Peo v. Pompa

23CA1461 Peo v Pompa 04-30-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1461
Arapahoe County District Court No. 20CR476
Honorable Eric White, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kevin Adam Pompa,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE GOMEZ
Pawar and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 30, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Phalen Kohlruss-Reuman, Assistant Attorney General, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mackenzie R. Shields, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Kevin Adam Pompa, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after a jury convicted him of burglary, criminal

trespass, and menacing. He argues that (1) his statutory right to a

speedy trial was violated; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted

testimonial hearsay statements in violation of his Confrontation

Clause rights; and (3) the trial court allowed the prosecutor to

engage in reversible misconduct during closing argument. We

reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 Pompa and the victim had a casual relationship after meeting

on a dating website. A few months into their relationship, the

victim moved apartments. She and Pompa agreed that she would

pay him $350 to help her move. When Pompa came to help, he

brought his wife and mother-in-law.

¶3 The victim said that things with Pompa were awkward after

the move because she’d thought he was separated from his wife and

because he complained he should’ve been paid more for his help.

She agreed to pay him more but needed time to do so. Eventually,

he became more demanding about the money in phone calls and

text messages with her.

1
¶4 About a month after the move, the victim was woken up by a

knock at her door. She asked who was there and heard someone

say, “[M]aintenance.” She testified that she cracked the door open

and saw Pompa, who shoved her door open, walked inside with a

gun in his hand, and started demanding money and threatening to

shoot her. When she refused to give him money, he hit her in the

head with the gun. She fell to the ground and lost consciousness.

¶5 When the victim regained consciousness, she realized she was

bleeding heavily from her head. She called 911, and her neighbor

came to help after hearing her screams. The victim and her

neighbor told the 911 operator what had happened and that the

attacker had fled with another person in a white truck.

¶6 Later on, the victim was confused about some of the details of

the attack, like how her fingernail was broken, how her TV got

knocked over, and why beer bottles were scattered on the floor. But

her account that Pompa had been to her apartment was later

corroborated by a vehicle registration record showing that Pompa

owned a white truck and by cell phone data that showed Pompa in

the area of the victim’s apartment at the time of the attack.

2
¶7 Pompa didn’t testify at trial. His theory of defense was that

the victim either made up the story or was attacked by someone

else, and that she accused him because she was mad when she

found out he wasn’t separated from his wife. The jury convicted

him on charges of first degree burglary, first degree criminal

trespass, and felony menacing, while acquitting him on another

first degree burglary charge and a charge of second degree assault.

¶8 This appeal followed.

II. Speedy Trial

¶9 Pompa first contends that his statutory right to a speedy trial

was violated. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court erred in

rejecting his speedy trial challenge by (1) concluding that he was

unavailable while he was in federal custody; (2) incorrectly

determining the start date of his period of unavailability; and

(3) miscalculating the new speedy trial deadline after he became

available. We aren’t persuaded.

A. Timeline

¶ 10 The events giving rise to Pompa’s charges occurred in early

2020. After his initial arrest, Pompa was released on bond. On

July 27, 2020, he pleaded not guilty. The trial court calculated the

3
initial speedy trial deadline as January 27, 2021, and trial was set

to begin on January 5.

¶ 11 On November 11, 2020, the prosecution learned that Pompa

was in federal custody but was being held in the Denver County

Jail. The next day, the prosecution requested, and the court

issued, a writ to the Denver Sheriff Department so Pompa could

appear remotely for a motions hearing on November 13. Pompa

failed to appear at that hearing. At that time, the court declared a

mistrial due to the COVID-19 pandemic, see Crim. P. 24(c)(4);

People v. Sherwood, 2021 CO 61, ¶ 3, and calculated the new

speedy trial deadline as April 27, 2021. The court set the trial to

begin on April 13.

¶ 12 In March 2021, the prosecution requested, and the court

issued, a writ to the United States Marshals Service’s District Office

in Denver — where Pompa was assumed to be — for him to appear

at an April 7 pretrial readiness conference. The same day the court

issued the writ, Pompa filed a letter with the court saying he was

“finishing up [a] [f]ederal sentence in [Bureau of Prisons] custody.”

The return address on the letter was a federal correctional facility in

Oklahoma.

