People v. Matthew Rodolfo Vansant Lopez

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
September 1, 2022

2022COA97

No. 19CA0287, People v. Lopez — Constitutional Law — Sixth

Amendment — Right to Counsel — Right to Conflict-Free

Representation

As a matter of first impression, a division of the court of

appeals determines whether a defendant must satisfy the Sullivan

prophylaxis in order to obtain relief in a conflict-free counsel claim

when the conflict arises from the simultaneous prosecution of

defense counsel and defendant by the same jurisdiction during the

representation. Our supreme court has thus far explicitly limited

the Sullivan prophylaxis to conflicts arising from the representation

of multiple defendants. The division concludes that due to the

differing nature of the conflicts, the Sullivan prophylaxis should not

be extended. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA97

Court of Appeals No. 19CA0287
El Paso County District Court No. 17CR3917
Honorable David A. Gilbert, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Matthew Rodolfo Vansant Lopez,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V
Opinion by JUSTICE MARTINEZ*
Fox and Casebolt*, JJ., concur

Announced September 1, 2022

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank Lawson, Assistant Attorney General,
Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

McClintock Law Firm, LLC, Elizabeth A. McClintock, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2021.
¶1 Matthew Rodolfo Vansant Lopez appeals his multiple

convictions on two grounds. First, he contends that the trial court

violated his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. Second, he

argues that the trial court erred by failing to disqualify a biased

juror. We agree with his first contention and therefore reverse his

convictions and remand his case for a new trial. Because his

second claim is unlikely to arise on remand, we need not address it.

I. Background

¶2 Lopez and the victim, K.H., knew each other as acquaintances,

and he invited her to his apartment. When she arrived, he showed

her his gun collection, then propositioned her for sex. When she

declined, Lopez told her, “[Y]ou know I’m going to rape you, right.”

K.H. attempted to flee, but Lopez blocked her path, forced her onto

his couch, and sexually assaulted her. K.H. reported the assault to

the police, and when they searched Lopez’s home, they found a

homemade incendiary or explosive device that looked like a tennis

ball wrapped in duct tape.

¶3 Lopez was charged with seven felony counts: two counts of

sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-402, C.R.S. 2021, along

with two crime of violence sentence enhancers pursuant to section

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18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I)(A), C.R.S. 2021; one count of second degree

kidnapping in violation of section 18-3-302(1), (3), C.R.S. 2021; one

count of possession of an explosive or incendiary device in violation

of section 18-12-109(2), C.R.S. 2021; and one count of menacing in

violation of section 18-3-206(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. 2017. Following a

jury trial, Lopez was convicted as charged. This appeal followed.

II. Conflict-Free Counsel

¶4 Lopez contends that the trial court violated his constitutional

right to conflict-free counsel because it did not obtain a valid waiver

of the right from him. We agree.

A. Additional Facts

¶5 Lopez was prosecuted by the El Paso County District

Attorney’s Office (DA) and represented by the same attorney

(defense counsel) throughout the pendency of his case. Before

entering his appearance as Lopez’s counsel, and then concurrently

with the representation, defense counsel was prosecuted by the

same DA for multiple offenses.

¶6 In July 2015, the DA charged defense counsel with

misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI); he pleaded guilty in

July 2016 and received an eighteen-month deferred sentence. In

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April 2017, he was charged with a second DUI in the same

jurisdiction. In November 2017, defense counsel was charged with

driving under restraint by the DA and was charged with the same

count again in a separate matter in January 2018. When defense

counsel pleaded guilty to the April DUI in December 2017, he was

sentenced to work release, in-home detention, and supervised

probation, and his 2016 deferred sentence was revoked and

replaced with a concurrent, identical sentence. In October 2019,

the week before Lopez’s trial, defense counsel resolved all of his

pending cases through a global disposition. Defense counsel began

representing Lopez in August 2017.

¶7 In May 2018, the trial court made the following inquiry into

whether Lopez had been advised of the potential conflicts of interest

that existed due to defense counsel’s criminal charges:

THE COURT: [Defense counsel], have you gone
through the advisement slash conflict waiver
issues with Mr. Lopez?

[Defense counsel]: What conflict waiver? Oh,
yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Lopez, you’re
aware of current circumstances, and you’re
perfectly fine again continuing with
representation by [Defense counsel]?

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MR. LOPEZ: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Excellent. Thank you, very
much.

Both parties agree that the court did not speak to Lopez again

regarding the conflict of interest after this conversation.

