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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
BENNIE GRAY, JR. v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 47784)
Clark, Wilson and Sheldon, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of possession of narcotics
with intent to sell, appealed following the granting of his petition for certifica-
tion to appeal from the habeas court’s judgment denying his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that the court improperly concluded that
certain undisclosed impeachment evidence was not material either to guilt
or to punishment under the third prong of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S.
83). Held:
The habeas court properly rejected the petitioner’s claim for relief from his
conviction pursuant to Brady based on the state’s failure to disclose to him
certain impeachment evidence concerning D, one of the state’s key witnesses
at his criminal trial, as the undisclosed evidence would not have provided the
petitioner with any significant impeachment material that was not already
available to and used by him to cross-examine D at his criminal trial and,
even though the undisclosed evidence could have cast doubt on D’s general
credibility, it was not of such significance, in the context of all the evidence
adduced at trial, that it might reasonably have undermined confidence in
the jury’s guilty verdict.
Argued September 2—officially released November 4, 2025
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Tolland and tried to the court, Wagner, J.; judgment
denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the
granting 	of 	certification, 	appealed 	to 	this 	court.
Affirmed.
Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appel-
lant (petitioner).
Rebecca R. Zeuschner, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Matthew Gedansky, state’s
attorney, and Angela Macchiarulo, supervisory assis-
tant state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
Opinion
SHELDON, J. Following a grant of certification to
appeal, the petitioner, Bennie Gray, Jr., appeals from
the judgment of the habeas court denying his amended
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner
claims that the court improperly concluded that he is
not entitled to relief from his 2019 conviction for posses-
sion of narcotics with intent to sell in violation of Gen-
eral Statutes § 21a-277 (a), based on the state’s failure
to disclose to him certain impeachment evidence con-
cerning one of the state’s key witnesses at his criminal
trial, because it incorrectly determined that such undis-
closed evidence was not ‘‘material either to guilt or
to punishment,’’ as required to prove a due process
violation under the test set forth in Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of
the habeas court.
The petitioner’s challenged conviction was the sub-
ject of a direct appeal. See State v. Gray, 212 Conn.
App. 193, 274 A.3d 870, cert. denied, 343 Conn. 929, 281
A.3d 1188 (2022). In affirming that conviction, this court
recited the following relevant facts based upon the
record of his criminal trial: ‘‘During the late afternoon
hours of May 9, 2018, four plainclothes officers from
the vice and narcotics unit of the New London Police
Department (police department) were conducting sur-
veillance near the intersection of Broad Street and Led-
yard Street in New London. The officers were monitor-
ing two convenience stores, the Gulf station located at
265 Broad Street and the 7-Eleven situated at the corner
of Broad Street and Parker Street, which were locations
known for narcotics trafficking. The officers were
divided into teams of two, with investigators Todd
Lynch and Jeremy Zelinski occupying one unmarked
vehicle, and investigators Ryan Griffin and Joseph Pel-
chat occupying another.

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‘‘At approximately 4:30 p.m., the officers noticed a
man, later identified as Brian Drobnak, standing along-
side a Volvo sedan parked on the right side of the Gulf
station parking lot. The officers observed Drobnak pace
back and forth alongside the vehicle and continuously
check his cell phone. They did not see Drobnak pur-
chase gasoline, enter the convenience store, or use the
air pressure machine near where the Volvo was parked.
‘‘Shortly thereafter, a dark blue Toyota Camry, oper-
ated by a man later identified as the [petitioner], drove
into the Gulf station and stopped alongside the Volvo.
The officers observed Drobnak enter the front passen-
ger seat of the Toyota, remain inside the vehicle for
less than one minute, exit the vehicle, and subsequently
enter the Volvo through the driver’s side door. The
officers could not see what transpired between Drob-
nak and the [petitioner] inside of the Toyota, but the
brief nature of the interaction led them to believe that
they had just witnessed a narcotics transaction. Accord-
ingly, the officers decided that Lynch and Zelinski
would investigate Drobnak, while Griffin and Pelchat
would follow the Toyota. Lynch and Zelinski then drove
into the Gulf station parking lot at the same moment that
the Toyota was exiting the lot, parked their unmarked
vehicle behind the Volvo, and exited the vehicle. Lynch
walked toward the driver’s side door of the Volvo while
Zelinski approached the passenger’s side.
‘‘Through the driver’s side window, Lynch observed
Drobnak sitting in the driver’s seat with a white, [rock-
like] substance in his lap. Lynch later testified that Drob-
nak appeared to be manipulating the [rocklike] sub-
stance with the ink cartridge of a ballpoint pen. Lynch
identified himself as law enforcement, at which point
Drobnak attempted to conceal the ink cartridge and
[rocklike] substance in the empty space between the
driver’s seat and the passenger’s seat. Zelinski then
opened the passenger side door, placed Drobnak in

