard is not to be accepted uncritically or presumed to be true; nor is
the evidence necessarily construed, as would be true on a motion to dismiss
at the end of a plaintiff’s [case-in-chief] in a full-blown trial, in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Malave v. Ortiz, supra, 43 Conn. L. Rptr. 148–49.
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‘‘book of business’’ had anything to do with the forma-
tion of LLBH. Additionally, he maintained that his busi-
ness at LLBH bore ‘‘no resemblance to his prior business
at Merrill Lynch,’’ and he ‘‘did not bring [former Merrill
Lynch] clients to LLBH and LLBH did not bring those
clients.’’ He also stated that Focus purchased an option
to buy a minority interest in LLBH for $2 million ‘‘soon
after its formation . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) He
described LLBH as a ‘‘startup company’’ and that he
was self-employed in a new industry at Focus. The
defendant further indicated that Focus purchased this
option after LLBH had been formed and was open for
business, and, because the defendant and his three part-
ners had already left Merrill Lynch, the option bought
by Focus was not material to his departure from that
company. Finally, the defendant maintained that Focus’
option to purchase ‘‘was a transaction which has no
nexus to the defendant’s leaving the employ of Merrill
Lynch, was not ‘tantamount to a sale’ of his interest
in Merrill Lynch, and as such does not implicate the
provisions of [the parties’ prenuptial agreement].’’
(Emphasis added.)
In his arbitration award, McLachlan found that, when
the defendant and his partners left Merrill Lynch and
formed LLBH, each invested approximately $10,000 to
$15,000 into the startup of this business. He further
determined that Focus purchased the option to buy an
interest in LLBH for $2 million shortly after its forma-
tion, and each partner received $500,000. After Focus
exercised this option to purchase an interest in LLBH,
a corporate reorganization, and the creation of a new
entity known as Partner Wealth Management, LLC, the
defendant received, inter alia, $1,655,000 and 90,000
shares of Focus stock.
McLachlan then determined that the language of para-
graph 6 (B) of the parties’ prenuptial agreement did not
apply to the defendant’s departure from Merrill Lynch
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and the formation of a new business with his partners.
‘‘The only conclusion one could reach is . . . that
[paragraph 6 (B)] was drafted in contemplation of [the
defendant] leaving Merrill Lynch and going to a compet-
itor who would pay him to come not only in recogni-
tion of the Merrill Lynch employment benefits he would
be forfeiting, but because some of the contacts and
business that he would be bringing with him . . . .
The context, as it actually occurred, was [the defendant]
leaving initially with three (3) partners to form a new
business. He and his partners were not paid to go to
LLBH but, in fact, each paid into the venture to start
it. . . . This is substantially different than the situation
where an employee leaves a brokerage house and is
compensated by the new employer. [The defendant’s]
new employer was a company that he owned a portion
of and in which he had invested. The new employer
was not in a position to, and in fact, did not give
him any property, real or personal, including, but not
limited to, a sum of money by way of a ‘sign-on’ bonus
or otherwise, a premium bonus and/or restricted stock
or other ownership interest. [The defendant] acquired
an ownership interest in LLBH because he invested in
it. This transaction is not tantamount to a sale. He was
then able to sell a portion of that ownership interest
to Focus.’’ (Emphasis added.) The arbitration decision,
therefore, accepted the defendant’s testimony about the
timeline of events regarding his departure from Merrill
Lynch and forming LLBH.
At the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to open, how-
ever, the defendant acknowledged that Focus paid him
and his three partners $2 million at the same time LLBH
was formed. The defendant admitted that the option
agreement with Focus was signed on the same day that
he resigned from Merrill Lynch. He also conceded that
the negotiations with Focus had occurred prior to his
leaving Merrill Lynch and that Focus was committed to
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supporting their new business venture. The defendant
further admitted that he received $500,000 from Focus
at the time he left Merrill Lynch. The defendant then
conceded that, during a prior deposition, he had stated
that ‘‘no one gave [him] any money’’ when he formed
LLBH with his partners. Several aspects of the defen-
dant’s testimony were contrary to his prior statements
and the evidence presented to McLachlan during the
arbitration hearing.
Additionally, during a July 27, 2016 deposition that
was taken as a part of the marital dissolution proceeding
and utilized at the hearing before Judge Truglia, the
defendant had testified that he and his three partners
left Merrill Lynch and ‘‘put our own money into LLBH.
