Peo v. Marceleno

24CA0212 Peo v Marceleno 05-07-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0212
Weld County District Court No. 22CR293
Honorable Timothy Kerns, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Danny Marceleno,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Grove and Schock, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced May 7, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Sonia Raichur Russo, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Patrick R. Henson, Alternate Defense Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr, Alternate
Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Danny Marceleno appeals the judgment of conviction entered

after a jury found him guilty of vehicular eluding, criminal mischief,

and two counts of reckless endangerment. He contends the district

court erred by denying his motion to suppress, arguing that his

Miranda waiver was invalid and his subsequent statements were

involuntary. We disagree and affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Early one morning, while running license plates in a truck

stop parking lot in search of stolen vehicles, Deputy Justin

Napolitano and Deputy Steven Fay found Marceleno and his

girlfriend asleep inside a car that had been reported stolen, with

narcotics strewn across the front seats. Before attempting to arrest

Marceleno, the deputies positioned their patrol cars at the front and

rear of the stolen car to block any escape route. The entire

interaction between the deputies and Marceleno was captured on

body camera footage.

¶3 The deputies then approached from the driver’s side and

ordered the couple to exit the vehicle. Upon waking, Marceleno

maneuvered the car through a narrow gap near the front patrol

car — striking two vehicles and nearly hitting both deputies — and

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sped out of the parking lot. A high-speed chase ensued for over ten

minutes. The pursuit ended when Marceleno crashed through a

community gate blocking his path.

¶4 Ten minutes later, the deputies detained Marceleno in the

back of a patrol car. When Deputy Napolitano first approached

Marceleno, he asked whether Marceleno was okay, and Marceleno

responded, “Yeah.” Asked whether he needed an ambulance,

Marceleno, with his eyes closed, replied, “No, I’m good.” He stated

that he had not taken more opioids than usual and had not hit his

head, but Deputy Napolitano called for emergency medical services

anyway.

¶5 Deputy Napolitano then introduced himself and asked for

basic identifying information. Despite his eyes being intermittently

closed, Marceleno responded accurately and corrected Deputy

Napolitano when he misspelled Marceleno’s name. After confirming

that Marceleno had general familiarity with Miranda rights, Deputy

Napolitano read him those rights, pausing after each one to ask

whether Marceleno understood. Marceleno confirmed that he

understood each right. Deputy Napolitano then asked if Marceleno,

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understanding these rights, still wanted to talk to him. Marceleno

agreed, saying, “Yeah, it don’t matter to me, man.”

¶6 After the Miranda waiver, Deputy Napolitano told Marceleno he

had nearly run him over. Marceleno apologized — attributing his

actions to being startled — and then apologized again unprompted.

Marceleno then admitted that he had outstanding arrest warrants,

was on parole, and had fentanyl in the car for personal use. When

the paramedics arrived, Deputy Napolitano paused the interview to

allow them to examine Marceleno.

¶7 After paramedics examined Marceleno, concluding, “[He’s] with

it and knows where he’s at and what’s going on,” Deputy Napolitano

moved him to a second patrol car. Before resuming the interview,

Deputy Napolitano again advised Marceleno of his rights and

confirmed his continued willingness to speak. Marceleno then

stated that he had purchased the car from a man named Chico for

$200 — with a promise that Chico would deliver the title at a later

date — and that he and his girlfriend had smoked fentanyl before

the crash.

¶8 About an hour after the chase ended, Deputy Napolitano

asked again if Marceleno was okay because he appeared drowsy.

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Marceleno said he was more tired than he was high, rating his level

of intoxication as a five out of ten. He apologized twice more to

Deputy Napolitano, expressed regret for endangering his girlfriend,

and insisted that neither he nor his girlfriend was a “big-time drug

dealer.” He later declined, however, to provide information about

Chico or his opioid dealer. Throughout the questioning, Deputy

Napolitano remained cordial and thanked Marceleno for his

cooperation.

¶9 After the interview, Marceleno was transported to the hospital

for a blood draw and then to jail for booking. During booking,

Marceleno told the jail staff that he had ingested fifteen fentanyl

pills that evening — some before the chase and some immediately

before his arrest — though his typical daily intake was sixty pills.

Concerned, the jail medical staff administered Narcan and sent

Marceleno back to the hospital.

