26 CO 12, 25SA187, In Re: People v. Dilka (no oral arguments were held)

1 printed pages contain little extracted OCR body text; searchable legal-body completeness has not been established for those pages.

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

March 2, 2026

# 2026 CO 12

No. 25SA187, In Re People v. Dilka-Criminal Law- Statutes - Second Degree
Burglary - Protection Orders

The supreme court addresses whether the criminal violation of a protection
order under section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S. (2025), serves as a predicate crime for second
degree burglary under section 18-4-203, C.R.S. (2025). To be a predicate crime for
second degree burglary, the underlying crime must be a "crime against another
person or property." § 18-4-203(1).

The supreme court concludes that its ruling in People v. Rhorer, 967 P.2d 147
(Colo. 1998), created a bright-line rule that criminal protection order violations
under section 18-6-803.5 are crimes against another person or property because
such violations always involve the harm or threat of harm to another person or
property. Accordingly, the supreme court discharges the order to show cause and
remands to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 12

Supreme Court Case No. 25SA187
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
Weld County District Court Case No. 25CR336
Honorable Audrey Galloway, Judge

In Re
Plaintiff:

The People of the State of Colorado,

V.

Defendant:

Robert Joe Dilka.

Order Discharged
en banc
March 2, 2026

Attorneys for Plaintiff:

Michael J. Rourke, District Attorney, Nineteenth Judicial District

Blake Madone, Deputy District Attorney

Greeley, Colorado

Attorneys for Defendant:

Teodorovic Law, P.C.

Adrienne R. Teodorovic

Windsor, Colorado

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CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE SAMOUR and JUSTICE
BERKENKOTTER joined.
JUSTICE GABRIEL dissented.

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CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 In this original proceeding, we review the trial court's ruling at a
preliminary hearing that Robert Joe Dilka's criminal violation of a protection
order1 under section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S. (2025), constituted a predicate crime for
purposes of second degree burglary under section 18-4-203, C.R.S. (2025).

12 To commit second degree burglary, a person must enter or remain
unlawfully in a building or occupied structure "with intent to commit therein a
crime against another person or property." § 18-4-203(1). The question here is
whether, as a matter of law, the criminal violation of a protection order amounts
to a "crime against another person or property" for purposes of second degree
burglary.

13 Per our decision in People v. Rhorer, 967 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1998), the answer is
yes. There, we expressly held "that a violation of a no-contact order constitutes a
predicate crime for purposes of the burglary statute." Id. at 148. In so holding, we
reasoned that because the General Assembly has deemed the violation of a
protection order a crime in and of itself, see id. at 151 n.6 (citing § 18-6-803.5, 8B

1 Protection orders are also called "no-contact orders" and "restraining orders" in
common parlance and past case law. For consistency, we refer to them as
"protection orders" throughout this opinion, consistent with current Colorado
statutes. See § 18-1-1001, C.R.S. (2025); § 18-6-803.5, C.R.S. (2025); § 18-6-803.7,
C.R.S. (2025).

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C.R.S. (1986 & Supp. 1992)), the defendant's "intent to violate the no-contact order
by breaking into [the victim's] home constituted an 'intent to commit therein a
crime against [a] person or property' and fulfilled that element of the crime of
second degree burglary." Id. at 151 (quoting § 18-4-203, C.R.S. (1997)). Today, we
confirm that Rhorer established a bright-line rule that a criminal violation of a
protection order under section 18-6-803.5 serves as a predicate crime for second
degree burglary because such a violation constitutes a crime against another
person or property.

14 Here, the trial court properly concluded that, under Rhorer, the criminal
violation of a protection order serves as a predicate offense for purposes of second
degree burglary. Accordingly, we discharge the order to show cause and remand
the case for further proceedings.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

15
The People charged Dilka with second degree burglary and several other
offenses2 after he unlawfully entered his ex-wife's home in violation of a
mandatory protection order issued under section 18-1-1001, C.R.S. (2025). The

2 Dilka is charged with one count of second degree burglary, § 18-4-203(1), (2)(b)(I);
two counts of violation of a protection order, § 18-6-803.5(1)(a) (relating to
mandatory protection orders issued in two separate Weld County cases); one
count of criminal mischief, § 18-4-501(1), (4)(c), C.R.S. (2025); and one count of
second degree criminal trespass, § 18-4-503(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025).

