Peo v. Eastman

22CA1421 Peo v Eastman 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1421
Weld County District Court No. 20CR461
Honorable Marcelo A. Kopcow, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Kevin Dean Eastman,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE DUNN
Harris and Moultrie, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 16, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Joseph Paul Hough, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Kevin Dean Eastman appeals his convictions for two counts of

first degree murder, two counts of tampering with a deceased

human body, and two counts of tampering with physical evidence.

He contends that reversal is required because the district court

erred by (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence gathered from

a tracking device installed on his car and (2) admitting other act

and hearsay evidence. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 For several years, Eastman and Heather Frank were in an on-

and-off relationship. But in late December 2019, Frank ended the

relationship. According to Eastman, before this breakup, they

“treat[ed] each other bad,” and he was physically abusive.

¶3 Shortly after the breakup, Frank met Scott Sessions and the

two exchanged messages suggestive of a budding relationship.

¶4 On February 8, 2020, Eastman went to Frank’s apartment in

Greeley. Eastman said that when he got there, Frank told him she

had a date that night. That same evening, a message was sent from

Frank’s Facebook account inviting Sessions to come over. Sessions

said he would be there soon.

1
¶5 A few days later, on February 10, Sessions’s partially burned

body was found in Pingree Park. An autopsy showed that before he

was set on fire, Sessions’s jugular vein had been slashed. The

trajectory of the neck wound along with limited defensive wounds

were consistent with an ambush from behind.

¶6 Investigators quickly learned about the messages between

Sessions and Frank. And a review of Sessions’s cell phone records

confirmed that he was “in and around” Frank’s apartment the

evening of February 8. The phone records also showed that

Sessions’s phone stopped signaling early the next morning.

¶7 Continued investigation also uncovered Frank’s relationship

with Eastman. A review of his cell phone records confirmed that

Eastman was also “in and around” Frank’s apartment the evening

of February 8. Cell phone records also showed that early the next

morning, Frank’s and Eastman’s phones travelled together away

from Greeley and toward the Pingree Park area.

¶8 Four days after the discovery of Sessions’s body, and after

seeing Eastman’s car parked outside Frank’s apartment,

investigators obtained a warrant to place a GPS tracking device on

2
Eastman’s car. They also placed a surveillance camera outside

Frank’s apartment.

¶9 On the evening of February 15, the surveillance camera

showed Frank and Eastman leave in Eastman’s car. Investigators

then tracked Eastman’s car to his employer’s property and to some

stops around that property.

¶ 10 The next morning, an officer went to the property, where he

saw a smoke plume and Eastman tending a fire near a burn pit.

Concerned that Eastman was tampering with or destroying evidence

related to the Sessions homicide, the officer followed Eastman to a

gas station and arrested him. Officers then searched Eastman and

found, among other things, a fixed-blade knife, two spent .22

caliber shell casings, and three live .22 caliber shells.

¶ 11 Meanwhile, other officers searched the property where the fire

had been observed. There, they found Frank’s body next to the

burn pit. Frank had been shot twice in the chest and was wrapped

in plastic and bailing wire. Frank’s autopsy revealed a bullet lodged

in her chest that was consistent with a “small caliber,” such as

a .22.

3
¶ 12 During a recorded police interview, Eastman admitted that he

was at Frank’s apartment on February 8, someone was “hurt,” there

was a “big mess,” and blood was “fucking everywhere.” Eastman

never admitted to hurting or killing Sessions, though he muttered

things like, “there was a lot of fucked up shit that should never

[have] happened that happened.” Eastman denied knowing

anything about Frank’s death.

¶ 13 The prosecution charged Eastman with two counts of first

degree murder, two counts of tampering with a deceased human

body, and two counts of tampering with physical evidence.1

¶ 14 Eastman didn’t testify at trial, but his counsel defended on the

theory that Frank killed Sessions and that when Eastman arrived at

her home, he helped clean the murder scene and dispose of

Sessions’s body. Eastman’s counsel also advanced the theory that

Eastman’s employer helped dispose of Sessions’s body but then

panicked, killed Frank, and hid her body on his property.

1 The prosecution also charged Eastman with possession of a

weapon by a previous offender but later dismissed that count.

4
¶ 15 The jury convicted Eastman as charged, and the court

sentenced him to a controlling sentence of life in prison without the

possibility of parole.