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
custody, and took possession of the [rocklike] sub-
stance, which had fallen to the floor of the vehicle.
Lynch performed a field test on the [rocklike] sub-
stance, which returned positive for crack cocaine. Drob-
nak was arrested and given Miranda1 warnings. At the
scene, Drobnak voluntarily agreed to speak with Lynch
and Zelinski. He informed the officers that he had pur-
chased $50 worth of crack cocaine from the man in the
Toyota and showed them the phone number he had
contacted to arrange the transaction.
‘‘Meanwhile, Griffin and Pelchat continuously had
been monitoring the Toyota operated by the [petitioner]
since it had exited the Gulf station. After leaving the
parking lot, the [petitioner] traveled down Broad Street
and turned into a Sunoco station, where he remained
for a few minutes. Griffin and Pelchat observed a
woman, later identified as Amanda Barton, emerge from
a restaurant next to the Sunoco station and walk toward
the Toyota carrying two plastic bags. Once Barton
entered the Toyota, the [petitioner] exited the Sunoco
parking lot and turned onto Connecticut Avenue.
‘‘As Griffin and Pelchat continued to follow the Toy-
ota, they were informed by the other officers that Drob-
nak was found in possession of narcotics, was placed
under arrest, and had told the officers that he had pur-
chased the narcotics from the operator of the Toyota.
. 	. 	. 	Griffin and Pelchat requested that the police
department send a marked police cruiser to assist them
in apprehending the Toyota. Sergeant Gregory Moreau,
the 	street 	sergeant 	assigned 	to 	the 	patrol 	shift,
responded to the officers’ request. Shortly thereafter,
Moreau pulled behind Griffin and Pelchat, who were
still following the [petitioner] down Briggs Street.
Moreau then maneuvered his police cruiser between
1 ‘‘Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d
694 (1966).’’ State v. Gray, supra, 212 Conn. App. 198 n.3.

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
the Toyota and the officers’ unmarked vehicle, activated
his siren and overhead lights, and attempted to initiate
a motor vehicle stop. Despite the siren and headlights,
the [petitioner] continued to drive forward at a slow
speed. Moreau then used his vehicle’s public address
system to order the [petitioner] to pull the Toyota over
to the side of the road. After proceeding an additional
two to four hundred feet, the [petitioner] came to a stop.
Moreau exited the police cruiser and walked toward
the driver’s side window of the Toyota, while Griffin,
who 	had 	exited 	the 	unmarked 	vehicle, 	began 	to
approach the Toyota on foot.
‘‘As Griffin drew closer to the Toyota, he observed
Barton and the [petitioner] appear to manipulate their
hands near their waists. Concerned that Barton and the
[petitioner] could be concealing ‘weapons’ or ‘narcotics’
on their persons, Griffin and Moreau ordered the pas-
sengers to raise their hands to where the officers could
see them. Barton complied immediately, but the [peti-
tioner] raised his hands only after Griffin issued a sec-
ond verbal command. The officers removed Barton and
the [petitioner] from the Toyota and placed them in
investigative detention. Griffin conducted a pat-down
search of the [petitioner] for weapons and, after feeling
‘a bulge in [the petitioner’s] pocket,’ uncovered $1268 in
cash. Believing the cash to be the proceeds of narcotics
transactions, the officers seized the currency. The offi-
cers also noticed three cell phones, including an LG
cell phone, in the Toyota’s center console. Although
Barton and the [petitioner] each claimed ownership of
one of the phones, neither claimed to own the LG phone.
‘‘Around that time, Pelchat, who had parked the
unmarked vehicle a short distance away, approached
the [petitioner’s] Toyota. Pelchat had been in contact
with Lynch, who communicated that Drobnak had pro-
vided the officers with the phone number he had used
to arrange the narcotics transaction. The officers agreed

