Peo v. Webster

23CA0981 Peo v Webster 05-21-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0981
Adams County District Court No. 18CR2394
Honorable Priscilla J. Loew, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Jeremy Webster,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Yun and Schutz, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 21, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Esteban A. Martinez, Alternate Defense Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Jeremy Webster appeals his convictions for one count of first

degree murder, six counts of attempted first degree murder, four

counts of first degree assault, one count of attempted first degree

assault, and ten crime of violence sentence enhancers. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 A jury could have reasonably found the following facts from

the evidence introduced at trial.

¶3 On June 18, 2018, following a road rage incident, Webster

shot a mother, two of her children, and a bystander in a dental

office parking lot. One of the children died from the gunshot

wound, while the other victims survived. Webster was charged with

the counts noted above.

¶4 At trial, defense counsel argued that Webster was not guilty by

reason of insanity (NGRI). The jury found Webster guilty as

charged, however. The trial court sentenced him to a mandatory

controlling sentence of life without the possibility of parole in the

custody of the Department of Corrections.

¶5 Webster rests his appeal on three Sixth Amendment

arguments, asserting that the trial court (1) denied his right to

counsel at a critical stage; (2) violated his right to counsel of choice

1
by removing his original public defenders; and (3) infringed his right

to conflict-free counsel by creating a conflict between him and the

public defenders. We disagree.

II. Analysis

A. Additional Facts

¶6 Webster’s initial advisement took place three days after the

shootings. But the case did not go to trial for another five years.

¶7 The initial wave of the COVID-19 pandemic struck during the

pretrial proceedings and delayed the completion of Webster’s NGRI

evaluation. As a result, Webster did not enter his NGRI plea until

April 6, 2020.

¶8 The COVID-19 pandemic also caused problems for Webster’s

lawyers. In January 2021, during a virtual hearing at which the

trial court said it was prepared to set the case for trial, Webster’s

two public defenders, Kimberly A. Gonzalez and Stuart I.

Rubinstein (jointly, initial defense counsel), informed the court that

they did not intend to appear at trial due to their high risk for

COVID-19 infections. Gonzalez said that health issues placed her

at high risk and that Rubinstein was at high risk because he had a

2
young child and his wife was pregnant. Nonetheless, the court set

Webster’s trial for July 7, 2021.

¶9 Although that trial began as scheduled, it ended in a mistrial

due to the unavailability of a critical prosecution witness. At a July

9 hearing to reset the trial, Rubinstein informed the trial court that

he would not appear on a new trial date that coincided with his

pregnant wife’s due date — September 25, 2021. He said he would

withdraw as Webster’s counsel if the court scheduled the trial on

that date. The parties and the court agreed to schedule the new

trial for October 25, 2021, with a pretrial conference set for October

12.

¶ 10 On September 23, 2021, during a hearing at which Gonzalez

appeared in person and Rubinstein appeared remotely, initial

defense counsel requested a continuance due to the risks posed by

COVID-19 to Rubinstein’s family if he became infected while

participating in the October 25 trial. The court did not address the

requested continuance because the prosecution had not yet spoken

with the victims about the possibility of another continuance.

¶ 11 At the next hearing in the case, conducted on September 29,

the trial court said that, although it appreciated Rubinstein’s

3
concerns regarding his family’s health, it was denying the

continuance request because, among other considerations, the

victims objected to a continuance, the case had been pending for an

“extremely lengthy” time, and all parties had previously agreed to

the October 25 trial date.

¶ 12 Rubinstein did not appear at the October 12 pretrial

conference. At that conference, Gonzalez appeared in person and

again asked the trial court to continue the October 25 trial date

because Rubinstein “made the choice to remain on [family and

medical leave] for the protection of his family” and would not appear

at the October 25 trial, and she could not “effectively represent

[Webster]” alone. The court granted the continuance but postponed

setting a new trial date to allow the parties time to discuss possible

trial dates with their witnesses.

