Peo in Interest of E.Q

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
July 30, 2020

2020COA118

No. 20CA0089, Peo in Interest of E.Q. — Children’s Code —
Juvenile Court — Dependency and Neglect — Allocation of
Parental Responsibilities, Parenting Time, Child Support —
Child Support Guidelines

In this dependency and neglect proceeding, a division of the

court of appeals considers two matters of first impression in

Colorado. The division first holds that when a juvenile court orders

child support under section 19-1-104(6), C.R.S. 2019, it must

comply with article 6 of the Children’s Code, specifically section 19-

6-106, C.R.S. 2019, and use the child support guidelines set forth

in section 14-10-115, C.R.S. 2019, to compute child support. The

division further holds that, consistent with the Social Security Act,

the juvenile court may not order one parent to designate the other

parent as the representative payee of his or her social security
disability benefits. Accordingly, the child support judgment is

reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA118

Court of Appeals No. 20CA0089
Prowers County District Court No. 19JV22
Honorable Stanley A. Brinkley, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of E.Q. and J.Q., Children,

and Concerning R.Q.,

Appellant,

and

J.Q.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Terry and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

Announced July 30, 2020

Scranton Specht Associates P.C., Darla Scranton Specht, Lamar, Colorado, for
Appellee

Kim R. Verhoeff, Guardian Ad Litem

Debra W. Dodd, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Berthoud, Colorado, for
Appellant

Roy Wallis, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Mesa, Arizona, for Appellee
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, R.Q. (father)

appeals the juvenile court’s judgment ordering child support in

conjunction with granting a stipulation to allocate parental

responsibilities for the children to J.Q. (mother). Although father

agrees that he has a duty to support the children, he challenges the

provisions in the order requiring him to release his social security

disability insurance (SSDI) benefits to mother and designate her as

the payee for his benefits.

¶2 To resolve father’s appeal, we must answer two questions that

have not yet been answered by Colorado’s appellate courts. First,

what standard or criteria should the juvenile court apply when

ordering child support in a dependency and neglect proceeding

under section 19-1-104(6), C.R.S. 2019? We hold that a court must

follow the provisions for determining child support set forth in

section 19-6-106, C.R.S. 2019, which, in turn, requires compliance

with the child support guidelines in section 14-10-115, C.R.S.

2019. Because the court’s order failed to address the factors set

forth in the child support guidelines, we reverse the child support

judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

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¶3 Second, may a juvenile court order one parent to designate the

other parent as the representative payee of his or her SSDI benefits

as part of a child support order? We hold that it may not because

federal law does not permit a juvenile court to determine the

designated payee of a parent’s SSDI benefits. Therefore, we reverse

the court’s child support judgment on this basis as well.1

I. Factual Background

¶4 In April 2019, the Prowers County Department of Human

Services (Department) filed a dependency and neglect petition

concerning sixteen-year-old E.Q. and thirteen-year-old J.Q. The

petition alleged that father had sexually abused E.Q. and had

admitted to some of the abuse when mother confronted him. The

juvenile court placed the children in mother’s custody under the

protective supervision of the Department. The following month,

father was arrested and charged criminally. He remained

incarcerated throughout the remainder of the case.

¶5 The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and

neglected based on the parties’ stipulation. It adopted a treatment

1Those portions of the judgment not challenged on appeal remain
undisturbed.

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plan for father. In October 2019, mother initiated a separate

proceeding to dissolve her marriage to father.

¶6 Two months later, the parties reached a stipulation concerning

parental responsibilities for the children. As pertinent here, the

stipulation provided that (1) mother would be the children’s

custodian and have sole decision-making responsibilities; and (2)

child support would be determined by the domestic relations court.

Mother also filed a motion asking the juvenile court to order father

to release his prior three months of SSDI benefits to her. Father

filed a written objection to this motion.

¶7 After hearing further argument and offers of proof from the

parties, the juvenile court issued an order adopting the parties’

stipulation and addressing mother’s motion. Finding that it had

jurisdiction to consider child support in a dependency and neglect

proceeding under section 19-1-104(6), the court ordered father to

turn over his previous three months of SSDI benefits to mother and

to restore mother as the payee of his benefits until further order of

the court. It then certified the order into the parties’ domestic

relations proceeding.

