Peo in Interest of H-SKR

25CA2046 Peo in Interest of H-SKR 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA2046
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 23JV30929
Honorable Laurie Clark, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of H-S.K.R., a Child,

and Concerning J.R.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
J. Jones and Dunn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Boulder Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.R. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationship with H-S.K.R. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Denver Department of Human Services received a report

that mother had gone to a hospital claiming to be pregnant when

she was not. Mother later returned to the hospital, stating that she

was in active labor. Hospital staff placed her on a mental health

hold and reported that she appeared disengaged from her then

three-year-old child and disinterested in the child’s basic care. The

Department removed the child and filed a petition in dependency

and neglect.

¶3 The juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and

neglected. The court adopted a treatment plan for mother requiring

her to (1) provide active, stable parenting, including through family

time; and (2) address her mental health to ensure a safe

environment for the child. The court later ordered mother to take a

hair follicle test and added a substance use component to her

treatment plan.

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¶4 The court appointed an attorney for mother during the first

hearing in the case. At the second hearing, it granted her counsel’s

request to appoint mother a guardian ad litem (GAL). While the

court did not explain why it was appointing a GAL for mother, it

later found that she had a “disability” or a “mental health

disability.”

¶5 Mother’s counsel and her GAL asked to withdraw from the

case multiple times. The court denied her counsel’s first

withdrawal request. At that point, mother’s GAL noted that mother

had directed the GAL and counsel not to contact mother in any

way. Later, both mother’s counsel and the GAL moved to withdraw

at mother’s request. The court denied the GAL’s motion. After an

advisement by the court, mother said that she no longer wished for

her attorney to withdraw.

¶6 A year and a half into the case, mother’s counsel and the GAL

again moved to withdraw, each citing a breakdown in

communication with mother. The court allowed both to withdraw.

Around the same time, the Department moved for termination.

Mother’s GAL asked the court to appoint a new GAL, but the court

instead directed mother’s former counsel to notify the office of

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respondents’ parent counsel (ORPC) of mother’s withdrawal

requests and the termination motion:

[Mother’s former counsel,] if you will just let
ORPC know that [mother] has asked for the
withdrawal of both attorney and guardian ad
litem and that there’s a . . . motion for
termination pending. So if you’ll at least put
them on notice, I’d appreciate that. . . .

I know everybody would like to help [mother]
the best they can, and [mother] is struggling to
accept that help, but if there is a way that
ORPC can engage her indirectly, that would be
great, and I’d be happy to appoint based on
their recommendation. . . .

I’m not going to appoint another guardian ad
litem at this point because I’m not clear that
that’s what [mother] wants or will engage with,
and I think I [will] just set that person up for
failure unless ORPC can engage her.

¶7 Over a year into the case, mother completed a psychological

evaluation. The evaluator opined that mother experienced “multiple

diagnoses including paranoia, somatic symptoms, and possibly a

history of substance use that interfere with daily functioning” and

noted it was highly likely she met the diagnostic criteria for post-

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The evaluator wished to meet

with mother to explain the evaluation but, after receiving

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“threatening communication” from her, was willing to do so only if

her counsel “and/or” someone with the Department were present.

¶8 Around this time, the court adopted a “contact plan” between

the Department and mother because of threatening statements

mother had made to caseworkers. The plan provided that all

parties were expected to correspond by email, with mother’s counsel

copied, and that all in-person meetings would occur inside the

courthouse.

¶9 Two months after mother’s counsel withdrew, the court

appointed her new counsel and later granted her new attorney’s

request to continue the termination hearing. The Department filed

an amended termination motion.

¶ 10 Nearly two years after the case was opened, the court held a

termination hearing at which mother was represented. After the

hearing, the court noted that, during the brief period mother lacked

counsel, it was “because she insisted on . . . represent[ing] herself.”

In a written ruling, the court terminated mother’s parent-child legal

relationship with the child.

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II. Termination Criteria

¶ 11 A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights if it

finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment

plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit;

and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

III. Statutory Right to Counsel

¶ 12 Mother contends that the juvenile court violated her statutory

right to counsel by failing to (1) “timely appoint” a second attorney

and (2) advise her of her right to counsel following the filing of the

first termination motion.

