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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
ASHLEY HOWARD v. COMMISSIONER
OF CORRECTION
(AC 47404)
Cradle, C. J., and Alvord and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of murder, on a plea of
guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford (400 U.S. 25), and, in a separate
docket, had admitted to a violation of probation (collectively, plea), appealed
following the granting of her petition for certification to appeal from the
habeas court’s judgment denying in part and dismissing in part her petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly
dismissed her claim that her plea was involuntary. Held:
The habeas court properly denied the petitioner’s claim that she was
deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel during the plea process,
as she failed to demonstrate that, but for the alleged deficient performance
of her trial counsel, she would have proceeded to trial and, therefore, that
she was prejudiced by trial counsel’s performance.
The habeas court properly dismissed the petitioner’s claim that her plea
was involuntary, as the petitioner failed to raise the issue before the trial
court or on direct appeal, and the petitioner failed to show either good
cause or actual prejudice sufficient to excuse the procedural default.
Argued May 19—officially released November 25, 2025
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment
denying in part and dismissing in part the petition, from
which the petitioner, on the granting of certification,
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Judie Marshall, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(petitioner).
Rebecca Z. Oestreicher, special deputy assistant
state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Matthew

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
Gedansky, state’s attorney, and Erin Stack, assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
Opinion
WILSON, J. Following the granting of her petition for
certification to appeal, the petitioner, Ashley Howard,
appeals from the judgment of the habeas court, Bhatt,
J., denying in part and dismissing in part her petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims that
the habeas court improperly (1) denied her claim that
she was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel
and (2) dismissed her claim that her guilty plea was
involuntary. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the
judgment of the habeas court.
The following facts, which were either found by the
habeas court or are not in dispute, and procedural his-
tory are relevant to our resolution of the petitioner’s
appeal. In the proceedings before the trial court in con-
nection with the petitioner’s criminal charges, the peti-
tioner was represented by Attorney Richard Cohen. On
June 18, 2013, the petitioner pleaded guilty pursuant to
the Alford doctrine 1 to one count of murder in violation
of General Statutes § 53a-54a and, under a separate
criminal docket, admitted to a violation of probation
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-32 (collectively,
plea). The petitioner’s murder conviction stems from
an early morning dispute on June 9, 2012, between the
petitioner and the victim regarding the victim’s alleged
infringement on the drug selling territory of the peti-
tioner and her codefendant. During the dispute, the
petitioner approached the victim as he stood on a Hart-
ford sidewalk, discharged a firearm at close range, and
killed the victim with a single gunshot to the head.
Following a canvass, the court, Alexander, J., accepted
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d
162 (1970).

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the plea and imposed a total effective sentence of forty
years of incarceration. 2
2 The canvass included the following colloquy between the court, the
petitioner, and Cohen:
‘‘The Court: Docket ending 678 charges you with the crime of murder,
[§] 53a-54a, do you say guilty or not guilty?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Guilty.
‘‘[Cohen]: And that’s under Alford, Your Honor.
‘‘The Court: And an Alford plea means that you don’t agree with every
fact that is going to be alleged against you by the state. But you recognize
that if you had a trial, there is substantial likelihood that you would be
convicted of this charge. And do you agree that there is the potential for a
bigger sentence if you were convicted after trial? Do you agree with that?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: So, the reason the person says guilty under Alford isn’t because
they are admitting every fact in the case against them, but it is because
they want to take a plea agreement rather than have a trial. Is that true?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: Did you take alcohol, medicine, or drugs today that prevents
you from understanding the court?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: No, ma’am.
‘‘The Court: Did you talk to Mr. Cohen about your decision to enter into
a plea agreement rather than have a trial?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: And are you satisfied with the information and advice that
he gave you?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yeah.
‘‘The Court: And you understand it all. Correct?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Correct. . . .
‘‘The Court: Now, on the [charge of murder] these are the rights that
you’ve given up: A right to a trial before a court or before a jury, a right to
remain silent, a right to plead not guilty and have the state show that you
are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. At a trial your lawyer is allowed to
confront or cross-examine the state’s witnesses. You could testify on your
own behalf. You could present a defense if you chose.
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, I understand.
‘‘The Court: Do you understand each of those rights?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: Has anyone forced you or threatened you in any way to make
you enter these pleas?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: No.
‘‘The Court: Are these pleas of your own free will?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes.
‘‘The Court: The maximum sentence or what you owe on probation is
seven years and nine months. A maximum charge in murder is sixty years
to serve; twenty-five years is the minimum sentence on murder. Your agree-
ment is for a forty year sentence to serve. Is that your understanding?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: Yes, ma’am.