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II. Jurisdiction and Terms of the Stipulation

¶8 Father contends that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to

issue the child support order addressing his SSDI benefits because

it had already ended the case when it approved the parties’

stipulation. He reasons that, by accepting the parties’ stipulation to

defer child support to the domestic court, the court was precluded

from entering any child support orders. We reject father’s

jurisdictional argument but conclude that the court must

reconsider the conflicting provisions regarding child support in the

order.

A. Standard of Review and Law

¶9 Whether a juvenile court has subject matter jurisdiction is a

question of law that we review de novo. In re Petition of E.R.S., 2019

COA 40, ¶ 23.

¶ 10 Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s authority to

decide a particular matter. Id. at ¶ 24; see also In re Support of

E.K., 2013 COA 99, ¶ 8. Dependency and neglect proceedings are

governed by the Children’s Code. L.A.G. v. People in Interest of

A.A.G., 912 P.2d 1385, 1389 (Colo. 1996). The Children’s Code

grants a juvenile court exclusive jurisdiction over any child who is

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dependent and neglected. § 19-1-104(1)(b). It also expressly

authorizes a juvenile court to enter an order allocating parental

responsibilities and addressing parenting time and child support

matters when it maintains jurisdiction in a case involving a child

who is dependent and neglected and no child custody action or

action for the allocation of parental responsibilities concerning the

same child is pending in a district court in this state.

§ 19-1-104(6).

¶ 11 In this case, the juvenile court had continuing jurisdiction

over the children based on their status as dependent and neglected

children. Although mother initiated a separate domestic relations

proceeding, no party asserted that a custody or parental

responsibilities action was pending in that case. Consequently, the

domestic relations proceeding did not affect the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction to determine child support.

¶ 12 Father asserts that the juvenile court was divested of

jurisdiction to issue the order because it had already granted the

stipulation and certified the matter to the domestic relations court.

However, the record shows that the court considered both requests

— mother’s motion to release father’s SSDI benefits and the parties’

5
request for the court to approve their stipulation — at the same

time. It granted both requests as part of the same written order

and later certified that order to the domestic relations court. Thus,

the juvenile court was not divested of jurisdiction to issue an order

concerning the children’s support.

B. Terms of the Stipulation

¶ 13 We next consider father’s contention that the juvenile court

was precluded from considering mother’s request to release his

SSDI benefits by the terms of the parties’ stipulation. We reject

father’s contention that the terms of the stipulation restricted the

court’s authority to consider mother’s request. As previously

discussed, the court considered both requests simultaneously.

Moreover, parties may not preclude or limit the court’s authority

concerning child support. In re Marriage of Miller, 790 P.2d 890,

892-93 (Colo. App. 1990).

¶ 14 Nevertheless, we agree that the order contains conflicting

provisions that cannot be reconciled. The court addressed the

children’s support by ordering father to release his SSDI benefits

while at the same time adopting the parties’ stipulation that child

support would be addressed through the domestic relations case.

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Because we are unable to reconcile these provisions, we reverse the

judgment and remand the case for the court to reconsider whether

child support will be determined in the dependency and neglect

case or the domestic relations case. See In re Marriage of Rozzi, 190

P.3d 815, 822 (Colo. App. 2008) (recognizing that the court’s order

must contain findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficiently

explicit to give an appellate court a clear understanding of the basis

of its order); cf. People in Interest of D.C-M.S., 111 P.3d 559, 562

(Colo. App. 2005) (rejecting a contention that a judgment had to be

reversed when the trial court’s findings were neither inconsistent

nor contradictory).

III. The UDMA and the Social Security Act

¶ 15 Because they will arise on remand, we address father’s

remaining contentions. He contends that the juvenile court erred

by (1) failing to apply the child support provisions of the Uniform

Dissolution of Marriage Act (UDMA); and (2) requiring him to name

mother the payee of his SSDI benefits in violation of the Social

Security Act (SSA). We agree with both contentions.

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A. Standard of Review and Statutory Interpretation

¶ 16 We review de novo whether the juvenile court applied the

correct legal standard. People in Interest of I.J.O., 2019 COA 151,

¶ 6. We also review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.

People in Interest of L.M., 2018 CO 34, ¶ 13.

¶ 17 In construing a statute, we look at the entire statutory scheme

“in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of

its parts, and we apply words and phrases in accordance with their

plain and ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting UMB Bank, N.A. v.

Landmark Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22). When construing

statutes related to the same subject matter, we aim to avoid a

statutory interpretation that would render certain words or

provisions superfluous or ineffective. Id. Instead, we adopt an

interpretation that achieves consistency across a comprehensive

statutory scheme. Id.