¶ 10 Marceleno was charged with (1) vehicular eluding; (2) criminal

mischief; (3) attempted second degree murder of Deputies Fay and

Napolitano; (4) attempted first degree assault of Deputies Fay and

Napolitano; (5) four crime-of-violence sentence enhancers;

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(6) aggravated motor vehicle theft; and (7) driving under the

influence (DUI).1

¶ 11 Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress Marceleno’s

statements to the deputies. At the suppression hearing, the defense

toxicology expert testified that Marceleno’s blood draw — which

revealed fentanyl, amphetamine, and methamphetamine —

indicated he was “significantly intoxicated” at the time of his

statements, despite some “tolerance” to fentanyl. The expert added

that Marceleno could appear coherent to a layperson by answering

basic questions while still being “mentally gone.”

¶ 12 Notwithstanding this expert testimony, the district court

denied the motion to suppress in a detailed written order after

conducting a comprehensive review of the body camera footage. At

trial, the prosecution introduced portions of the interrogation

video — specifically, Marceleno’s statements from the first and

second patrol cars, with all references to his warrants and parole

excluded. The jury acquitted Marceleno of aggravated motor vehicle

theft but convicted him of (1) vehicular eluding; (2) criminal

1 The prosecution dismissed the DUI charge before trial.

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mischief; and (3) reckless endangerment — the lesser included

offense of attempted second degree murder and attempted first

degree assault.

¶ 13 Marceleno now appeals.

II. Analysis

¶ 14 Marceleno contends that the district court reversibly erred by

denying his motion to suppress because his intoxication rendered

(1) his Miranda waiver invalid and (2) his subsequent statements

involuntary. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 15 Our review of the district court’s suppression order “presents a

mixed question of fact and law.” People v. Thompson, 2021 CO 15,

¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for clear error,

accepting them if they are “supported by competent evidence, but

we assess the legal significance of the facts de novo.” Id. (citation

omitted).

¶ 16 Additionally, when the challenged interview is video recorded

and there are no relevant disputed facts outside of the recording,

“we are in essentially the same position as the trial court to

determine the question of suppression.” People v. Taylor, 2018 CO

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35, ¶ 7. “Thus, we may undertake an independent review of the

recording to determine whether the evidence was properly

suppressed in light of the controlling law.” Id.

B. Validity of Miranda Waiver

¶ 17 We first address Marceleno’s contention that his Miranda

waiver was invalid because his “intoxication rendered him unable to

make a voluntary,2 knowing, and intelligent waiver.”

1. Applicable Law

¶ 18 The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee

individuals the right against self-incrimination. U.S. Const.

amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. To safeguard this right,

officers must advise a defendant of his constitutional rights to

remain silent and to request an attorney before conducting a

2 Although Marceleno argues that he did not voluntarily waive his

Miranda rights, he does not develop this argument or cite any legal
authority. See People v. Cuellar, 2023 COA 20, ¶ 44 (noting that
undeveloped arguments are not addressed). In any event,
self-induced intoxication does not render a Miranda waiver
involuntary. See People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1066 (Colo. 2004)
(explaining that because voluntariness is implicated only when
government conduct causes the intoxication, if the suspect causes
his own intoxication, courts simply examine whether the waiver was
knowing and intelligent). We therefore address only whether
Marceleno’s waiver was knowing and intelligent.

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custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444

(1966). A defendant may waive these rights, but a valid waiver

must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. People v. Thames,

2015 CO 18, ¶ 12. The burden falls on the prosecution to establish

the validity of the Miranda waiver by a preponderance of the

evidence. People v. Knedler, 2014 CO 28, ¶ 10.

¶ 19 In determining whether a Miranda waiver is knowing and

intelligent, courts consider the following factors:

(1) the length of time between the initial
Miranda advisement and the interrogation;
(2) whether the defendant or the interrogating
officer initiated the interview; (3) whether and
to what extent the interrogating officer
reminded the defendant of his or her rights
before the interrogation; (4) the clarity and
form of the defendant’s acknowledgment and
waiver; (5) the defendant’s background and
experience with the criminal justice system;
and (6) any language barriers and the
defendant’s age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence.

Knedler, ¶ 13.

¶ 20 Self-induced intoxication is an additional factor that may

render a waiver unknowing and unintelligent. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 17. But

“intoxication alone will not invalidate an otherwise valid Miranda

waiver if the defendant was able to understand the nature of his or

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her rights and the ramifications of waiving them.” Id. at ¶¶ 15, 22

(holding that a defendant with a blood alcohol content of .284

validly waived his rights despite his “extreme intoxication”). When

intoxication is at issue, courts apply the “Platt factors” to determine

whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent:

(1) whether the defendant was oriented to his
or her surroundings and situation; (2) whether
the defendant’s answers were the responsive
product of a rational thought process;
(3) whether the defendant was able to
appreciate the seriousness of his or her
situation and the possibility of incarceration;
(4) whether the defendant had the foresight to
attempt to deceive the police to avoid
prosecution; (5) whether the defendant
expressed remorse for his or her actions; and
(6) whether the defendant expressly stated that
he or she understood his or her rights. Id.

