Peo v. Breackenridge

23CA2086 Peo v Breackenridge 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA2086
City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR4122
Honorable A. Bruce Jones, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Manuel Breackenridge,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES
Lum and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Alejandro Sorg Gonzalez, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Dilyn K. Myers, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Manuel Breackenridge, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of felony

menacing. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction and that the district court erred by failing to

suppress his incriminating statements. We disagree with both

contentions and therefore affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Breackenridge and J.B. leased a commercial kitchen to

prepare items for their respective food businesses. The cleanliness

of the kitchen had been a sore point before the underlying incident.

¶3 On the day in question, J.B. and her husband — the victim —

arrived at the kitchen to find it in a state of disarray. J.B. called

Breackenridge to ask him to come in and clean up the mess, and

Breackenridge apologized and said he would be in later. J.B. and

the victim put some things back in order and began to work in the

kitchen.

¶4 When Breackenridge arrived, J.B. and the victim greeted him,

but Breackenridge expressed hostility at the state of the kitchen

and accused them of making the mess. A verbal altercation ensued

between Breackenridge and the victim. Eventually, Breackenridge

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removed a gun from its holster, racked the gun to load a bullet in

the chamber, put the gun back in his pocket, and walked toward

the victim and said, “I have a concealed carry. Don’t fuck with me.”

¶5 The People charged Breackenridge with felony menacing. At

trial, Breackenridge asserted defense theories of general denial and

self-defense. The jury found him guilty as charged, and the district

court sentenced him to two years of probation.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶6 Breackenridge argues that the prosecution failed to present

sufficient evidence to prove that (1) he made a threat or physical

action that placed the victim in fear of serious bodily injury; or (2) if

such threat or physical action occurred, the victim was in fear of

imminent serious bodily injury. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 To satisfy due process, the prosecution is required to prove all

elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Montez v. People,

2012 CO 6, ¶ 21 (first citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; and then

citing Colo. Const. art. II, § 25). A person commits the crime of

menacing “if, by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly

places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent

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serious bodily injury.” § 18-3-206, C.R.S. 2025. At the relevant

time, menacing was a class 3 misdemeanor but was elevated to a

felony offense if committed

(a) By the use of a deadly weapon or any article
used or fashioned in a manner to cause a
person to reasonably believe that the article is
a deadly weapon; or

(b) By the person representing verbally or
otherwise that he or she is armed with a
deadly weapon.

§ 18-3-206(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. 2021.

¶8 “In determining whether the defendant knowingly placed or

attempted to place another person in fear of imminent serious

bodily injury, the proper focus is on the intent and conduct of the

actor, not of the victim.” People v. Shawn, 107 P.3d 1033, 1035

(Colo. App. 2004). “The prosecution need only prove the defendant

was aware that his or her conduct was practically certain to cause

fear.” Id.

¶9 We review sufficiency of the evidence claims de novo to

determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient in both

quality and quantity to sustain a conviction. McBride v. People,

2022 CO 30, ¶ 38; People v. Roggow, 2013 CO 70, ¶ 13. “In so

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doing, we must determine whether the relevant evidence, when

viewed as a whole in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is

sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the

defendant is guilty of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Roggow, ¶ 13. “A verdict cannot rest on guessing, speculation,

conjecture, or a mere modicum of relevant evidence.” McBride, ¶

38.

¶ 10 “An appellate court may not serve as a thirteenth juror and

consider whether it might have reached a different conclusion than

the jury.” People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 33. Instead, we afford

the prosecution the benefit of every reasonable inference that might

fairly be drawn from the evidence, and, where reasonable minds

could differ, deem the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Thomas v. People, 2021 CO 84, ¶ 10; People v. Alemayehu, 2021

COA 69, ¶ 18.

¶ 11 “It is the fact finder’s role to weigh the credibility of witnesses,

to determine the weight to give all parts of the evidence, and to

resolve conflicts, inconsistencies, and disputes in the evidence.”

People v. Poe, 2012 COA 166, ¶ 14. Therefore, we won’t disturb

jury determinations on issues of credibility and weight “unless the

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evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” People v. Padilla, 113 P.3d 1260, 1261 (Colo.

App. 2005).

¶ 12 “Where there is a video recording of the relevant events,

however, we are in the same position as the jury to determine

whether the video supports or contradicts a witness’ testimony.”

People v. Liebler, 2022 COA 21, ¶ 21. “That is because the nature

of the evidence presented in the video does not depend on an

evaluation of credibility or a weighing of disputed facts; rather, it

presents indisputable visual evidence . . . .” Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 13 At trial, the prosecution introduced a recording from the

kitchen’s surveillance camera, which showed the following events.

