Marriage of Schultz

25CA1282 Marriage of Schultz 04-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1282
El Paso County District Court No. 22DR31526
Honorable Samuel Evig, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Emily Schultz,

Appellee,

and

Travis Schultz,

Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Fox and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 9, 2026

Emily Schultz, Pro Se

Griner Legal, LLC, Amy D. Griner Guheen, Lakewood, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case between Travis

Schultz (father) and Emily Schultz (mother), father appeals the

district court’s order denying his motion to relocate with their child.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2023, the district court dissolved the parties’ marriage and

entered permanent orders allocating parental responsibilities for

their then-seven-year-old child. The court ordered that father

would be the primary custodian and that the child would live with

him in Wisconsin during the school year. It granted mother

parenting time in Colorado during the summer and monthly visits

in Wisconsin during the school year.

¶3 One year later, father filed a motion to relocate from Wisconsin

to Alaska with the child. Mother objected to the proposed

relocation and requested that the court designate her as the

primary custodian and grant her majority parenting time.

¶4 At father’s request, the district court appointed a child and

family investigator (CFI) to evaluate whether relocation would be in

the child’s best interests. After completing her investigation, the

CFI filed a report in which she concluded that relocation to Alaska

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wouldn’t be in the child’s best interests and recommended that the

child live primarily with mother in Colorado.

¶5 In May 2025, the district court held a contested hearing on

father’s motion. Thereafter, the court issued a written order

denying father’s request to move to Alaska. It designated mother as

the primary custodian and ordered that the child live primarily with

her in Colorado. It also granted father parenting time in Alaska

during the summer and monthly visits in Colorado during the

school year.

II. Discussion

¶6 On appeal, father contends (1) that the district court applied

the wrong legal standard when analyzing his motion to relocate and

(2) that the court’s decision denying his motion constituted an

abuse of discretion because it wasn’t supported by the record or in

the child’s best interests. We reject both contentions.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 The standards for modification of parenting time are codified

in section 14-10-129, C.R.S. 2025. In re Marriage of Dale, 2025

COA 29, ¶ 9 (cert. granted in part July 21, 2025). Generally, “the

court may make or modify an order granting or denying parenting

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time rights whenever such order or modification would serve the

best interests of the child.” § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I).

¶8 However, section 14-10-129(2) limits the court’s ability to

modify a prior parenting time order in a way that “substantially

changes” parenting time and changes the party with whom the

child resides a majority of the time. In such instances, the court

“shall retain the parenting time schedule established in the prior

decree” unless, as provided in subsection (c), the party with whom

the child resides a majority of the time is intending to relocate with

the child to a residence that substantially changes the geographical

ties between the child and the other party (the relocation

subsection), or, as provided in subsection (d), the child’s present

environment endangers the child’s physical health or significantly

impairs the child’s emotional development and the advantage of a

change of environment outweighs the harm a change would likely

cause to the child (the endangerment subsection).

§ 14-10-129(2)(c)-(d).

¶9 In determining whether to modify a parenting time order

under the relocation subsection, the court must apply the best

interests standard. See In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135,

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140-48 (Colo. 2005); In re Marriage of DeZalia, 151 P.3d 647, 650

(Colo. App. 2006). More specifically, the court must consider the

best interest factors in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025, and

the relocation factors in section 14-10-129(2)(c). See

§ 14-10-129(2)(c); Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 140. In doing so, the court

must begin its analysis with each parent on equal footing and may

not presume that the child is made better off or disadvantaged by

relocating with the moving parent. Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 147. Each

parent has the burden to persuade the court that the relocation

would be in, or contrary to, the child’s best interests. Id. at 148.

¶ 10 By contrast, to modify under the endangerment subsection,

the court must start with a presumption that the prior orders, or

status quo, should remain in effect. In re Parental Responsibilities

Concerning B.R.D., 2012 COA 63, ¶ 21. To overcome the

presumption, the court must find that the evidence shows that the

status quo endangers the child and that the proposed modification

will create advantages that outweigh any harm it may cause. Id.

The court must also determine whether the proposed modification

is in the child’s best interests. Id.

