26 CO 9, 24SC698, Hinds v. Foreman

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The opinion summaries are not part of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion. They have been prepared solely for the reader's
convenience. As such, they may not be cited or relied upon. If
there is any discrepancy between the language in the summary
and the opinion, the language in the opinion controls.

ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE
February 2, 2026

2026 CO 9

# No. 24SC698, Hinds v. Foreman-Civil Procedure - Anti-SLAPP Statute- Appellate Review of County Court Final Judgments.

This case requires the supreme court to determine whether a final judgment
granting a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP ("strategic lawsuit
against public participation") statute, § 13-20-1101, C.R.S. (2025), may be appealed
from a county court to the court of appeals.

The supreme court holds that section 13-20-1101 and section 13-4-102.2,
C.R.S. (2025), are unconstitutional to the extent that they authorize the court of
appeals to review a final judgment of a county court because article VI, section 17
of the Colorado Constitution requires that a final judgment of the county court be
reviewed on appeal either by a district court or this court.

Thus, the court concludes that the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over
the petitioner's appeal and accordingly remands the case to the division with
directions to dismiss the appeal.

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# The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado 2 East 14th Avenue . Denver, Colorado 80203

2026 CO 9

Supreme Court Case No. 24SC698
C.A.R. 50 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Case No. 24CA1380

Petitioner:
Rebeca Hinds,

V.

Respondent:
Corrine Foreman.

Case Remanded with Directions
en banc
February 2, 2026

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Ernst Legal Group, LLC

Dan Ernst

Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

JVAM PLLC

J. Casey Martin

Laurel Quinto

Quentin H. Morse

Buena Vista, Colorado

JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE GABRIEL, and JUSTICE SAMOUR joined.

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JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

11 We accepted transfer of this case from the court of appeals pursuant to
section 13-4-109, C.R.S. (2025); section 13-4-110(1)(a), C.R.S. (2025); and
C.A.R. 50(a)(1)-(3) because the issue raised involves matters of substance not
previously determined by this court. The case requires us to determine whether a
final judgment granting a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP
("strategic lawsuit against public participation") statute, § 13-20-1101, C.R.S.
(2025), may be appealed from a county court to the court of appeals.1 We conclude
that the statutes authorizing such an appeal, section 13-20-1101 and
section 13-4-102.2, C.R.S. (2025), are unconstitutional to the extent that they
authorize the court of appeals to review a final judgment of a county court. This is
because article VI, section 17 of the Colorado Constitution explicitly requires that
a final judgment of a county court be reviewed on appeal by this court or the
district court.

1 We assume for purposes of this opinion, without deciding, that the anti-SLAPP
statute can apply in a county court proceeding. We accepted transfer of this case
to address the following issue:

Whether a county court's grant of a special motion to dismiss
under sections 13-4-102.2, C.R.S. (2024)[,] and 13-20-1101[,] C.R.S.
(2024)[,] can be appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals given
that both sections appear to conflict with section 13-6-310(1), C.R.S.
(2024)[,] and [a]rticle VI, [s]ection 17 of the Colorado Constitution.

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12
Thus, we conclude that the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over Rebeca
Hinds's ("Hinds") appeal. We, accordingly, remand the case to the division with
directions to dismiss the appeal. Because Hinds could not have reasonably
anticipated that her appeal should have been filed in the district court, her request
for leave to file out of time is granted.

## I. Facts and Procedural History

13
In March of 2022, Hinds requested a temporary protection order ("TPO")
against her boyfriend J.F. As grounds for the TPO, Hinds alleged that J.F. put
bleach in the humidifiers in their home despite knowing that she was severely
allergic to bleach. This, according to Hinds, caused her serious injury and required
her to seek medical treatment. Hinds also testified that she was terrified J.F. would
find "some other way to 'accidentally' kill or incapacitate" her.

14 Officer Mitchell subsequently began investigating Hinds's allegations and
"had concerns about the veracity of her reports." As part of his investigation,
Officer Mitchell sought out witnesses, including Corrine Foreman ("Foreman"),
who stated in an affidavit

that, around December 2021, ... Ms. Hinds expressed ... she was
having relationship problems with her boyfriend [J.F.], [Hinds] was
tired of him, and ... would fabricate or make up a domestic violence
allegation to get [J.F.] to leave or get him removed from the house.

15
Foreman indicated that she made this statement to law enforcement to the
best of her knowledge and recollection and did not seek out law enforcement.