. . . We set up our firm. We put our own capital in,
and we set up a business.’’ Later in that deposition, the
defendant stated: ‘‘For the record, for the record, I did
not sell anything. . . . I started a business. No one—
no one gave me any money. I got no consideration. I
put my own money into a . . . new company, took
[an] inordinate amount of risk at the absolute peak of
the financial crisis, had no way of knowing that my
clients would come with me, [and] walked away from
. . . millions of dollars . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
The defendant’s counsel indicated to Judge Truglia
that, during the arbitration proceeding, McLachlan had
been provided with a copy of the option agreement
between LLBH and Focus.18 The plaintiff’s attorney dis-
agreed with this representation. The defendant con-
firmed that the option contract was executed on Octo-
ber 17, 2008, the same day he and his three partners
left their employment with Merrill Lynch. The defendant
further conceded that the negotiation regarding the
18
The court subsequently stated that it considered it ‘‘very important’’
and a ‘‘[v]ery significant piece of evidence as to whether . . . McLachlan
. . . had [the option contract] in front of him when he issued his decision.’’
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Karen v. Loftus

option contact had occurred prior to October 17, 2008,
and he knew he would receive payment once the con-
tract was executed. The defendant then admitted, dur-
ing a September 26, 2016 deposition during the dissolu-
tion proceedings, that he had stated that he started
LLBH ‘‘on day one with nothing’’ and set up a new
company that did not pay him ‘‘anything.’’
At the January 4, 2023 hearing, the plaintiff’s counsel
read from the defendant’s testimony in a separate law-
suit19 in which he had testified that the option contract
with Focus had been contemplated before leaving Mer-
rill Lynch, and he described his receipt of $500,000 as
a ‘‘payment.’’ In this prior testimony, he also stated that
he and his LLBH partners, over the course of three
months, brought over approximately $375 million in
assets to manage from former Merrill Lynch clients.
The plaintiff testified at the hearing on her motion
to open that she, her attorney and McLachlan had not
been in possession of the Focus option agreement at
the time of the arbitration, and that she did not learn
of its existence, or the subsequent asset purchase agree-
ment, until ‘‘[l]ong after’’ the arbitration.20 She also
stated that, at the arbitration hearing, the defendant
had testified that it was not until ‘‘sometime after’’ he
left Merrill Lynch and formed LLBH ‘‘that Focus came
around in any way.’’ She also recalled that his testimony
before McLachlan was that he and his partners had no
contact with Focus before leaving Merrill Lynch. She
further indicated that, at the time of his departure from
Merrill Lynch, the defendant had worked to transfer
client accounts to the new enterprise.
19
See Lomas v. Partner Wealth Management, LLC, Superior Court, judicial
district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S.
20
On cross-examination, the plaintiff conceded that she was aware that
the defendant had received a payment from Focus on or about October 17,
2008. She also acknowledged that she was generally aware of a financial
agreement with Focus in May, 2007.
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Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, the court
admitted into evidence a transcript of McLachlan’s
December 19, 2022 deposition. During his deposition,
McLachlan was shown a copy of the October 17, 2008
Focus option agreement, and he testified that he did
not recognize it and that he knew that it was not part
of the record during the arbitration proceeding. He spe-
cifically stated that he was unaware ‘‘when [he] issued
[his] award that [the defendant] and his partners had
executed an option agreement with Focus . . . on the
very day they left Merrill Lynch to open their own busi-
ness.’’ On the basis of the evidence presented during
the deposition, which differed from what had been pre-
sented during the arbitration proceeding, McLachlan
concluded that this transaction had occurred on the
same day that the defendant left Merrill Lynch, contrary
to his statement in the award that Focus purchased an
option to buy an interest in LLBH shortly after LLBH’s
formation. McLachlan also testified that he had been
unaware that the defendant received $500,000 from
Focus on the day he left Merrill Lynch. He specifically
stated that ‘‘the timeline [described by the defendant
at the arbitration proceeding] was a little bit different
and not as crisp as the timeline [described by the defen-
dant at the hearing on the plaintiff’s motion to open].’’
McLachlan also testified that there was no evidence
at the arbitration hearing that the defendant and his
partners had been negotiating with Focus prior to their
departure from Merrill Lynch. McLachlan also had not
known that approximately $350 million to $370 million
dollars of business from Merrill Lynch clients had been
transferred to LLBH.