¶ 13 Though mother concedes that this issue is unpreserved, she

urges that we review her claim to avoid a miscarriage of justice. See

People in Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 14. But the miscarriage

of justice exception has a high bar and a narrow scope, applying

only to limited situations in which an error by the juvenile court,

not otherwise properly preserved for appeal, results in a grossly

unfair outcome for the parent. See People in Interest of M.B., 2020

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COA 13, ¶¶ 23-24. Mother’s argument does not establish that the

termination judgment created such a result.

¶ 14 To start, mother waived her statutory right to counsel during

the brief period when she was without counsel. See § 19-3-202(1),

C.R.S. 2025 (an indigent parent has a right to court-appointed

counsel at every stage of the dependency and neglect proceedings);

see also People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶¶ 65-70 (a parent’s

statutory right to counsel in dependency proceedings is waivable;

the waiver can be express or implied and must only be voluntary,

not knowing or intelligent). The record supports the court’s finding

that mother wished to be self-represented during this period. And

mother — who does not address waiver — does not assert that any

waiver was involuntary. See B.H., ¶¶ 1, 4, 74 (holding that a

parent, who had struggled with mental health issues, voluntarily

waived his right to counsel). Nor did mother request new counsel

during this period. See People in Interest of Z.P., 167 P.3d 211, 213

(Colo. App. 2007) (to invoke the right to counsel, a parent must

timely request an attorney be appointed; failure to do so constitutes

a waiver of the right).

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¶ 15 Based on the foregoing, the court was not required to sua

sponte appoint mother counsel during this period, contrary to

mother’s assertion. See id.; People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d

1132, 1133 (Colo. App. 1998). For the same reason, even assuming

that mother was not advised of her right to counsel after the first

termination motion was filed, any failure to advise her at that point

did not, contrary to mother’s contention, violate her statutory right

to counsel. See § 19-3-602(2), C.R.S. 2025 (after a motion for

termination is filed, the parent shall be advised of the right to

counsel if not already represented). To the extent she otherwise

argues that any lack of advisement at this juncture was error, she

fails to demonstrate how the outcome of the case would have been

different because of it. Further, it is undisputed that mother was

represented at the termination hearing, which took place over three

months after new counsel was appointed.

¶ 16 Thus, we are unpersuaded that the lack of appointed counsel

for a two-month period resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

IV. Appointment of a Second GAL

¶ 17 Mother next asserts that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by not appointing her a second GAL after the first GAL

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withdrew. She concedes that this issue is unpreserved but again

asks us to address it under the miscarriage of justice exception.

But even assuming that this issue is properly before us, we discern

no reversible error.

¶ 18 A juvenile court may appoint a GAL for a parent who has a

behavioral or mental health disorder or an intellectual or

developmental disability. § 19-1-111(2)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see People

in Interest of T.M.S., 2019 COA 136, ¶ 5. The appointment of a GAL

for a parent is within the court’s discretion. T.M.S., ¶¶ 6, 10.

¶ 19 Even if we assume, based on the record, that the court should

have appointed a second GAL for mother, we conclude that any

error was harmless. See C.A.R. 35(c); People in Interest of R.J.,

2019 COA 109, ¶ 22 (an error or defect only requires reversal if it

affects a substantial right, meaning that it can be said with fair

assurance that the error or defect substantially influenced the

case’s outcome or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself); see

also People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257, 262 (Colo. App. 2007)

(even for a due process claim, a parent may not obtain relief absent

a showing of harm or prejudice).

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¶ 20 Mother contends that she was prejudiced because, during the

two months she was without a GAL or an attorney, she had no

“legal team” to (1) accompany her to a meeting to debrief with the

psychological evaluator; or (2) help her communicate with the

Department while the contact plan was in place. She also asserts

that concerns about her mental health had “intensified” during this

period.

