Williams v. Stancil

25CA0837 Williams v Stancil 03-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0837
El Paso County District Court No. 25CV34
Honorable Gregory R. Werner, Judge

Jimmy Williams,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Moses Andre Stancil, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of
Corrections,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE KUHN
Fox and Sullivan, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 12, 2026

Jimmy Williams, Pro Se

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebekah Ryan, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
¶1 Plaintiff, Jimmy Williams, appeals the district court’s

judgment dismissing his lawsuit against defendant, Moses Andre

Stancil, the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of

Corrections (CDOC). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Williams was convicted of six felonies, including sexual

assault, and was sentenced into the custody of the CDOC. Still

serving his sentence, he asked the CDOC to award him earned time

credits that the CDOC had previously withheld. The CDOC denied

the request.1 See § 17-22.5-405, C.R.S. 2025.

¶3 Williams then filed a lawsuit against the CDOC, alleging that

the CDOC improperly withheld earned time credits by (1) neglecting

to enter credits for three separate months; (2) arbitrarily

withholding credits based on Williams being ineligible for the sex

offender treatment and monitoring program (SOTMP), see DOC

Admin. Reg. 700-19; and (3) improperly withholding all credits

while the CDOC held Williams in administrative segregation.

1 Williams requested the additional credits by submitting a letter to

his case manager and then exhausting the CDOC’s grievance
process.

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Williams thus sought to compel the CDOC to “reward all missing

earn[ed]-time.”

¶4 The CDOC moved to dismiss the complaint as moot under

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(5).

The CDOC asserted that Williams’s complaint amounted to a

C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) request for mandamus relief. It argued that

Williams’s claim regarding the three omitted months was moot

according to a 2025 official time computation, which the CDOC

submitted with its motion. And the CDOC argued that mandamus

relief was unavailable for the remaining claims because the CDOC

retains sole discretion over whether to grant earned time credits.

The district court adopted the CDOC’s motion as its order and

dismissed the lawsuit. Williams appeals.

II. Analysis

¶5 Williams contends that the district court erred by ruling that

his claims were moot or lacked plausible grounds on which to

compel the CDOC to grant him earned time credits. We disagree.

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A. Standard of Review

¶6 By summarily adopting the CDOC’s motion, the district court’s

order to dismiss necessarily relied on both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule

12(b)(5).

¶7 We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Rule 12(b)(1) as a mixed question of fact and law. Jefferson

County v. Dozier, 2025 CO 36, ¶ 13. This means we defer to the

court’s factual findings — unless clearly erroneous — and review its

legal conclusions de novo. Id.; see also Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Urbina,

2013 COA 155, ¶ 23 (“We review de novo the legal question of

whether a case is moot.”).

¶8 “Courts must confine their exercise of jurisdiction to cases

that present a live case or controversy.” Davidson v. Comm. for Gail

Schoettler, Inc., 24 P.3d 621, 623 (Colo. 2001). Thus, courts lack

subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate moot claims. See

Robertson v. Westminster Mall Co., 43 P.3d 622, 628 (Colo. App.

2001). “A case is moot when a judgment would have no practical

legal effect on the existing controversy.” Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO

70, ¶ 10.

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¶9 We also review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(5), and we apply the same standards as the

district court. Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc.,

2018 CO 3, ¶ 7. To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(5), a

plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that suggest plausible grounds

to support a claim for relief. Froid v. Zacheis, 2021 COA 74, ¶ 29;

Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 24.

¶ 10 In conducting our review, “[w]e accept all factual allegations in

the complaint as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, but we are not required to accept bare legal

conclusions as true.” Norton, ¶ 7. We may consider only “facts

alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or

incorporated by reference, and matters proper for judicial notice.”

Id. We will uphold a district court order granting a Rule 12(b)(5)

motion only if the plaintiff’s factual allegations do not support the

claim for relief as a matter of law. Norton, ¶ 7.