4
¶ 13 When Pompa didn’t appear at the April 7 conference, the

prosecution began searching for his precise location and learned he

was in a federal facility in California. The prosecution then filed a

motion asking the court to issue a warrant for Pompa’s arrest so it

could lodge a detainer with that California facility, noting that

Pompa could be brought back to Colorado either under the

Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), § 24-60-501, C.R.S. 2025,

or through the extradition process after his federal sentence

concluded. The prosecution also asked the court to find Pompa

unavailable under section 18-1-405(6)(d), C.R.S. 2025, and to reset

the speedy trial deadline because the prosecution “cannot simply

writ a [d]efendant, from a federal prison, located in another state.”

¶ 14 The court concluded that Pompa was unavailable under

section 18-1-405(6)(d) and that “the period of his unavailability

should be excluded from statutory speedy trial.” The court further

concluded that Pompa’s period of unavailability began on November

13, 2020, when he first failed to appear. The prosecution lodged a

detainer for Pompa’s return to Colorado, but Pompa never

requested action under the IAD while he remained in federal

5
custody. On September 7, 2021, he was released from federal

custody and brought back to Colorado.

¶ 15 Following Pompa’s return to Colorado and the resumption of

efforts to set a trial date in this case, defense counsel filed a motion

to dismiss, asserting that the speedy trial deadline had already

passed. The court held a hearing, after which it denied the motion.

¶ 16 After another COVID-19-related mistrial and a speedy trial

waiver by Pompa, the trial in this case was held in October 2022.

B. Relevant Legal Standards

¶ 17 We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for

violation of a defendant’s speedy trial rights as a mixed question of

law and fact. People v. Burdette, 2024 COA 38, ¶ 37. We won’t

disturb the court’s factual findings if they are supported by the

record, id., but we review de novo the court’s application of the

speedy trial statute, People v. Curren, 2014 COA 59M, ¶ 13.

¶ 18 Section 18-1-405 secures a defendant’s constitutional right to

a speedy trial. People v. Lucy, 2020 CO 68, ¶ 20. The statute

provides, in pertinent part, that a defendant must be “brought to

trial . . . within six months from the date of the entry of a plea of

not guilty.” § 18-1-405(1). When computing the deadline for trial,

6
any period of delay caused by the “unavailability of the defendant”

or by a mistrial is excluded. § 18-1-405(6)(d), (e). The burden of

complying with these provisions lies with the trial court and the

prosecution. People v. DeGreat, 2020 CO 25, ¶ 17.

C. Pompa’s Unavailability

¶ 19 We first consider whether the trial court properly determined

that Pompa was unavailable for purposes of the speedy trial statute

while he was in federal custody. We conclude that it did.

¶ 20 A defendant is unavailable “whenever [their] whereabouts are

known but [their] presence for trial cannot be obtained.” § 18-1-

405(6)(d). But “a defendant’s incarceration outside the state does

not make [them] ‘unavailable’ for the purposes of speedy trial

considerations unless the prosecution can show that despite

diligent efforts the defendant’s presence could not be secured.”

Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 548 (Colo. 1985).

¶ 21 When the trial court was initially presented with Pompa’s

absence due to his incarceration at a federal facility in California, it

found that Pompa was “unavailable” within the meaning of section

18-1-405(6)(d). Then, in ruling on Pompa’s later motion to dismiss,

the court made more robust findings that the prosecution had acted

7
diligently in trying to determine where he was and secure his

presence for trial.

¶ 22 In challenging the trial court’s rulings, Pompa relies largely on

People v. Byrne, in which our supreme court held that the facts of

that case — including that the prosecution never requested a writ to

the United States Marshal after learning the defendant was in

federal custody — supported the trial court’s conclusion that the

prosecution hadn’t made diligent efforts to obtain the defendant’s

presence for trial. 762 P.2d 674, 677 (Colo. 1988).