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
that Lynch would use his city-issued cell phone to call
the number once Pelchat arrived at the motor vehicle
stop. When Lynch placed the call, Pelchat observed the
unclaimed phone ring in the Toyota’s center console
and display Lynch’s phone number as the incoming
caller. The officers seized the phone. The [petitioner]
was then placed under arrest and transported to the
police department. No narcotics, residue, or parapher-
nalia were recovered from the scene.
‘‘At the station, Lynch asked the [petitioner] why he
was involved in selling narcotics, to which the [peti-
tioner] responded, ‘that’s all I know.’ . . . Drobnak
was transported to the New London police station,
where he provided a written statement indicating that
he had purchased $50 worth of ‘loose crack cocaine’
from ‘G,’ and had done so on ‘at least three different
occasions.’ Drobnak was also shown a photographic
lineup consisting of eight photographs and was asked to
determine whether one of those photographs displayed
the individual from whom he had purchased narcotics.
He identified an individual other than the [petitioner].
Later, at trial, Drobnak identified the [petitioner] as the
individual from whom he had purchased narcotics and
testified that he had purchased the narcotics using two
$20 bills and one $10 bill. Drobnak explained that he
initially misidentified the [petitioner] because his ‘anxi-
ety was off the wall,’ he was going through withdrawal,
and he ‘just wanted [the police interview] to be over
and to be done with.’ He then testified that ‘[t]here is
no doubt in my mind that [the petitioner] is the man
who sold me crack cocaine.’ Drobnak also testified that
he was previously familiar with the [petitioner] and had
purchased narcotics from the [petitioner] at least twice
before. During cross-examination, Drobnak admitted
that ‘G’ was actually the nickname of Greg Williams, a
mutual acquaintance of Drobnak and the [petitioner].

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Although Drobnak identified ‘G’ in his written state-
ment, he testified that he had intended to refer to the
[petitioner].
‘‘A jury trial commenced on April 2, 2019. At trial,
the [petitioner], appearing as a self-represented party,
testified in his defense that he had previously met Drob-
nak a few days prior to May 9, 2018, when Drobnak
had given the [petitioner] and Williams a ride to Groton.
The [petitioner] stated that he had left his son’s cell
phone—the same unclaimed LG phone recovered from
the [petitioner’s] center console—in Drobnak’s car. He
further testified that he had met with Williams on the
morning of May 9, 2018, and that Williams had returned
the phone to him. The [petitioner] asserted that Drob-
nak contacted him later that day in order to speak with
him about the missing phone. The [petitioner] agreed,
and the two arranged to meet at the Gulf station.
‘‘The 	[petitioner] 	testified 	that 	Drobnak 	briefly
entered the [petitioner’s] car in the Gulf station parking
lot and requested a financial reward for finding the
missing cell phone. The [petitioner] told Drobnak that
the phone already had been returned to him and asked
Drobnak to exit his car. The [petitioner] denied selling
narcotics and testified that the seized currency was
income he had earned working as a groundskeeper at
Lake of Isles golf course in North Stonington. He
asserted that he planned to use the money to pay for
rent.’’ (Footnote in original; footnotes omitted.) Id.,
196–202.
After a jury found the petitioner guilty as charged of
possession of narcotics with intent to sell in violation
of § 21a-277 (a), he was sentenced to twenty years of
incarceration, execution suspended after twelve years,
followed by five years of probation. The Sentence
Review Division of the Superior Court subsequently
reduced the petitioner’s sentence to twelve years of