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Hinds was charged with one count of false reporting to authorities, a class 2
misdemeanor, pursuant to section 18-8-111(1)(a)(III), (b), C.R.S. (2025). Seven
months later, the charge was dismissed. Hinds then filed a civil complaint against
Foreman in county court alleging that Foreman "made knowingly false and
defamatory statements" by accusing Hinds of "criminal conduct for which she was
charged." And, though Hinds acknowledged that the criminal charge against her
was dismissed, she claimed that she "had to endure and incur the intended
humiliation, economic damages[,] ... [and] non-economic damages to her
well-being, health and welfare, as well as cost[s] and fees of litigation."

16 In response to the complaint, Foreman filed a special motion to dismiss
arguing that her statements to Officer Mitchell were protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute.2

2 The anti-SLAPP statute safeguards speech against those who attempt to use
litigation to chill expressive activity. Lind-Barnett v. Tender Care Veterinary Ctr.,
Inc., 2025 CO 62, 1 1, 580 P.3d 573, 574-75. A defendant may claim protection
under the anti-SLAPP statute by filing "a special motion to dismiss in the very
early stages of litigation." Id. at "| 2, 580 P.3d at 575. If a defendant filing a special
motion to dismiss can show "that the [plaintiff's] claim arises from the defendant's
exercise of their right of petition or free speech[,] [t]hen the burden shifts 'to the
plaintiff to demonstrate a "reasonable likelihood that [they] will prevail on the
claim.""" Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Rosenblum v. Budd, 2023 COA 72, 1 24,
538 P.3d 354, 362); see also § 13-20-1101(3)(a). If the plaintiff is unable to meet their
burden, "the case is dismissed." Lind-Barnett, 1 2, 580 P.3d at 575. To survive a
special motion to dismiss "when a defendant's allegedly defamatory statements
involve a matter of public concern, the plaintiff must ... prove, among other
things, that the defendant 'published the statements with actual malice, instead of

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17
First, the county court agreed that Foreman's speech fell under the
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute because the claims against her arose from acts
"in furtherance of [her] right of ... free speech ... in connection with a public
issue." § 13-20-1101(3)(a). Foreman's speech, in the court's view, constituted a
"written or oral statement ... made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding or any other official proceeding authorized by law."
§ 13-20-1101(2)(a)(I).

18 The county court then considered whether Hinds, as the plaintiff,
established "a reasonable likelihood" of success on her claims. § 13-20-1101(3)(a),
(c). The county court found that Hinds met her burden regarding the falsity of
Foreman's statements. However, the court concluded that Hinds failed to produce
"sufficient evidence that [Foreman] . . . acted with actual malice" because Foreman
"was a collateral witness in an overall criminal investigation involving" Hinds and
J.F. Further, Foreman did not ask for criminal charges to be filed against Hinds,
nor did she give any additional statements regarding the investigation. Officer
Mitchell, the court found, pursued charges against Hinds based on the totality of
the circumstances.

mere negligence."" Id. at [ 42, 580 P.3d at 583 (quoting Coomer v. Salem Media of
Colo., Inc., 2025 COA 2, 1 23, 565 P.3d 1133, 1143).

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19
The county court accordingly granted the special motion to dismiss and
awarded Foreman fees and costs. The court's order granting Foreman's special
motion to dismiss was a final judgment-it dismissed the only issue before the
court. Hinds then appealed the county court's judgment to the court of appeals.
See Hinds v. Foreman, at 1 (Colo. App. No. 24CA1380, Aug. 16, 2024) (unpublished
order).

110 The division subsequently flagged a jurisdictional concern. The judgment
being appealed, it observed, was without doubt a final judgment of a county court,
since the judgment granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice, and thus
concluded the proceedings. Id. at 2. What's more, the division noted, the
anti-SLAPP statute, § 13-20-1101(7), explicitly confers jurisdiction upon the court
of appeals as it directs that "an order granting or denying a special motion to
dismiss is appealable to the ... court of appeals pursuant to section 13-4-102.2."
See § 13-4-102.2 ("The court of appeals has initial jurisdiction over appeals from
motions to dismiss actions involving constitutional rights pursuant to
section 13-20-1101."). But there was a problem. The division explained:

Generally, the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review
county court cases. This is because [a]rticle VI, [s]ection 17 of the
Colorado Constitution provides, "[a]ppellate review by the supreme
court or the district courts of every final judgment of the county courts
shall be as provided by law," (emphasis added), and
section 13-6-310(1)[, C.R.S. (2025),] provides, in turn, "[a]ppeals from
final judgments ... of the county court shall be taken to the district
court."

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Hinds, at 1-2 (omission in original) (first quoting Colo. Const. art. VI, § 17; and then
quoting § 13-6-310(1)).