¶ 23 The facts here are markedly different from those in Byrne, and

the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecution

made sufficient efforts to try to obtain Pompa’s presence. As soon

as the prosecution was made aware that Pompa was in federal

custody but being held at the Denver County Jail, it requested a

writ to the proper federal authorities. For whatever reason, that

writ was ineffective and Pompa didn’t appear before the court in

November 2020. Without further information, the prosecution

assumed Pompa to be in the same location and requested a writ to

secure his presence at a scheduled court date in April 2021. When

that writ was also ineffective and the prosecution learned Pompa

8
was no longer in Colorado, the prosecution searched for his location

and discovered he was in a federal facility in California. Again, the

prosecution petitioned the court for the proper legal mechanism to

secure Pompa’s presence under the IAD or via extradition.

Accordingly, it is evident that the prosecution made diligent —

albeit initially unsuccessful — efforts to secure Pompa’s presence

from early on in the case.

D. Determining the Period of Pompa’s Unavailability

¶ 24 Having concluded that the trial court properly determined that

Pompa was unavailable, we next consider whether the trial court

correctly determined the start date of that period of unavailability.

We conclude that it did.

¶ 25 The record supports the trial court’s determination that the

period of Pompa’s unavailability ran from November 13, 2020 —

when the prosecution knew Pompa was in federal custody and it

was first unable to secure his presence through a writ to federal

authorities — to September 7, 2021 — when Pompa was released

from federal custody and brought to Colorado.

¶ 26 We are unpersuaded that the trial court erred in applying its

finding of unavailability in April 2021 to determine that Pompa’s

9
period of unavailability began in November 2020. Pompa relies on

People v. Nunez, in which the supreme court rejected a trial court’s

attempt to retroactively declare a mistrial after the speedy trial

deadline had passed. 2021 CO 31, ¶¶ 6-10, 23. But Nunez is

inapposite for two reasons. First, the trial court here was still

within the speedy trial deadline, having timely declared a mistrial in

November 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. And second, the

court’s “retroactive” application of its unavailability finding to the

first time Pompa failed to appear was not an effort “to get around

the mandatory deadlines set by Colorado’s speedy trial statute.” Id.

at ¶ 20. Instead, the court was merely calculating Pompa’s period

of unavailability, and it accurately included the time when Pompa’s

presence couldn’t be secured despite the prosecution’s diligent

efforts. See § 18-1-405(6)(d); Watson, 700 P.2d at 548.

E. Calculating the Speedy Trial Deadline
After Pompa’s Period of Unavailability

¶ 27 We now consider whether the trial court properly calculated

the amount of time to be excluded from the speedy trial deadline

based on the COVID-19 mistrial and Pompa’s unavailability.

10
¶ 28 Crim. P. 24(c)(4) allows a court to declare a mistrial due to a

public health crisis like COVID-19. See Sherwood, ¶ 3 (applying the

rule). When a mistrial is declared, it tolls the speedy trial deadline

for “[t]he period of delay caused by [the] mistrial, not to exceed three

months for each mistrial.” § 18-1-405(6)(e).

¶ 29 Pompa asserts that it was inappropriate for the trial court to

exclude the three-month period for the COVID-19 mistrial declared

on November 13, 2020 because it also concluded that Pompa’s

period of unavailability began on that same day. In essence, Pompa

argues that the court couldn’t double count the days excluded from

the speedy trial deadline by counting the same days as part of the

mistrial period and as days when Pompa was unavailable.

¶ 30 We decline to consider whether the court erred in these

calculations because its exclusion of a period of three months in

calculating the speedy trial deadline can be supported another way.

See People v. Dyer, 2019 COA 161, ¶ 39 (“[A]n appellate court may

affirm a [trial] court’s decision on any ground supported by the

record, whether relied upon or even considered by the trial court.”).

Specifically, under section 18-1-405(6)(h), the court could exclude

“[t]he period of delay between the new date set for trial following the

11
expiration of the time period[] excluded by paragraph[] . . . (d)

[regarding a period of unavailability], not to exceed three months.”

Thus, the three additional months the court added to the speedy

trial deadline based on the first COVID-19 mistrial (beginning on

November 13, 2020) could instead be attributed to the three

months after Pompa’s period of unavailability ended (beginning on

September 7, 2021), leading to the same speedy trial deadline.1

¶ 31 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ultimate calculation of

the amount of time that should be excluded from the speedy trial

deadline under section 18-1-405. And because Pompa doesn’t raise

any other challenges to the court’s calculations, and the trial

commenced within the extended speedy trial period following the

second COVID-19-related mistrial and Pompa’s speedy trial waiver,

we reject Pompa’s claim that his speedy trial rights were violated.