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protection order prohibited Dilka from contacting his ex-wife and barred him from
her home.

16 At a preliminary hearing on the burglary charge, the People presented
testimony and other evidence that Dilka violated the protection order when he
jumped the fence to enter his ex-wife's yard, damaged the doorbell and back door,
and ultimately entered the home. Despite his ex-wife's insistence that he leave, he
followed her into the home. His ex-wife locked herself in the bathroom and called
the police. When the police arrived, they found Dilka jumping back over the fence
and placed him in custody.

17 Dilka did not contest this evidence. Instead, he argued that his conduct did
not amount to a "crime against another person or property" for purposes of second
degree burglary. The trial court rejected Dilka's argument, reasoning that under
Rhorer, the violation of a protection order serves as a predicate crime for purposes
of second degree burglary because it is a crime against a person or property. The
court further reasoned that the protection order in this case clearly stated that
Dilka was to stay away from the victim's home or any other location where she
was likely to be found, and that by violating that order, Dilka committed a crime
against a person or property. Thus, based on its understanding of Rhorer, the court
concluded that the People had met their burden to establish probable cause for the
second degree burglary charge and set that charge over for trial.

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18 Dilka sought this court's review of the trial court's ruling under C.A.R. 21.
We granted his petition and now discharge the order to show cause.

## II. Jurisdiction

19 Under C.A.R. 21, this court has "sole discretion to exercise our original
jurisdiction." People v. Justice, 2023 CO 9, 1 17, 524 P.3d 1178, 1182 (quoting
People v. Cortes-Gonzalez, 2022 CO 14, 1 21, 506 P.3d 835, 842). Any relief granted
under Rule 21 is "extraordinary in nature and .... will be granted only when no
other adequate remedy is available." C.A.R. 21(a)(2). We have granted such relief
under Rule 21 "when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, when a party
may otherwise suffer irreparable harm, [or] when a petition raises 'issues of
significant public importance that we have not yet considered."
People v. Walthour, 2023 CO 55, 1 8, 537 P.3d 371, 374 (alteration in original)
(quoting People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, 1 8, 455 P.3d 746, 748).

110 Here, we agree with Dilka's contention that any appellate remedy would be
inadequate because the issue concerns the trial court's probable cause
determination at Dilka's preliminary hearing, which is unreviewable on appeal.
See People v. Nichelson, 219 P.3d 1064, 1066-67 (Colo. 2009). In addition, this case
presents an issue of statutory interpretation that warrants guidance from this
court. For these reasons, we exercise our jurisdiction under Rule 21.

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## III. Analysis

111 After setting forth the standard of review, we begin by discussing the
holding in Rhorer and confirm that it established a bright-line rule that a criminal
violation of a protection order serves as a predicate crime for purposes of the
second degree burglary statute. We then explain that the rule in Rhorer is
consistent with the text of the burglary statute and the legislative intent behind
section 18-6-803.5. We conclude that the trial court did not err in applying Rhorer
to Dilka's case to find probable cause to bind over the second degree burglary
charge for trial.

### A. Standard of Review

112 We review a trial court's probable cause determination at a preliminary
hearing for an abuse of discretion. White v. MacFarlane, 713 P.2d 366, 369 (Colo.
1986). But to the extent a trial court's probable cause finding rests on interpreting
a question of law, we review the trial court's interpretation de novo. See
People v. Webb, 2014 CO 36, 1 15, 325 P.3d 566, 570. Here, because the trial court's
probable cause finding centered on its interpretation of sections 18-6-803.5 and
18-4-203, as well as our opinion in Rhorer, we review those interpretations de novo.
113 When interpreting statutes, our goal is to discern and give effect to the
legislature's intent. See Town of Minturn v. Tucker, 2013 CO 3, 1 27, 293 P.3d 581,
590. In doing so, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of undefined phrases

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and read statutes "in context" to give "consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect
to all of [their] parts." McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, 11 37-38, 442 P.3d 379, 389.