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
incarceration, execution suspended after seven years,
followed by five years of probation.
The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in 2020. He later filed an amended petition on
October 24, 2022, alleging that his due process rights
were violated by the state’s failure to disclose to him,
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83,
a search warrant for Drobnak’s cell phone records that
contained otherwise undisclosed impeachment evi-
dence concerning Drobnak, specifically, that he had
refused to cooperate with law enforcement officers
between the date of his and the petitioner’s arrests in
this case and the start of the petitioner’s criminal trial.
To provide context for the petitioner’s Brady claim,
we preliminarily note the following relevant legal princi-
ples. ‘‘The prosecution’s duty to disclose under Brady
applies not only to exculpatory evidence but also to
impeachment evidence, which is evidence having the
potential to alter the jury’s assessment of the credibility
of a significant prosecution witness. . . . To prove a
Brady violation, the petitioner must establish: (1) that
the state suppressed evidence (2) that [the suppressed
evidence] was favorable to the defense and (3) [that
such evidence was] material either to guilt or to punish-
ment. . . . If the petitioner fails to meet his burden as
to one of the three prongs of the Brady test, then we
must conclude that a Brady violation has not occurred.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, 221 Conn.
App. 294, 304, 301 A.3d 1136 (2023).
‘‘The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due
process. Its purpose is not to displace the adversary
system as the primary means by which truth is uncov-
ered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does
not occur. Thus, the prosecutor is not required to deliver
his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed,
would deprive the defendant of a fair trial . . . .’’ (Inter-
nal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryan, 193 Conn.
App. 285, 317, 219 A.3d 477, cert. denied, 334 Conn. 906,
220 A.3d 37 (2019). In other words, ‘‘[u]nder the last
Brady prong, the prejudice that the defendant suffered
as a result of the impropriety must have been material
to the case, such that the favorable evidence could
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.
. . . If . . . [the petitioner] . . . fail[s] to meet his
burden as to [any] one of the three prongs of the Brady
test, then [the court] must conclude that a Brady viola-
tion has not occurred.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quo-
tation marks omitted.) State v. Rosa, 196 Conn. App.
480, 498, 230 A.3d 677, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 920, 231
A.3d 1169 (2020).
The habeas court recounted the following additional
factual and procedural information in its memorandum
of decision denying the petitioner’s habeas petition. ‘‘At
the habeas trial, [Lynch] testified that he searched for
Drobnak after he failed to appear in court on his narcot-
ics possession charge that stemmed from the incident
involving the petitioner. As part of his search efforts,
[Lynch] filed an affidavit and application for a search
warrant—the search warrant in question—for Drob-
nak’s cell phone. The search warrant, dated October
3, 2018, detailed the following pertinent information.
Drobnak had active arrest warrants for failing to appear
in the narcotics case in New London and a case in Derby
where Drobnak faced a sixth degree larceny charge.
An additional arrest warrant was issued for Drobnak
for a violation of probation that resulted after he was
arrested for third degree burglary. New London, New
Haven, Torrington, Derby, Redding, Milford, and Con-
necticut State Police Departments were unable to locate

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
Drobnak to serve the warrants. In August, 2018, Drob-
nak was stopped by [officers from] the New Haven
Police Department while operating a motor vehicle.
Drobnak provided the police with a false name and
eluded apprehension on the arrest warrants. In late
September, 2018, Drobnak contacted [Lynch] by cell
phone and informed him that he would not turn himself
in to the police. The search warrant further noted that
Drobnak is a material witness in the petitioner’s trial
scheduled to begin during the week ending October
12, 2018, and the production of Drobnak’s cell phone
records would be material and relevant information for
the police in determining his whereabouts. The record
indicates that Drobnak was subsequently taken into
custody and testified at the petitioner’s criminal trial.
. . . Drobnak testified at the habeas trial that he was
an active drug user and on the run from the police prior
to testifying in the petitioner’s criminal trial. Drobnak
testified that during this time he spoke to the New
Haven police and provided them with the fake name
‘Brian Rivers’ because he did not want to go to jail.’’
In rejecting the petitioner’s claim, the habeas court
determined that the first two prongs of Brady, requiring
proof that the state failed to disclose evidence favorable
to the petitioner, had been satisfied, but that the third
prong, requiring proof that the undisclosed evidence
was material to guilt or to punishment, had not. Con-
cerning the third prong of Brady, the habeas court
explained that ‘‘[t]he information contained in the
search warrant indicated that Drobnak gave the police
a false name and evaded arrest for several months prior
to the petitioner’s trial. At the petitioner’s criminal trial,
the petitioner cross-examined Drobnak on his convic-
tions and pending charges, including his charges for
failing to appear. The petitioner also asked Drobnak
how long it took him to show up to court, and Drobnak
testified that he was homeless, taking drugs and on the