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¶ 11 We review parenting time modifications for an abuse of

discretion. Dale, ¶ 7. Thus, we won’t disturb the district court’s

decision unless it is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,

or it misconstrues or misapplies the law. Id. at ¶ 8; In re Marriage

of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 8. We also won’t disturb the court’s

factual findings when the record supports them. People in Interest

of N.G.G., 2020 COA 6, ¶ 10. But we review de novo whether the

court applied the appropriate legal standard when modifying

parenting time. Dale, ¶ 8.

B. Application of the Best Interests Standard

¶ 12 Father argues that the district court erred by applying the best

interests standard instead of the endangerment standard. He

doesn’t dispute that the best interests standard applies when a

court modifies parenting time under section 14-10-129(2)(c).

Rather, he argues that that the relocation subsection didn’t apply to

his motion because a move from Wisconsin to Alaska wouldn’t have

“substantially change[d] the geographical ties” between mother and

the child. Consequently, he asserts that the only authority for

changing the child’s primary custodian came from the

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endangerment subsection, which the court didn’t apply. We discern

no error.

1. Preservation

¶ 13 As a threshold matter, mother asserts that father failed to

preserve his legal standard argument for appeal. We agree that

father never argued to the district court that it should apply the

endangerment standard in resolving his motion. And father admits

that “there was never a direct discussion about which legal

standard should be applied.”

¶ 14 Moreover, in father’s motion to relocate, he specifically cited

section 14-10-129(2)(c) as the basis for his request, never

mentioning subsection (2)(d) or the endangerment standard. In

addition, in the parties’ joint trial management certificate, father

asserted that the court should consider the child’s best interests.

He further asserted, citing Ciesluk, that the court was required to

begin its analysis “with each parent on equal footing” and couldn’t

presume that the child was made better off or disadvantaged by

relocating with him. Again, he didn’t mention the endangerment

subsection or argue that the endangerment standard applied.

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¶ 15 Nonetheless, father asserts that he wasn’t required to preserve

his argument because, according to him, a court’s application of the

law is part of the “merits” of its ruling, and a party may appeal the

merits of a court’s ruling regardless of preservation. He also claims

that he didn’t have the opportunity to preserve his argument before

the court issued its order applying the allegedly incorrect legal

standard.1

¶ 16 We need not decide whether father was required to preserve

his argument because, even assuming without deciding that the

argument is properly before us, we discern no error.

2. Analysis

¶ 17 By applying the relocation subsection, the district court

implicitly found that the move from Wisconsin to Alaska would

substantially change the geographical ties between the child and

mother. Moreover, the court expressly found that “Alaska and

Colorado are not close to each other” and credited mother’s

1 Father also asserts that he preserved his argument by “filing a

notice of appeal” and timely appealing the written orders. We agree
that father timely and correctly perfected his appeal, but that
doesn’t address whether he preserved his argument for applying the
endangerment standard.

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testimony “that the [move from Wisconsin to Alaska] w[ould] affect

her ability to visit the child as frequently.” To that end, the CFI

noted that a move from Wisconsin to Alaska would increase the

distance between the child and mother from 1,100 miles to 3,100

miles.2 And the CFI provided a comparison of how travel time and

cost would be significantly higher when travelling between Colorado

and Alaska as opposed to Colorado and Wisconsin. Thus, the

court’s implicit finding that the move would substantially change

the geographical ties between the child and mother enjoys record

support.

¶ 18 We reject father’s argument that, because the court could

retain the parties’ long-distance parenting plan and award mother

the same amount of parenting time, the move to Alaska wouldn’t

have substantially changed the geographical ties between the child

and mother. The legislature didn’t limit section 14-10-129(2)(c)’s

application to relocations that would substantially change the

noncustodian’s parenting time. Rather, the legislature limited

2 The CFI didn’t testify at the hearing, but the parties stipulated to

the admission of her report. Thus, when we refer to the CFI’s
statements throughout this opinion, we are referring to the
statements in the CFI’s report, not testimony.