After Breackenridge and the victim engaged in a verbal argument,

Breakenridge removed a gun from its holster and tossed the holster

onto a metal table, where it clattered noisily. Breackenridge then

turned his body partly away from the victim and racked the gun to

load a bullet in its chamber. Breackenridge’s body wasn’t

positioned such that it completely blocked the gun from view, and

the recognizable sound of a gun being racked could be heard

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throughout the kitchen. Breackenridge returned the unholstered

gun to his pocket and collected the holster. While walking toward,

and looking at, the victim, Breackenridge said that he had a gun

and told the victim to not “fuck with me.”

¶ 14 The victim testified that, after he had returned to his

workstation in the kitchen, he saw Breackenridge pull a gun out of

his pocket and that he saw and heard him rack the gun. He said

that Breackenridge then walked toward him and told him that he

had a gun and not to fuck with him.

¶ 15 The victim testified that Breackenridge’s actions and words

were very threatening and that “the intention [he] got was

[Breackenridge] wanted to murder [him] right then.” The victim

said that it was “a pretty disturbing thing when someone does that

to you” and that he believed Breackenridge “was threatening to kill

[him].” The victim was “[v]ery scared, very worried,” and

“frightened,” and he said that the experience “was one of the more

fearful times in [his] life.”

¶ 16 A recording from a police body camera that captured an

interview of the victim on the day of the incident was admitted into

evidence. The victim’s recorded statements to the police regarding

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the underlying incident were generally consistent with his trial

testimony.

¶ 17 J.B. testified that she saw Breackenridge take a gun out of his

pocket and heard him rack it. She said that Breackenridge pulled

the gun out during “a little bit of a lull in the argument” when she

and the victim had gone “back to work, and [she] was trying to

focus on that and stay out of the way and try to deescalate the

situation as much as possible.” J.B. felt scared when she saw the

gun. Breackenridge’s cousin also testified that she saw

Breackenridge pull out a gun and yell at the victim when leaving

the kitchen.

¶ 18 Last, the prosecution introduced a recording from a police

body camera that showed Breackenridge being detained after the

incident. Breackenridge falsely told the officers that he didn’t pull

out his gun during the confrontation with the victim.

¶ 19 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution and affording the prosecution the benefit of every

reasonable inference that may be drawn therefrom, we conclude

that it was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that, by threat or physical action, Breackenridge

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placed or attempted to place the victim in fear of imminent serious

bodily injury. See People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 672 (Colo. App.

2001) (“If the prosecution presents evidence from which the trier of

fact may properly infer the elements of the crime, the evidence is

sufficient to sustain the conviction.”); People v. Perez, 2016 CO 12,

¶ 31 (In a sufficiency of the evidence inquiry, “[a] court must not

invade the province of the jury by second-guessing its conclusion

when the record supports the jury’s findings.”).

¶ 20 The surveillance footage shows (1) within the sight and earshot

of the victim, Breackenridge removing a gun from its holster and

racking the gun to put a bullet in the chamber; (2) Breckenridge

walking toward the victim while possessing the unholstered, racked

gun; and (3) Breackenridge telling the victim that he had a

concealed weapon and not to fuck with him. See Shawn, 107 P.3d

at 1035; see also People v. Hines, 780 P.2d 556, 558-59 (Colo.

1989) (the making of a conditional or contingent threat while

holding a weapon in the presence of another was sufficient to

constitute felony menacing); People v. Lopez, 2015 COA 45, ¶¶ 11-

15 (evidence was sufficient to support a menacing conviction where

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the defendant told the victim officer he had a knife, and he lifted up

his shirt).

¶ 21 The police body camera footage also recorded Breackenridge’s

false statement to the police that he didn’t pull out his gun. See

People v. Summitt, 132 P.3d 320, 324 (Colo. 2006) (“Proof that after

the charged crime the accused acted in ways apparently calculated

to avoid detection, arrest, prosecution, or conviction is often

relevant in suggesting a guilty mind.” (quoting 1 Christopher B.

Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 85, at 420

(1994))); see also People v. Phillips, 219 P.3d 798, 800 (Colo. App.

2009) (“An actor’s state of mind is normally not subject to direct

proof and must be inferred from his or her actions and the

circumstances surrounding the occurrence.”); People v. Miralda,

981 P.2d 676, 679 (Colo. App. 1999) (“Intent may . . . be established

from circumstantial evidence and from the inferences that may

reasonably be drawn from those circumstances.”).