B. Applicable Law

¶ 11 As a preliminary matter, Williams’s complaint seemingly

invokes Rule 106(a)(4) by repeatedly asserting that the CDOC

abused its discretion. Of course, we construe pro se pleadings

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liberally, giving effect to their substance rather than form.2 See

Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. But despite his references to

abuses of discretion, we interpret his complaint as narrowly seeking

relief under Rule 106(a)(2). This is so because the complaint

explicitly seeks only to compel the CDOC to award Williams

additional earned time credits. Cf. Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA

5, ¶ 10 (holding that it is not our role to act as advocate for pro se

parties); Minshall v. Johnston, 2018 COA 44, ¶ 21 (“[L]iberal

construction does not include inventing arguments not made by the

pro se party.”).

¶ 12 Rule 106(a)(2) provides that a plaintiff may seek relief “to

compel a lower judicial body, governmental body, corporation,

board, officer or person to perform an act which the law specially

enjoins as a duty.” Also known as mandamus, Rule 106(a)(2)

provides “an extraordinary remedy that requires public officials to

perform plain legal duties they owe by virtue of their offices.”

Owens v. Carlson, 2022 CO 33, ¶ 21. Mandamus relief is

appropriate only when a plaintiff demonstrates that “(1) the plaintiff

2 The complaint’s title referenced C.R.C.P. 106(a)(2) and (4).
The
rest of Williams’s pleadings contain no mention of Rule 106(a)(4).

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has a clear right to the relief sought; (2) the agency has a clear duty

to perform the act requested; and (3) no other adequate remedy is

available to the plaintiff.” Verrier v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 77 P.3d

875, 877 (Colo. App. 2003). Mandamus can compel only the

performance of “a purely ministerial duty involving no discretionary

right”; it cannot compel a task that is “discretionary or involves the

exercise of judgment.” Owens, ¶ 21 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs

v. Cnty. Rd. Users Ass’n, 11 P.3d 432, 437 (Colo. 2000)).

¶ 13 As relevant here, the CDOC has the discretion under section

17-22.5-405(1) to award earned time credits:

Earned time, not to exceed ten days for each
month of incarceration or parole, may be
deducted from the inmate’s sentence upon a
demonstration to the [CDOC] by the
inmate . . . that the inmate has made
consistent progress in [specified] categories as
required by the [CDOC] . . . .

(Emphasis added.) Because the CDOC has discretion whether to

award earned time credits, a “plaintiff has no clear right to receive,

and [the CDOC] ha[s] no clear duty to grant, earned time credit[s].”

Verrier, 77 P.3d at 878.

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C. Mandamus Is Not Available for Williams’s
Sought Earned Time Credits

¶ 14 Williams’s claims for relief fail because they are either moot or

ultimately seek to compel the CDOC to exercise its discretionary

judgment through mandamus.

¶ 15 First, referring to the time records in his complaint, Williams

claimed that the CDOC neglected to enter earned time credits for

the months of March 2018, October 2013, and September 2009.

Yet with its motion to dismiss, the CDOC provided a 2025 official

time computation showing that the CDOC had properly entered

those three months into Williams’s time computation — which the

district court implicitly accepted as part of its order. In his opening

brief, Williams does not contest that the CDOC entered the three

months into his time records. The issue is thus moot because

compelling the CDOC to make time entries for those same months

in which it has already made entries will have no practical effect.

See Diehl, ¶ 10.

¶ 16 Williams also doesn’t challenge the substance of the March

2018 and October 2013 entries, which awarded him the full earned

time credits. But Williams asserts that the third month —

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September 2009 — remains omitted from the 2025 computation.