1 Pompa argues that the prosecution didn’t raise this argument in

the trial court. But the prosecution did alert the trial court to the
additional three-month extension available under section 18-1-
405(6)(h), C.R.S. 2025. And while the trial court didn’t rely on
subsection (6)(h) in its calculations, we can, as indicated, affirm the
judgment on any basis supported by the record. See People v. Dyer,
2019 COA 161, ¶ 39.

12
III. Hearsay Evidence

¶ 32 Pompa also contends that the trial court erred by admitting

portions of the victim’s 911 call that included statements from the

victim’s neighbor. He asserts that the neighbor’s statements were

testimonial for purposes of the federal and state Confrontation

Clauses and that even if they weren’t, they don’t fall within the

excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 33 Before trial, the prosecution filed a notice of its intent to

introduce statements made by the victim’s neighbor during the

victim’s 911 call. The relevant portion of the 911 call included the

following exchange:

Operator: Can you tell me what happened? Do
you know what’s going on?

Neighbor: I heard her screaming really, really
loud, and I just kind of came down the stairs
to help her. She’s bleeding all over. As I was
coming down the stairs, I had seen two
Mexican guys went into a white truck.

Operator: So they left in a white truck?

Neighbor: Yeah. It was a white pickup truck,
and there was damage to the front. But she
says she has the license plate number.

Victim: I do. It’s in my phone.

13
Operator: Okay. Did you see what they looked
like? I know you said they were Hispanic. Did
you see where [inaudible]

Neighbor: [inaudible] she has a picture of them
in her phone.

....

Operator: And did you see what direction they
went in?

Neighbor: They just took the exit out of the
complex. I don’t know.

¶ 34 Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the statements

were testimonial and were inadmissible hearsay. The court

overruled the objection.

¶ 35 The 911 call was played at trial. The neighbor did not testify.

B. The Confrontation Clause

¶ 36 We reject Pompa’s contention that the neighbor’s statements

violated his Confrontation Clause rights.

¶ 37 We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on whether the

admission of evidence violates a defendant’s Confrontation Clause

rights. See Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO 71, ¶ 17.

¶ 38 The Confrontation Clauses in the federal and state

constitutions — which allow a defendant to be confronted with the

witnesses against them — are implicated only by testimonial

14
statements, not nontestimonial statements. Davis v. Washington,

547 U.S. 813, 821-25 (2006); Nicholls, ¶¶ 23, 30. A testimonial

statement is one made “under circumstances that would lead an

objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be

available for use at a later trial.” Nicholls, ¶ 22. Relevant

circumstances in determining whether a statement is testimonial

include whether there was an ongoing emergency at the time it was

made, its formality and spontaneity, the environment in which it

was made, and the identity of the person to whom it was made.

People v. McFee, 2016 COA 97, ¶ 37.

¶ 39 The trial court concluded that the neighbor’s statements

during the 911 call were nontestimonial because the call was “made

to a 911 operator,” not “to a police department”; the call “was made

under . . . emergency circumstances” to convey and receive

“emergency information,” rather than “circumstances specifically

designed to create an out-of-court statement for use in trial”; and

the neighbor’s statements “relate[d] to the nature of the emergency

[she was] observ[ing].”

¶ 40 We agree. The neighbor made the statements to a 911

operator during an ongoing emergency. First responders hadn’t yet

15
arrived, and the attacker had just fled the scene and hadn’t been

apprehended. Some of the neighbor’s statements that weren’t

challenged related to the victim’s name and physical condition and

the actions the neighbor was taking to treat the victim before

emergency personnel arrived. Yet even the challenged statements

concerning the attacker’s description and the vehicle he left in were

made to the 911 operator in the context of the emergency and may

have assisted first responders in assessing whether the attacker

might return or might confront them as they were responding to the

call. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 827-28 (the circumstances of a

witness’s statement to a 911 operator — including that she was

facing an “ongoing emergency,” she was speaking on the phone in a

“not tranquil” environment where she might not be safe from her

attacker, and “dispatched officers might . . . be encountering a

violent felon” as they came to assist her — “objectively indicate[d]

[that the statement’s] primary purpose was to enable police

assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”); Raile v. People, 148

P.3d 126, 130 (Colo. 2006) (“[S]tatements made during an ongoing

emergency to assist police officers in their efforts to assess the

present situation are nontestimonial.”).