II. Motion to Suppress

¶ 16 Eastman contends that the district court reversibly erred by

denying his “motion to suppress incriminating evidence gathered by

GPS tracking.” We aren’t persuaded.

A. Additional Procedural Background

¶ 17 Before trial, Eastman filed a motion to suppress evidence

obtained from the GPS tracking device. He argued that (1) the

affidavit submitted in support of the warrant did not establish

probable cause; (2) the warrant lacked particularity; and (3) the

good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.

¶ 18 The district court denied the motion to suppress. It rejected

Eastman’s argument that the affidavit did not establish probable

cause. But it agreed that the warrant lacked particularity because

it did not include any “limitation on the length of time” the tracker

would be installed. Even so, it concluded that under the good faith

exception the warrant was not so “facially deficient” that it was

objectively unreasonable for an officer to rely on it.

5
¶ 19 On appeal, Eastman does not challenge the court’s ruling that

the officers acted in good faith in executing the warrant even

though it lacked temporal particularity. Instead, he argues only

that the court erred by denying the motion to suppress because the

affidavit supporting the warrant to install the device failed to

establish probable cause.

B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 20 The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable

searches and generally requires the police to obtain a warrant

supported by probable cause before conducting a search. People v.

Tafoya, 2021 CO 62, ¶ 24; U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Colo. Const.

art. II, § 7. Installing a tracking device on a vehicle constitutes a

search and requires a warrant. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.

400, 404 (2012). Thus, the installation of a tracking device on a car

must be supported by probable cause. See id.; People v. Seymour,

2023 CO 53, ¶¶ 41-42 (noting that a valid warrant must

“demonstrate[] probable cause”).

¶ 21 To establish probable cause for a search warrant, an affidavit

must contain sufficient facts to allow a person of reasonable

caution to believe that evidence of criminal activity is located at the

6
place to be searched. Seymour, ¶ 54. This means that an affidavit

“must establish a nexus between the alleged criminal activity and

the place to be searched.” Id. Direct evidence of a nexus isn’t

required. People v. Green, 70 P.3d 1213, 1215 (Colo. 2003).

Rather, “[t]he link between the suspected crime and the place to be

searched can be established by circumstantial evidence” and

“commonsense inferences” drawn from the facts. Id. at 1214-15;

see People v. McKay, 2021 CO 72, ¶ 8.

¶ 22 On review, “the central question” is whether there was a

substantial basis to issue the warrant. McKay, ¶ 10. And the

probable cause determination is entitled to “great deference.” Id.

¶ 23 The district court’s denial of a motion to suppress presents a

mixed question of fact and law. Seymour, ¶ 19. We defer to the

court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent

evidence, but we review the legal effect of those findings de novo.

Id.

C. The Affidavit Was Sufficient to Establish Probable Cause

¶ 24 We conclude that based on the facts alleged in the ten-page

affidavit together with the reasonable inferences from those facts,

7
the court had a substantial basis to issue a warrant to install a GPS

tracker on Eastman’s car.

¶ 25 Among other things, the affidavit alleged the following facts

and circumstances:

• Sessions arranged to meet at Frank’s apartment the evening

of February 8.

• Eastman and Frank had a relationship dating back several

years.

• Eastman had an outstanding warrant for assault and

domestic violence against Frank.

• Eastman had a criminal history, including domestic

violence, assaults involving weapons, felony menacing, and

carrying concealed weapons.

• Sessions’s partially burned body was discovered near

Pingree Park Road in Larimer County two days after he

arranged to meet Frank.

• An autopsy showed Sessions “suffered a fatal injury to his

neck” and ruled the manner of death a homicide.

• Crime scene footwear impressions showed at least two

“adult male” individuals were near the body.

8
• A vehicle with a wheel width of “approximately” seventy-two

inches was used to transport the body to the scene.

• Eastman’s car had a wheel width of “approximately”

seventy-one inches.

• Surveillance photos from the Mishawaka Center in Larimer

County showed a vehicle matching Eastman’s the day

before Sessions’s body was found in Larimer County.2

• Two days after Sessions’s body was found, parking lot

surveillance video near Frank’s apartment captured

Sessions’s car enter and park in the lot. The video then

showed an individual exit the car and head in the direction

of Frank’s apartment.