### B. Rhorer

114 Dilka argues that Rhorer only addressed whether a protection order
violation amounted to a crime at all and did not establish a categorical rule that
violating a protection order constitutes a predicate crime "against another person
or property" for purposes of burglary. We disagree.

115 The defendant in Rhorer broke his ex-girlfriend's basement window in an
effort to get into her home. 967 P.2d at 148. At the time, a protection order issued
by the Denver County Court was in effect prohibiting the defendant from
contacting the victim. Id. The People charged the defendant with second degree
burglary and other crimes. Id.

116 At trial, the jury was instructed and given a verdict form that allowed it to
find the defendant guilty of burglary using any of three predicate crimes: assault,
menacing, or violation of a protection order. Id. The jury returned a verdict
finding the defendant guilty of second degree burglary based solely on the
defendant's intent to violate the protection order. Id.

117 A split division of the court of appeals reversed the conviction, reasoning
that the violation of a protection order entered pursuant to a municipal ordinance
(rather than a state statute) was not a crime. People v. Rhorer, 946 P.2d 503, 506-08

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(Colo. App. 1997), rev'd, 967 P.2d at 151. The division majority refused to consider
section 18-6-803.5, the state statute criminalizing protection order violations,
because the People did not rely on section 18-6-803.5 to justify the second degree
burglary charge. Id. at 507-08. The division majority further reasoned that "an
intent simply to enter [the] premises, even if in violation of a court order, would
not constitute an intent to commit another crime 'therein'" beyond the intent to
make an unlawful entry. Id. at 508. Dissenting in part, Judge Metzger reasoned
that at the time of the offense, a violation of a protection order issued by a
municipal court was a misdemeanor under section 18-6-803.5, and thus, such a
violation "was an appropriate predicate offense for the crime of burglary." Id. at
509 (Metzger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

118 We granted certiorari review and reversed. We noted at the outset that
"the court of appeals held that an intent to violate a no-contact order does not
qualify as an 'intent to commit therein a crime against a person or property" in
violation of section 18-4-203. Rhorer, 967 P.2d at 147 (quoting § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S.
(1997)). We observed that the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction
for burglary based solely on the jury's finding that the defendant intended to
violate a protection order (and not an intent to commit assault or menacing). Id.
at 148. In other words, the court of appeals reasoned that the defendant's act of
breaking into the victim's home in violation of the protection order could not,

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without more, serve as a predicate crime for second degree burglary. We then
expressly disagreed with the court of appeals' analysis and held that "a violation
of a no-contact order constitutes a predicate crime for purposes of the burglary
statute." Id. We reasoned that at the time of the crime, section 18-6-803.5 was
already the law, making the violation of a protection order a crime under state law.
Id. at 149-51. In particular, we observed that the protection order at issue in the
case "was obviously intended to protect [the ex-girlfriend] from the harms
delineated in section 18-6-803.5(1)." Id. at 150. Specifically, the order barred the
defendant from "threatening, beating, striking, or assaulting" her and "require[d]
[the defendant] to leave certain premises and refrain from entering or remaining
on such premises." Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting § 18-6-803.5(1), 8B
C.R.S. (1986 & Supp. 1992)).