¶ 21 However, mother’s assertion of prejudice based on these

claims is speculative. See R.J., ¶ 22. Mother never discussed the

evaluator’s treatment recommendations with the case worker. Nor

did she discuss the evaluator’s treatment recommendations with

the caseworker. Second, she does not explain how a GAL’s

assistance in corresponding with the Department during this period

would have altered the case’s outcome. And, as the court found,

mother “struggle[ed] to accept” help from the professionals in the

case. Third, though the caseworker’s concerns about mother’s

mental health had “intensified” during the case, mother concedes

that these concerns persisted throughout the entire case and were a

basis for the Department’s involvement.

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¶ 22 More generally, mother does not explain how the outcome of

the proceeding changed because she lacked a GAL for five months

of a roughly two-year case. See id.

¶ 23 In addition, the evidence introduced in support of termination

was overwhelming, and mother does not challenge its sufficiency.

Cf. B.H., ¶ 55 (noting that a due process claim about the

appointment of counsel fails where the “risk of an erroneous result

at his termination hearing was low”). The child was diagnosed with

autism spectrum disorder and had “very specific high needs.”

Mother participated in only one or two visits during the first year of

the case, consistently exercised family time during only a five-

month period, and attended no visits during the final six months of

the case. The caseworker opined that mother did not know or

understand the child’s “very significant” needs and appeared to

have lapses with reality that posed a risk to meeting those needs.

¶ 24 Based on the evidence, the court found that mother was unfit

and unable to provide nurturing and safe parenting, which was

unlikely to change within a reasonable period, in part, because she

made no progress toward reunification. See § 19-3-604(c)(I)(B) (in

cases where the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions

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apply, such as here, the court shall not find that a parent

reasonably complied with their treatment plan where the parent is

unable to provide nurturing and safe parenting). And, while it

found that mother’s consistent engagement was crucial based on

the child’s tender age and diagnosis, mother last attended parenting

time six months before the termination hearing. See § 19-3-

604(c)(I)(A) (in EPP cases, the court shall not find reasonable

treatment plan compliance when the parent has not attended family

time as set forth in the treatment plan).

¶ 25 Thus, even assuming that the court should have appointed

mother a second GAL, we discern no reversible error.1

V. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 26 Last, mother contends that the juvenile court erred by

concluding that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate her.

1 Mother does not develop an argument that the absence of a GAL

during the termination hearing itself prejudiced her or violated her
due process rights. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530,
531 (Colo. App. 2004) (declining to address an issue presented
without supporting facts or specific argument).

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A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 27 To determine whether a parent is unfit, the juvenile court

must consider whether the department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family. See §§ 19-3-

100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” means

the “exercise of diligence and care” for children who are in out-of-

home placement. § 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025. Services provided

in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S. 2025, satisfy the

reasonable efforts standard. § 19-1-103(114).

¶ 28 Among other services, section 19-3-208 requires screenings,

assessments, and individual case plans for the provision of services;

referral services to available public and private assistance

resources; and family time services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Other

services, such as diagnostic and mental health services, must be

provided if determined “necessary and appropriate” and the state

has sufficient funding for them. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

¶ 29 A juvenile court should holistically measure whether a

department made reasonable efforts. See People in Interest of E.D.,

2025 COA 11, ¶ 11. And it may consider a parent’s unwillingness

to participate in treatment in determining this question. Id. at ¶ 12.

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¶ 30 Whether a department satisfied its reasonable efforts

obligation is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of

A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. We review the court’s factual findings

for clear error but review de novo its legal determination as to

whether the department satisfied its obligation. Id.

B. Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)

¶ 31 Mother argues that the Department’s efforts were deficient

because it did not make reasonable accommodations for her as

required by the ADA. We are not persuaded.

¶ 32 Services provided under section 19-3-208 must comply with

the ADA. See § 19-3-208(2)(g). The ADA requires a public entity,

such as a county department of human services, to make

reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals with

disabilities. See People in Interest of C.Z., 2015 COA 87, ¶¶ 11-12.

A parent may be a qualified individual with a disability if the parent

has a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).

¶ 33 Whether a parent is a qualified individual with a disability

under the ADA requires a case-by-case determination. People in

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Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 21. Before a department can be

required to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA, it

must know that the individual has a qualifying disability, either

because that disability is obvious or because someone has informed

it of the disability. Id. at ¶ 22. Thus, while a department must

provide appropriate screening and assessments of a parent, the

parent is responsible for disclosing information regarding their

disability. Id. at ¶ 21. And a parent should also identify any

modifications that they believe are necessary to accommodate their

disability. Id.