¶ 26 The affidavit requested a warrant to install the GPS tracking

device on Eastman’s car to assist investigators with the homicide

2 The affidavit specifically identifies the Mishawaka Event Center

and attaches a photo of a car matching Eastman’s car taken from
the center’s security camera. Though the affidavit doesn’t list the
address of the event center, we take judicial notice that it is in
Larimer County, Colorado. See CRE 201(b)(2) (a court may take
judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is not subject to
reasonable dispute because it is “capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned”).

9
investigation and asserted that the tracker could lead investigators

to persons involved in the homicide and evidence that had not yet

been located. These facts along with the reasonable and

commonsense inferences drawn from them are sufficient to

establish a specific nexus that connects Eastman to Sessions and

the discovery of Sessions’s body. To the extent Eastman suggests

that the affidavit was insufficient because it “most certainly did not

show that Eastman was probably involved in [Sessions’s] murder”

and that evidence of that crime would “most likely” be found by

attaching a tracker to his car, that’s not quite the standard.

Because probable cause “deals with probabilities, not certainties,”

People v. Altman, 960 P.2d 1164, 1171 (Colo. 1998), the affidavit

needed to establish only “a fair probability” that installing a GPS

tracker on Eastman’s car would lead to evidence of criminal activity.

Green, 70 P.3d at 1214 (emphasis and citation omitted); see also

People v. Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 937 (Colo. 2009) (“At the margins,

probable cause requires ‘less than evidence which would justify

condemnation or conviction . . . .’” (citation omitted)).

10
¶ 27 Because the affidavit here did that, we affirm the denial of

Eastman’s motion to suppress.3

III. Other Act Evidence

¶ 28 Eastman next contends that the district court reversibly erred

by admitting “irrelevant and highly prejudicial” evidence of other

acts of domestic violence between himself and Frank. We are not

persuaded.

A. Additional Background

¶ 29 Before trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of

several incidents of domestic violence between Eastman and Frank

under section 18-6-801.5(3), C.R.S. 2025, and CRE 404(b). The

prosecution also filed a motion to introduce Frank’s statements

about some of the incidents under CRE 807, the residual exception

to the hearsay rule. Eastman objected to both motions.

¶ 30 After a motions hearing, the court found that the prosecution

had satisfied its burden to show that “such acts did occur,” that the

acts were admissible under Rule 404(b) and section 18-6-801.5(4),

3 Because we conclude that the affidavit established probable

cause, we don’t address the People’s alternate argument under the
good faith exception.

11
and that the statements Frank made to others about the incidents

were admissible under Rule 807. It therefore permitted the

prosecution to admit the other acts to establish Eastman’s “motive

and intent” and to provide context to “Eastman’s attitude, threats

and behavior towards Frank.”

¶ 31 At trial, Frank’s adult son told the jury that in 2014, Eastman

sliced Frank’s neck (leaving a scar), broke her wrist, and hit her in

the face (leaving noticeable bruising). And he described an

altercation in 2015 where he saw Eastman put Frank in a “choke

hold”; when he tried to free his mom, Eastman punched him three

times in the head. He also testified that Frank told him in 2019

that Eastman had strangled her, she feared Eastman, and she

wanted help.

¶ 32 Other witnesses shared similar stories. One of Frank’s

longtime friends testified that Frank told her that Eastman would

“put his hands on her and get physical,” she was scared to leave

him, and it “would be dangerous” for her. The friend also testified

that she saw “bruises on [Frank’s] arm, on her wrists, [and on] her

neck” on numerous occasions and once saw her arm in a sling. A

male friend of Frank’s testified that, in 2019, Frank told him that

12
Eastman was abusive and that she feared for her safety. And this

friend told the jury about the threatening messages Eastman sent

him after he had tried to help Frank. Frank’s hairdresser testified

that in 2019 she noticed a bald spot on Frank’s head, marks on her

neck, and a bruise on her arm. Frank told her that Eastman had

yanked her hair out and strangled her.

¶ 33 Before each witness testified, and again before the jury

deliberated, the court instructed the jury on the limited purposes

for which the evidence could be considered.

B. Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 34 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible “to

prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular

occasion the person acted in conformity with the character.” CRE

404(b)(1). But such evidence may be admissible for another

purpose, such as to prove motive or intent. CRE 404(b)(2).

