Peo v. Taylor

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
May 14, 2020

2020COA79

No. 17CA2273, Peo v Taylor — Criminal Law — Rights of
Defendant — Speedy Trial

A division of the court of appeals considers whether a district

court may extend a defendant’s speedy trial deadline under section

18‑1‑405(3.5), C.R.S. 2019, which refers to failure to appear on the

“trial date,” when the defendant fails to appear at a pretrial

readiness conference conducted on the day before trial. The

division concludes it may not because the date of a pretrial hearing

is not the “trial date.”
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA79

Court of Appeals No. 17CA2273
El Paso County District Court No. 16CR1475
Honorable Larry E. Schwartz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Paul Anthony Taylor,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Fox and Berger, JJ., concur

Announced May 14, 2020

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brittany L. Limes, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Tanja Heggins, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant
¶1 The Colorado speedy trial statute, section 18-1-405(1), C.R.S.

2019, requires that a person accused of a crime be “brought to

trial” within six months of his or her not guilty plea. Section

18-1-405(3.5) provides that the six-month period is extended if the

defendant fails to appear on the “trial date.”

¶2 In this case, the district court held that the failure of

defendant, Paul Anthony Taylor, to appear for a pretrial hearing

extended the six-month speedy trial period. But the date of a

pretrial hearing is not the “trial date.” As a consequence of this

misreading of the speedy trial statute, the district court set Taylor’s

trial for a date more than six months after his not guilty plea.

¶3 Because the district court violated Taylor’s statutory right to a

speedy trial, we grant Taylor the only remedy the law permits for a

speedy trial violation. We vacate the judgment of conviction and

remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the

charges filed against Taylor with prejudice.

I. Background

¶4 A Colorado Springs police officer pulled Taylor over for turning

into a parking lot without signaling. Through a check on the

vehicle’s license plate number, the officer discovered that the car

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had been stolen. A second officer placed Taylor in handcuffs, while

the first officer inventoried Taylor’s car. During the inventory, the

officer found marijuana, an open container of alcohol, a

methamphetamine pipe, and a baggie containing

methamphetamine.

¶5 Taylor was charged with aggravated motor vehicle theft,

possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to

manufacture or distribute marijuana or marijuana concentrate,

driving under restraint, failure to signal for a turn, and illegal

possession or consumption of alcohol in a motor vehicle. Taylor

pleaded not guilty to the charges on August 29, 2016.

¶6 The district court set a pretrial readiness conference for 9:00

a.m. on January 23, 2017, and set his jury trial for the same time

on January 24, 2017.

¶7 Although Taylor failed to appear for the pretrial readiness

conference at 9 a.m. on January 23, 2017, his defense counsel was

present. The district court agreed to recall the case at 1:30 p.m. so

that defense counsel could attempt to contact Taylor. When the

case was recalled, Taylor was not present, and his counsel informed

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the court that he had been unable to reach Taylor. The court

issued a warrant for Taylor’s arrest.

¶8 The clerk then asked the court, “Waiver of speedy trial as of

today?” and the court answered, “Yes.” Defense counsel inquired, “I

assume vacate tomorrow’s trial date?” and the court responded,

“Yes.”

¶9 At 4:45 p.m. that same day, Taylor arrived at the court

without counsel. The court again recalled the case. Taylor asked if

he could explain “what happened.” The court replied, “I don’t want

you to make any statements that might come back to haunt you”

and refused to let Taylor make a statement outside the presence of

his attorney.

¶ 10 Taylor and his attorney did not appear in court for a trial on

January 24 because the court had vacated the trial date the

previous day.

¶ 11 On February 6, 2017, Taylor appeared before the court with

counsel, who requested that Taylor’s trial be set within the speedy

trial period. The court asked, “[W]hen was the last waiver of speedy

trial?” and defense counsel responded that there “[s]hould have

been no previous waivers.” He explained that he and Taylor had

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appeared at a pretrial readiness conference on December 19, 2016,

at which the prosecution had moved to continue the trial. The

court had granted the continuance over the defense’s objection.

Counsel continued,

As we stated Mr. Taylor appeared six hours
tardy for readiness on [January] 23. He was
taken into custody. So obviously [he] would
have been available for trial on [January] 24.

I note that there was no finding of speedy —
waiver of speedy made at any time when Mr.
Taylor was represented by counsel.