¶ 34 For the first time on appeal, mother argues that the

Department did not provide accommodations under the ADA. She

concedes that she did not raise the ADA’s applicability in the

juvenile court but asserts that the Department was “on notice” that

she had qualifying “mental health disabilities” for purposes of the

ADA.

¶ 35 In light of the juvenile court’s finding that mother had a

mental health disability, we assume that she had an ADA-

cognizable mental health disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A);

see also S.K., ¶ 20 (noting that a mental impairment for the

14
purposes of the ADA includes any mental or psychological disorder

such as an “emotional or mental illness” (citation modified)).

¶ 36 But the only specific unprovided accommodation that mother

raises is the Department’s alleged failure to ensure that her family

time providers were trained “to work with” mother’s mental health

diagnoses. However, she did not request this accommodation in the

juvenile court. See S.K., ¶ 21. Thus, the court was unable to

determine whether this was a reasonable accommodation. See id.

at ¶ 35.2

¶ 37 Mother also asserts that she reported she had various health

conditions during the case, such as anxiety, PTSD, a traumatic

brain injury, a dislocated shoulder, allergies, damaged kidneys, and

an issue with her jaw. But she does not argue that these varying

issues are qualifying disabilities under the ADA, nor did she to the

2 To the extent that mother asserts that her statement to the court

— that her request for a support person during family time was not
being “accommodated” — amounted to a request for a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA, we disagree. Mother did not make
this comment within the context of the ADA or her mental health
disability. Nor did mother, who was represented by counsel at the
time of the comment, move for a support person to accommodate a
disclosed disability. See People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36,
¶ 21.

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juvenile court. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); S.K., ¶¶ 21-22. Thus,

the juvenile court did not have an opportunity to determine whether

any of these reported conditions were ADA-cognizable disabilities.

See S.K., ¶ 21 n.2 (recognizing that whether a parent is a qualified

individual with a disability under the ADA requires a fact-specific

determination that a juvenile court must resolve); see also People in

Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 21, n.1 (noting that the ADA is

“inherently fact-dependent” and that an appellate court does not

make factual determinations).

¶ 38 Thus, we reject mother’s argument that the Department failed

to provide reasonable accommodations under the ADA.

C. Remaining Contentions

¶ 39 As best we can tell, mother also asserts that the Department

made deficient efforts with respect to family time and mental health

services. We disagree.

¶ 40 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother, including efforts to

arrange family time, provide referrals, and identify appropriate

services. But it found that mother’s lack of engagement left the

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Department unable to effectuate its goal of rehabilitating mother

such that she may safely parent. See E.D., ¶ 12.

¶ 41 The record amply supports the court’s findings. The

Department referred mother for family time, but she scarcely

attended visits outside of a five-month stretch of consistent

participation. See id. At one point, mother was discharged from a

visitation agency because she missed too many visits; while mother

asserted that she was on bedrest, she did not provide a doctor’s

note as the agency had requested. After her last visit, the

caseworker continued monthly attempts to contact mother but did

not receive a response from her about participating in family time.

¶ 42 The Department attempted to pursue the psychological

evaluator’s recommendations, but mother’s unwillingness to engage

hindered those efforts. See id. The evaluator recommended (1)

treatment modalities, such as cognitive behavioral therapy; (2)

focus areas for treatment; (3) reevaluation of mother’s psychotropic

medications; and (4) obtaining more information to further evaluate

mother’s diagnoses. But mother did not discuss the evaluator’s

recommendations with the caseworker, complete a hair follicle test

to determine if she was using substances, or complete all releases

17
requested to communicate with her providers. Instead, according to

the caseworker, mother was “very passionate” about not engaging in

mental health services and did not report any participation in

treatment.

¶ 43 Based on the foregoing, we will not disturb the court’s

determination that the Department made reasonable efforts. See

id.; A.S.L., ¶ 15.

VI. Disposition

¶ 44 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE DUNN concur.

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