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
run for almost a year prior. The court finds that the
petitioner effectively cross-examined Drobnak regard-
ing his evading arrest before the petitioner’s trial and
thus the only undisclosed impeachment evidence was
the fact that Drobnak gave a fake name to the police
during a motor vehicle stop.’’
The court ultimately concluded that, ‘‘in the context
of the entire record, the petitioner failed to meet his
burden of proving that there is a reasonable probability
that, had the state disclosed the search warrant, the
outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial would have
been different. The petitioner’s conviction did not hinge
entirely on Drobnak’s testimony, and the undisclosed
impeachment information contained in the search war-
rant—namely, the fact that Drobnak gave the police a
fake name while he was on the run—would not have
undermined his 	testimony to a 	significant degree
beyond what the petitioner accomplished on cross-
examination.’’ The habeas court later granted the peti-
tioner’s petition for certification to appeal. This appeal
followed.
We begin by noting that the first two prongs of Brady
are not at issue in the present appeal. With that in
mind, we note the following additional relevant legal
principles regarding the third prong of Brady, requiring
proof of materiality. ‘‘[M]ateriality under Brady pre-
sents a mixed question of law and fact subject to plenary
review, with the underlying historical facts subject to
review for clear error.’’ State v. Rosa, supra, 196 Conn.
App. 500–501. ‘‘The test for materiality is whether the
suppressed evidence in the context of the entire record
creates a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceed-
ing would have been different. . . . [T]he mere possi-
bility that an item of undisclosed evidence might have
helped the defense or might have affected the outcome
of the trial, however, does not establish materiality in

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
the constitutional sense. . . . The question [of materi-
ality] is not whether the defendant would more likely
than not have received a different verdict with the evi-
dence, but whether in its absence he received a fair
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy
of confidence. A reasonable probability of a different
result is accordingly shown when the government’s evi-
dentiary suppression undermines confidence in the out-
come of the trial. . . . [W]here there is no reasonable
probability that disclosure of the exculpatory evidence
would have affected the outcome, there is no constitu-
tional 	violation 	under 	Brady.’’ 	(Citation 	omitted;
emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Williams v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 221
Conn. App. 304–305.
‘‘A defendant need not demonstrate that after dis-
counting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undis-
closed evidence, there would not have been enough left
to convict. . . . One does not show a Brady violation
by demonstrating that some of the inculpatory evidence
should have been excluded, but by showing that the
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict. . . . Accordingly, the focus
is not whether, based [on] a threshold standard, the
result of the trial would have been different if the evi-
dence had been admitted. We instead concentrate on
the overall fairness of the trial and whether nondisclo-
sure of the evidence was so unfair as to undermine our
confidence in the jury’s verdict. . . . Put differently,
materiality is established if the withheld evidence is of
sufficient import or significance in relation to the origi-
nal trial evidence that it reasonably might give rise to a
reasonable doubt about the petitioner’s guilt.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lapointe
v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 225, 263, 112
A.3d 1 (2015).

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In this appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas
court incorrectly determined that the undisclosed infor-
mation set forth in the search warrant for Drobnak’s
cell phone records was not material under Brady v.
Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 87. It was in fact material,
the petitioner contends, because without it he could
not cross-examine Drobnak, a key state’s witness upon
whose credibility the state’s entire case allegedly
depended, about his active lying to police in the months
following his arrest for possession of narcotics stem-
ming from this incident—particularly, about his use of
a fake name during an unrelated motor vehicle stop to
avoid being taken into custody on outstanding arrest
warrants for failure to appear. 2 We disagree.
‘‘[W]hen the prosecution’s case hinges entirely on the
testimony of certain witnesses, information affecting
their credibility is material. . . . The fact that the wit-
ness’ testimony is corroborated by additional evidence
supporting a guilty verdict also may be considered in
determining whether the suppressed impeachment evi-
dence was material. . . . [W]ithheld impeachment evi-
dence may not be material when the witness’ credibility
and motives for testifying already had been impeached
via defense counsel’s comprehensive and skillful cross-
examination . . . [and the witness’] testimony, while
significant, was not dispositive . . . . If the evidence
in question would not have provided the [petitioner]
with any significant impeachment material that was not
already available and used by him . . . it is immaterial
under Brady. This is true even if the [evidence’s] cumu-
lative effect may have lent some additional support
to the [petitioner’s] attack on [a witness].’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams
2 The petitioner also contends, without much elaboration, that the trial
court ‘‘overstate[d] the petitioner’s burden.’’ The habeas court’s decision,
in which it accurately cites the law pertaining to materiality under Brady,
belies this argument.