B. Determination of Child Support

1. Legal Framework

¶ 18 Section 19-1-104(6) specifically authorizes a juvenile court

that retains jurisdiction in a dependency and neglect case to “enter

an order allocating parental responsibilities and addressing

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parenting time and child support matters.” It also permits the

court to do so without requiring a party to initiate a separate

domestic relations proceeding under the UDMA or a support

proceeding under article 6 of the Children’s Code. People in Interest

of E.M., 2016 COA 38M, ¶ 23, aff’d on other grounds, 2018 CO 34.

However, the statute provides no guidance as to the standard or

criteria the juvenile court should apply when determining child

support. Therefore, we must look to other provisions of the

Children’s Code. See People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70,

¶¶ 14-16 (looking to the UDMA when the Children’s Code did not

contain a provision governing conducting an in camera interview

with a child); see also People in Interest of S.E.G., 934 P.2d 920, 921

(Colo. App. 1997) (recognizing that, when the Children’s Code did

not specify the criteria to be applied in entering permanent

parenting time orders in a parentage action, it was appropriate to

look to and apply the statute governing temporary orders).

¶ 19 In addition to having jurisdiction over a child who is

dependent and neglected, the juvenile court has exclusive

jurisdiction under article 6 of the Children’s Code to issue orders to

9
determine parentage and to compel a parent to support a child.

§ 19-1-104(1)(e)-(f).

¶ 20 A division of this court considered whether a juvenile court in

a nonpaternity, dependency and neglect proceeding could determine

a child’s paternity (or parentage) in People in Interest of J.G.C., 2013

COA 171, ¶ 10. The division held that it could, but that the

juvenile court was required to follow the procedures outlined in the

Uniform Parentage Act. Id. at ¶ 11.

¶ 21 We perceive no reason to treat the juvenile court’s authority to

address child support matters any differently. Article 6 authorizes

the juvenile court to enter an order directing a parent or other

legally responsible person to support a child or children.

§§ 19-6-101(1)(a), 19-6-104(1), C.R.S. 2019. It also permits the

court to enter a child support order for a time period that preceded

the entry of the support order. § 19-6-104(1).

¶ 22 The court may order child support as is reasonable under the

circumstances, taking into consideration the factors under section

19-4-116(6), C.R.S. 2019. § 19-6-104(1). Section 19-4-116(6), in

turn, requires the court to consider all relevant facts in determining

child support, including the following:

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 the child’s needs;

 the standard of living and circumstances of the parents;

 the relative financial means of the parents;

 the earning ability of the parents;

 the child’s need and capacity for education, including higher

education;

 the child’s age;

 the child’s financial resources and earning ability;

 the responsibility of the parents for the support of others;

 the value of services contributed by the parent with whom the

child resides most of the time;

 the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the

parents been married; and

 the child support guidelines, as set forth in section 14-10-115

of the UDMA.

¶ 23 Furthermore, section 19-6-106 expressly requires the juvenile

court to follow the provisions of section 14-10-115 when

determining a child support obligation under article 6. And section

14-10-115 of the UDMA contains a reciprocal provision addressing

11
its applicability to support proceedings under the Children’s Code.

It provides that the child support guidelines apply to all child

support obligations that are established or modified as part of any

proceeding, including article 6 of the Children’s Code. § 14-10-

115(1)(c).

¶ 24 Accordingly, we hold that when the juvenile court determines

child support in a dependency and neglect proceeding, it must

follow the provisions for establishing child support orders under

article 6 of the Children’s Code.

2. Application

¶ 25 In determining that father should be required to support the

children by releasing his SSDI benefits to mother, the court

identified three factors. First, father had regularly used his $650

monthly benefit to support the children until October 2019.

Second, although mother was employed, she struggled to support

the children without access to father’s SSDI benefits. Third, father

did not need this benefit for support because he was incarcerated.

¶ 26 However, the court did not consider relevant facts related to

the children’s needs or the children’s financial resources and

earning abilities. And, significantly, the court did not consider the

12
child support guidelines under section 14-10-115. Therefore, we

reverse the portion of the order requiring father to release his SSDI

benefits to mother and to restore mother as the payee of the

benefits.

C. Violation of the SSA

1. Necessity of Review and Preservation

¶ 27 Father contends that the juvenile court’s order requiring him

to name mother as the payee of his SSDI benefits violates federal

law. He concedes that he did not raise this legal issue in the

juvenile court. Nonetheless, it may be appropriate to consider

questions of pre-emption of federal law for the first time on appeal.