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subsection (2)(c)’s application to relocations that would

substantially change the geographical ties between the child and

noncustodian parent. See Byers Peak Props., LLC v. Byers Peak

Land & Cattle, LLC, 2026 CO 7, ¶ 25 (in construing a statute, we

respect the legislature’s choice of language).

¶ 19 Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the district

court’s implicit finding that father’s proposed relocation would

substantially change the geographical ties between the child and

mother. As a result, the court didn’t err by applying the relocation

subsection and the best interests standard in evaluating father’s

motion to relocate with the child. See Ciesluk, 113 P.3d at 140-42;

DeZalia, 151 P.3d at 649-50.

C. Denial of Father’s Motion to Relocate

¶ 20 Father also contends that the district court abused its

discretion by denying his motion to relocate because the evidence

didn’t support the court’s findings and its decision wasn’t in the

child’s best interests. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 21 After the contested hearing, the district court entered a

thorough and detailed written order. The court began its analysis

by recognizing that, under section 14-10-129(2)(c) and Ciesluk,

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there was no presumption in favor of either parent even though

father had been the primary custodian leading up to the hearing.

The court then carefully considered the relocation factors under

section 14-10-129(2) and the best interests factors under section

14-10-124(1.5)(a). It made findings related to every factor, and the

record supported those findings. Based on those findings, the court

determined that it was in the child’s best interests to live primarily

with mother in Colorado, and it modified the parenting time orders

to reflect that determination.

¶ 22 Father makes specific challenges to the following portion of the

district court’s order:

First, the absence of extended family in either
location evens the scales in terms of location.
Second, the Court agrees with Mother that the
timing of the evaluation is problematic.
Mother flagged these concerns years ago, but
Father took no action even when he
demonstrated awareness of a potential issue.
Third, the Court has concerns about Father
isolating the child. The Court therefore finds it
in the child’s best interest that the child live in
Colorado during the school year. Finally, the
Court also agrees with the CFI’s analysis in
terms of where the parents are at in terms of

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their ability to devote time and energy to the
child.3

¶ 23 We address each of these findings in turn.

1. “Problematic Timing” of the Child’s Evaluation

¶ 24 First, father asserts that the evidence didn’t support the

court’s finding about the “problematic” timing of the child’s autism

spectrum disorder (ASD) evaluation. But the record belies father’s

assertion.

¶ 25 At the hearing, father admitted that mother had previously

raised concerns that the child may have ASD. But mother testified

that father didn’t initiate any discussion about having the child

evaluated for ASD until after the CFI filed the report, which

3 Father appears to assert that this quoted portion of the district

court’s order was its only reasoning for denying his motion to
relocate. But that isn’t the case. Rather, the court made numerous
other findings supporting its decision, including: (1) although father
may have more financial freedom in Alaska, no evidence showed
that Alaska would provide a “qualitatively better situation” than
Wisconsin, nor did the evidence show that Alaska was “better” for
the child than Colorado; (2) after permanent orders entered, mother
had spent “significant time with the child” and “a lot of time, effort,
and money to make sure she remained a part of the child’s life”;
(3) the child would have to attend a new school regardless of
whether she moved to Alaska with father or to Colorado with
mother, so some transition was inevitable; and (4) the child had
“more experience living in Colorado in the recent past,” and
Colorado would be “more familiar” to the child than Alaska.

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recommended that the court deny father’s motion to relocate.

Further, the parents’ online messages were admitted as evidence

and showed that mother’s response to father’s request for her

consent was, “Wow! What makes you want to get [the child]

evaluated now? I’ve literally been suggesting we do this for years.”

Mother agreed to have the child evaluated one month before the

relocation hearing. But, according to mother, when the provider the

parties agreed on couldn’t evaluate the child before the relocation

hearing, father took the child to be evaluated by a different provider

that mother hadn’t consented to.

¶ 26 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that ample evidence

supported the court’s finding that the timing of the child’s

evaluation was “problematic” as it related to the timing of the CFI’s

report and the hearing. Although the evidence could have

supported a different conclusion, that doesn’t mean that the court

abused its discretion. See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205,

¶ 35 (even when evidence in the record could have supported a

different conclusion, we won’t substitute our judgment for that of

the district court).