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 221 Conn.
App. 315–16.
With these principles in mind, we question first,
whether the undisclosed impeachment evidence would
have 	provided 	the 	petitioner 	with 	any 	significant
impeachment material that was not already available
and used by him to cross-examine Drobnak at his crimi-
nal trial, and second, if such previously undisclosed
evidence would have provided the petitioner with signif-
icant new impeachment material, whether Drobnak’s
original trial testimony played such a significant role
in supporting the state’s case against the petitioner at
trial that reconsideration of that testimony in light of
the new impeachment material reasonably might be
taken to put the whole case in such a different light as
to undermine confidence in the jury’s guilty verdict.
In answer to the first question, we conclude that the
undisclosed search warrant for Drobnak’s cell phone
records would not have provided the petitioner with any
significant impeachment material that was not already
available to and used by him to cross-examine Drobnak
at his criminal trial. On direct examination, Drobnak
testified that he had called the petitioner by telephone
in order to purchase crack cocaine, then met him at
the Gulf station, got into his car, and purchased $50
worth of crack cocaine from him. On cross-examina-
tion, the petitioner challenged this testimony by elic-
iting several admissions from Drobnak: first, that he
initially identified another man as the person who alleg-
edly sold him crack cocaine on the day of the petition-
er’s arrest, having done so by selecting the other man’s
photo from a photographic lineup shown to him by the
police; second, that in his written statement to the
police following his arrest, he referred to the person
who allegedly sold him crack cocaine on that day as
‘‘G,’’ a nickname he knew to be that of a different man
named Greg Williams, although Drobnak claimed that

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
by using that nickname, he intended to identify the
petitioner as the drug seller; third, that when he was
interviewed by the police following his arrest for pos-
session of narcotics in connection with this incident,
he falsely told them that he always showed up in court
for his scheduled court appearances, although he pre-
viously had failed to appear in court when required
to do so and had been criminally charged on those
occasions with failure to appear; and fourth, that while
he was out on bail following his arrest for possession
of narcotics, he failed to appear and then was ‘‘on the
run for a year because [he] was getting high.’’ Such
admissions were clearly elicited by the petitioner on
cross-examination to raise doubts both as to Drobnak’s
general credibility as a witness, based upon his long-
term drug abuse and his repeated willingness to lie to
and otherwise frustrate the efforts of law enforcement
authorities, and as to the truthfulness of his specific
claim in this case that the petitioner had sold him crack
cocaine when they met together at the Gulf station
parking lot on the day of his and the petitioner’s arrests.
Against this background, although the undisclosed
evidence of Drobnak’s giving a fake name to police in
the course of an unrelated motor vehicle stop undoubt-
edly would have cast further negative light on Drobnak’s
general credibility as a witness, it in no way is related
to and thus did not contradict the substance of his
specific account of purchasing crack cocaine from the
petitioner during their police monitored meeting at the
Gulf station parking lot on the day in question. Not only
did the subject motor vehicle stop not concern that
earlier meeting and alleged drug purchase, but it was
conducted by different police officers, from a different
town and police department, for reasons other than
those that led to the investigation in this case.
The undisclosed evidence described dishonest con-
duct by Drobnak that, if he had admitted to it in

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
response to further cross-examination by the petitioner,
could have affected Drobnak’s general credibility as a
witness by showing him to be a person who was willing
to lie to the police. As such, it was merely additional
evidence of Drobnak’s untruthfulness in dealing with
law enforcement personnel, particularly his denial of
prior failures to appear in court and his misidentifica-
tion of the person who had sold him crack cocaine on
the day of his and the petitioner’s arrests. It was there-
fore not material for purposes of establishing a Brady
violation because, even if it had been disclosed to the
petitioner and he had been permitted, in the court’s
discretion, to cross-examine the witness about it,3 Drob-
nak’s further admission of such conduct would have
lent only ‘‘incremental’’ support to the petitioner’s claim
that he was not a credible witness and, thus, that his
testimony should not be relied on as a basis for finding
the petitioner guilty. State v. Floyd, 253 Conn. 700, 746,
756 A.2d 799 (2000); see also id. (suppressed impeach-
ment evidence was not material under Brady where it
was merely incremental in value because jury had
already been apprised of witness’ motivation for testi-
fying falsely for state and substance of witness’ testi-
mony was corroborated by other evidence).
3 Even if Drobnak’s arrest warrant had been disclosed and the petitioner
had been allowed, at the discretion of the trial court; see Martyn v. Donlin,
151 Conn. 402, 408, 198 A.2d 700 (1964); to cross-examine him regarding
whether he had ever given a false name to the police, the petitioner would
have had to accept Drobnak’s answer and could not have admitted at trial
the extrinsic evidence of Drobnak’s arrest warrant. ‘‘[T]he only way to prove
misconduct of a witness for impeachment purposes is through examination
of the witness.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Filippelli v. Saint
Mary’s Hospital, 319 Conn. 113, 128, 124 A.3d 501 (2015); see also Conn.
Code Evid. § 6-6 (b) (2); State v. Annulli, 309 Conn. 482, 492, 71 A.3d
530 (2013) (‘‘[A] witness may be cross-examined about specific acts of
misconduct that relate to his or her veracity. . . . First, cross-examination
may only extend to specific acts of misconduct other than a felony conviction
if those acts bear a special significance upon the issue of veracity . . . .
Second, extrinsic evidence of such acts is generally inadmissible.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)).