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
Thereafter, the petitioner brought the habeas corpus
action underlying this appeal. The petitioner alleged in
count one of her second amended petition, inter alia,
that her right to due process was violated because her
guilty plea ‘‘was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
because it was motivated by the threat of the prosecut-
ing authority to prosecute [her] maternal and paternal
grandmothers for hindering prosecution . . . if [she]
did not accept the offered plea agreement’’ and because
the court was not made aware of the alleged threat
and, thus, was unable to consider this aspect of the
petitioner’s plea agreement. In count two, the petitioner
alleged that she received ineffective assistance from
trial counsel. The petitioner alleged that counsel per-
formed deficiently by his failure: (1) to investigate facts
and circumstances of the case; (2) to adequately
research and prepare a theory of self-defense; (3) to
consult with relevant experts; (4) to interview or obtain
the testimony of specified individuals; (5) to investigate
the petitioner’s background, upbringing, and medical
history; (6) to advise the petitioner regarding the costs
and benefits of providing a statement to the police; (7)
to create a record at the petitioner’s plea hearing or
sentencing hearing regarding the petitioner’s primary
motivation for accepting the plea agreement; and (8)
to accurately convey to her the terms of the plea agree-
ment as understood by the state. The petitioner asked
the court to vacate the judgment of conviction and to
order whatever other relief the court deemed appro-
priate in the interest of justice.
The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction,
filed a return in which he denied the substantive allega-
tions in counts one and two of the petition. With respect
to count one, the respondent alleged procedural default
‘‘The Court: Other than that agreement, did anyone promise you anything
else to have you enter these pleas?
‘‘[The Petitioner]: No.’’

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
as a special defense in that the petitioner failed to raise
the issue concerning the voluntariness of her plea
before the trial court or on direct appeal, and the peti-
tioner had not established good cause for the failure.
In her reply to the return, the petitioner alleged that
she was able to establish cause and prejudice to excuse
the procedural default because she was deprived of the
effective assistance of trial counsel, as alleged in count
two. The petitioner also replied that the ‘‘threat of the
prosecuting authority . . . prevented the petitioner
from seeking to withdraw her plea or otherwise litigate
the matter further.’’
The habeas court held a trial on the petitioner’s opera-
tive amended petition on August 21 and 22, 2023. The
court heard testimony from Cohen; prosecuting attor-
ney John Fahey; Hartford Police Department Detectives
Christopher Reeder and Renee LaMark Muir; Frank
Evangelista, the associate state medical examiner who
performed the autopsy of the victim; and Andrew
Meisler, a clinical and forensic psychologist retained
by the petitioner’s habeas counsel. The petitioner also
testified and submitted exhibits. On January 9, 2024,
the habeas court issued its memorandum of decision.
The court concluded that the petitioner’s first claim,
alleging a violation of due process, was procedurally
defaulted and that the petitioner had failed to establish
cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome the default.
The court denied the petitioner’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claim for failure to demonstrate either defi-
cient performance or prejudice. Thereafter, the peti-
tioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which
the court granted. This appeal followed.
Before we evaluate the merits of the petitioner’s
claims, we set forth our standard of review for habeas
corpus appeals. ‘‘The habeas court is afforded broad

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
discretion in making its factual findings, and those find-
ings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly errone-
ous. . . . The application of the habeas court’s factual
findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, pre-
sents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject
to plenary review.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
tion marks omitted.) Gaines v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, 306 Conn. 664, 677, 51 A.3d 948 (2012). Addi-
tionally, the issue of ‘‘[w]hether the representation
[that] a defendant received at trial was constitutionally
inadequate is a mixed question of law and fact. . . .
As such, that question requires plenary review by this
court unfettered by the clearly erroneous standard.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burgos v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 229 Conn. App. 818, 829, 328 A.3d
708 (2024), cert. denied, 351 Conn. 912, 331 A.3d 738
(2025).
I
We first address the petitioner’s claim that the habeas
court 	improperly 	denied 	her 	claim 	that 	she 	was
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. We are
not persuaded.
The following principles of law are relevant to our
analysis. Under the sixth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States constitution and article first, § 8,
of the Connecticut constitution, criminal defendants
have a constitutional right to adequate and effective
assistance of counsel at all critical stages of a proceed-
ing. See U.S. Const., amend. VI; Conn. Const., art. I, § 8;
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Horn v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 321 Conn. 767, 775, 138 A.3d 908
(2016). The United States Supreme Court has also ‘‘long
recognized that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a
critical phase of litigation for purposes of the [s]ixth
[a]mendment right to effective assistance of counsel.’’