¶ 13 At an in-person hearing on October 28, which Gonzalez

attended but Rubinstein did not attend, the court reset the trial for

January 19, 2022.

¶ 14 On January 3, 2022, the chief judge of the judicial district in

which the case was pending suspended all jury trials set in the

district from January 3 through January 28, 2022, citing the

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“alarming and continuing rise over the last week in COVID[-19]

positivity rates due to outbreak of the Omicron variant.”

Seventeenth Jud. Dist., Addendum to Ninth Amended

Administrative Order Regarding Court Operations Under COVID-19

Effective November 23, 2020 Until Further Notice and Order (Jan.

3, 2022). The chief judge said that the court would consider

exceptions to the moratorium if, “due to unique and compelling

circumstances, . . . cases . . . need to be tried within the next

[thirty] days.” Id. The prosecution asked the trial court to allow the

trial in Webster’s case to proceed as scheduled on January 19

under the exception.

¶ 15 At a pretrial conference on January 7, Gonzalez, who appeared

in person, and Rubinstein, who appeared remotely, objected to the

January 19 trial date due to COVID-19 health concerns. They

stated that they did not intend to appear for trial even if ordered by

the court. Nonetheless, the trial court found that the trial could

proceed safely on the scheduled date and granted the prosecution’s

request for an exception to the chief judge’s moratorium on jury

trials.

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¶ 16 On January 13, the court ordered the parties to disclose how

many individuals planned to be physically present in the courtroom

during trial. The next day, initial defense counsel informed the trial

court that Rubinstein had tested positive for COVID-19 and was

“actively symptomatic,” and that the defense would have “[zero]

individuals present to proceed to trial on January 19, 2022.”

¶ 17 On January 16, initial defense counsel filed a motion seeking

a mistrial and continuance or, alternatively, leave to withdraw as

Webster’s counsel of record “due to a conflict of interest” (the

conflict motion). Initial defense counsel said that the choices

Gonzalez would “have to make during trial to protect herself, her

family, [Webster,] and her community [were] in direct conflict with

her ethical obligations to [Webster] and create[d] a conflict of

interest pursuant to [Colo. RPC] 1.7.” In addition, initial defense

counsel said that Rubinstein’s positive COVID-19 test result and

his family situation created a similar conflict.

¶ 18 Initial defense counsel also said in the conflict motion that,

“[s]hould the court decline to declare a mistrial,” they “hereby

move[d] to withdraw pursuant to [Colo. RPC] 1.7 based on personal

conflicts of interest,” and they requested that the court “appoint

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conflict-free counsel to advise [Webster] regarding his rights and

choices with respect to counsel’s request to withdraw.” Initial

defense counsel based their requests on Webster’s “right to counsel,

due process, right to trial, equal protection, compulsory process,

confrontation, right to silence, and right to appeal clauses of the

United States and Colorado Constitutions and pursuant to the

Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.”

¶ 19 The court held a hearing on the conflict motion on January

18, with Gonzalez present in person and Rubinstein appearing

remotely. At the hearing, initial defense counsel reiterated their

request for a mistrial or continuance due to Rubinstein’s COVID-19

infection. The trial court denied the mistrial but said its “posture

analysis” was “different on a motion to continue.” Accordingly, in

recognition of Rubinstein’s “health circumstances,” the trial court

granted a continuance. It did not reset the trial at that time.

¶ 20 In addition, at the same hearing, the court acknowledged

initial defense counsel’s potential conflict of interest with Webster,

“especially if the case [could not] be tried.” The trial court noted

that its role in presiding over Webster’s trial included “effectively

and safely running its courtroom,” while “tak[ing] into account the

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[victims’] position, the efficiency of the proceedings, the length of

proceedings, [and] the pendency of the case.” At the conclusion of

the hearing, the court set a status conference “to address what [it

saw] as the three pending issues[:] [c]hoice of counsel, conflict of

counsel, and resetting the jury trial.”