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Furthermore, even though the undisclosed evidence
could have cast doubt on the general credibility of Drob-
nak, it was not of such significance, in the context of
all the evidence adduced at trial, that it might reason-
ably have raised a reasonable doubt about the truthful-
ness of Drobnak’s testimony that he purchased crack
cocaine from the petitioner in this case, or thus under-
mined confidence in the jury’s guilty verdict. This is so
because, although Drobnak’s testimony that he pur-
chased crack cocaine from the petitioner while they
sat together in the petitioner’s car was directly relevant
to the state’s claim that the petitioner possessed narcot-
ics with the intent to sell, the principal basis upon which
the state sought to confirm the truthfulness of such
testimony was not Drobnak’s general credibility, but
rather inferences supporting the reliability of his incul-
patory testimony based upon the testimony of several
experienced police officers about the consistency of
Drobnak’s and the petitioner’s conduct, as the officers
observed it before, during and after their meeting in
the Gulf station parking lot, with that of buyers and
sellers of illegal drugs. Given the persuasive force of
such unchallenged confirmatory evidence in support
of the truthfulness of Drobnak’s testimony against the
petitioner, even far more persuasive evidence of Drob-
nak’s lack of general credibility than that furnished
by the contents of the previously undisclosed search
warrant for Drobnak’s cell phone records could not
reasonably have placed the state’s entire case against
the petitioner in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the jury’s guilty verdict. Instead, we con-
clude that, because there was such overwhelming evi-
dence presented at the petitioner’s criminal trial to cor-
roborate Drobnak’s testimony that the petitioner sold
him crack cocaine when they met at the Gulf station
on the day in question, and thus that the petitioner
possessed narcotics with intent to sell, the undisclosed

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
evidence of Drobnak’s giving a fake name to police to
avoid being arrested during an unrelated motor vehicle
stop does not satisfy the test for materiality under the
third prong of the Brady test.
To begin with, there was no question that the peti-
tioner was present at the Gulf station on the day and
time in question, as he admitted at his criminal trial
that he met there briefly with Drobnak in his Toyota,
even though he offered a different explanation for their
meeting. This fact, moreover, was confirmed by the
testimony of several investigating officers, who described
what they observed as follows.
Lynch testified that he, along with Zelinski, Griffin,
and Pelchat, conducted surveillance of a Gulf station
in New London known for narcotics trafficking. Lynch
explained that he noticed Drobnak at the Gulf station
pacing back and forth near a Volvo sedan while on and
off his phone, failing to get gas, failing to enter the
convenience store, and failing to use the air pressure
machine near where his Volvo was parked. He explained
that narcotics investigators learn in ‘‘narcotics 101,
[their] basic training, [that when] . . . someone . . .
is at a convenience store that is not going in to get gas,
not going in to buy anything, not entering the store . . .
that person is there to wait for someone to purchase
narcotics.’’
Lynch testified that he then observed a dark blue
Toyota Camry operated by the petitioner drive into the
Gulf station and stop alongside the Volvo. Drobnak then
entered the petitioner’s vehicle and remained in the
front passenger seat for less than one minute before
exiting the vehicle and getting back into his Volvo.
Lynch further explained that this conduct was signifi-
cant to him as a narcotics investigator because in ‘‘basic
narcotics investigations—someone enters the vehicle,