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Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010).
We evaluate the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel by applying the well established two-
pronged analysis set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668.
‘‘First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient. This requires showing that coun-
sel made errors so serious that counsel was not func-
tioning as the counsel guaranteed the [petitioner] by
the [s]ixth [a]mendment. Second, the [petitioner] must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors
were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a [petitioner]
makes both showings, it cannot be said that the convic-
tion . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id., 687.
Cases involving claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel relative to guilty pleas are also governed by the
legal principles set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
supra, 466 U.S. 668, as modified by Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985).
See Shaheer v. Commissioner of Correction, 207 Conn.
App. 449, 465, 262 A.3d 152, cert. denied, 340 Conn. 903,
263 A.3d 388 (2021). In modifying the prejudice prong
of Strickland’s two-pronged test, Hill provided: ‘‘[T]o
satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the [petitioner] must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial.’’ Hill v. Lock-
hart, supra, 59.
‘‘As noted in Strickland, [t]he object of an ineffec-
tiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance.
. . . The sixth amendment does not guarantee perfect

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
representation, only a reasonably competent attorney.
. . . Representation is constitutionally ineffective only
if it so undermined the proper functioning of the advers-
arial process that the defendant was denied a fair trial.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Shaheer v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 207
Conn. App. 467. ‘‘[T]he ultimate focus of inquiry must
be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose
result is being challenged.’’ Strickland v. Washington,
supra, 466 U.S. 696. ‘‘When a [habeas petitioner] com-
plains of the ineffectiveness of [trial] counsel’s assis-
tance, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s repre-
sentation 	fell 	below 	an 	objective 	standard 	of
reasonableness. . . . In other words, the petitioner
must demonstrate that [trial counsel’s] [performance]
was not reasonably competent or within the range of
competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training
and skill in the criminal law. . . . Moreover, the perfor-
mance inquiry must be whether counsel’s assistance
was reasonable considering all the circumstances.’’
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Jordan v. Commissioner of Correction, 341 Conn. 279,
287, 267 A.3d 120 (2021). ‘‘In making this determination,
a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider
the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.’’
Strickland v. Washington, supra, 695.
In Strickland, the court explained that ‘‘there is no
reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance
claim to . . . address both components of the inquiry
if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing on
one. In particular, a court need not determine whether
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining
the prejudice suffered by the [petitioner] as a result
of the alleged deficiencies.’’ Id., 697; see also Soto v.
Commissioner of Correction, 215 Conn. App. 113, 120,
281 A.3d 1189 (2022) (‘‘It is axiomatic that courts may
decide against a petitioner on either prong [of the

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
Strickland test] . . . . 	[T]he petitioner’s failure to
prove either [the performance prong or the prejudice
prong] is fatal to a habeas petition.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.)) ‘‘Thus, [a]n error
by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does
not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal
proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burgos v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, supra, 229 Conn. App. 829.
Because we conclude that the petitioner failed to dem-
onstrate that she was prejudiced by counsel’s perfor-
mance, we need not reach the question of whether trial
counsel’s performance was in fact deficient.
In count two of her petition, the petitioner alleged,
inter alia, that trial counsel failed to render effective
assistance because he did not adequately research and
prepare a self-defense theory of defense. The petitioner
urges us to conclude that, if counsel had consulted
forensic experts and had investigated her personal, fam-
ily, and medical history, he could have formulated a
viable theory of self-defense and she would not have
pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial. The
habeas court concluded that the petitioner was not
prejudiced by counsel’s failure to pursue a theory of
self-defense because, in light of the evidence presented,
such a defense was weak or nonviable.
The petitioner further alleged in count two that trial
counsel was ineffective because he failed to advise her
properly during plea negotiations regarding the alleged
coercive tactics employed by the state and failed to
create a record of the full terms of what the petitioner
viewed as a coercive plea agreement. The court rejected
the petitioner’s claims and concluded that the petitioner
was not prejudiced. The petitioner urges us to conclude
that the court erred in its analysis of this issue and its
conclusion that, ‘‘[i]n light of all the circumstances, it
is not credible that [the petitioner] would have rejected