¶ 21 On January 26, the trial court held a virtual status conference

to address those issues. As relevant to this appeal, to determine

whether the trial could be reset for a date when initial defense

counsel could appear in court, the court asked initial defense

counsel whether the conflict described in the conflict motion was

“permanent or ha[d] been remedied.” Gonzalez responded that,

because of her health situation, she could not guarantee that she

could appear at a new trial setting: “If COVID[-19] is not better by

the time this case is slated to start trial, I can’t represent to the

[c]ourt that I won’t have a big concern or that I won’t think that

same [conflict] motion [would be] necessary.”

¶ 22 The trial court then reviewed the factors set forth in People v.

Brown, 2014 CO 25, ¶ 24, 322 P.3d 214, 220-21, for determining

whether to grant a continuance. Applying the Brown factors, the

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court found that initial defense counsel had a conflict in

representing Webster. It said,

Given the length of the case and the impact on
the prosecution and potential prejudice, given
the position that the victims have objected and
this does have an impact and the age of the
case — I recognize that this will delay a trial
setting into a few months away but the
permanent nature of COVID[-19] from this
[c]ourt’s perspective, this is the most
appropriate decision because the permanency
of COVID[-19] and the permanency of the
circumstances of counsel and the [c]ourt
cannot continue to risk what the status is with
the pandemic in order to get this case tried.

¶ 23 The court specifically found that:

• Webster understood the “nature of the conflict,” that “it

affect[ed] [initial defense counsel’s] ability to effectively

represent him at a trial moving forward,” and that

Webster “would choose to have [initial defense counsel]

as counsel.”

• The COVID-19 pandemic was ongoing with “no end in

sight,” and Gonzalez’s health situation and Rubinstein’s

family concerns were also “not going away,” as initial

defense counsel “conce[ded] in [the conflict] motion and

the record in court.”

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• Therefore, the record did not allow the court to “make a

specific finding” as to whether initial defense counsel

would be available for trial “at any date in the future

based on [their] circumstances.”

• “[T]he length of the continuance necessary to

accommodate” initial defense counsel was “completely

unknown and speculative.”

• Further delay of the trial “potential[ly] prejudice[d] . . .

the prosecution,” given the “number of witnesses in the

case” and because “multiple witnesses ha[d] moved out of

state.”

• There had been multiple previous trial settings, and the

continuances had inconvenienced the witnesses “both

professionally and personally.”

• The case was 1,318 days old.

• Initial defense counsel had already requested four

continuances.

• Initial defense counsel made their most recent request for

a continuance on “the eve of trial.”

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• Another continuance would impact the court’s docket

because Webster’s case would require “a two and a half

to three week trial depending on jury selection” and

would require the court to “request senior judge coverage,

request coverage from other judges, . . . move dockets,

and delay other trials.” The court noted that, not only

was it “digging out of the pandemic with multiple jury

trials,” but that “set[ting] aside time for this trial

continually [had] an impact on the [c]ourt’s functioning[,]

. . . the [c]ourt’s availability[,] . . . [and] . . . the court

system.”

• The victims and their families had objected to each

continuance.

• Other cases were proceeding to trial. The court explained

that, in October 2021, when Webster’s case was

previously set for trial, the district had conducted ten

felony trials. In addition, at the time of the status

conference, other trials, including criminal felony jury

trials with large jury panels, were proceeding to trial.

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¶ 24 After finding that initial defense counsel had a conflict with

Webster, the court permitted initial defense counsel to withdraw

and appointed alternate defense counsel (ADC) to represent

Webster. The court then scheduled a status conference.

¶ 25 But ADC did not appear at the February 1 status conference.

Gonzalez attended with Sarah Quinn, the head of the public

defender’s office handling the case. Rubinstein was absent. The

court noted that initial defense counsel had not yet filed a notice of

withdrawal.

¶ 26 Quinn said that the public defender’s office did not see a

conflict between initial defense counsel and Webster, and that

initial defense counsel would not be filing a motion to withdraw.

