Peo v. Dewitt

24CA1765 Peo v Dewitt 01-15-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1765
El Paso County District Court No. 22CR2300
Honorable Jessica L. Curtis, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Vincent Dewitt,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN*
Tow and Lipinsky, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced January 15, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Janet Kinniry, Alternate Defense Counsel, Gardner, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Vincent Dewitt, appeals the postconviction court’s

order denying his Crim. P. 35(c) motion for postconviction relief.

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 One evening, Dewitt was driving a car in the southbound lane

of a road in Colorado Springs, and the victim was driving a

motorcycle in the northbound lane. The two vehicles collided in the

northbound lane, and the victim died as a result.

¶3 Dewitt was charged with three counts of vehicular homicide;

one count each of driving under the influence, driving under

restraint, and speeding; four counts of unlawful possession of a

controlled substance; and five habitual criminal counts. During

pretrial proceedings, Dewitt filed a pro se motion to remove his

attorney and appoint conflict-free counsel, asserting his attorney

had a conflict because he refused to gather allegedly exculpatory

police body and dash camera footage. After a hearing, the district

court denied Dewitt’s request for appointment of conflict-free

counsel.

¶4 Dewitt then filed a pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel. Specifically, he argued that counsel refused to provide

1
Dewitt with the police body and dash camera footage and failed to

present at pretrial hearings exculpatory evidence that would show

the victim crossed into the southbound lane of the road and caused

the accident.

¶5 Before the district court could address the ineffective

assistance motion, Dewitt agreed to plead guilty to vehicular

homicide in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges

and a stipulated twenty-four-year prison sentence. Dewitt initialed

and signed his agreement to the following provisions of the written

plea documents: (1) “[m]y plea is voluntary and is not the result . . .

of undue influence or coercion or force by anyone”; (2) “I have

consulted with my lawyer concerning this matter and I am satisfied

with what my lawyer has done for me”; (3) “if I tender a plea of

guilty[,] I give up,” among other things, “the right to have the

prosecution prove each element of each offense charged in this

matter beyond a reasonable doubt”; (4) “I expressly waive my right

to trial by jury on all issues”; (5) “I agree that there is a factual basis

for the plea of guilty to the crime charged in this matter and I will

lay a full factual basis on the record upon entry of this plea

2
agreement”; and (6) “I agree that my plea will be final,” and “[o]nce I

plead guilty in court, I will not be allowed to change my mind.”

¶6 At the providency hearing, Dewitt confirmed his agreement to,

and understanding of, the plea deal and denied having any

questions. He acknowledged that he had spoken with his attorney

about the charges, possible defenses to the charges, the plea deal,

and the consequences of pleading guilty. Dewitt confirmed his

satisfaction with “the advice and representation that [he had]

received.”

¶7 The district court advised Dewitt that he did not have to plead

guilty and that he could proceed to a jury trial at which the

prosecution would be required to prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt and he could present a defense. When asked if he

had any questions about that, Dewitt responded,

No, Your Honor. I just would like to apologize
and give my sympathy to the [victim’s]
family . . . . This is an unfortunate situation
and I just hope that they find in their hearts to
one day have some type of understanding and
forgive me for being involved in this situation.
And I want to take responsibility in the role I
played in this, and I was just hoping that the
[prosecutor] and the [c]ourts could have some
type of leniency on me if possible for doing
lesser time so I would get back home to my

3
family, and get back to working, and get back
to my loved ones. I deeply am sorry, and I was
just hoping that that could be tooken [sic] into
consideration for a little lesser time.

The court ensured that Dewitt was not being forced to give up his

right to a jury trial and that he understood he would not be eligible

for a sentence less than that stipulated in the plea agreement.

¶8 When the court asked Dewitt “what happened that ma[d]e[]

[him] guilty of” vehicular homicide, Dewitt’s attorney responded,

In speaking with him about the date of the
offense, a lot of it is blurry for him. He doesn’t
remember a lot of it. He’s been described
what’s been contained in the police reports, he
agrees with it. He’s taking responsibility, he
does plead guilty under the – stipulates to the
factual basis just based upon his not exactly
remembering exactly what happened but he
will stipulate to the establishment of [count] 1
and he does take responsibility for this, Your
Honor.