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
the offer of forty years to go to trial with a nonviable
defense and risk receiving a sentence twenty years
greater than she did.’’ We disagree with the petitioner’s
arguments relating to counsel failing to pursue a theory
of self-defense and failing to advise her during plea
negotiations of alleged coercive tactics by the state and
therefore conclude that the petitioner was not preju-
diced by counsel’s performance.
Reviewing courts have provided multiple considera-
tions, none individually dispositive, for evaluating the
credibility of a petitioner’s claim of prejudice or that
but for counsel’s alleged deficient representation, there
is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would
have insisted on going to trial. ‘‘In evaluating the credi-
bility of such an assertion, the strength of the state’s
case is often the best evidence of whether a [petitioner]
in fact would have changed [her] plea and insisted on
going to trial . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction, 144
Conn. App. 461, 475, 72 A.3d 426 (2013), appeal dis-
missed, 317 Conn. 594, 119 A.3d 1153 (2015). 3 Courts
may also consider the viability of unpursued claims to
evaluate whether it would have been rational under the
circumstances for the petitioner to reject a plea offer
and proceed to trial. Id.; see also Ramos v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 172 Conn. App. 282, 307, 159 A.3d
1174 (rejecting petitioner’s claim of prejudice for failure
to sufficiently investigate affirmative defense of mental
disease or defect when there was ‘‘low probability’’ of
success at trial), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 904, 170 A.3d
1 (2017).
The petitioner claims that the habeas court ‘‘erred in
concluding that the petitioner’s potential defense of
3 The court, in its memorandum of decision, determined the petitioner’s
defense at trial to be ‘‘weak, at best.’’ The court also credited the testimony
of Fahey who testified that he believed that he had ‘‘an overwhelming case
with five other witnesses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

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self-defense was weak or nonviable,’’ and, therefore,
counsel was ineffective in his failure to pursue a theory
of self-defense. We are not persuaded. On the basis of
our review of the testimony and evidence presented
before the habeas court, there is no reasonable likeli-
hood that a theory of self-defense would have suc-
ceeded at trial. The evidence demonstrates that the
petitioner, armed with a firearm, approached the victim
as he stood on a sidewalk. The petitioner then verbally
confronted the victim about the victim selling drugs on
the drug selling turf of the petitioner and her codefen-
dant. Multiple eyewitnesses provided statements impli-
cating the petitioner as the shooter. More than one
statement 	indicated 	that 	the 	petitioner 	verbally
demanded that the victim provide her with the money
the victim had received from a recent drug sale. Eyewit-
ness statements also indicated that the petitioner
attempted to go through the victim’s pockets to retrieve
the money just before shooting him. The undisputed
evidence demonstrated that the victim was killed by a
single 	gunshot 	to 	the 	head 	fired 	at 	close 	range.
Although, during the habeas trial, the petitioner testified
that her firearm inadvertently was discharged when she
used it to strike the victim in the head, this testimony
was contradicted by the testimony of the state medical
examiner who performed the autopsy of the victim.
According to the medical examiner, if someone had
struck the victim near the gunshot wound, he would
have observed a separate injury indicating blunt trauma.
The examiner testified that he found no evidence of
blunt trauma at or near the site of the gunshot wound.
Further, although the petitioner testified that she
believed that the victim typically was armed, there was
no weapon found on or near the victim following the
shooting. In light of the evidence presented, we find no
error in the habeas court’s determination that a self-
defense claim was weak at best and, therefore, that the