119 We reasoned that the violation of the protection order issued in the case by
the Denver County Court pursuant to its authority under the Domestic Abuse Act,
sections 14-4-101 to -105, 6B C.R.S. (1987 & Supp. 1992), constituted a crime under
section 18-6-803.5. Rhorer, 967 P.2d at 150. Thus, the defendant's "violation of the
no-contact order was an appropriate predicate crime under the second degree
burglary statute." Id. In reaching this conclusion, we expressly rejected the court
of appeals' reasoning that the jury failed to find that the defendant intended to
commit a crime apart from the intent to commit an unlawful entry, again

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emphasizing that the legislature has deemed the violation of a protection order "a
crime in and of itself." Id. at 151 n.6. We then summarized our analysis, holding
that the defendant's "intent to violate the no-contact order by breaking into [the
victim's] home constituted an 'intent to commit therein a crime against [a] person
or property' and fulfilled that element of the crime of second degree burglary." Id.
at 151 (quoting § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. (1997)).

120 This categorical statement in Rhorer means what it says: a criminal violation
of a protection order is not just a crime, but a requisite predicate "crime against
another person or property" for purposes of second degree burglary.
§ 18-4-203(1).

121 We therefore reject Dilka's contention that our holding in Rhorer was limited
to whether a violation of a protection order constituted a crime at all. Rather, the
language quoted above makes clear that we held that it does serve as a predicate
crime, specifically, that a criminal violation of a protection order under section
18-6-803.5 qualifies as a "crime against [a] person or property."

## C. Rhorer Is Consistent with the Text of the Burglary Statute and the Purpose of Section 18-6-803.5

122 The legislature did not define the phrase "crime against another person or
property" in the burglary statute. § 18-4-203(1). Although the legislature could
have easily referenced specific categories of offenses in the Criminal Code, such as
"Offenses Against the Person" in article 3 of title 18, or "Offenses Against

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Property" in article 4 of title 18, it did not do so. Accordingly, we construe the
phrase according to its plain and ordinary meaning to refer to an offense involving
harm or the threat of harm to another person or to property. 3

123 With this plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase in mind, a close look at
the definition of protection order in section 18-6-803.5 clarifies why the Rhorer
court understood a criminal violation of a protection order to qualify as a "crime
against [a] person or property." Rhorer, 967 P.2d at 151 (quoting § 18-4-203(1),
C.R.S. (1997)). This statute defines a protection order as any order issued by a state

3 Although Dilka relies on the court of appeals' analysis of this phrase in
People v. Poindexter, 2013 COA 93, 11 11-15, 338 P.3d 352, 355-56, we are not bound
by that decision. In any event, the statutory history of the second degree burglary
statute supports a broad reading of the phrase. The phrase did not appear in the
second degree burglary statute until 1971 when the legislature added it as part of
the overhaul of Colorado's criminal code. See Ch. 121, sec. 1, § 40-4-203, 1971 Colo.
Sess. Laws 388, 427. Before that time, second degree burglary allowed any felony
or misdemeanor to serve as a predicate crime. See § 40-3-5, 3 C.R.S. (1963) (defining
the predicate offenses for second degree burglary as "murder, robbery, rape,
mayhem, larceny, or other felony or misdemeanor" (emphasis added)). When the
1971 revision replaced this language with the phrase "crime against a person or
property," 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws at 427, an official comment accompanied the
amendment, clarifying that the new language "embod[ied] the substance of
section 40-3-5, C.R.S. 1963." § 40-4-202 cmt., 3 C.R.S. (1963 & Supp. 1971). Because
the "substance of section 40-3-5, C.R.S. 1963," id., included all felonies and
misdemeanors as predicate crimes, we can infer, at a minimum, that the legislature
intended the replacement phrase "crime against a person or property" to be
broadly construed. See Cooper v. People, 973 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Colo. 1999) (relying
on the official comments appended to the burglary statutes as evidence of the
statutes' proper scope).

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or municipal court that prohibits the restrained person from harming or
threatening to harm the protected person or their property (including animals):

'Protection order' means any order that prohibits the restrained
person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting,
threatening, or touching any protected person or protected animal, or
from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a
specified distance of a protected person or protected animal or
premises or any other provision to protect the protected person or
protected animal from imminent danger to life or health . .. .

§ 18-6-803.5(1.5)(a.5)(I).