The trial court pointed out that it had already found a conflict

“pursuant to the rule and pursuant to case law,” and it reiterated

that initial defense counsel’s request in the alternative to withdraw

based on a conflict “didn’t change facts before the [c]ourt as to the

basis for the conflict.” Moreover, the court observed that “the fact[s]

before the [c]ourt in [the] last trial setting may very well be the same

facts moving forward with the COVID[-19] pandemic and the health

conditions of the counsel on the record from [Quinn’s] office.”

12
¶ 27 The court asked Quinn whether she wanted the case to

proceed under such circumstances. Quinn asked the court to “set

it over” for initial defense counsel, who were “still the attorneys

[whom she] would assign to the case.” She underscored that she

would “not chang[e] counsel” in Webster’s case. Quinn further

expressed concern that Webster “ha[d] no attorney” present at the

hearing.

¶ 28 The trial court responded that, “on paper, ADC [was] on the

case,” although it agreed to allow the public defender’s office to file

a motion to reconsider its ruling that initial defense counsel was

conflicted from further representation of Webster. The court added

that it was “completely inappropriate that [Webster was] not

represented” at the time and set a further status conference.

¶ 29 On February 2, the court ordered initial defense counsel,

Quinn, and ADC to appear at a status conference the next day.

Also on February 2, Gonzalez filed a motion to reconsider the

appointment of ADC (the motion to reconsider), asserting that the

granted continuance had mooted any conflict with initial defense

counsel. In addition, the same day, Lindy Frolich, the Director of

13
the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel, through counsel, filed a

motion objecting to ADC’s appointment for Webster.

¶ 30 Initial defense counsel, Quinn, Frolich, Frolich’s counsel, and

several ADC attorneys all attended the in-person status conference

on February 3. At the beginning of the status conference, the court

explained the pending motions to Webster and noted there was “no

counsel with [Webster] at this time,” given the court’s previous

finding that initial defense counsel had a conflict of interest and the

ongoing objections from initial defense counsel and Frolich to the

appointment of ADC for Webster.

¶ 31 As relevant to this appeal, at the February 3 status

conference, the court asked Gonzalez whether she would appear at

trial if the court reset the trial for that day and determined it was

“safe to proceed and [it brought] in 200 more people for jury service

and ma[de] the [COVID-19] accommodations[:] ordering . . . N95

masks and socially distancing the courtroom and picking the jury

[over] four days.” Gonzalez responded that her answer would

depend “on the circumstances at the time.”

¶ 32 The court then asked Gonzalez whether there would continue

to be a conflict of interest “[i]f the [COVID-19] pandemic d[id] not

14
continue to go in a positive direction, or if there [was] a

disagreement with the way the [c]ourt organize[d] the [reset]

trial . . . ?” Gonzalez replied, “[I]f there [was] a suspension order in

place and the positivity rate [was] similar to where [it was] right

now[,] then” she thought there would be a conflict if the court forced

initial defense counsel “to go to trial in those circumstances.”

Quinn then reiterated that, so long as initial defense counsel

remained employed at the public defender’s office, she would not

appoint new attorneys from the office to represent Webster. The

court denied the motion to reconsider from the bench.

¶ 33 On July 2, the trial court entered a detailed order confirming

its denial of the motion to reconsider.

¶ 34 ADC continuously represented Webster following the entry of

the July 2 order, including at his trial, which began on April 7,

2023.

B. The Court Did Not Deny Webster
His Right to Counsel at a Critical Stage

1. Standard of Review

¶ 35 We “review an alleged violation of a constitutional right de

novo.” People v. Cuevas, 2024 COA 84, ¶ 21, 558 P.3d 1041, 1046.

15
2. The February 1 Status Conference Was Not
a Critical Stage of the Proceeding

¶ 36 We initially note that Webster’s opening brief fails to comply

with C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) because it does not, “under a separate

heading placed before the discussion of each issue,” contain

“statements of the applicable standard of review with citation to

authority, whether the issue was preserved, and if preserved, the

precise location in the record where the issue was raised and where

the court ruled.” It is not our responsibility to comb through the

voluminous record to determine whether Webster’s arguments were

preserved or to identify the applicable standards of review. See

Black v. Black, 2018 COA 7, ¶ 67, 422 P.3d 592, 604.