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petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
develop a self-defense theory of defense.4
In her second category of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims made before the habeas court, the peti-
tioner contended that she was prejudiced by counsel’s
performance specific to her plea, claiming that counsel
failed to protect the petitioner from the coercive effects
of the prosecutor’s alleged improprieties regarding the
possible arrest of members of the petitioner’s family
or, in the alternative, by counsel’s alleged failure to
convey accurately the terms of the plea agreement as
understood by the prosecutor. We note that the petition-
er’s characterization of counsel’s performance as inade-
quately protecting the petitioner during plea negotia-
tions relies heavily on a presumption that the prosecutor,
in fact, engaged in coercive tactics during plea negotia-
tions. For reasons further articulated in part II of this
opinion, in our analysis of the petitioner’s procedurally
defaulted due process claim, we are unpersuaded by
the petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor engaged in
coercive plea tactics or that her plea was not made
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.5 Although the
4 The petitioner also claims that the habeas court erred by ‘‘concluding
that there was not a reasonable probability that an unsuccessful self-defense
claim at trial could still have served to negate the intent element of the
crime of murder and therefore create a reasonable probability of a more
favorable outcome to the petitioner . . . .’’ This claim is without merit. The
habeas court properly applied the definition of self-defense found in General
Statutes § 53a-19 relative to the petitioner’s self-defense claim and the evi-
dence presented. Further, the petitioner’s exposure risk included a charge
of one count of felony murder, which, unlike murder, does not have a
specific intent requirement. See General Statutes § 53a-54c. We also disagree
with the petitioner’s contention that State v. Abdalaziz, 248 Conn. 430, 729
A.2d 725 (1999), stands for the principle that an unsuccessful self-defense
claim can be used to negate the intent requirement for a murder conviction.
Instead, we reiterate, as the Supreme Court has previously, that Connecticut
does not recognize the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. Id., 434.
5 As the respondent submits in his brief, the petitioner’s claim that counsel
failed to protect her from the ‘‘coercive impact’’ of alleged state coercion
is inadequately briefed and therefore considered abandoned. See State v.
Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868 (2016).

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
petitioner testified that she would not have pleaded
guilty but for the alleged coercion, the court did not
find this testimony credible and, instead, found that she
was motivated to accept the state’s plea offer because
of her remorse for the victim’s death, her desire to
protect her family members from prosecution, and her
desire to limit her exposure from a sentence in excess
of sixty years of incarceration to an agreed upon sen-
tence of forty years of incarceration.
The petitioner urges us to conclude that, but for coun-
sel’s failure to advise her properly and create a proper
record of the circumstances surrounding her plea, she
would have elected to proceed to trial. We are unper-
suaded. ‘‘It is clear enough that a [petitioner] must make
more than a bare allegation that [s]he [but for counsel’s
conduct] would have pleaded differently and gone to
trial . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carra-
way v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 144 Conn.
App. 473. This assertion ‘‘suffers from obvious credibil-
ity problems and must be evaluated in light of the cir-
cumstances the [petitioner] would have faced at the
time of [her] decision.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Id., 475. ‘‘Moreover . . . a petitioner must con-
vince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain
would have been rational under the circumstances.’’
Padilla v. Kentucky, supra, 559 U.S. 372; see also Flomo
v. Commissioner of Correction, 169 Conn. App. 266,
280, 149 A.3d 185 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 906,
152 A.3d 544 (2017).
In evaluating whether a decision to proceed to trial
would have been rational under the circumstances, a
court may consider, as the habeas court did here, the
exposure risk the petitioner faced in the absence of a
plea agreement. See Carraway v. Commissioner of
Correction, supra, 144 Conn. App. 476 (‘‘credibility of
the petitioner’s after the fact insistence that he would
have gone to trial should be assessed in light of the

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
likely risks that pursuing that course would have
entailed’’); see also Yerinides v. Commissioner of Cor-
rection, 156 Conn. App. 71, 78, 111 A.3d 961 (2015)
(rejecting petitioner’s claim of prejudice after consider-
ing, among other factors, that plea bargained sentence
was substantially less than petitioner’s possible ulti-
mate sentence). For the charge of murder alone, the
petitioner faced a term of incarceration of up to sixty
years with a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years
of incarceration.6 In addition, the petitioner faced a
maximum sentence of seven years and nine months of
incarceration for violating the terms of her probation.
The petitioner’s plea agreement was for forty years of
incarceration. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the state
would not pursue the additional charges in the informa-
tion, each of which carried additional sentencing expo-
sure. In consideration of the petitioner’s exposure, the
habeas court determined that there is ‘‘no reasonable
likelihood that [the petitioner] would have rejected an
offer and proceeded to trial with a weak or nonviable
self-defense claim where the potential exposure was
sixty years’ incarceration, especially when one of her
stated motivations for accepting the offer was to limit
her sentence exposure and the offer was to resolve all
of her pending cases which added on to her potential
exposure.’’
In light of the nonviability of a self-defense claim and
the maximum sentencing exposure the petitioner faced
in the absence of a plea agreement, we are unpersuaded
that, but for the alleged deficient performance of coun-
sel, the petitioner would have proceeded to trial and,
therefore, that the petitioner was prejudiced by trial
6 General Statutes § 53a-54a (c) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Murder is pun-
ishable as a class A felony in accordance with subdivision (2) of section
53a-35a . . . .’’
General Statutes § 53a-35a (2) provides: ‘‘For the class A felony of murder,
[the sentence of imprisonment shall be fixed by the court as] a term not
less than twenty-five years nor more than life . . . .’’