124 Every aspect of this definition shows that protection orders exist to shield
protected persons and their property from harm or the threat of harm by the
restrained party. Notably, this definition applies to protection orders throughout
the Colorado statutes, including both civil protection orders issued pursuant to
article 14 of title 13, and mandatory criminal protection orders issued pursuant to
section 18-1-1001. § 18-6-803.5(1.5)(a.5)(I)(A).4

125 The legislative declaration in section 13-14-100.2, C.R.S. (2025), further
reveals the legislature's concern with shielding protected parties from harm or the

4 The definition also applies to orders under section 19-2.5-607, C.R.S. (2025)
(requiring protection orders against juvenile criminal offenders and their parents
akin to those imposed on adults under section 18-1-1001); section 19-4-111(4),
C.R.S. (2025) (allowing parties to family law proceedings concerning parental
rights and responsibilities to request temporary protection orders concerning the
allocation of parental responsibility, decision-making responsibility, and
parenting time); and C.R.C.P. 365 (providing limited authority to county courts to
issue temporary restraining orders).

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threat of harm.5 The declaration begins by recognizing that protection orders
"promote safety, reduce violence and other types of abuse, and prevent serious
harm and death." § 13-14-100.2(1). It underscores that victims of domestic abuse
are subjected to not just physical violence and harm, but also mental and emotional
abuse, as well as various forms of control that make "a victim more likely to return
to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs."
§ 13-14-100.2(2). The declaration further acknowledges that victims experience
both physical and emotional trauma from unwanted contact with perpetrators and
endure intense physical and emotional distress from stalkers. § 13-14-100.2(3)-(4).
126 Similarly, the statute establishing mandatory protection orders in criminal
cases acknowledges the potential for harm to the victims of crime as well as the
potential for witnesses to be subjected to intimidation or retaliation. § 18-1-1001(1).
The statute thus requires a court to enter protection orders that bar a defendant
from "harassing, molesting, intimidating, retaliating against, or tampering with

5 The statute criminalizing protection order violations cross references and
incorporates elements of the civil protection order statutes. See
§ 18-6-803.5(1)(c)(I), (1.5)(a.5)(I)(A) (stating that certain civil protection order
violations can be crimes and including civil protection orders in the definition of
"[p]rotection order"). And the legislative declaration itself cross references the
"mandatory criminal process" for protection orders in section 18-1-1001.
§ 13-14-100.2(1). Thus, while the civil and criminal protection order statutes reside
in different titles of the code, the legislature has treated the criminal violation of
either the same under section 18-6-803.5. Such violations present the same harm
or threat of harm to protected persons and their property.

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any witness to or victim of the acts charged." § 18-1-1001(1)(a). It also authorizes
the court to impose additional restrictions, such as prohibitions on contacting a
protected party, being in locations where the victim or witness is likely to be
found, possessing firearms, and the consumption of alcohol when there is a
sufficient nexus to the safety of a victim or witness. § 18-1-1001(3)(a)(II).

127 Section 18-6-803.5 recognizes that a restrained party's violation of such
protection order provisions innately threatens a protected person's safety. Such
violations present the very psychological, emotional, and potentially physical
harm to the protected party (or to property, including animals) that such
protection orders seek to avoid.

128 For all these reasons, we reaffirm the rule established in Rhorer: the criminal
violation of a protection order under section 18-6-803.5 is a "crime against another
person or property" for purposes of section 18-4-203(1) and thus serves as a
predicate crime for second degree burglary.

## IV. Conclusion

129 The trial court correctly relied on our holding in Rhorer to conclude that
Dilka's violation of the mandatory protection order served as a predicate crime for
second degree burglary and properly bound the charge over for trial.
Accordingly, we discharge the order to show cause and remand the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL dissented.

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JUSTICE GABRIEL, dissenting.

