Aragon v. Walsh

25CA0726 Aragon v Walsh 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0726
City and County of Denver District Court No. 25CV30449
Honorable John J. Olafson, Judge

Celina Aragon,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

John Walsh, District Attorney for the Second Judicial District,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 30, 2026

Vanguard Justice LLC, Elisabeth L. Owen, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellant

John Walsh, District Attorney, Richard F. Lee, Senior Deputy District Attorney,
Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 In this case, plaintiff, Celina Aragon, appeals the dismissal of

her claims against defendant, John Walsh, acting in his official

capacity as District Attorney for the Second Judicial District. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Aragon brought a C.R.C.P. 106 claim for mandamus relief and

three constitutional claims for declaratory and injunctive relief

against Walsh based on events that occurred in a separate criminal

proceeding.1 In the criminal proceeding, the prosecution charged

Aragon with several offenses in district court, dismissed those

charges, and then refiled a single offense in county court. While

her criminal case was still pending in county court, Aragon filed

this civil action. As relevant to this appeal, she claimed the

prosecution’s policy and custom of charging, dismissing, and

refiling criminal charges to purportedly avoid speedy trial issues

violated procedural and substantive due process, as well as the

separation of powers doctrine.

1 Aragon initially brought the same claims against the Denver

County Court, but those claims were later dismissed.

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¶3 Walsh filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. The prosecution in the criminal

proceeding then dismissed the remaining charge against Aragon in

county court, and Aragon voluntarily dismissed her mandamus

claim in this case. The district court granted Walsh’s motion to

dismiss, finding that there was no final judgment in the criminal

proceeding to review and that, despite her mandamus arguments,

Aragon failed to establish subject matter jurisdiction.

¶4 Aragon appeals, arguing the court erred by relying on her

mandamus arguments to dismiss all her claims when Walsh only

moved to dismiss her C.R.C.P. 106 claim. She further asserts the

court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to C.R.C.P. 57 and

article 6, section 9 of the Colorado Constitution, and prosecutorial

immunity did not bar her claims.

¶5 We conclude Aragon’s claims for injunctive relief are not ripe,

and she also lacks standing to pursue those claims. We further

conclude she failed to state a claim for declaratory relief.

Accordingly, we affirm.

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II. Claims for Injunctive Relief

A. Applicable Law

¶6 The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction, including ripeness and standing. Zook v. El Paso

County, 2021 COA 72, ¶ 7; Wilson v. Prentiss, 140 P.3d 288, 290

(Colo. App. 2006). We review these jurisdictional questions de novo.

Zook, ¶ 7; Hickenlooper v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014

CO 77, ¶ 7.

¶7 Ripeness tests whether an issue is real, immediate, and fit for

adjudication. Zook, ¶ 9. A claim is not ripe for review if it is based

on uncertain or contingent future matters that suppose a

speculative injury that may never occur. Id.

¶8 To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) an

injury in fact (2) to a legally protected right. Wimberly v. Ettenberg,

570 P.2d 535, 538 (Colo. 1977). The injury-in-fact requirement

“ensures that an actual controversy exists so that the matter is a

proper one for judicial resolution.” Hickenlooper, ¶ 9. Although

intangible injuries like the deprivation of legal rights can constitute

injuries in fact, the remote possibility of a future injury is not an

injury in fact. Id.; see also Olson v. City of Golden, 53 P.3d 747, 752

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(Colo. App. 2002) (neither a “presently speculative” injury nor one

“that cannot be determined until a remote time in the future”

constitutes an injury in fact).

B. Discussion

¶9 In her opening brief, Aragon describes this case as about

“put[ting] an end to the [district attorney’s office’s] policy and

custom of dismissing and refiling cases against criminal defendants

in contravention” of the law. But which criminal defendants, and in

what proceedings? To the extent Aragon seeks to enforce the rights

of other criminal defendants in unidentified future proceedings, her

claims are not real and immediate but based on speculation.

Therefore, these claims are not ripe for review, and, in any event,

Aragon lacks standing to pursue claims on behalf of other

defendants. See Jones v. Samora, 2016 COA 191, ¶ 26 (“Colorado’s

third-party standing rule ‘prevents a party from asserting the claims

of third parties who are not involved in the lawsuit’” except in

“exceptional circumstances” (citations omitted)).

¶ 10 Likewise, Aragon’s claim that the district attorney’s office

might unlawfully prosecute her again in the future is speculative.