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counsel’s performance. Accordingly, we conclude that
the habeas court properly denied the petitioner’s inef-
fective assistance of counsel claims.
II
Next, the petitioner claims that the habeas court
improperly dismissed her claim that her guilty plea was
involuntary. We are not persuaded.
As we have already stated in this opinion, the court
relied on the procedural default doctrine when it dis-
missed the petitioner’s claim that her plea was involun-
tary. ‘‘[A] habeas court’s conclusion that a petitioner’s
claim is barred by the procedural default doctrine
involves a question of law over which we exercise ple-
nary review.’’ Kukucka v. Commissioner of Correction,
225 Conn. App. 159, 165, 314 A.3d 631, cert. denied, 350
Conn. 904, 323 A.3d 342 (2024).
Where, as here, ‘‘a habeas petitioner has failed to file
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea or to challenge
the validity of the plea on direct appeal, a challenge to
the validity of the plea in a habeas proceeding is subject
to procedural default.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Crawford v. Commissioner of Correction, 294
Conn. 165, 175, 982 A.2d 620 (2009). Under the proce-
dural default doctrine, ‘‘a claimant may not raise, in a
collateral proceeding, claims that he could have made
at trial or on direct appeal in the original proceeding
and that if the state, in response, alleges that a claimant
should be procedurally defaulted from now making the
claim, the claimant bears the burden of demonstrating
good cause for having failed to raise the claim directly,
and he must show that he suffered actual prejudice as
a result of this excusable failure.’’ Hinds v. Commis-
sioner of Correction, 151 Conn. App. 837, 852, 97 A.3d
986 (2014), aff’d, 321 Conn. 56, 136 A.3d 596 (2016).7
7 ‘‘[T]he cause and prejudice test is designed to prevent full review of
issues in habeas corpus proceedings that counsel did not raise at trial or
on appeal for reasons of tactics, inadvertence or ignorance . . . .’’ (Internal

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
We conclude that the petitioner has not shown either
good cause or actual prejudice sufficient to excuse the
procedural default.8
‘‘[T]he existence of cause for a procedural default
must ordinarily turn on whether the [petitioner] can
show that some objective factor external to the defense
impeded counsel’s efforts to comply with the [s]tate’s
procedural rule. . . . [For example] a showing that the
factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably
available to counsel . . . or . . . some interference by
officials . . . would constitute cause under this stan-
dard.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v.
Commissioner of Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 568, 941
A.2d 248 (2008). Having already concluded in part I of
this opinion that the habeas court properly rejected the
petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
we conclude that the court properly rejected the peti-
tioner’s argument that she could overcome the special
defense of procedural default by means of counsel’s
alleged ineffective performance. For the reasons pro-
vided subsequently in this opinion, we also conclude
that the habeas court properly rejected the petitioner’s
claim that allegedly coercive tactics by the state during
the plea process provided good cause to excuse her
procedural default.
On appeal, the petitioner claims, in essence, that her
entire plea process, from the statement she provided
to the police regarding the underlying crime prior to
receipt of a plea offer, to her ultimate plea of guilty,
was the result of a coercive ‘‘threat’’ by the prosecutor
to arrest members of the petitioner’s family in the
quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 285
Conn. 556, 567–68, 941 A.2d 248 (2008).
8 If a petitioner fails to make a showing of good cause, the court will not
reach the merits of the habeas claim. See Johnson v. Commissioner of
Correction, 285 Conn. 556, 568, 941 A.2d 248 (2008).