B. Standard of Review and Law

¶8 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused enjoys the right to

effective assistance of counsel for their defense. See U.S. Const.

amend. VI; see also Colo. Const. art. II, § 16; Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). The right to effective

assistance of counsel encompasses the right to conflict-free

representation by counsel. People v. Edehbohls, 944 P.2d 552, 556

(Colo. App. 1996). “The right to the effective assistance of counsel

can therefore be violated by ‘representation that is intrinsically

improper due to a conflict of interest.’” Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d

1054, 1070 (Colo. 2007) (quoting People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932,

943 (Colo. 1983), overruled on other grounds by West v. People,

2015 CO 5, ¶ 29).

¶9 Once a potential conflict of interest is apparent, defense

counsel has a duty to advise the defendant of the nature of the

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conflict, and to describe how the conflict may affect their

representation in plain terms. Edebohls, 944 P.2d at 556. And

once the trial court learns that counsel has a conflict of interest, it

“has a duty to inquire into the propriety of continued

representation.” People v. Delgadillo, 2012 COA 33, ¶ 31.

¶ 10 Although a defendant is entitled to conflict-free counsel, they

may waive that right in many circumstances. Castro, 657 P.2d at

944. To waive the right to conflict-free counsel, a defendant must

be fully advised of the existing or potential conflict. People v.

Martinez, 869 P.2d 519, 525 (Colo. 1994). A waiver is valid on a

showing that the defendant was “aware of the conflict and its likely

effect on the attorney’s ability to offer effective representation and

that the defendant thereafter voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently relinquished [their] right to conflict-free

representation.” Castro, 657 P.2d at 946. Further, “‘[t]he record

must affirmatively show that the trial court fully explained the

nature of the conflict and the difficulties defense counsel faced in

[their] effective advocacy for the defendant.’” Edebohls, 944 P.2d at

557 (quoting Martinez, 869 P.2d at 525).

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¶ 11 “The violation of a defendant’s right to conflict-free

representation cannot be viewed as harmless error.” Id. at 559.

When there is not a valid waiver of a defendant’s right to conflict-

free representation, reversal of the defendant’s conviction is

required. Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 12 A conflict of interest exists when defense counsel’s own

interests could limit their ability to represent a client. Delgadillo,

¶ 9. In Edebohls, a division of this court held that a conflict of

interest exists “when defense counsel has been charged with a

crime and is susceptible to prosecution, during the pendency of the

representation of their client, by those responsible for the client’s

prosecution.” 944 P.2d at 556. In that situation, the Edebohls

division explained, defense counsel’s interests conflict with the

client’s interests because the prosecutor “‘might take umbrage at a

vigorous defense’ of [the] defendant and become more ardent in the

prosecution of defense counsel” — or, at least, defense counsel may

fear as much. Id. (quoting Castro, 657 P.2d at 945). This

case — where the same DA pursued charges against Lopez and

defense counsel simultaneously — concerns facts nearly identical to

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those in Edebohls. See id. Thus, defense counsel labored under an

actual conflict of interest. See id.

¶ 13 Once a trial court learns that counsel has a conflict of interest,

its duty “to inquire into the propriety of continued representation”

includes explaining to the defendant, on the record, the nature of

the conflict and seeking from the defendant “a narrative response,

on the record, indicating [their] understanding of the right to

conflict-free representation and a description of the conflict at

issue.” Delgadillo, ¶ 31 (citation omitted). Although the trial court

has broad discretion in this inquiry, it must, at a minimum, ensure

that the defendant knows the specific nature of the conflict. See,

e.g., Edebohls, 944 P.2d at 557-58 (waiver was invalid because the

trial court did not specifically ascertain whether defense counsel

and defendant had discussed the conflict of interest and it did not

explain the conflict to the defendant); Delgadillo, ¶¶ 32, 37 (same);

Martinez, 869 P.2d at 524-29 (waiver was valid because the court

explicitly made sure that Martinez was aware of counsel’s conflicts

and their effect on the representation); People v. Preciado-Flores, 66

P.3d 155, 168-69 (Colo. App. 2002) (same). The trial court did not

do so here.

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¶ 14 The People assert that People v. Waddell, 24 P.3d 3, 8 (Colo.