¶ 12 The clerk clarified that Taylor’s failure to appear was “deemed

waiver of speedy trial on January 23.” The court stated:

He was not here on the date that I made the
trial call. Then the question is whether or not
that constitutes a waiver as opposed to the
next day. When we are normally set.

I conclude there was a waiver of speedy trial.
That is our trial call time. The fact that we
could not have a jury present does not change
my opinion on that. Nor the fact that he was
in custody the next day.

So we will reset it within six months of the
date he failed to appear.

¶ 13 The following day, the court issued supplemental findings to

support its finding of a waiver of speedy trial. In the supplemental

findings, the court stated that on “January 24, the date set to begin

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jury selection, neither the defendant nor his attorney was present.”

The court concluded that “by failing to appear at trial call on

January 23 and failing to be present to demand trial on January

24, the defendant waived his right to a speedy trial.”

¶ 14 During a subsequent pretrial hearing, Taylor moved to dismiss

the charges against him on speedy trial grounds. The court denied

his motion. After the prosecution was granted a second

continuance over Taylor’s objections, Taylor’s trial was eventually

held on June 20-21, 2017, nearly ten months after Taylor entered

his not guilty plea. A jury found Taylor guilty of aggravated motor

vehicle theft, possession of a controlled substance, possession of

marijuana, failure to signal for a turn, and illegal possession or

consumption of alcohol in a motor vehicle.

¶ 15 On appeal, Taylor argues that (1) the district court violated his

statutory right to a speedy trial; (2) the district court violated his

constitutional rights when it prevented his counsel from raising an

affirmative defense of recreational marijuana; (3) there was

insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions for aggravated motor

vehicle theft and possession of a controlled substance; (4) the

district court erred by admitting hearsay testimony that the vehicle

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he was driving had been reported as stolen; (5) the district court

erred by denying his request to appoint substitute counsel; and (6)

the cumulative effect of the district court’s errors requires reversal.

II. The Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial

A. Standard of Review

¶ 16 When a district court denies “a defendant’s motion to dismiss

based on its application of a speedy trial statute to undisputed

facts, our review is de novo.” People v. Desantiago, 2014 COA 66M,

¶ 12, 409 P.3d 389, 391. “We also review de novo an issue of

statutory interpretation.” Id.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 17 Section 18-1-405(1) is clear: a person accused of a crime must

be “brought to trial” within six months of the date on which he or

she pleaded not guilty. See also Crim. P. 48(b)(1). However, “[i]f a

trial date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to

make an appearance in person on the trial date, the period within

which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month

period from the date of the defendant’s next appearance.”

§ 18-1-405(3.5) (emphasis added).

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¶ 18 The duty to pursue trial within the speedy trial deadline rests

with the People and the district court. People v. DeGreat, 2020 CO

25, ¶ 11, ___ P.3d ___, ___. The remedy for a speedy trial violation

is dismissal of charges with prejudice. Id.

III. The District Court Violated Taylor’s Statutory Right to a
Speedy Trial

¶ 19 Taylor contends that his judgment of conviction must be

vacated because the district court violated his right to a speedy

trial. He argues that he did not waive his right to a speedy trial

under section 18-1-405(3.5) when he appeared six hours late to the

pretrial readiness conference on January 23, 2017. We agree.

¶ 20 The People first argue that the district court did not err by

denying Taylor’s motion to dismiss because, under People v. Peltz,

697 P.2d 766 (Colo. App. 1984), aff’d, 728 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1986),

the pretrial readiness conference on January 23, 2017, fits within

the meaning of “brought to trial,” and that Taylor’s failure to appear

at the conference was adequate grounds to restart the speedy trial

period. But this argument misreads the statute.

¶ 21 Section 18-1-405(3.5) does not extend the speedy trial period if

the defendant fails to appear in person on the date he or she is

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“brought to trial.” It states that the speedy trial period is extended

for an additional six months if “the defendant fails to make an

appearance in person on the trial date.” § 18-1-405(3.5) (emphasis

added). (The language “brought to trial” appears in the definition of

the conclusion of the speedy trial period. See § 18-1-405(1)

(requiring that a defendant’s charges be dismissed with prejudice if

the defendant is “not brought to trial on the issues raised by the

complaint, information, or indictment within six months from the

date of the entry of a plea of not guilty”) (emphasis added). Thus,

the question before us is not whether a pretrial readiness

conference falls within the meaning of “brought to trial.”)