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
absence of full compliance with the plea agreement.9
The petitioner additionally claims that the alleged coer-
cive threat infected all aspects of the petitioner’s plea
and provides good cause to excuse the petitioner’s fail-
ure to raise her due process claim in an earlier proceed-
ing, such as a proceeding to withdraw her guilty plea.
We are unpersuaded.
Due process requires a criminal defendant’s plea to
be entered knowingly and voluntarily. See Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n.5, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed.
2d 274 (1969). ‘‘[T]he determination as to whether a
plea has been knowingly and voluntarily entered entails
an examination of all of the relevant circumstances
. . . . ’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 44, 751 A.2d 298 (2000). It does
not appear that an appellate court of this state has
defined what constitutes ‘‘coercive’’ tactics by the state
that could infect a plea process and, specifically, under-
mine the voluntariness of a plea. Our Supreme Court,
however, has discussed the voluntariness of confes-
sions in relevant part as follows: ‘‘Irrespective of
Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct.
1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)], and the fifth amendment
itself . . . any use in a criminal trial of an involuntary
confession is a denial of due process of law. . . . The
state has the burden of proving the voluntariness of the
confession by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
. . . [T]he test of voluntariness is whether an examina-
tion of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct
of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear
[the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confes-
sions not freely self-determined . . . . The ultimate
test remains . . . [i]s the confession the product of an
9 The habeas court found credible Fahey’s testimony that he believed he
had ‘‘ ‘an overwhelming case’ ’’ against the petitioner with five witnesses
who implicated the petitioner in the murder; therefore, the only potential
value of a statement by the petitioner was if the petitioner implicated her
codefendant, which, ultimately, she did not.

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?
If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against
him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the
use of his confession offends due process. . . . The
determination, by the trial court, whether a confession
is voluntary must be grounded upon a consideration of
the circumstances surrounding it.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Christopher
S., 338 Conn. 255, 280–81, 257 A.3d 912 (2021). In light
of the due process concerns that are implicated by
involuntary confessions and involuntary pleas, we see
no reason why the principles that are related to an
evaluation of the voluntariness of a confession do not
apply with equal force in an evaluation of whether a
petitioner’s guilty plea was so overborne by coercion
so as to result in an involuntary plea.
The habeas court, on the basis of the evidence and
testimony presented before it, found that the petition-
er’s claim that her plea and subsequent failure to with-
draw her plea were the product of a coercive threat
was without merit. The evidence supported a finding
that the petitioner was neither threatened nor coerced
as she alleged. We therefore conclude that the habeas
court properly dismissed the petitioner’s due process
claim as procedurally defaulted.
The court, having found the testimony of Fahey,
Cohen, and LaMark Muir credible, reasonably found
that the petitioner’s single statement to the police was
voluntary. The court found that it was the petitioner
who, through counsel, inquired if the prosecutor would
be interested in a statement by the petitioner in
exchange for assurance from the state that members
of the petitioner’s family who were ‘‘already being inves-
tigated and . . . the police were considering seeking
arrest warrants for’’ would not be arrested for their

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suspected role in hindering prosecution of the peti-
tioner. LaMark Muir testified that during the one meet-
ing at which the petitioner provided a statement to the
police, she elicited information regarding the possible
arrests of members of her family. The evidence there-
fore supports a finding that the petitioner acted with
conscious free choice and was not coerced when she
elicited from the police information regarding the possi-
ble arrest of members of her family and when she,
through counsel, offered to provide a statement regard-
ing the underlying crime in exchange for the immuniza-
tion of members of her family.
In further support of her claim that her plea was
involuntary, the petitioner testified that she, at the direc-
tion of trial counsel, met alone with Fahey multiple
times. During one of those meetings, she claims, he
displayed to her five affidavits, each for the arrest of
a member of the petitioner’s family. The court rejected
the petitioner’s testimony as not credible. Instead, the
court credited the testimony of Cohen, Fahey, and
LaMark Muir who each testified that Cohen was pres-
ent, and Fahey was not, for the one meeting during
which the petitioner provided a voluntary statement to
the police. The court also determined that at no time
did the petitioner meet with Fahey. Instead, the court
found credible ‘‘that there was one meeting during
which [the petitioner] provided a statement and [Cohen]
was present for that meeting with police officers, but
[Fahey] was not.’’ We therefore conclude there was no
error in the court rejecting the petitioner’s claim. In
deference to the habeas court as the trier of fact, we
do not disturb the court’s credibility determination that
the petitioner’s claim that Fahey threatened to arrest
members of the petitioner’s family during a private,
one-on-one meeting was not credible. On the basis of
the factual predicate that the alleged meeting during