App. 2000), is instructive here because in that case a division of

this court found a defendant’s waiver to be knowing and intelligent

despite the “abbreviated nature” of the court’s discussion of

conflicts. However, the brevity of the Waddell trial court’s inquiry

was not the deciding factor in the case. Rather, the waiver in

Waddell was valid because the court verified that the defendant was

aware of the specific charges against defense counsel before

accepting his waiver. Id. at 7. Here, the court only asked if Lopez

was aware of “current circumstances,” and made no mention of the

fact that defense counsel had been criminally charged. Thus, the

court’s inquiry was procedurally deficient. Furthermore, other than

the words of defense counsel, nothing in the record indicates that

Lopez was informed of the nature and potential consequences of the

conflict beforehand. Defense counsel said that he had advised

Lopez about the conflict but could not confirm how many times he

had spoken with Lopez on the subject because he did not document

it, nor could he confirm whether he had a written waiver of conflict

signed by Lopez, as would be consistent with Colo. RPC 1.7(b)(4).

Defense counsel also did not refer Lopez to any independent

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counsel to advise him regarding the conflict. Accordingly, we

cannot find that the court’s inquiry was sufficient for Lopez’s waiver

to be knowing and intelligent.

¶ 15 The People further argue that even if we do not find a knowing

and intelligent waiver, Lopez should be denied relief unless he can

satisfy the Sullivan prophylaxis outlined in Ybanez v. People, 2018

CO 16, ¶¶ 26-29, and West, ¶¶ 3, 36 — that is, a showing that a

conflict of interest existed, and the conflict itself adversely affected

counsel’s performance. To prevail under the People’s argument,

Lopez would have to

(1) identify a plausible alternative defense
strategy or tactic that counsel could have
pursued, (2) show that the alternative strategy
or tactic was objectively reasonable under the
facts known to counsel at the time of the
strategic decision, and (3) establish that
counsel’s failure to pursue that strategy or
tactic was linked to the conflict.

Ybanez, ¶ 27 (citing West, ¶ 57); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446

U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980).

¶ 16 West, in applying the Sullivan prophylaxis, overruled Castro.

Castro presumed, rather than required, proof that an actual conflict

of interest adversely affected the representation. See West, ¶ 2; see

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also Castro, 657 P.2d at 944-45. However, West expressly limited

its holding to conflicts involving the representation of multiple

codefendants. West, ¶ 36. In Ybanez, our supreme court again

applied the Sullivan prophylaxis, but pointedly noted the express

limitations of West’s holding and explicitly limited the Ybanez

holding in the same way, stating,

With regard to the kinds of conflicting loyalties
or interests to which the so-called Sullivan
prophylaxis . . . is at least potentially
applicable, in West we acknowledged
remaining uncertainty and expressly limited
our holding in that case to the conflicts arising
from multiple representation implicated there.
Again today, although for very different
reasons, we find it unnecessary to decide the
extent to which the separate standard for
actual conflicts of interest applies to conflicting
loyalties or interests apart from those
implicated by multiple representations.

Ybanez, ¶ 29 (citation omitted). Consistent with the limits of the

holdings in West and Ybanez, neither case mentioned — much less

overruled — Edebohls. Thus, Edebohls, and the division’s

presumption of an adverse effect from the conflict created by both

the defendant and defense counsel facing criminal charges in the

same jurisdiction, remains persuasive authority. Moreover, Castro,

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upon which Edebohls relies, appears to have been overruled only in

conflicts involving multiple representations.

¶ 17 The conflict of interest in this case does not involve multiple

representations by the defense attorney. Here, the defense attorney

himself was being prosecuted, making the conflict personal rather

than professional. When representing codefendants, a lawyer is

attempting to negotiate the freedom of others. However, in

situations where defense counsel is under current criminal charges,

representation of the defendant is likely to be hampered by the fear

that “‘the prosecutor might take umbrage at a vigorous defense’ of

defendant and become more ardent in the prosecution of defense

counsel.” Edebohls, 944 P.2d at 556 (quoting Castro, 657 P.2d at

945). When defense counsel must balance preserving their own

freedom against fighting for the best interest of a client, “a reviewing

court cannot reliably determine to what extent . . . decisions were

based on legitimate tactical considerations and to what extent they

were the result of impermissible considerations.” Id. at 559

(citation omitted). Further, the impact on the zeal with which a

defense attorney in this position represents a client cannot be

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measured and could involve an attorney accused of even more

serious charges than those defense counsel faced here.

¶ 18 Applying Ybanez, West, and by extension the Sullivan

prophylaxis to the present case would place an extremely high

burden on Lopez’s efforts to protect his constitutional rights.

Because Edebohls has not been overruled and our supreme court

was careful to limit the reach of West and Ybanez, adopting the

Sullivan prophylaxis for the actual conflicts of interest represented

by this case would be a significant shift in Colorado jurisprudence

— something more appropriate for our supreme court to decide.

Until that court sets a new direction, we respect the limits of West

and Ybanez.

III. Conclusion

¶ 19 The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new

trial.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE CASEBOLT concur.

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