During cross-examination by the defendant’s counsel
during his deposition, McLachlan described his recol-
lection of the defendant’s theory of the case: ‘‘Well, he
said first of all he wasn’t being paid—this is as I recall
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his theory—he wasn’t being paid for bringing the cli-
ents, the book of business with him, he was—because
what he was doing was different, that he—I am not
sure if he represented—if he was advising corporations
when he was at Merrill Lynch that went to advising
individuals, but that it wasn’t really the same as just
bringing a book of business because he started a new
business. And his theory was that he started this new
business, he and his partners, that it wasn’t as though
they went to [an existing competitor of Merrill Lynch].’’
McLachlan later was asked: ‘‘[I]n your mind, [were]
there any efforts made to obfuscate the existence of
the option, the $2 million payment, $500,000 of which
went to [the defendant] or it’s temporal connection with
the group of men leaving Merrill Lynch?’’ He responded:
‘‘Well, I would say yes. I think there was, I—I mean, I
think, you know, [the defendant] didn’t want to repre-
sent that [he] walked out the door and somebody gave
[him] $500,000. You know, whether or not that would
still be within [paragraph 6 (B) of the prenuptial agree-
ment] is a separate issue, but he certainly didn’t say
that [he] had a deal with Focus, that when [the four
partners] left they were going to [be paid] $2 million.’’
McLachlan also stated that, had he known this informa-
tion regarding the timing of the Focus option agree-
ment, he would have asked more questions and that
the facts ultimately were different from the impression
that he had formed at the arbitration proceeding, and
based on these facts, it looked ‘‘more like they were
going to work for Focus than starting their own busi-
ness.’’
We now turn to the legal principles governing fraud
in the context of a motion to open filed in a marital
dissolution action. We emphasize that, at this stage of
the proceedings, the plaintiff is not required to prove
the existence of fraud but, rather, must demonstrate
only probable cause as to the existence of fraud in
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order for the court to open the judgment for the limited
purpose of proceeding with discovery. See, e.g., Long-
bottom v. Longbottom, 197 Conn. App. 64, 72, 231 A.3d
310 (2020). Additionally, ‘‘[t]his preliminary hearing is
not intended to be a full scale trial on the merits of the
[moving party’s] claim. The [moving party] does not
have to establish that he will prevail, only that there
is probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim.
. . . If the moving party demonstrates to the court that
there is probable cause to believe that the judgment
was obtained by fraud, the court may permit discovery.’’
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id.21
‘‘Fraud consists in deception practiced in order to
induce another to part with property or surrender some
legal right, and which accomplishes the end designed.
. . . The elements of a fraud action are: (1) a false
representation was made as a statement of fact; (2) the
statement was untrue and known to be so by its maker;
(3) the statement was made with the intent of inducing
reliance thereon; and (4) the other party relied on the
statement to his detriment. . . .
‘‘Fraud by nondisclosure, which expands on the first
three of [the] four elements [of fraud], involves the
failure to make a full and fair disclosure of known
facts connected with a matter about which a party has
assumed to speak, under circumstances in which there
is a duty to speak. . . . A lack of full and fair disclosure
21
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court explained that the plaintiff
had failed to present any ‘‘compelling evidence’’ or prove that the defendant
had ‘‘misled’’ McLachlan at the arbitration. In its subsequent ‘‘statement of
decision,’’ the court indicated that it ‘‘found no evidence of fraud.’’ These
statements suggest that the court misapprehended the plaintiff’s burden. As
to the former, there is no requirement in our law that the plaintiff present
‘‘compelling’’ evidence of fraud in the context of a motion to open the
judgment. Regarding the latter, the plaintiff was required only to meet the
lesser standard of probable cause, and, as we conclude in this opinion, she
has done so.
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of such facts must be accompanied by an intent or
expectation that the other party will make or will con-
tinue in a mistake, in order to induce that other party
to act to her detriment. . . . In a marital dissolution
case, the requirement of a duty to speak is imposed
by Practice Book § [25-30], requiring the exchange and
filing of financial affidavits . . . and by the nature of
the marital relationship.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 72–73;
see also Reville v. Reville, supra, 312 Conn. 441–42;
Cimino v. Cimino, supra, 174 Conn. App. 9–11; Pospisil
v. Pospisil, 59 Conn. App. 446, 450, 757 A.2d 655, cert.
denied, 254 Conn. 940, 761 A.2d 762 (2000).