Knedler, ¶ 14 (citing People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1066 (Colo.

2004)).

2. Discussion

¶ 21 Marceleno argues that his Miranda waiver is invalid solely

under the Platt factors. Applying those factors here, we conclude

the district court did not err by finding that Marceleno’s waiver was

knowing and intelligent.

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¶ 22 First, Marceleno contends that his “body language” shows he

was not oriented to his surroundings and situation. But as the

district court observed, and as the body camera footage confirms,

Marceleno had the wherewithal to maneuver his car through a

police blockade and lead the deputies on a ten-minute, high-speed

chase. He also “followed directives” from law enforcement and

hospital staff and “volunteer[ed] information regarding his

outstanding arrest warrants, employment and financial

information, and recent drug use.” The district court correctly

concluded that these facts “all lend themselves to a finding of

orientation to surroundings and circumstances.” See People v.

Clayton, 207 P.3d 831, 836 (Colo. 2009) (holding waiver valid when

the intoxicated defendant appeared aware of his surroundings and

answered questions appropriately).

¶ 23 Second, Marceleno argues his answers were unresponsive

because he mumbled and because, after the 4 a.m. blood draw,

Deputy Napolitano had to say his name twice and touch his knee to

get his attention. But the record supports the district court’s

finding that Marceleno was “constantly responsive to the questions

asked by Deputy Napolitano and other professionals with whom he

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interacted.” Though he appeared tired and mumbled at times, he

followed instructions, moved unassisted, and responded

rationally — even correcting Deputy Napolitano on two errors:

misspelling his name and wrongly stating that his girlfriend had an

outstanding warrant.

¶ 24 Third, Marceleno argues he “could not be expected to be aware

of . . . the seriousness of his situation” because he was “mentally

gone.” But, as the district court observed, Marceleno’s prior

experience with law enforcement — his warrants and parole

status — suggests his familiarity with, and appreciation of, the

prospect of incarceration. Additionally, the paramedics

independently confirmed his ability to comprehend, noting, “[He]

knows where he’s at and what’s going on.” And his repeated

insistence that he was not a drug dealer further underscores that

he understood the gravity of his situation.

¶ 25 Fourth, we agree with Marceleno that he did not attempt to

deceive law enforcement. Although he declined to provide

information about Chico and his opioid dealer, he was forthcoming

about his outstanding arrest warrants, his parole status, and the

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fentanyl found in the car. Because Marceleno did not engage in any

deception, this factor weighs in his favor.

¶ 26 Fifth, Marceleno argues that he did not express genuine

remorse because his apologies were prompted. But as the district

court found, he repeatedly apologized, both with and without

prompting. Even if his first apology was prompted, he later

expressed remorse — unprompted — for endangering the lives of

his girlfriend and the deputies.

¶ 27 Sixth, Marceleno argues that he made “no clear statement”

about his rights, but as the district court observed, and as the video

footage shows, Marceleno “acknowledged each portion of the

Miranda advisement demonstrating he understood each specific

right, individually and collectively.” Although he sometimes

murmured while Deputy Napolitano was still speaking, he clearly

confirmed his understanding each time Deputy Napolitano paused

to ask, “Do you understand that?” Further, we agree with the court

that Deputy Napolitano “did not minimize the significance of his

rights” to coax Marceleno’s agreement — he explained the rights

upfront and reminded Marceleno of his rights throughout the night.

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¶ 28 Because at least five of the Platt factors weigh in favor of a

knowing and intelligent waiver, the district court did not err by

denying the motion to suppress.

¶ 29 Nevertheless, Marceleno argues that his intoxication prevented

him from validly waiving his Miranda rights, pointing to his expert’s

opinion that he was “significantly intoxicated” and may have been

“mentally gone.” This argument fails for at least two reasons. First,

the expert herself conceded that “there was no way to definitively

determine . . . Marceleno’s mental functioning.” Second, even

unrebutted expert testimony “is not dispositive in answering the

legal question of whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently

waived his Miranda rights.” Thames, ¶ 18; see also Knedler, ¶ 23

(“Chemical analysis of blood . . . alone is not sufficient for a court to

conclude that a defendant’s waiver was not knowing and

intelligent.”). The law instead requires courts to “focus on the

cognitive ability that different people actually exhibit at the time

they are asked to waive their rights.” Knedler, ¶ 23.

