Interest of Salcedo Hart

25CA0747 & 25CA1422 Interest of Salcedo Hart 06-11-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals Nos. 25CA0747 & 25CA1422
Douglas County District Court No. 17PR30108
Honorable Theresa M. Cisneros, Judge

In the Interest of Margarita M. Salcedo Hart,

Margarita M. Salcedo Hart,

Appellant,

v.

Melissa Schwartz,

Appellee.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Sullivan and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced June 11, 2026

Powers Law Firm, LLC, Jean M. Powers, Englewood, Colorado, for Appellant

Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, Jason D. Melichar, Kimberly L.
Koehler, Denver, Colorado; Todd E. Kastetter, P.C., Todd E. Kastetter, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee
¶1 Margarita M. Salcedo Hart appeals the district court’s order

awarding her former limited conservator, Melissa Schwartz, her

fees, attorney fees, and costs. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Salcedo Hart was an elderly woman who had lost over a

million dollars to online romance scams. In 2017, Schwartz was

appointed as her limited conservator to prevent that from

happening again. Schwartz was given access to all of Salcedo

Hart’s financial accounts to monitor them for suspicious

transactions. Schwartz was also given authority to retain counsel

to represent her if, in her sole discretion, she deemed it necessary.

That counsel was to be paid by Salcedo Hart.

¶3 Two years later, in 2019, Salcedo Hart petitioned to terminate

the conservatorship and separately to remove Schwartz as the

limited conservator. The district court granted the petition to

terminate the conservatorship in 2022 without resolving the

petition to remove Schwartz.

¶4 Also in 2022, Salcedo Hart petitioned for a surcharge (the

surcharge petition) against Schwartz based on the allegation that

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Schwartz had breached her fiduciary duty. The district court

denied this petition, finding no breach.

¶5 In 2023, Schwartz petitioned to be discharged as Salcedo

Hart’s limited conservator and for her compensation and costs (the

discharge-compensation petition). The district court granted this

petition, discharging Schwartz and awarding her several hundred

thousand dollars in compensation and costs, including money for

attorney fees and expert witness fees.

¶6 Salcedo Hart appeals the court’s compensation and costs

award, arguing that she was entitled to a hearing on the

reasonableness of the award and that the award violated various

statutes. We conclude that none of these arguments warrant relief.

II. Hearing

¶7 We first conclude that Salcedo Hart failed to preserve, and

therefore waived, the argument she now advances in support of her

right to a hearing on the reasonableness of the award. See

Vanderpool v. Loftness, 2012 COA 115, ¶¶ 34-35 (failure to raise an

argument to the district court in a civil case waives the right to

raise it on appeal). Although Salcedo Hart requested a hearing on

the award’s reasonableness before the district court, she did not

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raise the ground she now relies on. See People v. Rogers, 2012 COA

192, ¶ 24 (“An issue is unpreserved for review when an objection or

request was made to the trial court, but on different grounds than

those raised on appeal.”).

¶8 On appeal, Salcedo Hart relies on section 15-10-604, C.R.S.

2025, which sets out rules for resolving compensation and costs

disputes in probate cases. It provides that when compensation or

costs are disputed, “the court shall determine, after notice and

hearing, the amount of compensation and costs it considers to be

reasonable.” § 15-10-604(4). Salcedo Hart argues in her opening

brief that because she disputed the reasonableness of the

compensation and costs, a hearing was mandatory under this

provision.

¶9 But she did not raise section 15-10-604(4)’s (purportedly

mandatory) hearing provision to the district court. Instead, relying

on different authority, she urged the district court to exercise its

discretion to hold a hearing.

¶ 10 Before the district court, Salcedo Hart quoted C.R.C.P. 121,

section 1-22(2)(c), which explains when an attorney fees hearing is

mandatory versus discretionary. A hearing is mandatory when

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“required . . . by law.” C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2)(c). Alternatively, a

hearing may be granted in the court’s discretion when the hearing

“would materially assist the court in ruling on the motion.” Id.