See Fuentes-Espinoza v. People, 2017 CO 98, ¶¶ 1, 19 (choosing to

address a pre-emption question that the division of the court of

appeals had determined was unpreserved); see also Town of

Carbondale v. GSS Props., LLC, 169 P.3d 675, 682-83 (Colo. 2007)

(recognizing that a pre-emption defense may be waivable when it

involves the law to be applied by the court, but that pre-emption

involving federal law may raise a separate set of issues, including,

for example, the application of the Federal Supremacy Clause). For

these reasons, we will review father’s argument.

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2. Standard of Review and the SSA

¶ 28 We review de novo whether the provision of the order requiring

father to designate mother as the payee of his SSDI benefits

conflicts with the SSA and thereby violates the Supremacy Clause

of the United States Constitution. See In re Marriage of Anderson,

252 P.3d 490, 493 (Colo. App. 2010); see also People in Interest of

C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶ 10.

¶ 29 When a person becomes disabled, he or she may receive SSDI

benefits under the SSA. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (2018); In re Marriage

of Anthony-Guillar, 207 P.3d 934, 938 (Colo. App. 2009). In some

cases, SSDI benefits are paid directly to the beneficiary. In re

Guardianship of Smith, 17 A.3d 136, 140 (Me. 2011). In other

cases, payments can be made to a duly certified fiduciary — known

as a representative payee — for the beneficiary’s use and benefit.

Id.

¶ 30 SSDI benefits constitute income for child support purposes.

§ 14-10-115(5)(a)(I)(P); see also 42 U.S.C. § 659(a) (2018). And the

federal government has consented to SSDI benefits being withheld,

garnished, or subjected to another similar proceeding to enforce the

14
legal obligation of the individual to provide child support. 42 U.S.C.

§ 659(a).

¶ 31 However, no provision of the SSA permits a state court to

determine who should serve as the representative payee. Rather,

the SSA tasks the Commissioner of Social Security with

investigating and determining whether an individual receiving SSDI

benefits should have a representative payee and, if so, who should

serve as the payee. State in Interest of W.B., 755 So. 2d 281, 282

(La. Ct. App. 1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(A), (2)(A)(i)-(ii)

(2018); 20 C.F.R. § 416.610 (2019) (reciting the principles and

procedures that the administration follows in determining whether

to make representative payment and in selecting a representative

payee). The individual who receives the benefit may also designate

an individual as a representative payee. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j)(1)(C)(i).

But this occurs when the administration determines that payment

will be made to a representative payee. 20 C.F.R. § 416.618(a)(2)

(2019).

¶ 32 Once appointed, representative payees are subject to detailed

regulations governing the use of SSDI benefits. Wash. State Dep’t of

Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S.

15
371, 376 (2003); see also Smith, 17 A.3d at 140; 20 C.F.R.

§§ 416.635, 416.640, 416.645 (2019). A representative payee is

required to use the benefit payments solely for the beneficiary’s use

and benefit in a manner and for the purposes that the

representative payee determines to be in the beneficiary’s best

interests. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a) (2019); see also In re Ryan W.,

76 A.3d 1049, 1053 (Md. 2013). And payees must abide by “a

system of accountability monitoring” under which they are

forbidden from “misus[ing]” an individual’s benefit payments in any

way and must submit a report at least once per year with respect to

the use of such payments. See Smith, 17 A.3d at 140 (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 405(j)(3)(A), (7)(A)); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.625, 416.665

(2019).

¶ 33 Taken together, these provisions establish that a juvenile court

lacks the authority to determine who a parent must designate as

the representative payee for his or her SSDI benefits. See W.B., 755

So. 2d at 282 (recognizing that a request to change the

representative payee is a question for the Social Security

Administration with possible review by the federal courts); see also

Ryan W., 76 A.3d at 1061 (concluding that the juvenile court did

16
not have authority under Maryland law to monitor the allocation of

social security benefits by a representative payee).

¶ 34 Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the order requiring father

to designate mother as the representative payee for his SSDI

benefits.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 35 The child support portion of the judgment is reversed, and the

case is remanded to the juvenile court. On remand, the juvenile

court must vacate the provision of the order requiring father to

designate mother as the representative payee of his SSDI benefits.

The court must also either redetermine child support, based on the

criteria under sections 14-10-115 and 19-4-116(6), or certify the

issue into the parties’ domestic relations case.

JUDGE TERRY and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

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