16
¶ 41 We therefore agree with the trial court’s rejection of Pompa’s

Confrontation Clause challenge.

C. Hearsay

¶ 42 We also reject Pompa’s contention that the neighbor’s

statements were inadmissible hearsay.

¶ 43 We review the admission of nontestimonial hearsay for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶¶ 63, 75.

¶ 44 “‘Hearsay’ is a statement other than one made by the

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence

to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” CRE 801(c). Hearsay is

generally inadmissible unless it falls within an exception. CRE 802.

¶ 45 One such exception is an excited utterance, which is “[a]

statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or

condition.” CRE 803(2); see People v. Vanderpauye, 2023 CO 42,

¶ 40. To fall within this exception, three conditions must be

satisfied: (1) the event must have been sufficiently startling to

render the observer’s normal reflective thought processes

inoperative; (2) the statement must have been a spontaneous

reaction to the event; and (3) there must be sufficient evidence to

17
allow a jury to infer that the declarant had the opportunity to

observe the event. People v. Pernell, 2014 COA 157, ¶ 31, aff’d on

other grounds, 2018 CO 13. Relevant factors in assessing the

second condition — the statement’s spontaneity — include the

lapse of time between the startling event and the statement,

whether the statement was made in response to an inquiry, whether

it was accompanied by outward signs of excitement or emotional

distress, and the choice of words used. People v. Abdulla, 2020

COA 109M, ¶ 65.

¶ 46 We conclude that the court didn’t abuse its discretion by

admitting the neighbor’s statements under the excited utterance

exception. The court aptly addressed all three conditions in finding

the exception applied.

¶ 47 First, the court concluded that the event was sufficiently

startling to render the neighbor’s normal reflective thought

processes inoperative. The court reasoned that “although [she] isn’t

panicked in this statement, . . . she’s still right in the middle of a

911 call . . . in the same vicinity as her neighbor who is bleeding

from her head.” In other words, the court explained, “I think that

sitting in her home with a bleeding woman having just witnessed

18
people fleeing from a scene is a startling event that would render a

person’s [thought] processes inoperative.”

¶ 48 Second, the court concluded that the neighbor’s statements

were a spontaneous reaction to the event. The court reasoned that

“although there were questions asked to kind of clarify the initial

information” the neighbor had given, “the information conveyed was

a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence. ‘I just saw this. This is

what happened. This is who I saw. This is where they went.’”

¶ 49 And third, the court noted that, as of the time of its ruling, the

prosecution had indicated that it would present sufficient evidence

to allow a jury to infer that the neighbor had observed the startling

event. The court indicated that if the prosecution didn’t satisfy that

foundational burden, it would take an objection as to the third

prong. No such objection was lodged.

¶ 50 The trial court thus applied the appropriate considerations,

and we don’t perceive any abuse of discretion in its ruling.

IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 51 Finally, Pompa contends that the trial court erred when it

allowed the prosecutor to commit misconduct during closing

argument by (1) misstating the law on reasonable doubt, thus

19
lowering the prosecution’s burden of proof; and (2) urging the jury

to do justice and hold him accountable. We disagree that there was

any error in allowing the first argument. As to the second, we

conclude that any error was harmless.

A. Relevant Legal Standards

¶ 52 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims of

prosecutorial misconduct. People v. Buckner, 2022 COA 14, ¶ 17.

We determine first “whether the prosecutor’s questionable conduct

was improper based on the totality of the circumstances” and then

“whether such actions warrant reversal according to the proper

standard of review.” Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096 (Colo.

2010); accord People v. Robinson, 2019 CO 102, ¶ 18.

¶ 53 When, as here, objections are preserved, we consider whether

any error by the trial court in allowing a prosecutor’s improper

statements “substantially influenced the verdict or affected the

fairness of the trial proceedings.” Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63,

¶ 12 (quoting Tevlin v. People, 715 P.2d 338, 342 (Colo. 1986)).