The record does not support this assertion. Contrary to his

argument, the time computation report shows that the CDOC

entered the month of September 2009 as zero, not that it omitted

the month altogether.3

¶ 17 Even so, Williams contends that the CDOC acted deceptively

by “alter[ing] [his] time computation” and “giving earn[ed] time

credits” for the omitted months only after he filed his complaint.4

But even assuming the CDOC’s reasons for altering his time

computation were fraudulently motivated, Williams still recognizes

that the CDOC did “giv[e] earned time credits” for two of the months

at issue, and the record reflects that the third time entry was

3 Williams did not raise the issue of whether the CDOC had a clear

duty to award him more than zero credits for September 2009, as
he merely contends that the month was omitted. See Colo. Div. of
Ins. v. Statewide Bonding, Inc., 2022 COA 67, ¶ 73 (“Arguments
never presented to, considered by, or ruled upon by a trial court
may not be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

4 Williams provided a 2022 official time computation that shows the

three months had been previously omitted. If accurate, it is
perhaps concerning that the CDOC allegedly waited until after
Williams initiated his lawsuit to correct its oversight. Nonetheless,
this concern doesn’t impact our analysis because it is not relevant
to Williams’s mandamus relief, as discussed above.

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added, albeit as a zero. He doesn’t assert that the credits weren’t

entered or that the district court erred by relying on the 2025

official time computation. See Dozier, ¶ 13. It follows that, even if

the CDOC acted for deceptive reasons, Williams’s claim remains

moot. In his complaint, Williams sought only to compel the CDOC

to fix the missing time entries. And he has already received that

relief. See Diehl, ¶ 10.

¶ 18 Second, Williams contends that the CDOC must award him

missing earned time credits for the period of December 1998 to

September 2005. During this period, the CDOC allegedly awarded

him less than ten days of earned time credits per month due to

Williams not participating in SOTMP. According to Williams, he

could not participate in SOTMP because the CDOC deemed him

ineligible for the program.5 See DOC Admin. Reg. 700-19(IV)(C)(4).

Further, he asserts that the CDOC began awarding him the

maximum amount of earned time credits after 2005, even though

Williams remained ineligible for SOTMP. Williams argues that this

5 Williams was purportedly classified as ineligible for SOTMP

because he had more than four years until his parole eligibility
date. See DOC Admin. Reg. 700-19(IV)(C)(4).

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demonstrates that the CDOC’s withholding of credits before 2005

based on his SOTMP ineligibility was capricious.

¶ 19 To be sure, the allegations that the CDOC withheld earned

time credits because it wouldn’t permit Williams to participate in a

treatment program give us pause. But that explanation also doesn’t

entirely line up with this record. It’s true that Williams received a

reduced number of hours forty-six times during the period he

challenges, and he received zero hours on twenty-one occasions.

But according to the report he submitted in support of his

argument, he also received the full amount of earned time for

fourteen of those months, interspersed among the others. This

pattern does not suggest that the CDOC was reducing his hours

because he was not participating in treatment for which he was not

yet eligible.6

¶ 20 All that said, we are ultimately unpersuaded that Williams is

entitled to relief because granting earned time credits — and

allocating SOTMP resources — are wholly discretionary acts. See

6 Additionally, as best as we can discern, Williams’s status of

“ineligible” would be considered compliant for purposes of earned
time. DOC Admin. Reg. 625-02(IV)(D)(3)(b)(2)(a).

10
Reeves v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 155 P.3d 648, 651 (Colo. App. 2007)

(“The [C]DOC has broad discretion over the classification and

rehabilitation of inmates and the management of prisons.”).

Therefore, as it relates to mandamus, Williams has no clear right to

compel the CDOC to award him discretionary earned time credits.

See Verrier, 77 P.3d at 878; Owens, ¶ 21.

¶ 21 Nevertheless, Williams further argues that under Chambers v.

Colorado Department of Corrections, 205 F.3d 1237, 1240-42 (10th

Cir. 2000), his status as a convicted sex offender triggers a

protected liberty interest that entitles him to earned time credits

that the CDOC withheld.