Salcedo Hart then relied on the discretionary hearing language in

the rule, arguing that “a hearing on the reasonableness of all these

fees and costs would materially assist the Court in ruling on

Schwartz’s motion.”

¶ 11 The discretionary hearing language in the rule was the only

ground on which Salcedo Hart requested a hearing below. She did

not argue, as she does now on appeal, that a hearing was required

under section 15-10-604(4). Indeed, she did not even cite any

provision of section 15-10-604 in her hearing request below.

Because she failed to alert the district court that a hearing might be

required under section 15-10-604(4), she waived the right to

advance that argument on appeal, and we will not address it. See

Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C., 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App.

2010) (preservation requires that “the issue be brought to the

attention of the trial court and that the court be given an

opportunity to rule on it”).

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III. Schwartz’s Entitlement to Compensation and Costs

¶ 12 Salcedo Hart next challenges various parts of the district

court’s compensation and costs award on several different grounds.

We address two of these contentions on their merits and conclude

the remainder are insufficiently supported and developed to trigger

appellate review.

A. Sections 15-10-602(1) and -602(6)

¶ 13 As we understand it, Salcedo Hart primarily challenges the

court’s award of compensation and costs to Schwartz for litigating

the surcharge petition and the discharge-compensation petition.

Salcedo Hart argues that awarding these amounts violated sections

15-10-602(1) and -602(6), C.R.S. 2025, because one of these

provisions limits the other.

¶ 14 This is a statutory interpretation argument that we review de

novo. See Crandall v. City & County of Denver, 238 P.3d 659, 661

(Colo. 2010). To resolve it, we consider the statutory text in the

context of the statute as a whole and give the language chosen by

the legislature its commonly accepted and understood meaning.

See Gallegos Fam. Props., LLC v. Colo. Groundwater Comm’n, 2017

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CO 73, ¶ 25. If the language is clear when considered in context,

we look no further. Id.

¶ 15 Section 15-10-602(1) provides that a fiduciary and their lawyer

are entitled to reasonable compensation for “services rendered on

behalf of an estate.”

¶ 16 In turn, section 15-10-602(6) provides that a fiduciary is

entitled to reasonable reimbursement from the estate for

“defend[ing] or prosecut[ing] a proceeding in good faith, whether

successful or not.”

¶ 17 The district court found that Schwartz litigated the surcharge

and discharge-compensation petitions in good faith, thereby

rendering Schwartz’s services and costs incurred in this litigation

awardable under section 602(6). Salcedo Hart argues this was error

because section 602(6) awards must also separately comply with

section 602(1). In other words, according to Salcedo Hart, good

faith litigation costs under section 602(6) are awardable only if

those costs also qualify as services rendered on behalf of the estate

under section 602(1). We disagree and conclude that reading the

provisions in context, they are stand-alone provisions not subject to

one another.

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¶ 18 Under Salcedo Hart’s interpretation, section 602(6)

compensation would be a wholly subsumed subcategory of section

602(1) compensation. This would render section 602(6) redundant

and superfluous. We must reject such interpretations. See Byers

Peak Props., LLC v. Byers Peak Land & Cattle, LLC, 2026 CO 7,

¶ 24.

¶ 19 The only interpretation that does not render section 602(6)

superfluous is that sections 602(1) and 602(6) identify two

overlapping but potentially distinct sets of compensable activities.

Services rendered on behalf of the estate are compensable under

section 602(1). Separately, a good faith prosecution or defense is

compensable under section 602(6), regardless of whether such

litigation would also be compensable under section 602(1).

¶ 20 We therefore reject Salcedo Hart’s argument that the award for

the surcharge and discharge-compensation petitions litigation

under section 602(6) was error.1

1 The argument we reject as insufficiently developed to warrant

review includes the argument that Schwartz was not entitled to
compensation and costs for, as Salcedo Hart puts it, “responding to
subpoenas, depositions and other discovery requests related to the
Compensation and Surcharge Petitions.”