130 Relying on our decision in People v. Rhorer, 967 P.2d 147, 148 (Colo. 1998),
the majority concludes that the violation of a protection order is, as a matter of
law, a predicate crime to support a burglary charge, regardless of whether the facts
establish that the violation constituted a crime against another person or property,
an essential element of the crime of burglary. Maj. op. 11 2-3, 14, 20, 28.

131 Because (1) I do not agree that every violation of a protection order,
regardless of the facts at issue, constitutes a crime against another person or
property sufficient to establish a predicate crime for second degree burglary;
(2) holding otherwise unnecessarily lowers the prosecution's burden of proof in
all burglary cases in which the defendant may have violated a protection order
and will lead to absurd and unjust results in many cases; and (3) our decision in
Rhorer did not actually decide the question now before us, I respectfully dissent.

## I. Factual Background

132 The majority sufficiently sets forth the relevant facts. I will not repeat all of
those facts here, but I will highlight the facts most pertinent to my analysis.

133 The alleged victim, who is Robert Joe Dilka's ex-wife, had a protection order
against Dilka. The protection order precluded Dilka from contacting the alleged
victim or being in any place that she was likely to be.

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134 Notwithstanding the terms of the protection order, on the day in question,
Dilka entered the alleged victim's backyard and then her home. No evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing indicated that he said anything to the alleged
victim after he entered the home, nor did he make any threats. In addition, it
appears that, at all times, there was a door between him and the alleged victim,
and he did not make any attempt to open that door. According to him, he simply
wanted to retrieve his backpack.

135 The alleged victim contacted the police to report a protection order
violation, and the police responded to her home. Dilka was subsequently arrested
and charged with second degree burglary, which requires the prosecution to prove
that Dilka "[broke] an entrance into, enter[ed] unlawfully in, or remain[ed]
unlawfully ... in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a
crime against another person or property." § 18-4-203(1), C.R.S. (2025).

136 The matter proceeded to a preliminary hearing. In his pre-hearing briefing
and at the hearing, Dilka, relying on the division's opinion in People v. Poindexter,
2013 COA 93, 338 P.3d 352, argued that, on the facts presented, the prosecution
could not establish that any violation of the protection order was a crime against
another person or property. Specifically, Dilka argued that in Poindexter, 1 11,
338 P.3d at 355-56, the division had concluded that (1) crimes against a person
involve either offenses in which the perpetrator had used or threatened to use

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force or crimes against the body of another human being and (2) crimes against
property involve offenses in which the perpetrator sought to derive an unlawful
benefit from or to damage another's property without the threat of force. Dilka
asserted that no facts in this case support a finding of a crime against another
person or property under these definitions.

137 The prosecution responded that in Rhorer, 967 P.2d at 148, this court had
held that a violation of a protection order always constitutes a predicate crime for
purposes of the burglary statute and, therefore, the violation of the protection
order alone was enough.

138 The district court agreed with the prosecution and, thus, did not analyze the
specific facts of this case, beyond Dilka's protection order violation, in finding that
the prosecution had established probable cause to support the second degree
burglary charge.

139 Dilka then sought relief under C.A.R. 21, and we issued an order to show
cause.

## II. Analysis

140 I begin by setting forth the elements of second degree burglary, and I note
particularly the meanings of the pertinent terms contained therein. Next, I explain
why I do not believe that a violation of a protection order always constitutes a crime
against another person or property and why, in holding otherwise, the majority's

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opinion (1) unnecessarily lowers the prosecution's burden of proof in burglary
cases in which the defendant violated a protection order and (2) will lead to absurd
and unjust results. I end by explaining why I believe the majority errs in relying
substantially on Rhorer to reach its conclusion in this case.

### A. Applicable Legal Principles

141 "A person commits second degree burglary, if the person knowingly breaks
an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or
unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a
crime against another person or property." § 18-4-203(1).

142 Although the statute does not define "a crime against another person or
property," in Poindexter, [11, 338 P.3d at 355-56, the division adopted the
definitions of those terms contained in Black's Law Dictionary, and the parties
appear to agree that those definitions apply here.