¶ 30 That is precisely what the district court did here. After

weighing the expert testimony against its own review of the body

camera footage and the observations of Deputy Napolitano, the

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court concluded that Marceleno had the cognitive ability to

understand his rights and chose to waive them. See Knedler, ¶ 17

(“[A] trial court errs if it fails to consider the totality of the

circumstances and bases its decision to suppress a defendant’s

statements solely on intoxication.”). Because the record supports

this conclusion, the district court did not err in finding his Miranda

waiver valid. See Thames, ¶ 24 (concluding that a defendant “need

only have had a minimal understanding of his Miranda rights in

order to have knowingly and intelligently waived them.”).

C. Voluntariness of Statements

¶ 31 We next address Marceleno’s contention that his statements

were involuntary because the deputies “coerced” him by “tak[ing]

advantage of his intoxication to question him.”

1. Applicable Law

¶ 32 A valid Miranda waiver does not end the inquiry. Even when

the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a defendant’s

subsequent statements must still be suppressed if they were

involuntary. People v. Zadran, 2013 CO 69M, ¶ 9; see People v.

Jiminez, 863 P.2d 981, 984 & n.3 (Colo. 1993) (“The issues of

voluntariness of a statement and voluntariness of the waiver of

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Miranda rights that preceded the statement are analytically distinct

although factually related.”). Once a defendant challenges the

voluntariness of his statements, courts apply a two-step inquiry to

determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, law

enforcement “actually overbore the defendant’s will.” People v.

McIntyre, 2014 CO 39, ¶ 19; see People v. Ramadon, 2013 CO 68,

¶ 20. First, we determine whether the circumstances show that the

police conduct was coercive. Ramadon, ¶ 20. Second, if coercive

conduct is found, we determine whether it played a significant role

in inducing the statement. Id.

¶ 33 Both steps require weighing the following nonexhaustive

factors:

(1) whether the defendant was in custody;

(2) whether the defendant was free to leave;

(3) whether the defendant was aware of the
situation;

(4) whether the police read Miranda rights to
the defendant;

(5) whether the defendant understood and
waived Miranda rights;

(6) whether the defendant had an
opportunity to confer with counsel or

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anyone else prior to or during the
interrogation;

(7) whether the statement was made during
the interrogation or volunteered later;

(8) whether the police threatened [the]
defendant or promised anything directly
or impliedly;

(9) the method or style of the interrogation;

(10) the defendant’s mental and physical
condition just prior to the interrogation;

(11) the length of the interrogation;

(12) the location of the interrogation; and

(13) the physical conditions of the location
where the interrogation occurred.

Id. at ¶ 20 (citation omitted).

2. Discussion

¶ 34 Although Marceleno was intoxicated during his detention, the

relevant factors weigh in favor of voluntariness:

• Marceleno was aware of his situation — he explained why

he fled and clarified that the fentanyl was for personal use

only.

• Deputy Napolitano read Marceleno his Miranda rights and

explained each right in plain English.

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• Marceleno knowingly waived his Miranda rights: He

confirmed his understanding after each right was read,

agreed to speak with Deputy Napolitano on multiple

occasions, and withheld information that might incriminate

others.

• Marceleno conceded that Deputy Napolitano neither

threatened him nor promised him anything.

• Deputy Napolitano’s interrogation style was professional,

empathetic, and conversational throughout — never

aggressive, threatening, or deceptive.

• Marceleno represented that his condition was adequate: He

said he was fine, declined an ambulance, explained he had

taken his usual amount of fentanyl, insisted he was just

tired, and rated his level of intoxication as a five out of ten.

• Marceleno’s manner of engagement further confirmed his

lucidity. He answered questions directly, controlled the

scope of his responses, and showed no signs of tangential

thinking or illogical reasoning.

¶ 35 Marceleno argues that law enforcement took advantage of his

intoxication, but the district court found, and we agree, that Deputy

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“Napolitano did not prey upon Mr. Marceleno’s intoxication.” To the

contrary, despite Marceleno’s repeated assurances that he was fine,

Deputy Napolitano summoned emergency medical services and

continued to check on him throughout the night, even after the

paramedics cleared him. Marceleno now turns that very concern

against the prosecution by arguing that suppression was required.

But “intoxication alone does not automatically render statements

involuntary.” People v. Martin, 30 P.3d 758, 760 (Colo. App. 2000).

Critically, the record contains no evidence of coercive conduct — a

necessary predicate to any finding of involuntariness. See People v.

Smiley, 2023 CO 36, ¶ 20 (explaining that “coercive police activity is

a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not

‘voluntary’” (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167

(1986))).

¶ 36 Accordingly, the district court did not err by denying the

motion to suppress. The totality of the circumstances reveals no

coercive conduct, and Marceleno’s statements were therefore

voluntary.

III. Disposition

¶ 37 The judgment is affirmed.

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JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.

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