Williamson v. Owens

25CA0317 Williamson v Owens 03-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0317
Prowers County District Court No. 24CV30011
Honorable Tarryn L. Johnson, Judge

Donald Williamson,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

John Owens, Jr., and the Board of County Commissioners of the County of
Prowers, Colorado,

Defendants-Appellants.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 19, 2026

Irwin Fraley, PLLC, Ken Falkenstein, Centennial, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee

Dagner | Schluter | Werber LLC, Leslie L. Schluter, Greenwood Village,
Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants
¶1 In this interlocutory appeal, defendants, John Owens, Jr., and

the Prowers County Board of County Commissioners (the Board),

appeal the district court’s order denying their motion to dismiss the

complaint filed by plaintiff, Donald Williamson, under the Colorado

Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). We reverse and remand with

directions.

I. Background

¶2 Owens, a volunteer firefighter, drove a firetruck through a red

light while responding to an emergency. Williamson, driving a red

Mustang, collided with the back of the firetruck. Williamson

brought claims for negligence and negligence per se against Owens

and for vicarious liability against the Board.

¶3 The CGIA normally gives government volunteers like Owens

and government bodies like the Board immunity from tort liability.

§ 24-10-106(1), C.R.S. 2025. But through a series of immunity

waivers, exceptions, and conditions, that immunity disappears if

Owens drove through the red light without “slowing down as may be

necessary for safe operation.” § 42-4-108(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025; see

Smith v. City & County of Denver, 2025 COA 70, ¶ 33.

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¶4 Williamson argues that Owens did not slow down as necessary

for safe operation, and therefore he and the Board waived immunity

under the CGIA. Owens and the Board deny that claim. They

requested a Trinity hearing for the district court to resolve disputed

facts related to immunity and, in their prehearing brief, sought

dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

¶5 The district court held a Trinity hearing and determined that

Williamson met his burden to establish that Owens and the Board

had waived immunity.

¶6 Owens and the Board appeal, arguing the court applied an

incorrect legal standard, misconstrued section 42-4-108(2)(b), and

erred by refusing to consider evidence bearing on the parties’

dispute of jurisdictional fact. We agree that the court applied the

wrong legal standard and failed to consider relevant evidence.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new Trinity hearing.

II. Immunity and Waiver Under the CGIA

¶7 Governmental immunity is waived if, in the course of

employment, a public employee injures another person while

operating a motor vehicle owned or leased by the public entity.

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§ 24-10-106(1)(a). But that waived immunity is reinstated if the

motor vehicle is an emergency vehicle, such as a firetruck, that is

operated in compliance with section 42-4-108(2) and (3). § 24-10-

106(1)(a); Smith, ¶ 33.

¶8 As relevant to this appeal, section 42-4-108(2)(b) provides

that, when responding to an emergency call or a fire alarm, a

firetruck driver may “[p]roceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign,

but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe

operation.” If an emergency vehicle driver complies with this

requirement and employs visual or audible signals as required by

section 42-4-108(3) while responding to an emergency, CGIA

immunity is restored and bars any tort action for injuries arising

out of the driver’s conduct. Smith, ¶ 33.

III. Standard of Review

¶9 Questions of governmental immunity — including whether it

has been waived — implicate a district court’s subject matter

jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Bilderback v. McNabb, 2020

COA 133, ¶ 6. When a public entity seeks dismissal under C.R.C.P.

12(b)(1), the district court is “free to weigh the evidence and satisfy

itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Trinity

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Broad. of Denv., Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916, 925 (Colo.

1993) (citation omitted). The plaintiff has the burden of proving

that the court has jurisdiction. Smith, ¶ 34. This burden is

“relatively lenient,” affording the plaintiff the reasonable inferences

from his undisputed evidence. City & County of Denver v. Dennis,

2018 CO 37, ¶ 11.

¶ 10 When the jurisdictional facts are in dispute, the district court

should conduct a Trinity hearing and enter findings of fact resolving

those disputes. Tidwell v. City & County of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 85-

86 (Colo. 2003); see Dennis, ¶ 9. “[B]ecause Trinity hearings are

limited in nature, and because tort concepts are naturally

subjective, the district court should not fully resolve the issue of

whether the government has committed negligence; rather, the

court should only satisfy itself that it has the ability to hear the

case.” Dennis, ¶ 11 (emphasis omitted).

