Peo in Interest of KGS

25CA1893 Peo in Interest of KGS 04-09-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1893
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JV30488
Honorable Elizabeth McCarthy, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.G.S., a Child,

and Concerning S.S.O.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Grove and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 9, 2026

Miko Brown, City Attorney, Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, for Appellee

Sheena Knight, Guardian Ad Litem

James West, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Longmont, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 S.S.O. (father) appeals the judgment terminating his parent-

child legal relationship with K.G.S. (the child). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The Denver Human Services Department filed a petition in

dependency or neglect concerning the then-two-year-old child. The

petition alleged, among other things, that the child’s mother had

been using methamphetamine and behaving erratically and that

she had accused her then-partner of sexually abusing the child. At

the time, father’s contact with the child was limited to two

supervised visits per month under an allocation of parental

responsibilities in a prior dependency and neglect case.

¶3 Father entered a no-fault admission to the petition, and the

juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected. The

court then adopted a treatment plan requiring father to (1) complete

a substance abuse evaluation, maintain sobriety, and complete

substance use testing “as asked”; and (2) demonstrate safe and

appropriate parenting for the child by learning to meet the child’s

needs, providing stable housing, and maintaining employment.

¶4 Nearly three years later, and more than three years after the

petition was filed, the Department moved to terminate the parent-

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child legal relationship between father and the child. After an

evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion and

terminated father’s parental rights. As relevant to this appeal, the

court found that although father had made some progress, he had

failed to comply with either component of his treatment plan and

was unfit and unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time.

II. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 To terminate a parent-child legal relationship, the juvenile

court must find by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child

has been adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has

not reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved

treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is

unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶6 A treatment plan seeks to preserve the parent-child legal

relationship by helping the parent overcome the problems that

required government intervention. K.D. v. People, 139 P.3d 695,

699 (Colo. 2006). A plan is successful if it renders a parent fit or

corrects the conduct or condition that led to the intervention.

People in Interest of C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603, 611 (Colo. 1982).

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¶7 When a child is under six years old, as in this case, the

juvenile court must consider the expedited permanency planning

provisions, which require the child to be placed in a permanent

home as expeditiously as possible. See §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025. In such cases, the court may not find

that a parent is in reasonable compliance with, or has been

successful at, a treatment plan if the parent (1) exhibits the same

problems addressed in the treatment plan without adequate

improvement and (2) is unable or unwilling to provide nurturing

and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s physical, emotional,

and mental health needs and conditions. § 19-3-604(1)(c)(I)(B).

¶8 A parent is unfit if their conduct or condition renders them

unable or unwilling to give their child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶9 When deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

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consider whether any change has occurred during the proceeding,

the parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of

the parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 24. What constitutes a reasonable time is fact-specific

and must be determined by considering the physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs of the child. Id. at ¶ 25. But a

“reasonable time” is not an indefinite time. Id. And even when a

parent has made progress, the court is not required to give the

parent additional time to become fit. See id. at ¶¶ 24-25.

¶ 10 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s factual findings for

clear error, but we review de novo its legal conclusions based on

those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

III. Treatment Plan Compliance

¶ 11 Father argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that he

did not reasonably comply with his treatment plan. We disagree.

¶ 12 As an initial matter, father asserts that it is “unclear” whether

the treatment plan was appropriate. But other than asserting that

he was not involved in the issues that prompted the petition, father

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does not develop any argument that the treatment plan was not

appropriate. We therefore will not address the appropriateness of

the plan. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 29 (declining

to address assertion not developed with legal or factual argument).

¶ 13 As to father’s compliance with the treatment plan, the juvenile

court found that father failed to comply by (1) failing to complete

substance use testing as requested by the Department and ordered

by the court; (2) disengaging with the child’s therapy; and (3) failing

to secure stable housing and employment. The court also found

that the child had experienced significant trauma and needed a

protective caregiver who could meet her physical, mental, and

emotional needs — which the court found father could not do.

¶ 14 The record supports the court’s findings. First, as noted

above, father’s treatment plan required him to complete substance

use testing as requested. Although the caseworker did not have

concerns regarding father’s substance use for most of the case, that

changed approximately two months before the termination hearing,

when the caseworker observed a “pretty big change” in father’s

behavior. The caseworker testified that staff at the shelter where

father was living reported that father had sent them “disturbing

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messages,” was abusive toward shelter staff, and had “talked about

killing himself.” Father also stopped cooperating or communicating

with the caseworker, which was “out of the ordinary” for him.

¶ 15 Because of the caseworker’s concern that this change in

father’s behavior could be attributable to substance use, the court

ordered father to submit to urinalysis testing and hair follicle

testing, but father refused. See People in Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d

1080, 1082 (Colo. App. 2005) (concluding that mother’s refusal to

submit to urinalysis testing showed she was not committed to

meeting the child’s needs and was unfit); People in Interest of

M.H-K., 2018 COA 178, ¶ 69 n.5 (noting that father’s

noncompliance with court-ordered drug testing was “objectively

unreasonable”).

¶ 16 Second, a psychologist working with the child and father on

child-parent psychotherapy testified that father also stopped

engaging in therapy around the time of his behavior change. The

psychologist testified that therapy was necessary because the child

had experienced a significant amount of trauma. The psychologist

opined that the child would “need to work through this [trauma] her

whole life” and needed a caregiver who could meet these needs.

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¶ 17 To address this trauma, the psychologist used a three-phase

treatment approach. After working with the psychologist for more

than a year, father had not progressed past the first phase. The

psychologist explained that father still had “room to grow” in

understanding how the child’s trauma impacts her and in “taking

accountability for his role.” But father had stopped engaging in

therapy in the two months before the termination hearing and had

not reengaged, despite the psychologist’s efforts to reengage him.

¶ 18 Third, there was evidence that father had not secured stable

housing or employment. Although father had recently moved into

an apartment, the caseworker testified that she remained

concerned about father’s long “pattern of [housing] instability.”

About eighteen months before the termination hearing, father

secured transitional housing, but he was evicted seven months later

for not paying rent. He then stayed in two shelter programs before

obtaining a housing voucher that he used to find the apartment.

This history supported the court’s concern that father “could lose

his current housing particularly due to [his] unstable behavior of

the last few months.” The caseworker also testified that father did

not have stable employment, as his treatment plan required.

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¶ 19 Based on this, the caseworker opined that father had not

complied with his treatment plan and that the plan had not been

successful in rehabilitating father. Because the record supports

this conclusion, the juvenile court did not clearly err in so finding.

IV. Fitness

¶ 20 For similar reasons, we reject father’s contention that the

juvenile court clearly erred by finding that he was unfit and could

not become fit within a reasonable time. Father argues that he was

“a fit parent throughout,” and that he could have addressed the

issues that arose in the two months before the hearing if he had

been given a short amount of additional time. But despite noting

father’s progress, the juvenile court found otherwise, especially in

light of the expedited permanency planning provisions. In

particular, the court found that father was “no longer engaging with

[the child’s] therapy which is absolutely essential for this child.”

¶ 21 Again, the record supports the court’s findings. The

caseworker testified that, by the time of the termination hearing,

father had “disengaged from every part of [the case].” She opined

that, in light of that change, father was unfit and could not become

fit in the next six months because the case had been open for three

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years, father was “still in the same place,” and he had not “made

any progress” over the last few months. The caseworker concluded

that father was unable to provide reasonable parental care for the

child and that termination was in the child’s best interest.

¶ 22 Thus, because the record supports the juvenile court’s

determinations that father was unfit and unlikely to become fit

within a reasonable period of time, we discern no error.

V. Disposition

¶ 23 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE YUN concur.

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