B. Comments on Reasonable Doubt

¶ 54 Pompa first argues that the trial court erred by permitting the

prosecutor’s references to the reasonable doubt standard in closing

20
argument, which he claims misstated the law and lowered the

prosecution’s burden of proof. We disagree.

¶ 55 During closing argument, the prosecutor said,

I want to leave you with a reasonable doubt
instruction; you’re going to have a full copy of
it, but it tells you that a reasonable doubt is
not vague, it’s not speculative, it’s not
imaginary, and what I want to remind you is
that you can have questions about the facts of
this case. You might wonder how did her TV
get knocked over. If that question does not go
to an element of one of these charged crimes,
then the defendant is guilty.

¶ 56 Defense counsel lodged an objection, to which the court

responded that the jury was to consider and apply the instructions

as given by the court. The prosecutor then continued,

As we talked about, what we had to prove was
the element of each crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. It’s not all doubt, so if you have
questions and they’re not related to those
elements, the defendant is still guilty.

¶ 57 A prosecutor may not intentionally misstate the law. People v.

Herold, 2024 COA 53, ¶ 69. This includes making statements that

lessen the applicable burden of proof. See People v. Pollard, 2013

COA 31M, ¶ 48. That burden of proof requires the prosecution to

“prove every factual element necessary to constitute the crime

21
charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson v. People, 2019 CO

17, ¶ 10 (quoting Vega v. People, 893 P.2d 107, 111 (Colo. 1995));

accord Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1, ¶ 23.

¶ 58 We conclude that the prosecutor’s statements did not misstate

the law on reasonable doubt or lower the prosecution’s burden of

proof. The prosecutor correctly noted that the prosecution has the

burden to prove every element of the charged crimes beyond a

reasonable doubt and that any doubt unrelated to those elements

doesn’t necessarily affect this burden. Therefore, the court didn’t

err by allowing the statements.

C. Comments on Justice and Accountability

¶ 59 Pompa also argues that the trial court reversibly erred by

overruling his counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s statement

referencing justice and accountability. Again, we disagree.

¶ 60 Toward the end of the prosecutor’s closing argument, she said,

I’m going to ask each and every one of you to
take your time, to look at the evidence, to use
your memory of the testimony, and to return
the verdict that justice demands holding the
defendant accountable.

¶ 61 Defense counsel objected. The court overruled the objection.

22
¶ 62 “A prosecutor may not ‘pressure jurors by suggesting that

guilty verdicts are necessary to do justice for a sympathetic victim.’”

Buckner, ¶ 40 (quoting People v. Marko, 2015 COA 139, ¶ 221).

Nonetheless, a prosecutor’s request that jurors hold a defendant

accountable may be proper if it’s based on evidence of guilt and

simply asks that the defendant be held accountable for a crime they

committed. See People v. Tran, 2020 COA 99, ¶ 68.

¶ 63 We conclude that any error in overruling the objection and

allowing the prosecutor’s statement was harmless for four reasons.

First, the statement was one sentence in the entirety of the

prosecutor’s closing argument. See People v. Garcia, 2021 COA 80,

¶ 40 (reversal wasn’t required for a prosecutor’s appeal to justice

that was “brief and a small part of summation”), aff’d, 2023 CO 30.

Second, the statement was “likely to be interpreted by the jury as

merely an overly dramatic and inartful way of asking the jury to

return a guilty verdict based on the evidence.” People in Interest of

J.R., 2021 COA 81, ¶ 47 (reversal wasn’t required although the

prosecutor asked the jury to “vindicate” the victims by holding the

defendant accountable). Third, the jury returned a split verdict,

indicating that it “was not swayed by any potentially improper

23
argument.” People v. Snelling, 2022 COA 116M, ¶ 37. And fourth,

substantial evidence supports the jury’s guilty verdict. See People

v. Dominguez-Castor, 2020 COA 1, ¶ 86 (“the strength of the other

evidence of guilt” may support the harmlessness of a trial court’s

error in allowing improper argument). Accordingly, Pompa’s

assertion of prosecutorial misconduct doesn’t require reversal.

V. Disposition

¶ 64 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

24