¶ 37 It appears to us that Webster’s counsel never argued in the

trial court that Webster was denied the right to counsel at a critical

stage — the February 1, 2022, status conference, as Webster

asserts on appeal.

¶ 38 Webster’s argument that he was unrepresented at the status

conference, which he characterizes as a critical stage of his criminal

proceeding, fails for two reasons. First, three days before the status

conference, the trial court entered an order saying that, because it

16
found “a conflict of interest existed with [initial defense counsel],

Colorado law require[d] the appointment of an [ADC] attorney” and,

accordingly, it “order[ed] that an [ADC] attorney be assigned to

[Webster’s] case.” As a result, Webster had counsel of record —

ADC — at the time of the February 1 status conference.

¶ 39 Webster does not cite any authorities holding that a

represented defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated when

defense counsel fails to appear at a status conference.

¶ 40 Second, and more importantly, even if Webster lacked counsel

at the February 1 status conference, his Sixth Amendment rights

were not implicated because the status conference was not a critical

stage of the case. Nothing of substance occurred: the trial court did

not rule on any pending motions and merely announced that it

would consider the merits of those motions at another status

conference later that week. Notably, Webster does not argue that

he lacked counsel at the rescheduled status conference.

¶ 41 “Stages of criminal proceedings have been held to be ‘critical’

where there exists more than a ‘minimal risk’ that the absence of

the defendant’s counsel might impair the defendant’s right to a fair

trial.” Key v. People, 865 P.2d 822, 825 (Colo. 1994) (quoting

17
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267 (1967)). Even if, at the

February 1 status conference, the trial court engaged in a

substantive discussion regarding replacing initial defense counsel

with ADC, courts in other jurisdictions have held that hearings on

counsel replacement are not critical. See, e.g., LaGrand v. Stewart,

133 F.3d 1253, 1277 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A motion to replace a

criminal defendant’s trial counsel admittedly creates a delicate

situation for the lawyer, the defendant[,] and the court. But

bringing in a new lawyer is not required to protect the defendant’s

rights.”); see also United States v. Franklin, 547 F.3d 726, 734 (7th

Cir. 2008) (explaining that a defense counsel’s motion to withdraw

does not “qualify as a critical stage of the proceedings for Sixth

Amendment purposes, as the proceeding is simply not the sort of

trial-like confrontation between the accused and the [S]tate that

gives an accused a Sixth Amendment right to counsel”).

¶ 42 For these reasons, the trial court did not violate Webster’s

Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a critical stage of his case.

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C. The Court Did Not Violate Webster’s
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice

¶ 43 There is no legal basis for Webster’s argument that the trial

court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by denying him counsel

of choice. “The right to the effective assistance of counsel is

constitutionally guaranteed for all criminal defendants. The right to

choice of counsel is not. It is well settled that the right to counsel of

choice does not extend to defendants for whom the court appoints

counsel.” People v. Rainey, 2023 CO 14, ¶ 19, 527 P.3d 387, 392.

Rainey firmly rested on United States Supreme Court jurisprudence

that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does not extend to

defendants who require counsel to be appointed for them.” United

States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006); Rainey, ¶ 19,

527 P.3d at 392. Similarly, indigent criminal defendants like

Webster have no right to continued representation by their initial

appointed counsel. Rainey, ¶ 2, 527 P.3d at 390.

¶ 44 Although indigent criminal defendants have no right to select

or retain their appointed counsel, they have a due process interest

in continuing to be represented by the lawyer the court initially

appointed. See id. at ¶¶ 23, 34, 527 P.3d at 393-94, 396. But that

19
interest is not implicated unless the defendant “can demonstrate

that prejudice would result from substitution with a different

court-appointed attorney.” Id. at ¶ 23, 527 P.3d at 394. A court

does not violate a defendant’s interest in continued representation

by appointed counsel in the absence of a showing of actual

prejudice. See People v. Gardenhire, 903 P.2d 1165, 1168 (Colo.