143 Specifically, the Poindexter division noted that a crime against another
person is "[a] category of criminal offenses in which the perpetrator uses or
threatens to use force." Id., 338 P.3d at 355 (quoting Crimes Against Persons, Black's
Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). Likewise, an offense against the person is "[a]
crime against the body of another human being." Id. (quoting Offense Against the
Person, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). And a crime against property is
"[a] category of criminal offenses in which the perpetrator seeks to derive an

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unlawful benefit from- or do damage to-another's property without the use or
threat of force." Id., 338 P.3d at 356 (alteration in original) (quoting Crimes Against
Property, Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). (The current definitions in Black's
Law Dictionary are identical. See Crimes Against Persons, Black's Law Dictionary
(12th ed. 2024); Crimes Against Property, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024);
Offense Against the Person, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).) And the
division pointed out that for purposes of the foregoing definition of a crime against
property, the fact that an offense presents a risk of physical harm to a person does
not necessarily establish that the offense is a crime against a person. Poindexter,
T 12, 338 P.3d at 356.

### B. Protection Orders and Crimes Against Persons or Property

144 Applying the plain meanings of the foregoing terms, it is indisputable that
a violation of a protection order can constitute a crime against another person or
property. For example, a person who is subject to a protection order would likely
commit a crime against another person if the perpetrator accosted a protected
person and used or threatened to use force in the course of the interaction.
Similarly, a person who is subject to a protection order would likely commit a
crime against property if the perpetrator entered into a protected space and stole
or damaged items belonging to the protected person.

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145 But under the plain meanings of the foregoing terms, a violation of a
protection order does not always constitute a crime against another person or
property. For example, a person subject to a protection order might enter a
protected space simply by walking into it without using or threatening to use any
force and without encountering another person. Likewise, a person subject to a
protection order might enter a protected space without force or threat of force and
at a time when the protected person is not expected to be there simply to retrieve
the perpetrator's own property. I am hard-pressed to see how such conduct would
constitute either a crime against another person or property as defined above
(again, the People do not appear to dispute those definitions here).

146 Nor is every protection order violation by its very nature a crime against
another person, as the People suggest. For example, as Dilka observes, section
18-1-1001(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025), imposes a mandatory protection order against all
persons charged with violating any provision of title 18, which would include
persons charged with drug distribution, possession of a weapon by a previous
offender, or other crimes unrelated to domestic violence, many of which might be
deemed victimless crimes (i.e., as crimes against society, rather than crimes against
individual victims).

147 For these reasons, in my view, there is no legitimate basis to conclude that a
violation of a protection order is-in every case, regardless of the facts of the

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case-a crime against another person or property and, therefore, a predicate
offense to second degree burglary. Rather, I believe that the law requires a
case-by-case assessment to determine whether the protection order violation at
issue was, in fact, a crime against another person or property.

148 To hold otherwise, as the majority does today, unnecessarily lowers the
prosecution's burden of proof in burglary cases in which the defendant violated a
protection order. Now, in such a case, the prosecution need no longer prove that
the defendant committed a crime against another person or property, as those
terms have been defined in case law. Rather, the violation of a protection order
alone and as a matter of law establishes these essential elements of the crime of
second degree burglary.

149 I perceive no basis in law for allowing a court to relieve the prosecution of
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt essential elements of second
degree burglary (or any other crime), and the majority cites none.

150 Moreover, the majority's ruling will lead to absurd and unjust results in
many cases. Take the examples that I cited above (i.e., the scenarios in which (1) a
person subject to a protection order enters a protected space simply by walking
into it without using or threatening to use any force or without encountering
another person and (2) the perpetrator enters a protected space without force or
threat of force and at a time when the protected person is not expected to be there

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simply to retrieve the perpetrator's own property). Under the majority's view, this
conduct alone can be a predicate offense for second degree burglary, which is
either a class 3 or class 4 felony, § 18-4-203(2), with all of the severe collateral
consequences attendant to convictions of such crimes. I, however, cannot perceive
how such conduct would constitute a crime against another person or property,
and I believe that concluding otherwise, and allowing such conduct to support a
second degree burglary charge, would be absurd and manifestly unjust.