Moreover, Aragon has not established an injury in fact resulting

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from what occurred in the prior criminal proceeding. Her complaint

alleges the district attorney’s office “forced [her] to go to trial” in a

court lacking jurisdiction, demonstrated indifference to human

dignity, and usurped the function of the judicial branch. But

Aragon’s criminal case has been dismissed, and she does not

explain why any of these prospective injuries are more than remote

possibilities. Accordingly, we conclude her claims for injunctive

relief were properly dismissed.

III. Claims for Declaratory Relief

¶ 11 We similarly conclude that the district court properly

dismissed Aragon’s claims for declaratory relief, though under

different reasoning than the district court.

¶ 12 Initially, we question whether Aragon has established standing

to pursue her claims for declaratory relief. As to her injury in fact,

Aragon does not describe in any detail, in her complaint or on

appeal, how her liberties were restrained or how the prior criminal

proceeding infringed on her rights or interests. Indeed, her

assertion in her complaint of severe emotional distress (which she

made, for that matter, to support her mandamus claim, not her

constitutional claims) is conclusory. Likewise, as to whether her

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injury was to a legally protected interest, Aragon does not explain

how the Colorado Constitution includes an implied right of action

for due process and separation of powers violations.2

¶ 13 Nevertheless, even if we assume Aragon has sufficiently

alleged facts to establish standing, she is not entitled to relief

because she has not stated a claim as required by C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5).

See Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Samora, 2013 COA 81, ¶ 38 (we

may affirm on any ground supported by the record).3

¶ 14 To avoid dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), a party must plead

sufficient facts to suggest plausible grounds to support a claim for

relief. Coyle v. State, 2021 COA 54, ¶ 25. To determine whether a

plaintiff has pled a claim for relief, we accept all matters of material

2 Nor does she respond whatsoever to the arguments made in this

regard in the answer brief.
3 We recognize that Walsh did not base his motion to dismiss on

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), and the district court did not consider whether
Aragon stated a claim for relief. Nevertheless, our review is de novo,
applying the same standards as the district court. See Hess v.
Hobart, 2020 COA 139M2, ¶ 11; see also Denv. Post Corp. v. Ritter,
255 P.3d 1083, 1088 (Colo. 2011) (in determining whether a party
has stated a claim, we consider only the facts alleged in the
complaint, as well as exhibits and matters proper for judicial
notice). Because Walsh presented this argument in his answer brief
as an alternative basis to affirm, and we may affirm the court’s
dismissal on any grounds supported by the record, we elect to
consider it.

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fact alleged in the complaint as true and view the allegations in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. But we disregard

conclusory allegations or allegations purporting to assert principles

of law. Id.

¶ 15 Aragon asserts that Walsh violated the constitution by

dismissing and refiling charges against her, in further violation of

the speedy trial statute and the Colorado Rules of Criminal

Procedure. But she has not pled sufficient facts to allow us “to

draw the reasonable inference that [Walsh] is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009)

(describing the plausibility standard). With regard to speedy trial,

she must show some plausibility that the prosecution dismissed

and refiled the charges against her in order to avoid the speedy trial

mandate. Otherwise, the speedy trial deadline began anew when

the new charges were filed. See People v. Nelson, 2014 COA 165, ¶

18. Her complaint does not do so.

¶ 16 Likewise, particularly given the prosecution’s broad discretion

to file, dismiss, and refile criminal charges, Aragon has not pled

sufficient facts to demonstrate that any criminal rules were violated.

See People v. Pennington, 2021 COA 9, ¶ 27 (“Generally, a

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prosecutor’s discretion in charging or requesting the dismissal of

pending charges ‘may not be controlled or limited by judicial

intervention.’” (citation omitted)). While her complaint makes

conclusory allegations that the prosecution violated Crim. P. 5, 7,

and 8, she does not plead any facts to suggest plausible grounds to

support those claims, let alone to support her claim that any rule

violation further violated the constitution. See Crim. P. 5 (governing

preliminary proceedings for felonies and misdemeanors); Crim. P. 7

(governing how felony charges are filed and a defendant’s right to a

preliminary hearing); Crim. P. 8 (governing joinder of defendants

and offenses). Because she failed to state a claim for declaratory

relief, we conclude that these claims, too, were properly dismissed.

¶ 17 Finally, Aragon’s arguments on appeal do not require a

different result. Even if she were right that the district court

dismissed her constitutional claims sua sponte (an argument belied

by Walsh’s motion to dismiss and supporting brief), or that it failed

to analyze her claims independent of C.R.C.P. 106, and even if

prosecutorial immunity does not provide a basis for dismissal, her

claims were properly dismissed for the reasons set forth above.

Accordingly, she is not entitled to relief.

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IV. Disposition

¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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