App. 1995) (holding that “[a]bsent any evidence of prejudice based

on the public defender’s replacement with another public defender,”

there is “no reversible error in the trial court’s ruling”).

¶ 45 Webster appears to contend that the substitution of counsel

prejudiced him by forcing him to choose between “his statutory

right to a speedy trial and his constitutional right to effective and

conflict-free counsel.” But Webster does not argue that the trial

court violated his statutory speedy trial right or that ADC was

ineffective. Although he asserts he was prejudiced because his new

attorneys were “unprepared, lacked adequate time to review

extensive discovery, and requested continuances,” Webster does not

point to any errors following the appointment of ADC, nor does he

identify any error during his fourteen-day jury trial.

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¶ 46 Lastly, because Webster’s counsel of choice argument in his

opening brief solely rests on the Sixth Amendment, he has waived

any argument that the court violated his due process rights by

removing initial defense counsel and appointing ADC to represent

him. See People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 90, 544 P.3d 1202, 1224

(treating contentions not raised in the opening brief as waived).

¶ 47 For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not violate

Webster’s Sixth Amendment rights by ordering ADC to represent

him in place of initial defense counsel.

D. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Webster’s
Sixth Amendment Right to Conflict-Free Counsel

¶ 48 “The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of

counsel encompasses a defendant’s right to conflict-free counsel.”

People v. Shari, 204 P.3d 453, 457 (Colo. 2009). When defense

counsel informs the court of a “probable risk of a conflict of

interest[],” a court errs if it fails “to appoint separate counsel or to

take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk [is] too remote to

warrant separate counsel.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,

484 (1978).

21
¶ 49 Initial defense counsel repeatedly advised the court that their

health and family circumstances precluded their in-person

appearance in court during the COVID-19 pandemic. Those

concerns led initial defense counsel to file the conflict motion, in

which they asked the court to allow them to withdraw as Webster’s

counsel if the court did not strike the January 19, 2022, trial date.

When initial defense counsel informed the court of their conflict of

interest, the court would have erred if it had failed to address it.

See id. But Webster contends that the court erred by addressing

their conflict of interest.

¶ 50 Further, Webster incorrectly blames the court for allegedly

creating the conflict. But initial defense counsel admitted they had

a conflict with Webster if the trial court scheduled the trial for a

date when they believed that the COVID-19 pandemic placed them

and their families at risk if they appeared in court in person.

¶ 51 In addition, continuing the January 19, 2022, trial date did

not resolve initial defense counsel’s conflict because Gonzalez and

Rubinstein could not guarantee their availability for any future trial

date. In early 2022, it was impossible to predict how long the

COVID-19 pandemic would pose health risks for vulnerable

22
individuals such as initial defense counsel. If COVID-19 positivity

rates remained high over the coming weeks and months, the trial

court would have had to repeatedly set and continue multiple trial

dates if it did not find new counsel for Webster. Such a course of

action would have been untenable, particularly given the

extraordinarily long period the case had been pending. See People

v. Alengi, 148 P.3d 154, 159 (Colo. 2006) (explaining that a

defendant cannot delay his trial indefinitely while seeking counsel).

¶ 52 Moreover, Webster does not contend that ADC had a conflict of

interest in representing him. The trial court provided Webster with

conflict-free counsel after correctly finding that initial defense

counsel had an ongoing conflict.

¶ 53 Because the trial court properly granted the alternate relief

requested in the conflict motion to protect Webster’s Sixth

Amendment rights, and Webster does not argue that the court

compelled him to proceed with conflicted counsel, the court did not

violate his right to conflict-free representation, much less create

initial defense counsel’s conflict with Webster.

III. Disposition

¶ 54 The judgment is affirmed.

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JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHUTZ concur.

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