Dewitt agreed with his counsel’s statements and expressly accepted

responsibility for causing of the victim’s death.

¶9 The district court accepted Dewitt’s guilty plea and imposed

the stipulated sentence.

¶ 10 About a week later, Dewitt filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion in

which he asserted, among other things, ineffective assistance of

4
counsel claims similar to those raised in his pre-plea ineffective

assistance of counsel motion. He asked for his sentence and

conviction to be “vacated and dismissed.”

¶ 11 The postconviction court denied Dewitt’s motion without a

hearing, finding, among other things, that he was aware of all the

issues he raised in his postconviction motion when he pleaded

guilty, and that the purported exculpatory evidence “was actively

being weighed and debated between Mr. Dewitt and his counsel

prior to the entry of a plea in this case.”

II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review

¶ 12 “Because a guilty plea is an extensive waiver of the defendant’s

constitutional rights, a challenge to a conviction based on a guilty

plea is usually limited to whether the plea was knowing, voluntary,

and intelligent.” Sanchez-Martinez v. People, 250 P.3d 1248, 1255

(Colo. 2011). Thus, “[a] defendant may challenge [a] guilty plea on

the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel when that challenge

goes to the issue of whether the plea was knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently entered.” People v. Stovall, 2012 COA 7M, ¶ 13,

284 P.3d 151, 154.

5
¶ 13 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

guarantees the right to effective representation of counsel. People v.

Rainey, 2023 CO 14, ¶ 1, 527 P.3d 387, 390. “In order to prevail on

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must prove

that 1) counsel’s performance was deficient and 2) the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.” Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d

1054, 1062 (Colo. 2007). The failure to prove one of these two

prongs defeats an ineffective assistance claim. People v. Thompson,

2020 COA 117, ¶ 50, 485 P.3d 566, 574.

¶ 14 To establish deficient performance, a defendant must prove

that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88

(1984); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (applying

the Strickland test to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in

cases involving guilty pleas). To establish prejudice, a defendant

must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶ 15 In the context of a guilty plea, the prejudice prong requires a

defendant to “show that there is a reasonable probability that, but

6
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see People v.

Duran, 2025 COA 34, ¶ 17, 569 P.3d 899, 904. Further, the

defendant “must convince the court that a decision to reject the

plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); see Duran, ¶ 17, 569

P.3d at 904.

¶ 16 “[M]otions that challenge the validity of a defendant’s plea or

the manner in which it was taken are properly brought under Crim.

P. 35(c).” People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410, 414 (Colo. 2005). We

review a district court’s summary denial of a Crim. P. 35(c) motion

de novo. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14, 459 P.3d 516, 519.

Defendants need not set forth evidentiary support for their

allegations in Crim. P. 35(c) motions, but instead need only assert

facts that, if true, would provide a basis for relief. White v. Denv.

Dist. Ct., 766 P.2d 632, 635 (Colo. 1988). A Crim. P. 35(c) motion

may be denied without an evidentiary hearing only when the

motion, files, and record clearly establish that the defendant’s

allegations are without merit and do not warrant relief. Ardolino v.

People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003). “The denial of a claim of

7
ineffective assistance of counsel without a hearing is justified if, but

only if, the existing record establishes that the defendant’s

allegations, even if proven true, would fail to establish either

constitutionally deficient performance or prejudice.” People v.

Chavez-Torres, 2016 COA 169M, ¶ 31, 410 P.3d 690, 696, aff’d,

2019 CO 59, 442 P.3d 843.

III. Analysis

¶ 17 Dewitt contends that the postconviction court erred by

summarily denying his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing

to obtain purportedly exculpatory evidence. We disagree.

¶ 18 “A defendant has no right to raise a constitutional claim after

a guilty plea when that claim does not relate directly to the

adequacy of the plea.” People v. Isham, 923 P.2d 190, 195 (Colo.

App. 1995). Thus, even if we assume counsel’s pre-plea

performance was constitutionally deficient, Dewitt does not explain

why the asserted deficiencies affected the validity of his guilty plea.

See Stovall, ¶ 13, 484 P.3d at 154; see also People v. Houser, 2020

COA 128, ¶ 24, 490 P.3d 863, 870 (we will not consider a bald legal

proposition presented without argument or development).