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exchanges money for narcotics, and then quickly exits
the vehicle.’’
Upon approaching Drobnak’s vehicle at the Gulf sta-
tion, moreover, Lynch observed Drobnak sitting in the
driver’s seat holding in his lap a white, rocklike sub-
stance, which returned a positive field test for crack
cocaine, poking at it with the ink cartridge of a ballpoint
pen. Lynch explained that in his ‘‘training and experi-
ence [Drobnak] was poking at [the rocklike substance]
to break it into pieces so you don’t smoke it all at once;
you don’t use it all at once.’’ That observation, in turn,
supported Drobnak’s initial statement to Lynch, as
repeated in his trial testimony, that he had just pur-
chased crack cocaine from the petitioner when Lynch
approached him as he sat in his car after the petitioner
drove out of the Gulf station parking lot, not only
because the rocklike substance field tested positive for
crack cocaine, but because at the time of the officer’s
observation, the crack cocaine had not yet been broken
apart and made ready for personal use. Lynch further
testified that, after arresting Drobnak and advising him
of his Miranda rights, Drobnak not only described his
purchase of the crack cocaine from the petitioner, but
gave him the phone number he had called to arrange
for that purchase. Lynch, in turn, gave that phone num-
ber to Pelchat who, along with Griffin, had followed
the petitioner’s car out of the Gulf station.
Griffin testified similarly concerning the activities of
the petitioner and Drobnak at the Gulf station. He fur-
ther testified that he and Pelchat followed the petition-
er’s Toyota as it left the Gulf station parking lot. After
being informed that Drobnak had been found in posses-
sion of narcotics and had been placed under arrest,
Griffin requested a marked police vehicle to assist in
stopping 	the 	petitioner’s 	vehicle. 	Griffin 	further
explained that Moreau attempted to initiate a motor

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
vehicle stop, but the petitioner continued to drive for-
ward. Griffin explained that he ‘‘was concerned that,
although he was maintaining a slow roll, that he was
beginning the decision-making process of pursuing and
fleeing’’ and that another concern ‘‘was that he was not
initially stopping as most people do to buy himself time
to conceal the narcotics . . . .’’ Griffin further testified
that, after the petitioner finally stopped his vehicle, he
searched the petitioner for weapons and ‘‘felt a bulge
in [the petitioner’s] pocket,’’ which turned out to be
$1268 in cash, an amount sufficient in these circum-
stances to suggest to him that the cash constituted the
proceeds of drug sales.
Lynch further testified that after he arrested and
spoke with Drobnak, he kept in contact with Pelchat,
whom he informed that Drobnak had given him the
phone number of the person who had sold him the
crack cocaine. Pelchat testified that after he received
this information from Lynch, Lynch called the seller’s
number as Drobnak had reported it to him and Pelchat
saw Lynch’s phone number come up on the unclaimed
LG phone that had been found inside the petitioner’s
Toyota. Griffin testified that when he asked the peti-
tioner if the LG phone belonged to him, the petitioner
responded that he was ‘‘not willing to say, and that it
wasn’t his first rodeo.’’ Later, however, when Lynch
asked the petitioner why he was involved in selling
narcotics, the petitioner responded, ‘‘That’s all I know.’’
In view of the previously described testimony from
the investigating officers, we conclude that there is no
reasonable probability that the outcome of the petition-
er’s criminal trial would have been different if the state
had disclosed the search warrant for Drobnak’s phone
to the petitioner and he had used the impeachment
evidence in it to cross-examine Drobnak about giving
a fake name to police during an unrelated motor vehicle

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Gray v. Commissioner of Correction
stop. Not only was the undisclosed impeachment evi-
dence 	not 	qualitatively 	different 	from 	the 	other
impeachment evidence elicited by the petitioner at his
trial, and thus of no great significance in challenging
Drobnak’s general credibility, but even if it could be
found to support a finding that Drobnak had very poor
general credibility, any weakness in general credibility
established by it was so convincingly overcome by evi-
dence from police investigators confirming the truth of
Drobnak’s inculpatory testimony against the petitioner
that the new impeachment evidence cannot reasonably
be found to have given rise to a reasonable doubt about
the petitioner’s guilt. See William B. v. Commissioner
of Correction, 128 Conn. App. 478, 486, 17 A.3d 522
(‘‘Evidence that may first appear to be quite compelling
when considered alone can lose its potency when
weighed and measured with all the other evidence, both
inculpatory and exculpatory. Implicit in the standard
of materiality [under Brady] is the notion that the signif-
icance of any particular bit of evidence can only be
determined by comparison to the rest.’’ (Internal quota-
tion marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 912, 27
A.3d 371 (2011); see also State v. Bryan, supra, 193
Conn. App. 318–20 (undisclosed impeachment evidence
was not material even if defendant could have used
records to impeach credibility of state’s witness, when
overwhelming evidence was adduced at trial supporting
the defendant’s conviction). We therefore conclude that
the undisclosed impeachment evidence was not mate-
rial to guilt or to punishment under the third prong of
Brady, and thus that the habeas court properly rejected
the petitioner’s Brady claim.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.