The plaintiff presented evidence that, during the arbi-
tration proceeding, the defendant represented to
McLachlan that he and his partners left their employ-
ment at Merrill Lynch essentially to start a new com-
pany, LLBH, and that they did not receive any funding
from Focus until after its formation. The defendant
specifically had argued to McLachlan that the Focus
payment of $2 million constituted a transaction without
a nexus to his departure from Merrill Lynch. Indeed,
during a deposition taken earlier in this proceeding, he
stated that he did not sell anything, nor did he receive
any money or consideration from a third party; he used
his own money to create a new business. He also failed
to provide the plaintiff or McLachlan with a copy of
the Focus option agreement. The plaintiff presented
further evidence that showed that the defendant and
his partners had been working with Focus prior to their
departure from Merrill Lynch, and they executed the
option agreement with Focus on the same day they
formed LLBH. The group also brought over former Mer-
rill Lynch clients and their assets worth approximately
$375 million.
Applying the flexible, commonsense standard of
probable cause that would warrant a person of ordinary
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Karen v. Loftus

caution, prudence and judgment to entertain a bona
fide belief in the existence of the claim of fraud, we
conclude that the plaintiff had satisfied her ‘‘modest’’
burden at this preliminary stage of the proceedings by
substantiating her allegations to warrant discovery and
further proceedings. Our Supreme Court has instructed
that, in determining whether there is proof of fraud, a
court should consider the evidence ‘‘through the lens
of our well settled policy regarding full and frank disclo-
sure in marital dissolution actions.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Reville v. Reville, supra, 312 Conn. 442.
Pursuant to paragraph 6 (B) of the parties’ prenuptial
agreement, if the defendant ended his employment with
Merrill Lynch under an arrangement that was tanta-
mount to a sale of his interest therein, then the plaintiff
was entitled to a share of the proceeds. If, however,
the defendant left Merrill Lynch under conditions that
were not tantamount to a sale, then the plaintiff would
not receive any additional money from the defendant.
The defendant, therefore, had a financial incentive to
misrepresent the nature and timing of his dealings with
Focus in connection with the formation of LLBH. Stated
differently, by framing this transaction as the risky cre-
ation of a new business done solely with modest finan-
cial contributions from himself and the other LLBH
partners, rather than one in which he received a sub-
stantial sum of money along with the backing and assis-
tance from a third party, a reasonable person could
conclude that the defendant used deception regarding
the circumstances surrounding his leaving Merrill
Lynch and the formation of LLBH in order to deprive
the plaintiff of her share of the money from the new
venture to which she was entitled pursuant to paragraph
6 (B) of the prenuptial agreement. See Grayson v. Gray-
son, 4 Conn. App. 275, 287, 494 A.2d 576 (1985), appeal
dismissed, 202 Conn. 221, 520 A.2d 225 (1987); see also
Reville v. Reville, supra, 441; Gelinas v. Gelinas, 10
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Karen v. Loftus

Conn. App. 167, 173, 522 A.2d 295, cert. denied, 204
Conn. 802, 525 A.2d 965 (1987).
We determine that the plaintiff presented evidence
that satisfied the probable cause standard that the
defendant had made false statements, or failed to dis-
close facts, regarding the details of the end of his
employment at Merrill Lynch and the formation of LLBH
in an effort to deprive her of money she may have been
entitled to under the terms of the parties’ prenuptial
agreement. Such conduct, if proven, would result in a
situation ‘‘in which one party held a valuable asset, the
true worth and nature of which only that party knew.’’
Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, 275 Conn. 690. Efforts to
hide or obfuscate material facts in a marital dissolution
proceeding are incompatible with our jurisprudence,
and we will not countenance such an attempt to unfairly
bypass the conditions of a prenuptial agreement to the
detriment of the plaintiff. See id., 695; see also Miller
v. Appleby, 183 Conn. 51, 57 n.1, 438 A.2d 811 (1981)
(when false representations are made for purpose of
inducing act to another’s injury, necessarily there is
plain implication that such representations were made
with intent to deceive). We conclude, therefore, that
the court improperly denied the plaintiff’s motion to
open the judgment based on fraud. As a result, we
reverse the trial court’s judgment denying the plaintiff’s
motion to open and remand the case with direction to
open the judgment for the limited purpose of allowing
further discovery in conjunction with the plaintiff’s
claim of fraud.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.