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B. Redactions

¶ 21 Salcedo Hart also challenges the award of over $197,000 in

redaction costs on the ground that they were done for Schwartz’s

benefit, not Salcedo Hart’s, and were therefore not awardable under

section 602(1). This is an argument that the evidence did not

support the award, and we therefore review the court’s decision to

award the cost of the redactions for an abuse of discretion. See

Colo. Citizens for Ethics in Gov’t v. Comm. for Am. Dream, 187 P.3d

1207, 1220 (Colo. App. 2008). A court abuses its discretion if its

“findings are so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to

compel a contrary result.” Id. We perceive no abuse of discretion

here.

¶ 22 As evidence that these redactions were not done for her

benefit, Salcedo Hart points to Schwartz’s testimony that the

redactions “benefitted me as the conservator — limited conservator

for Margarita Salcedo Hart.” But Schwartz did not testify, as

Salcedo Hart suggests, that the redactions benefited Schwartz

personally. Instead, she testified that they benefited her as the

limited conservator.

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¶ 23 Moreover, it was Salcedo Hart who not only necessitated but

specifically requested the redactions in the first place. Salcedo Hart

subpoenaed Schwartz for all her correspondence with any other

party related to the case “excluding attorney-client privileged

communications” between Schwartz and her attorneys. Salcedo

Hart’s own subpoena ordered Schwarts to make the redactions.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say that characterizing the

redactions as completed on Salcedo Hart’s behalf was manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

C. Undeveloped Arguments

¶ 24 We conclude that Salcedo Hart’s remaining arguments are

undeveloped, and we will not address their merits.

¶ 25 Counsel on appeal “must inform the court both as to the

specific errors asserted and the grounds, supporting facts, and

authorities to support their contentions.” Barnett v. Elite Props. of

Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010). We will not consider

arguments presented without substantial argument or

development. See id.

¶ 26 Salcedo Hart argues that Schwartz could not be awarded

compensation and costs for opposing her removal as conservator.

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But Salcedo Hart does not identify what Schwartz did to oppose her

removal. This argument is therefore undeveloped.

¶ 27 The same is true of Salcedo Hart’s argument that Schwartz

should not have been compensated for testifying at the termination

hearing because she appeared as a fact witness. Salcedo Hart

neither describes Schwartz’s testimony at the termination hearing

nor explains why that testimony was fact-witness testimony.

Salcedo Hart’s argument is simply an unsupported and

unexplained assertion. This is insufficient to trigger our review.

¶ 28 Similarly, Salcedo Hart has not properly presented her

argument that compensation and costs for unidentified services

rendered after the termination were not awardable. She contends

that these unidentified services could not have been rendered on

behalf of the estate because the conservatorship had been

terminated. But she states this conclusion without citation to

authority or further explanation. Again, this argument is

undeveloped. See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) (stating the appellant’s brief

must contain, among other things, “citations to the authorities and

parts of the record on which the appellant relies”).

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¶ 29 Finally, Salcedo Hart presents an argument under section 15-

10-503(4), C.R.S. 2025, which provides that after a conservator

receives notice of a petition for their removal, they “shall not act

except to account, to correct maladministration, or to preserve the

estate.” Salcedo Hart contends that Schwartz was compensated for

many things she did after the removal petition and that these

things were not done to account, correct maladministration, or

preserve Salcedo Hart’s estate.

¶ 30 The district court found that “the entirety of [Schwartz’s] role

was to preserve the estate.” Salcedo Hart made clear at oral

argument on appeal that she is not challenging the factual

underpinnings of this determination. Instead, she argues that

Schwartz did various things that, as a matter of law, could not have

qualified as accounting, correcting maladministration, or preserving

the estate. But this contention is a bald legal proposition. She

cites section 15-10-503(4) and recites the court’s determination

under that statute. But she does not explain what it means to

account, correct maladministration, or preserve an estate, nor does

she explain why any of Schwartz’s actions fell outside the scope of

these terms. She merely states her conclusion without any

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explanation. We therefore conclude that this argument, too, is

insufficiently developed to trigger our review.

IV. Disposition

¶ 31 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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