¶ 11 The application of immunity under the CGIA presents a mixed

question of fact and law. Smith, ¶ 35. We defer to the court’s

factual findings and its resolution of factual disputes unless they

are clearly erroneous, finding no support in the record. Id. We

review de novo the court’s determination of questions of law,

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including whether the court applied the correct legal standard or

correctly interpreted a statute. Id. To promote the interest of

compensating victims of governmental negligence, we strictly

construe the CGIA’s immunity provisions, as well as its exceptions

to waivers of immunity. Id. at ¶ 36.

IV. Discussion

¶ 12 Owens and the Board argue that the district court (1) applied

an incorrect legal standard that limited its role in determining

immunity; (2) misconstrued section 42-4-108(2)(b); and (3) made

multiple evidentiary errors. We agree that the court applied an

incorrect legal standard and erred by excluding certain evidence

bearing on the issue of immunity. Because we reverse on these

bases, we do not reach the statutory interpretation issue.

A. Legal Standard

¶ 13 In his Trinity brief and at the hearing, Williamson argued that

he was only required to make a “prima facie case” — that is, present

“any evidence” — that Owens and the Board waived immunity

under the CGIA. At the hearing, he argued that he met this burden

because a jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence he

presented that Owens violated section 42-4-108(2)(b). He objected

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to the defense presenting any evidence in response because any

evidence the defense would have offered would have gone to the

question of liability and was properly reserved for the jury.

¶ 14 At the start of the hearing, the court stated that it tended to

agree with Williamson’s articulation of his burden. While the court

acknowledged that it could determine compliance with section 42-4-

108(2)(b) as a matter of law, it stated its concern that doing so

would require dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

would usurp the jury’s “determination of the factual issue.” At the

conclusion of the hearing, the court again stated its agreement that

Williamson “only has to demonstrate that [section] 42-4-108(2)(b)

was not necessarily complied with in order to find a waiver of

immunity under the CGIA.” It found that Williamson met this

burden for the “main reason” that Owens did “not slow down much”

despite there being ten cars near the intersection, coupled with

evidence that a van may have obstructed his view of the Mustang.

¶ 15 We conclude the court applied an incorrect standard. Recall

that the purpose of a Trinity hearing is for the court to resolve

factual disputes related to the issue of immunity. In this case,

whether immunity was waived turned on whether Owens complied

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with section 42-4-108(2)(b). As discussed further below, the parties

disputed several facts relevant to that issue, including whether

Owens’ sirens were on and whether his view was obstructed. The

court’s job at the Trinity hearing was to resolve those factual

questions before satisfying itself that Owens complied with section

42-4-108(2)(b) — not “necessarily,” but in fact. See Trinity, 848

P.2d at 925 (the standard governing a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) “differs greatly”

from that applied to a summary judgment motion or a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, where the plaintiff is afforded

the safeguard of having their allegations taken as true).

¶ 16 We recognize that Owens’ and the Board’s liability for

negligence per se also turned on whether Owens complied with the

statute, and the court was concerned about usurping the jury’s

function. Nevertheless, the court was required to determine

whether Owens complied with section 42-4-108(2)(b) to establish its

subject matter jurisdiction. See Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist.

R-1, 79 P.3d 1253, 1258 (Colo. 2003) (trial courts must “definitively

resolve all disputed issues of immunity, including those deemed

non-jurisdictional”); see also Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636, 643

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(Colo. 1998) (“Any factual dispute regarding the court’s jurisdiction

is for determination by the trial court, not the jury.”). By failing to

make this determination, the court relieved Williamson of his

burden to prove his version of the disputed facts.

B. Evidentiary Errors

¶ 17 We further conclude that the court compounded its legal error

by failing to consider certain evidence bearing on the parties’

dispute of jurisdictional fact.

¶ 18 To be sure, the district court did not err in every evidentiary

ruling it made at the Trinity hearing. For example, we disagree with

Owens and the Board that the court erred by considering Owens’

deposition statement that a green van was present at the

intersection and “maybe” obstructed his view of the Mustang. The

court acknowledged that Owens qualified his statement and seemed

unsure, noting that whether his view was obstructed was “at least a

possibility.” It was the district court’s role as the fact finder to

consider this and other conflicting evidence and to decide what

weight to give each piece of evidence. See Smith, ¶ 50; see also

Bilderback, ¶ 20 (requiring the court to consider and resolve

whether an emergency vehicle driver’s view was impeded, even

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though the defendants did not present evidence on that issue).

Likewise, we conclude the court properly declined to consider

evidence that it would have been impossible for Owens to avoid the

accident and that Williamson was looking down as he drove into the

intersection. This evidence went to the issue of Owens’ liability and

Williamson’s contributory negligence, not jurisdiction. Accordingly,

the court properly excluded it.