### C. Rhorer

151 The majority's principal basis for concluding that any violation of a
protection order is, as a matter of law, a crime against another person or property
and therefore a predicate crime for second degree burglary is that we purportedly
so concluded in Rhorer, 967 P.2d at 148. Although I acknowledge that certain
language that we used in that case was broad, a close reading of the case shows
that the issue presented today was not, in fact, before us in Rhorer. Nor did we
actually conclude that a violation of a protection order is, in every case, a crime
against another person or property.

152 In Rhorer, the Denver County Court had issued, pursuant to a municipal
ordinance, a no-contact order against the defendant. Id. at 147-48. A division of
our court of appeals subsequently concluded that because a municipal ordinance
is not a public law, its violation is not a crime. Id. at 149. Accordingly, in the

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division's view, the prosecution had not proved that the defendant had committed
a predicate "crime" for purposes of the burglary statute. Id. at 147, 149.

153 The People sought certiorari, and we granted their petition, explaining in
the very first sentence of our opinion, "We granted certiorari ... to determine
whether violation of a 'no-contact' court order ... issued by the Denver County
Court pursuant to a municipal ordinance can serve as a predicate act, i.e.,
constitutes a 'crime,' for purposes of the second degree burglary statute." Id. at
147 (citations omitted). This was the only question before us in that case.

154 We ultimately reversed the division's judgment, concluding that when the
Denver County Court had issued its no-contact order, it had invoked its authority
under state law. Id. at 150. Thus, we determined that the jury was appropriately
instructed that the violation of the no-contact order at issue could serve as a
predicate crime for purposes of the second degree burglary statute. Id. at 151.

155 Notwithstanding that the foregoing was the actual holding in that case, in
our opinion, we said, "We hold that a violation of a no-contact order constitutes a
predicate crime for purposes of the burglary statute." Id. at 148. Although when
taken out of context, this statement seems exceptionally broad, we must read the
statement in the context of our conclusion that a protection order violation can be
a predicate crime to burglary even if the order was issued pursuant to a municipal
ordinance. In my view, that is all that our statement was intended to convey. And

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as Dilka contends, we did not address the issue presented here, namely, whether
a protection order violation is always a crime against another person or property
and is therefore, in every case, a predicate crime that can support a burglary
charge. As noted above, that question was not before us.

156 Because I believe that the district court here misinterpreted what we actually
held in Rhorer (as I respectfully believe my colleagues in the majority do), that
court never considered whether, on the facts presented, the violation of the
protection order at issue constituted a crime against another person or property,
as those terms have been defined by case law. Moreover, without pre-judging the
issue, I believe that Dilka has presented a credible argument that the district court
could not properly have found that he committed a crime against another person
or property because no evidence indicated that he had used or threatened to use
force against the alleged victim, committed a crime against the alleged victim's
person, or sought to damage the alleged victim's property without the use of force.
157 Accordingly, I believe that further proceedings are warranted to allow the
district court to determine, on the facts presented, whether probable cause indeed
exists to permit the prosecution to pursue a charge of second degree burglary
against Dilka.

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## III. Conclusion

158
For these reasons, (1) I do not agree that every violation of a protection
order, regardless of the facts at issue, constitutes a crime against another person or
property sufficient to establish a predicate crime for second degree burglary;
(2) holding otherwise unnecessarily lowers the prosecution's burden of proof in
all burglary cases in which the defendant may have violated a protection order
and will lead to absurd and unjust results in many cases; and (3) our decision in
Rhorer did not actually decide the question now before us. Accordingly, I would
make our order to show cause absolute and return this case to the district court
with instructions that the court determine, based on the facts presented, whether
Dilka committed a crime against another person or property sufficient to support
the second degree burglary charge against him.

159
I therefore respectfully dissent.