¶ 22 Breackenridge argues, in part, that the evidence instead

supports a finding that he didn’t commit felony menacing because

he was acting in self-defense. But, “[w]hen self-defense is an

affirmative defense, the defendant generally admits the commission

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of the elements of the charged act, but seeks to justify the act.”

Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, ¶ 39. Thus, a self-defense theory

would undermine his argument that the evidence was insufficient to

prove that he committed the substantive elements of felony

menacing.

¶ 23 Moreover, by finding Breackenridge guilty, the jury necessarily

determined that the prosecution had disproved his self-defense

theory beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Mosely, 2021 CO

41, ¶ 21 (by finding the defendant guilty of the charged offense, the

jury necessarily found that the prosecution had proved the

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt); see also

Roberts v. People, 2017 CO 76, ¶ 22 (when the evidence raises the

issue of an affirmative defense, the affirmative defense becomes an

additional element of the charged offense, which the prosecution

must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt). Breackenridge doesn’t

assert that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s

finding on that element.

III. Motion to Suppress

¶ 24 Breackenridge next contends that the district court reversibly

erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress his incriminating

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statements, and by consequently allowing their admission at trial,

because the statements were impermissibly elicited while he was in

custody and subject to interrogation in violation of his

constitutional rights and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

We disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 25 To protect a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination, Miranda prohibits the prosecution from introducing

statements procured by custodial interrogation unless police

officers have first advised the defendant of their rights. Marko v.

People, 2018 CO 97, ¶ 35; People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453, 462

(Colo. 2002). Miranda protections apply only if a defendant is

subject to both custody and interrogation. Marko, ¶ 35; Mumford v.

People, 2012 CO 2, ¶ 12.

¶ 26 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes “whenever his

freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal

arrest.” People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571 (Colo. 2002).

¶ 27 “A suspect is interrogated, for purposes of determining

whether Miranda warnings are required, whenever the suspect ‘is

subjected to either express questioning or its functional

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equivalent.’” People v. Madrid, 179 P.3d 1010, 1014 (Colo. 2008)

(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)). In

other words, “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only

to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part

of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit

an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at

301. We consider the totality of the circumstances when

determining whether an officer interrogated a suspect. People v.

Bonilla-Barraza, 209 P.3d 1090, 1094 (Colo. 2009).

¶ 28 Typically, suppression cases involve a mixed question of fact

and law. Id. We defer to a court’s factual findings if competent

evidence in the record supports them, and we review the court’s

legal conclusions de novo. Id. “Whether an individual has been

subjected to custodial interrogation in violation of Miranda is a

question of law that we review de novo.” People v. Klinck, 259 P.3d

489, 493 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 29 But, “where the statements sought to be suppressed are

audio- and video-recorded, and there are no disputed facts outside

the recording controlling the issue of suppression, we are in a

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similar position as the trial court to determine whether the

statements should be suppressed.” Madrid, 179 P.3d at 1014.

“Thus, we may undertake an independent review of the audio or

video recording to determine whether the statements were properly

suppressed in light of the controlling law.” People v. Kutlak, 2016

CO 1, ¶ 13.

¶ 30 Because Breackenridge preserved this issue, we review any

error in the court’s denial of his motion to suppress his

incriminating statements for constitutional harmless error.

Niemeyer v. People, 2024 CO 58, ¶¶ 20, 50; Hagos v. People, 2012

CO 63, ¶ 11. Under this standard, we reverse if there is a

reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the

conviction. Niemeyer, ¶¶ 20, 50; Hagos, ¶ 11.

B. Additional Facts

¶ 31 At a motions hearing, a police corporal testified that he

responded to the victim’s report that a gun had been involved in a

dispute between the victim and Breackenridge. Officers found

Breackenridge in his car and told him to get out of the vehicle and

to walk backwards toward them. The corporal approached

Breackenridge and placed him in handcuffs. The corporal testified

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that, at that time, Breackenridge was just being detained, rather

than placed under arrest, because the corporal didn’t have enough

information to determine whether or not the victim’s report was

“unfounded” and to determine what crime, if any, had been

committed.

¶ 32 Police body camera footage showed that, after Breackenridge

was handcuffed, an officer told the corporal that Breackenridge had

a gun in his front pocket. In response, Breackenridge said, “Yeah, I

have a concealed.” The corporal replied, “Yup, and you can’t pull it

out at work.” Breackenridge said, “I didn’t pull it out. I just said I

had a concealed. The guy was getting in my face.”