¶ 22 The meaning of “trial date” is clear in the context of section

18-1-405(3.5) and is distinct from the meaning of “pretrial

readiness conference.” See Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four

Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 35 (Colo. 2000) (“When construing the

meaning of a statute, reviewing courts should first consider the

statutory language and give the words their plain and ordinary

meaning.”); see also Desantiago, ¶ 13, 409 P.3d at 391 (“As long as

the meaning of such words is unambiguous, we need not rely on

interpretive rules of statutory construction.”). Logically, a trial

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judge would not order parties to appear for a “pretrial readiness

conference” by directing them to show up on the “trial date”

because a pretrial conference is not a trial. Thus, we cannot

support the People’s overbroad reading of “trial date.”

¶ 23 Taylor failed to appear for a pretrial readiness conference.

Because it is clear that the pretrial readiness conference was not

Taylor’s trial date, his failure to appear in court at 9:00 a.m. and

again at 1:30 p.m. on January 23, 2017, did not authorize the

district court to rely on section 18-1-405(3.5) to extend his speedy

trial period an additional six months. See People ex rel. Gallagher v.

Dist. Court, 933 P.2d 583, 589-90 (Colo. 1997) (holding that a delay

caused by a defendant’s failure to appear at a pretrial hearing “does

not constitute a waiver of speedy trial under section 18-1-405(3)

such that a new six month period begins to run”).

¶ 24 The speedy trial statute provides a remedy for a delay caused

by the defendant’s voluntary absence from a pretrial hearing. See

People ex rel. Gallagher, 933 P.2d 583 at 589-90; see also

§ 18-1-405(6)(d). The trial court may add a period of time that is

reasonably attributable to the “delay resulting from the voluntary

absence or unavailability of the defendant” to the end of defendant’s

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original six-month speedy trial period. § 18-1-405(6)(d); see People

ex rel. Gallagher, 933 P.2d at 588 (“[T]he time period ‘resulting from’

a defendant’s unavailability or absence includes a reasonable period

in which to reschedule and prepare for trial a case that has been

postponed.”). However, the district court did not find, and the

People do not argue, that the delay caused by Taylor’s failure to

appear reasonably warranted the addition of four months at the end

of Taylor’s speedy trial period under 18-1-405(6)(d). For this

reason, we do not consider this argument.

¶ 25 The People further argue that, even if Taylor’s trial date was

January 24, 2017, the district court properly restarted his speedy

trial period under section 18-1-405(3.5) because he failed to appear

on that date. This argument is unpersuasive because the district

court struck the January 24 trial date on January 23. Defendants

are not required to appear in court on vacated trial dates.

¶ 26 Section 18-1-405(3.5) resets the speedy trial period “[i]f a trial

date has been fixed by the court and the defendant fails to make an

appearance in person on the trial date.” Although the court fixed

Taylor’s trial date when it set the case for trial on January 24,

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2017, the district court “unfixed” the trial date by vacating Taylor’s

trial on the afternoon of January 23, 2017.

¶ 27 As a result, when Taylor failed to appear in court on January

24, 2017, he was not in violation of section 18-1-405(3.5) because

the trial date was no longer “fixed by the court.” He did not have a

trial date. For this reason, Taylor’s speedy trial period was not reset

when he failed to appear in court on January 24, 2017. (Taylor also

argues that he did not fail to appear on January 24, 2017, because

he was in custody on that date — as a result of failing to appear the

previous day — and was, therefore, available to be transported to

court. We do not consider whether the fact that a defendant was in

custody and available to be transported to court is sufficient to

establish that he appeared in court on his trial date because we

conclude that Taylor no longer had a trial date.)

¶ 28 Nearly ten months elapsed between August 29, 2016, when

Taylor entered his not guilty plea, and June 20, 2017, when his

trial began, because the court misconstrued section 18-1-405(3.5).

This time period exceeded the six-month statutory speedy trial

period. Thus, we conclude that Taylor’s statutory right to a speedy

trial was violated.

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IV. Remaining Contentions on Appeal

¶ 29 Because we conclude that the district court violated Taylor’s

statutory right to speedy trial, we do not consider Taylor’s other

arguments.

V. Conclusion

¶ 30 Taylor’s judgment of conviction is vacated. The case is

remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the

charges against Taylor with prejudice.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE BERGER concur.

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