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¶ 27 Accordingly, we reject father’s argument that the court erred

by finding that the timing of the evaluation was “problematic.”

2. Concerns About Isolating the Child

¶ 28 Second, father asserts that the evidence didn’t support the

court’s “concerns about father isolating the child.” Again, the

record shows otherwise.

¶ 29 In addition to the finding that father points us to, the court

noted that a “very significant factor” in its prior orders, which

allowed the child to live primarily with father in Wisconsin, was the

child’s connection to extended paternal and maternal family who

lived there. The court found that since the prior orders, father had

“declined (or made no effort)” to allow the child to see her extended

family in Wisconsin. The court found that “not furthering” those

relationships increased the court’s concerns about father isolating

the child and showed that father wasn’t putting the child’s needs

first.

¶ 30 The record supported those findings. The CFI stated, and

father admitted, that he had never taken the child to see her

maternal extended family during his parenting time and that the

child didn’t have a relationship with her paternal extended family

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because father was estranged from them. Moreover, the CFI said

that “father and the child’s daily routine involves much time with

only the two of them together,” which was “absolutely invaluable”

but also showed that father could be “somewhat reclusive at times.”

The CFI also said that the child primarily interacts only with father

“to the apparent exclusion of other adults in her life.”

¶ 31 As father points out, he testified that he had some friends in

Alaska and that he had always encouraged the child to participate

in social and extracurricular activities. But the court heard that

testimony and still expressed concerns about isolation in its

findings. And we can’t reweigh the evidence or disturb the court’s

findings when, as here, they have record support and are based on

credibility determinations. See Nelson, ¶ 35; see also In re Marriage

of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330 (“It is the responsibility of the trial

court as the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses

and the sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence.”).

¶ 32 Accordingly, we reject father’s argument that the court erred

by finding that a move to Alaska would isolate the child.

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3. Ability to Devote Time and Energy to the Child

¶ 33 Next, father argues that the district court’s reliance on the

CFI’s analysis “in terms of [the parents’] ability to devote time and

energy to the child” wasn’t in line with its decision to deny his

motion to relocate. He argues that the CFI’s analysis didn’t support

the court’s implicit finding that mother would be able to devote

more time and energy to the child than father. The record shows

the opposite.

¶ 34 True, the CFI acknowledged father’s close relationship with the

child and identified many positive aspects of father’s parenting.

But the CFI also stated that mother would be “better equipped” to

support the child if she moved to Colorado because mother’s “life in

Colorado [was] already established making [her] slightly more stable

than father.” The CFI noted that “mother, unlike father, [was]

already established in her home, job, and community,” so she

would be “better able to focus on [the child] and her needs as she

[became] accustomed to her new world.” Further, the CFI said that

while father’s move to Alaska could result in more financial

stability, his plan was “laden heavily with unknowns.” He would be

“starting a relatively new job, in a relatively new state, with a new

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home [and] relatively new partner.” Noting that mother was

committed to staying in Colorado, the CFI opined that “the child’s

need for stability, continuity and family involvement, especially with

Mother, outweigh[ed] any financial benefit in relocating to Alaska.”

¶ 35 Based on the foregoing, we reject father’s assertion that the

CFI’s analysis didn’t support the court’s implicit finding that mother

would be able to devote more time and energy to the child than

father.

4. Best Interests of the Child

¶ 36 Finally, father argues that the district court didn’t sufficiently

consider the child’s wishes and that its ultimate decision wasn’t in

the child’s best interests. To get there, father points us to evidence

that was favorable to him and argues that such evidence showed

that it was in the child’s best interests to move to Alaska with him.

By doing so, father urges us to reweigh the statutory factors and

evidence in his favor to substitute our judgment for that of the

district court. But we can’t do that. See Nelson, ¶ 35; see also In re

Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989) (an appellate court

may presume that the district court considered all admitted

evidence).

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D. Conclusion

¶ 37 In sum, because the district court applied the correct legal

standard and the evidence supported its decision, we can’t say that

it exceeded its broad discretion by denying father’s motion to

relocate and ordering that the child live primarily with mother in

Colorado.

III. Disposition

¶ 38 We affirm the order.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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