111 "So," the division continued, "that raises the question whether this appeal
should, per the Colorado Constitution and section 13-6-310(1), have been filed in
the district court, rather than in this [c]ourt." Hinds, at 2. Ultimately, the division
filed a request for determination of jurisdiction pursuant to C.A.R. 50 with this
court, which we granted. Having done so, we now consider whether a county
court's final judgment granting a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP
statute may be appealed to the court of appeals given that both statutes
authorizing such an appeal appear to conflict with article VI, section 17 of the
Colorado Constitution, and section 13-6-310(1). We conclude that
sections 13-20-1101 and 13-4-102.2 are unconstitutional to the extent that they
permit the court of appeals to review a final judgment of the county court.

## II. Analysis

112 We begin our analysis by identifying the relevant standard of review. Then,
we explore the tension between the appeals authorized by sections 13-20-1101 and
13-4-102.2, on the one hand, and the explicit directions regarding county court
appeals provided in article VI, section 17 of the Colorado Constitution, and
section 13-6-310(1), on the other. Along the way, we also lay out the substantive
standard governing the review of a legislative act that seeks to limit a

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constitutional provision and apply that standard to the statutes and constitutional
provision at issue here.

### A. Standard of Review

113 We review issues of constitutional and statutory interpretation de novo.
Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 2014 CO 44, 1 7, 327 P.3d 232, 235. In interpreting
the Colorado Constitution, we afford the language "its 'ordinary and common
meaning' to give 'effect to every word and term contained therein, whenever
possible."" People v. Rodriguez, 112 P.3d 693, 696 (Colo. 2005) (quoting Bd. of Cnty.
Comm'rs v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263, 1273 (Colo. 2001)). "If the language of a
constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, we will enforce it as written."
Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO3, 1 8, 409 P.3d 331, 334.
114 When interpreting a statute, "we seek to give effect to the General
Assembly's . . . intent." All. for a Safe & Indep. Woodmen Hills v. Campaign Integrity
Watchdog, LLC, 2019 CO 76, 1 21, 450 P.3d 282, 287. Similarly, "[w]e read words
and phrases in context, according them their plain and ordinary meanings. If the
language is clear, we apply it as written and need not resort to other tools of
statutory interpretation." Id. (citation omitted).

## B. Constitutional Conflict

115 "The [C]onstitution is the supreme law of the state, solemnly adopted by the
people, which must be observed by all departments of government." In re Senate

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Bill No. 9, 56 P. 173, 174 (Colo. 1899). "Essential to our analysis is the principle that
Colorado's Constitution" is a "'limitation on [the] power [of the General
Assembly]."" Rodriguez, 112 P.3d at 695 (quoting Reale v. Bd. of Real Est. Appraisers,
880 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Colo. 1994)). "If a legislative act undertakes to limit the
provisions of the Constitution, then in a contest, the Constitution survives and the
act falls." Yenter v. Baker, 248 P.2d 311, 314 (Colo. 1952) (quoting Barker v. St. Louis
Cnty., 104 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. 1937)). "To declare an act of the legislature
unconstitutional is always a delicate duty, and one which courts do not feel
authorized to perform, unless the conflict between the law and the [C]onstitution
is clear and unmistakable." People ex rel. Thomas v. Goddard, 7 P. 301, 304 (Colo.
1885); see also Colo. Ethics Watch v. Indep. Ethics Comm'n, 2016 CO 21, 1 14, 369 P.3d
270, 273.

116 Previously, in determining whether a statute conflicts with the Constitution,
"we have held that 'legislation that furthers the purpose of ... constitutional
provisions or facilitates their enforcement is permissible.' By contrast, 'legislation
which directly or indirectly impairs, limits[,] or destroys rights granted by ...
constitutional provisions is not permissible."" In re Interrogatories on Senate Bill
21-247 Submitted by Colo. Gen. Assembly, 2021 CO 37, 1 32, 488 P.3d 1008, 1018
(omissions in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Zaner v. City of Brighton,
917 P.2d 280, 286 (Colo. 1996)) (citing In re Interrogatories Propounded by Senate

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Concerning House Bill 1078, 536 P.2d 308, 313 (Colo. 1975) ("The test for the
existence of a conflict is: Does one authorize what the other forbids or forbid what
the other authorizes?")).