¶ 35 When — as here — the other acts involve acts of domestic

violence against the same victim, the evidence is generally

considered “helpful” and “necessary” to establish, among other

things, the “escalating levels of seriousness” of the domestic

violence. § 18-6-801.5(1); see also People v. Cross, 2023 COA 24,

13
¶ 22 (noting that in enacting section 18-6-801.5, the legislature

“placed its finger on the scale in favor of admitting evidence of prior

acts of domestic violence in prosecutions involving domestic

violence”).

¶ 36 To be admissible under Rule 404(b) and section 18-6-801.5,

the court must first determine, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the other acts occurred and that the defendant committed the

acts. People v. Vasquez, 2022 COA 100, ¶ 74.

¶ 37 If the court so finds, it then must decide whether the other act

evidence satisfies the four-part test in People v. Spoto, 795 P.2d

1314, 1318 (Colo. 1990). See Vasquez, ¶ 75. Under Spoto, other

act evidence is admissible only if (1) it relates to a material fact; (2)

it is logically relevant; (3) the logical relevance is independent of the

prohibited inference that the defendant acted in conformity with his

bad character; and (4) the probative value is not substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Spoto, 795 P.2d at

1318.

¶ 38 We review the admission of other act evidence for an abuse of

discretion. People v. Lancaster, 2022 COA 82, ¶ 37. A court abuses

its discretion “when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable,

14
[or] unfair,” or when it is “based on an incorrect understanding of

the law.” People v. Owens, 2024 CO 10, ¶ 105.

C. The Offer of Proof Was Sufficient

¶ 39 Eastman first argues that the prosecution’s offer of proof “was

insufficient” to show that the other acts occurred.

¶ 40 A district court must apply the preponderance of the evidence

standard to determine whether it is more likely than not that the

other act occurred. See People v. Garner, 806 P.2d 366, 372 (Colo.

1991). But a court isn’t required to hold an evidentiary hearing to

make that determination. People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1, 3 (Colo. App.

2004). Rather, a court may determine the admissibility of other act

evidence based on an offer of proof. Id.; § 18-6-801.5(3) (allowing

proponent of other acts of domestic violence to “advise the [district]

court by offer of proof of such evidence”); see also People v. Groves,

854 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. App. 1992) (noting that an evidentiary

hearing was not required where parties had opportunity to present

offers of proof as to other act evidence).

¶ 41 The prosecution submitted a detailed offer of proof about the

other act evidence that it intended to introduce at trial. Some of the

previous incidents had resulted in police involvement and criminal

15
charges. The offer of proof also included corroborating information,

including from persons who either independently witnessed some of

the other acts or saw physical evidence of abuse consistent with the

described acts.

¶ 42 And in addition to the offer of proof, the court considered

Eastman’s admissions in his police recorded interview that the

parties had a volatile relationship and that Eastman had physically

abused Frank in the past.

¶ 43 Based on this, we can’t conclude that the court abused its

discretion by finding that the offer of proof was sufficient to satisfy

the prosecution’s burden to show that it was more likely than not

that the other acts happened.

D. Evidence of Other Acts of Domestic Violence Against Frank
Was Properly Admitted

¶ 44 Eastman argues that the other act evidence satisfied none of

the Spoto prongs because the prior acts were not substantially

16
similar to the charged crime and some acts were more remote in

time.4 We disagree.

¶ 45 First, Eastman doesn’t dispute that motive and intent are

material facts and that it’s well established that other acts of

domestic violence against the same victim are admissible to prove

motive, intent, and culpable mental state. See, e.g., Cross, ¶ 76

(evidence of the defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against

the victim were admissible to prove motive, intent, and lack of

accident); see § 18-6-801.5(1) (“[D]omestic violence is frequently

cyclical in nature, involves patterns of abuse, and can consist of

harm with escalating levels of seriousness.”).

¶ 46 Second, because the other act evidence was relevant to prove

that Eastman was motivated to use violence to control Frank and

that he acted intentionally when he killed her, we reject Eastman’s

related claim that the purported lack of similarity makes the other

4 Eastman treats all the evidence together and argues that the prior

acts are dissimilar and remote. But he never addresses or
acknowledges section 18-6-801.5, C.R.S. 2025, or its declaration
concerning the cyclical nature of domestic violence. Nor does he
account for the fact that the other acts include incidents during the
troubled relationship, some of which were closer in time to Frank’s
murder.