¶ 19 Nevertheless, we conclude the court improperly refused to

consider other evidence bearing on its determination of immunity.

Section 42-4-108(2)(b)’s requirement that a firetruck driver slow

down as may be necessary for safe operation requires a

consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. See Smith,

¶ 43. This includes evidence that Owens’ sirens and air horn were

dramatically audible (exceeding 100 decibels) well before he

approached the intersection and that Williamson entered the

intersection at a slow speed. Although the parties do not dispute

that Owens had his lights on for purposes of section 42-4-108(3),

whether he also had his sirens on may play into the totality of the

circumstances related to whether he complied with section 42-4-

108(2)(b).

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¶ 20 We recognize that the court allowed Owens and the county fire

chief to testify regarding Owens’ driving and applicable standards

for driving a firetruck, including the fact that Owens’ sirens were

on. But Williamson did not stipulate as much, so the fact was still

in dispute, and the court never made a factual finding that the

sirens were on. By excluding relevant evidence, the court failed to

fulfill its duty to resolve the parties’ factual disputes and to base its

legal conclusion on a well-developed record. See Finnie, 79 P.3d at

1258, 1261 (courts must resolve factual disputes related to

immunity and develop the record before determining whether the

case can proceed).

¶ 21 For the same reason, we conclude the court erred by declining

to consider photographs of the collision scene. The court rejected

this evidence because it was irrelevant to Owens’ conduct before the

collision. Relying on Bilderback and Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d

1082, 1086 (Colo. 2000), it altogether declined to consider the fact

that an accident had occurred. But far from precluding such a

consideration, Bilderback held that, “[i]n the case of section 42-4-

108(2)(b), the phrase ‘as may be necessary for safe operation’ calls

for the court to take into account how the [emergency driver]

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proceeded through the intersection.” Bilderback, ¶ 15 (emphasis

added) (the statute does not apply only to the driver’s conduct

before entering the intersection).

¶ 22 Corsentino applied a different statute in a different context.

There, the court concluded that the fact of an accident or damage

should not be considered in determining whether an emergency

vehicle driver endangered life or property under section 42-4-

108(2)(c). See 4 P.3d at 1093 (such a consideration may “lead to a

de facto abrogation of the immunity” because drivers only need

immunity when they cause an accident or damage). We agree with

Owens and the Board that the same considerations are not at play

under section 42-4-108(2)(b). As defense counsel argued,

photographs of the accident scene showed how the collision

occurred, including the relative speeds of the vehicles involved.

They were therefore relevant to whether Owens sufficiently slowed

down in compliance with section 42-4-108(2)(b).

¶ 23 Owens and the Board also argue the court should have

allowed their accident reconstruction engineer to testify that the

Mustang was only within the van’s profile for a thirtieth of a second.

Williamson argues the court properly excluded this evidence

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because it was not included in the engineer’s report. Because we

cannot be sure how this issue will arise on remand, we decline to

address it. We reiterate, however, that the court must allow the

parties to develop the record related to the issue of immunity and

should consider all admissible evidence that is relevant to that

inquiry. See L.J. v. Carricato, 2018 COA 3, ¶ 34 (the court is

required to resolve “all issues of immunity, including facts not

directly disputed by the parties” (citation omitted)).

¶ 24 Finally, we recognize that the district court determined it had

subject matter jurisdiction based on Williamson’s stipulation that

Owens slowed from thirty miles per hour to twenty-nine miles per

hour when entering the intersection, video evidence showing there

were ten cars near the intersection when Owens approached, and

Owens’ statement about the van. But because the court based its

conclusion on an incorrect legal standard and an underdeveloped

record, we conclude reversal is required.

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¶ 25 For these reasons, we reverse the court’s denial of Owens’ and

the Board’s motion to dismiss.1 We remand the case for the court

to make further findings of fact and conclusions of law resolving the

factual and legal disputes related to their governmental immunity.

In making these findings and conclusions, the court should

conduct a new Trinity hearing to allow the parties “to properly

explore and develop the facts necessary to determine whether”

immunity was waived. Finnie, 79 P.3d at 1261-62.

V. Disposition

¶ 26 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

1 Because we reverse on this basis, we do not address Owens’ and

the Board’s remaining contention that the court’s interpretation of
section 42-4-108(2)(b), C.R.S. 2025, violated the principles of
statutory enactment articulated in section 2-4-201, C.R.S. 2025.

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