117 As noted, the constitutional provision at issue here provides: "Appellate
review by the supreme court or the district courts of every final judgment of the
county courts shall be as provided by law." Colo. Const. art. VI, § 17 (emphasis
added). "We have consistently characterized a final [judgment] as 'one that ends
the particular action in which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court
pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties
involved in the proceedings."" People in Int. of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31, 1 37,
416 P.3d 905, 914 (quoting People v. Guatney, 214 P.3d 1049, 1051 (Colo. 2009)).

118 In this instance, there is no question that the county court order being
appealed is a final judgment. The only matter before the county court was Hinds's
defamation claim against Foreman-which the court dismissed with prejudice
when it granted Foreman's special motion to dismiss. The county court's dismissal
ended the action and "le[ft] nothing further for the court ... to do in order to
completely determine the rights of the parties involved." Id. (quoting Guatney,
214 P.3d at 1051).

119 Hinds points to sections 13-20-1101(7) and 13-4-102.2 and argues that her
appeal was properly filed in the court of appeals. She is correct up to a point:

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These statutes explicitly allow such a filing. Section 13-20-1101(7) provides that
"an order granting or denying a special motion to dismiss is appealable to the . . .
court of appeals pursuant to section 13-4-102.2." Section 13-4-102.2, in turn, states:
"The court of appeals has initial jurisdiction over appeals from motions to dismiss
actions involving constitutional rights pursuant to section 13-20-1101."

120 But here there is a direct conflict between these statutory provisions and our
Constitution's command that only this court and district courts may provide
appellate review of a county court's final judgment. Sections 13-20-1101(7) and
13-4-102.2, accordingly, authorize what the Colorado Constitution forbids. See In
re Interrogatories on Senate Bill 21-247, 132, 488 P.3d at 1018 (citing In re
Interrogatories Propounded by Senate, 536 P.2d at 313). In the face of this type of
conflict, we have consistently recognized the obvious: "[T]he Constitution
survives and the act[s] fall[]." Yenter, 248 P.2d at 314 (quoting Barker, 104 S.W.2d
at 376); see also Garcia v. Dist. Ct., 403 P.2d 215, 219 (Colo. 1965).

121 Our decision in Garcia illustrates the point. There, we held that a statute that
attempted to "subtract" jurisdiction from the district courts by vesting the Denver
Juvenile Court with exclusive jurisdiction conflicted with the Colorado
Constitution and thus was unconstitutional. Garcia, 403 P.2d at 219. The
legislature could not constitutionally enact the statute because it conflicted with

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the part of our Constitution that provides that "the [d]istrict [c]ourts of this State
. . . shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases." Id.

122 We apply Garcia's underlying reasoning here and hold that
sections 13-20-1101(7) and 13-4-102.2 are unconstitutional to the extent that they
permit the court of appeals to review a final judgment of the county court. See Colo.
Const. art. VI, § 17. To the extent that the division in VOA Sunset Housing LP v.
D'Angelo, 2024 COA 61, 555 P.3d 635, suggests that the court of appeals may
review a final judgment of the county court, we overrule that part of the division's
opinion. In sum, we hold that appellate review of a final judgment issued by a
county court on an anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss is reserved to the district
court and this court, consistent with our Constitution.

123 We emphasize, however, that sections 13-20-1101(7) and 13-4-102.2 may,
consistent with Colorado's Constitution, allow the court of appeals to review a
county court's "order granting or denying a special motion to dismiss,"
§ 13-20-1101(7), when such an order is not a final judgment. That is, the court may
consider an appeal of an order that does not "end[] the particular action in which
it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to
completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the proceedings." G.S.,
T 37, 416 P.3d at 914 (quoting Guatney, 214 P.3d at 1051).

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124 We recognize that the path we carve here is not an elegant solution to the
conundrum caused by sections 13-20-1101(7) and 13-4-102.2. But the General
Assembly's choice to authorize a party to appeal this type of order when it does
not end the particular action in which it is entered squares with article VI,
section 17 of the Colorado Constitution. Ultimately, consideration of a simpler,
arguably less confusing, appeal process for review of county court rulings in this
context is a matter best left to the legislature, not this court.

## III. Conclusion

125 Having concluded that sections 13-20-1101(7) and 13-4-102.2 are
unconstitutional insofar as they permit the court of appeals to review a final
judgment of a county court, we conclude that the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction
over Hinds's appeal. Accordingly, we remand the case to the division with
directions to dismiss the appeal. Because Hinds could not reasonably have
anticipated that her appeal should have been filed in the district court, her request
for leave to refile her appeal out of time in the district court is granted. We decline
to address Foreman's request for attorney fees as it is not yet ripe. See
§ 13-20-1101(4)(a) ("[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to dismiss is
entitled to recover the defendant's attorney fees and costs.").