17
acts not logically relevant. See People v. Torres, 141 P.3d 931, 934

(Colo. App. 2006) (noting other acts of domestic violence against the

victim were logically relevant because they “had a tendency to show

that it was more probable that [the defendant] intended to commit

[the charged crimes]”).

¶ 47 Third, the logical relevance of Eastman having abused Frank

in the past was independent of the intermediate inference that

Eastman had a bad character. Though not identical, the acts of

violence against Frank during their relationship were relevant to

show his motive to control her, to rebut his defense that someone

else (with no known motive) killed her, and because they made it

more likely that he intended to kill her. See People v. Fry, 74 P.3d

360, 371 (Colo. App. 2002) (the logical relevance of evidence of other

acts of domestic violence — that the defendant intended the

consequences of his actions — was independent of a bad character

inference), aff’d, 92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).

¶ 48 Fourth, we are unpersuaded by Eastman’s contention that the

other act evidence was unfairly prejudicial and “served no purpose”

other than to inject “collateral issues” that were likely to confuse

the jury. “[U]nfair prejudice . . . does not mean prejudice that

18
results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence.” People

v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo. 2002). Given Eastman’s claim

that he did not kill Frank, the other act evidence was significantly

probative of his motive and intent to kill her. Yet it was far less

inflammatory than the charged crimes, so it had little chance of

swaying the jury to render a decision on an improper basis. See

Cross, ¶ 26 (evidence of other acts of physical and emotional abuse

of the victim was not unfairly prejudicial and was probative to

suggest that the defendant intentionally shot the victim). The court

also minimized any prejudicial effect through the repeated and

explicit limiting instructions that prohibited the jury from

concluding that Eastman “is guilty . . . based on a belief” that he

“has bad character or a tendency to commit bad acts.”

¶ 49 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

by admitting the other act evidence under Rule 404(b) and section

18-6-801.5.

E. The Residual Hearsay Exception

¶ 50 Eastman next argues that even if the other act evidence was

admissible under Spoto, the court erred by admitting it because

some of the evidence included statements by Frank, and he argues

19
that those statements “were largely (if not entirely) devoid” of any

guarantees of trustworthiness.

¶ 51 We review hearsay rulings for an abuse of discretion. People v.

Sparks, 2018 COA 1, ¶¶ 35-36.

¶ 52 Under the residual hearsay exception, an out-of-court

statement that isn’t covered by other exceptions is admissible if the

statement has “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of

trustworthiness” and a court determines that

(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent
can procure through reasonable efforts; and
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.

CRE 807. The proponent must establish the trustworthiness of the

statement by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Thompson,

2017 COA 56, ¶ 155.

¶ 53 To evaluate the trustworthiness of a statement, a court

examines “the nature and character of the statement, the

relationship of the parties, the probable motivation of the declarant

20
in making the statement, and the circumstances under which the

statement was made.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶ 54 Considering these factors, we reject Eastman’s contention that

Frank’s statements to family and friends were devoid of any

guarantees of trustworthiness. Indeed, Eastman doesn’t dispute

that Frank’s statements were made spontaneously to family and

friends, they were not self-serving, and Frank had no motive to lie

about Eastman’s abuse. See People v. Fuller, 788 P.2d 741, 745-46

(Colo. 1990) (concluding that the victim’s statements were

supported by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness because

they were “spontaneous statements” to “close friends that she had

known for many years,” they were “not self-serving,” and she “had

no motive to lie”). Beyond that, Frank had personal knowledge of

the abuse and several of the witnesses personally observed

corroborating signs of abuse such as bruising, missing hair, and

other physical marks.

¶ 55 Finally, to the extent Eastman suggests that the admission of

Frank’s statements to family and friends violated his constitutional

confrontation rights, he doesn’t claim that the statements were

testimonial. And nontestimonial statements do not implicate a

21
defendant’s right to confrontation. Nicholls v. People, 2017 CO 71,

¶¶ 30-33.

¶ 56 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court acted

within its discretion by admitting Frank’s statements to family and

friends about Eastman’s abuse under Rule 807.

IV. Disposition

¶ 57 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.

22