¶ 22 But Chambers is distinguishable because it involved an

inmate labeled as a sex offender — whom the CDOC then denied

earned time credits upon his refusing to admit the sex offender

status to receive treatment — based on sexual assault allegations

uncovered in his criminal record. Id. at 1242-43. Here though, the

CDOC classified Williams as a sex offender as a result of his

conviction for sexual assault. Thus, Williams’s protected liberty

interest wasn’t triggered because he “received the due process

required for his classification” as a sex offender due to his having

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“been convicted of a sex offense in a prior adversarial setting.”

Fisher v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 56 P.3d 1210, 1213 (Colo. App. 2002);

see also Reeves, 155 P.3d at 652 (“[T]he [C]DOC need not provide

an inmate an additional hearing where the inmate was previously

convicted of a sex offense . . . .”). As a result, even though Williams

disagrees with the CDOC’s allegedly changing policy regarding

earned time credits withheld for SOTMP ineligibility, his status as a

convicted sex offender doesn’t trigger any clear duty by the CDOC to

award him earned time credits. See Renneke v. Kautzky, 782 P.2d

343, 344-45 (Colo. 1989) (“[T]he General Assembly has granted the

[CDOC] discretion to . . . withhold, withdraw[,] or restore earned

time credits authorized to be awarded to inmates.”).

¶ 23 Third, Williams contends that the CDOC improperly withheld

all earned time credits during his placement in administrative

segregation for nearly two years.7 He claims that the CDOC must

award him earned time credits for this period because (1) he “went

above and beyond regarding his behavior and cognitive development

7 As best we can discern, administrative segregation was

administered under DOC Admin. Reg. 600-02, which has since
been repealed.

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courses,” and (2) the CDOC failed to document any noncompliance

in Williams’s “chronological record.”

¶ 24 Whatever Williams’s success in developmental programs,

nothing in the statutes or regulations suggests that administrative

segregation affects the CDOC’s discretion to withhold earned time

credits. See People v. Frank, 30 P.3d 664, 666 (Colo. App. 2000)

(holding that, while section 17-22.5-405(3) requires the CDOC to

review an inmate’s performance record, “the granting of earned-time

by the [C]DOC is discretionary”).

¶ 25 As for documentation, Williams alleges that the CDOC failed to

document the reason why it withheld earned time credits when he

was in administrative segregation. This in turn, he argues, violated

the CDOC’s “documentation of compliance or non-compliance”

regulation, which states that “[i]f less than the maximum earned

time amount is granted, the reason must be documented in the

offender’s chronological record.” DOC Admin. Reg. 625-02(IV)(D)(3).

¶ 26 Even so, Williams’s complaint doesn’t seek judicial review of

the documentation regulation or review of the regulation’s

application to him. Cf. Verrier, 77 P.3d at 879 (holding that the

CDOC’s creation of a policy was not quasi-judicial under Rule

13
106(a)(4) because “the policy applies to all inmates and was not

directed specifically at [the] plaintiff”). Nor does he seek to compel

the CDOC to update his chronological records.

¶ 27 Rather, he contends that, because the CDOC allegedly did not

comply with its documentation regulation, the CDOC now has a

duty to award him earned time credits for all the undocumented

time in administrative segregation.

¶ 28 Even assuming Williams’s allegations are true, as we must,

the regulation grants him no right to earned time credits, and

Williams fails to establish how the CDOC’s alleged regulatory

violation somehow deprives it of its statutory authority to withhold

or withdraw credits at its discretion. See § 17-22.5-405(1); see also

Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006) (rejecting as

frivolous inmate’s due process claim based on denial of earned time

credits during administrative segregation). Consequently, Williams

has no clear right to an award of earned time credits simply

because the CDOC failed to document its reasons for withholding

those credits, even if it failed to follow its own regulation while doing

so. See Verrier, 77 P.3d at 878.

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¶ 29 Therefore, because Williams’s claims all fail to state adequate

grounds for mandamus relief, we conclude that the district court

did not err by dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction and for

failure to state a claim. See C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), (5).

III. Disposition

¶ 30 The judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

JUDGE FOX and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.

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