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Howard v. Commissioner of Correction
which Fahey threatened to arrest members of the peti-
tioner’s family suspected of hindering the petitioner’s
prosecution did not occur, we conclude that the peti-
tioner’s plea was not the result of a coercive threat but,
rather, a voluntary choice made by the petitioner in an
effort to receive a benefit for herself and members of
her family.
The habeas court’s finding that the petitioner’s claim
that she was threatened or otherwise coerced to plead
guilty was meritless is further supported by the petition-
er’s own responses during her plea canvass conducted
by the trial court. When the petitioner was directly
asked by the court during her plea canvass, ‘‘[h]as any-
one forced you or threatened you in any way to make
you enter these pleas,’’ the petitioner responded, ‘‘No.’’
When the court then asked, ‘‘Are these pleas of your
own free will,’’ the petitioner responded, ‘‘Yes.’’ And
when the court asked, ‘‘Other than [the sentence term]
agreement, did anyone promise you anything else to
have you enter these pleas,’’ the petitioner responded,
‘‘No.’’ 10 Had the petitioner felt threatened or otherwise
coerced into entering a guilty plea, she had an unencum-
bered opportunity to make the trial court aware of the
alleged threat. She declined to do so.
Upon review of the testimony and evidence presented
before the habeas court, we conclude that the habeas
court’s factual finding that the state’s actions did not
constitute a coercive ‘‘ ‘threat’ ’’ was not erroneous and,
therefore, that the petitioner’s plea was not involuntary.
As the respondent aptly argues, because the habeas
10 Habeas courts may rely on ‘‘the responses of the [petitioner] at the time
[s]he responded to the trial court’s plea canvass . . . .’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Smith v. Commissioner of Correction, 215 Conn. App. 167,
185, 282 A.3d 1036, cert. denied, 345 Conn. 921, 284 A.3d 983 (2022); see
also State v. Schlosser, 211 Conn. App. 143, 151, 271 A.3d 1074 (addressing
‘‘the issue of whether a defendant’s plea was knowingly or voluntarily made’’
in light of ‘‘the canvass conducted by the [trial] court’’), cert. denied, 343
Conn. 923, 275 A.3d 212 (2022).

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court resolved the petitioner’s claim of alleged coercion
as a matter of fact predicated on its credibility determi-
nations, the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court
erred in rejecting her claim of cause and prejudice based
on coercion is meritless. The petitioner has therefore
not met her burden of demonstrating an objective exter-
nal factor sufficient to excuse her procedural default.
Consistent with our determination that the petitioner
has failed to demonstrate that she was prejudiced by
counsel’s performance, we conclude that the petitioner
has failed to show actual prejudice as a result of the
state’s offer to immunize members of the petitioner’s
family against prosecution as part of the petitioner’s
plea negotiations. The evidence supports the court’s
finding that the petitioner solicited and accepted the
benefits of a plea agreement. As a result of the petitioner
providing a statement to the police, the state abandoned
its intention to arrest and prosecute members of the
petitioner’s family suspected of hindering the petition-
er’s prosecution. It is undisputed that, as a result of the
plea, the state reduced the petitioner’s charges to one
count of murder and one count of violation of probation.
As a further result of the plea, the state agreed not to
pursue other outstanding charges against the petitioner.
The petitioner’s sentencing exposure also was reduced
from more than sixty years to forty years of incarcera-
tion. Had the petitioner believed there to be a coercive
element of her plea agreement, she had an opportunity
to make the court aware of the state’s alleged actions
during her plea canvass. To excuse a procedural default,
a petitioner must demonstrate good cause for her failure
to make a claim in an original proceeding that she now
seeks to raise in a collateral proceeding, and she must
show actual prejudice as a result of that failure. The
petitioner has failed to satisfy this burden. We therefore

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conclude that the habeas court properly dismissed the
petitioner’s due process claim as procedurally defaulted.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.