8
¶ 19 Indeed, as the postconviction court found, Dewitt was aware of

counsel’s purported pre-plea deficient performance when he

accepted the plea offer, expressed his satisfaction with counsel’s

representation, took responsibility for the victim’s death, and

pleaded guilty to a felony offense. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411

U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly

admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with

which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that

occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”); Neuhaus v. People,

2012 CO 65, ¶ 8, 289 P.3d 19, 21 (entry of a guilty plea generally

precludes review of issues that arose before the plea); Isham, 923

P.2d at 195 (“A guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional objections,

including fundamental, Sixth Amendment constitutional rights.”).

¶ 20 Further, as the postconviction court also found, Dewitt was

aware of the purported exculpatory evidence when he pleaded guilty

to obtain the benefits of the plea offer. See Medina v. People, 2023

CO 46, ¶¶ 39, 43, 535 P.3d 82, 90, 91 (affirming the denial of the

defendant’s challenge to his guilty plea in part because, even

though he maintained his innocence, he knowingly, voluntarily, and

9
intelligently pleaded guilty to take advantage of the benefits of plea

bargain, which included the dismissal of several other criminal

cases).

¶ 21 In addition, Dewitt did not allege that, but for counsel’s

deficient performance, he would have rejected the plea offer and

proceeded to trial. Specifically, he did not explain why rejecting a

plea offer that resulted in dismissal of nine substantive criminal

charges and five sentence enhancing habitual criminal counts

would have been rational under the circumstances. See People v.

Villanueva, 2016 COA 70, ¶ 68, 374 P.3d 535, 549 (A “conclusory

allegation is insufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland.”).

¶ 22 Accordingly, we conclude that Dewitt failed to allege facts that,

if true, would establish that counsel’s allegedly deficient

performance affected the validity of his guilty plea or that any

asserted deficiency prejudiced him. See People v. Delgado, 2019

COA 55, ¶ 8, 442 P.3d 1021, 1024 (A court may deny a Crim. P.

35(c) motion without a hearing “if the claims are bare and

conclusory in nature and lack supporting factual allegations.”).

¶ 23 To the extent Dewitt argues that the police and the

prosecution committed pre-plea misconduct, he waived these issues

10
when he pled guilty, and he does not address how such actions

undermined the validity of his guilty plea. See Neuhaus, ¶ 8, 289

P.3d at 21 (A guilty plea waives nonjurisdictional pre-plea issues

“because a ‘guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events

which has preceded it in the criminal process.’” (quoting Tollett, 411

U.S. at 266-67)); see also Houser, ¶ 24, 490 P.3d at 870 (declining

to address unsupported arguments).

¶ 24 And to the extent Dewitt asserts that the prosecution’s

evidence was insufficient to support a finding of guilt on the

charged offenses, we conclude that his entry of a guilty plea

precludes such review. See § 16-7-206(3), C.R.S. 2025 (“The

acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty acts as a waiver by the

defendant of the right to trial by jury on all issues . . . [and] also

acts as a conviction for the offense.”); Neuhaus, ¶ 8, 289 P.3d at 21

(“A guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a criminal

charge.”); Patton v. People, 35 P.3d 124, 128 (Colo. 2001) (“By

pleading guilty, a defendant waives a number of important

constitutional rights, including . . . the right to insist at trial that

the prosecution establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”);

People v. Flagg, 18 P.3d 792, 794 (Colo. App. 2000) (“A plea of guilty

11
has the same effect as if defendant had been tried before a jury and

had been found guilty on evidence covering all the material facts.”).

¶ 25 Last, to the extent Dewitt is challenging the district court’s

order denying his pre-plea request for the appointment of

conflict-free counsel, we decline to consider that argument. See

Neuhaus, ¶ 8, 289 P.3d at 21 (Because “a guilty plea precludes

review of issues that arose prior to the plea,” “a defendant must

plead not guilty and go to trial to preserve appellate review of his

constitutional challenges to pretrial proceedings.”); see also People

v. Goldman, 923 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo. App. 1996) (“Allegations not

raised in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion or during the hearing on that

motion and thus not ruled on by the trial court are not properly

before this court for review.”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 26 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LIPINSKY concur.

12