¶ 33 While the corporal and the officer were later discussing

whether Breackenridge committed menacing or flourishing,

Breackenridge said, “But I don’t understand what I did wrong.” The

corporal said, “You can’t pull a gun out.” Breackenridge replied, “I

didn’t pull it out on him.” The corporal explained that the victim

reported that Breackenridge had pulled a gun on him and that, if

Breackenridge wanted to provide his side of the story, he could do

so after he had received a Miranda advisement.

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¶ 34 The corporal testified that he didn’t anticipate a response to

his comments and wasn’t attempting to elicit statements from

Breackenridge. He clarified, “That’s why I made [it] a statement and

not a question.” The corporal explained that he has found that he

can de-escalate a situation by providing individuals with the

reasons for why the police are contacting them.

¶ 35 The district court denied Breackenridge’s motion to suppress

his incriminating statements, finding that he wasn’t in custody and

that the statements were voluntarily given, and not the result of

interrogation. The prosecution introduced the body camera footage

at trial and played the recording during closing argument.

C. Analysis

¶ 36 Assuming, without deciding, that Breackenridge was in

custody, we conclude that he wasn’t subject to an interrogation

when he made the incriminating statements. Because neither party

argues that the corporal engaged in express questioning, we look to

whether his exchange with Breackenridge constituted the functional

equivalent of questioning.

¶ 37 First, we aren’t convinced that the corporal’s comment that

Breackenridge wasn’t allowed to pull out his weapon, made in

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response to Breackenridge’s statement that he had a concealed

weapon, could be perceived as an interrogation. See Bonilla-

Barraza, 209 P.3d at 1094 (The totality of the circumstances

inquiry “focuses on whether the officer reasonably should have

known that the officer’s words or actions would cause the suspect

to perceive that he or she was being interrogated.”); see also

Madrid, 179 P.3d at 1015 (The defendant’s incriminating

statements weren’t the product of an interrogation where the

defendant initiated the exchange with the detective and the

detective’s statements “appear to be an explanation of why [the

defendant] was being interviewed.”).

¶ 38 And we aren’t persuaded that the corporal should have known

that his offhand comment was reasonably likely to elicit

Breackenridge’s statement that he hadn’t pulled out his concealed

weapon. See Bonilla-Barraza, 209 P.3d at 1094 (The totality of the

circumstances inquiry also focuses on whether the officer’s words

or actions “were calculated to elicit incriminating statements.”); see

also Innis, 446 U.S. at 294-95, 303 (“[W]e cannot say that the

officers should have known that it was reasonably likely that [the

defendant] would . . . respond” to their stated concern that children

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might find a missing gun because “the entire conversation appears

to have consisted of no more than a few off hand remarks,” “[t]his

[wa]s not a case where the police carried on a lengthy harangue in

the presence of the suspect,” and “the record [does not] support the

[defendant’s] contention that, under the circumstances, the officers’

comments were particularly ‘evocative.’”); cf. People v. Rivas, 13

P.3d 315, 319 (Colo. 2000) (“A suspect’s inculpatory statement is

not considered to be the product of custodial interrogation merely

because it is made after he has been told the charges against

him.”).

¶ 39 Indeed, the officer explained that he provided Breakenridge

with the reason for his detention to de-escalate the situation. See

Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7 (while the interrogation inquiry primarily

focuses on the perceptions of the suspect, an officer’s intent does

have relevance as to whether the officer should have known that

their words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an

incriminating response).

¶ 40 Finally, we note that, when Breakenridge later expressed

confusion as to what he had done wrong, the corporal again told

him that he wasn’t allowed to pull out his gun, and Breakenridge

17
repeated the same incriminating statement that he hadn’t done so.

See Rivas, 13 P.3d at 319-20 (noting that “an officer’s direct

response to a question initiated by a suspect generally [does not]

constitute interrogation, even though the suspect is in custody and

has already invoked his right to counsel,” and holding that the

defendant wasn’t interrogated because “truthfully responding to the

defendant’s question [as to what charges were being filed] cannot be

objectively characterized as a ploy to evoke an incriminating

response”).

¶ 41 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court didn’t err by

denying Breackenridge’s motion to suppress his incriminating

statements because he wasn’t subject to the functional equivalent

of questioning at the time he made the statements. See People v.

Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 241 (Colo. 1999) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment

and Miranda do not prohibit the evidentiary use of volunteered,

non-compelled statements made by a suspect in the absence of

counsel.”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 42 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE LUM and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

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