Peo v. Gwaltney

24CA0353 Peo v Gwaltney 12-31-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0353
El Paso County District Court No. 09CR688
Honorable Laura N. Findorff, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Taylor Lane Gwaltney,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Kuhn and Martinez*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 31, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, William G. Kozeliski, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Suzan Trinh Almony, Alternate Defense Counsel, Broomfield, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Taylor Lane Gwaltney, appeals the postconviction

court’s denial of his Crim. P. 35(c) motion without an evidentiary

hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 The victim was found deceased on a pedestrian bridge after

police were alerted to the location of his body by an anonymous

call. The victim, who was unhoused at the time of his death, died

from severe head trauma. Police investigated Gwaltney, who lived

nearby and had told several acquaintances that he had beaten a

“bum” to death on the bridge.

¶3 The prosecution charged Gwaltney with first degree murder.

Gwaltney’s first trial ended in a mistrial after Cy Ormsby Jr. — a

witness for the prosecution — invoked his Fifth Amendment right to

remain silent.

¶4 After a second trial, a jury convicted Gwaltney as charged.

The trial court imposed a life sentence without the possibility of

parole. Gwaltney appealed the conviction, which was affirmed by a

division of this court. People v. Gwaltney, (Colo. App. No.

10CA1272, Nov. 21, 2012) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

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¶5 Gwaltney filed a pro se Crim P. 35(c) motion for postconviction

relief. As relevant here, Gwaltney’s pro se motion asserted claims

for ineffective assistance of counsel based on allegations that his

counsel failed to “point out” Ormsby as an alternate suspect and

failed to investigate whether Gwaltney was competent at the time of

trial.1

¶6 The trial court appointed Gwaltney postconviction counsel

who filed a supplement to Gwaltney’s pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion

(jointly, the postconviction motion).2 In the supplement, Gwaltney’s

postconviction counsel asserted additional claims for ineffective

assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to (1) pursue

1 Gwaltney’s pro se motion also asserted his trial counsel was

ineffective by failing to (1) investigate his mental illness at the time
of the murder; (2) properly cross-examine a coroner witness;
(3) properly cross-examine a different witness about their
inconsistent statements; (4) move to suppress “evidence of bloody
pants”; and (5) object to the prosecution’s reference to certain
physical evidence not introduced at trial. Gwaltney doesn’t reassert
these claims on appeal; we therefore deem them abandoned. People
v. Osorio, 170 P.3d 796, 801 (Colo. App. 2007).
2 Neither Gwaltney nor the People indicate why Gwaltney’s

appointed counsel didn’t supplement his pro se motion, which was
filed in 2014, until 2020. Nor is it clear from the record what the
delay was. However, because there is no time limit for bringing
postconviction challenges to class 1 felony convictions,
§ 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025, Gwaltney’s pro se motion and the
supplement were each timely filed.

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an alternate suspect theory of defense and (2) assert that

Gwaltney’s medications interfered with his ability to follow the trial

proceedings and assist in his defense. Gwaltney requested an

evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in his postconviction

motion, as well as an order vacating his judgment of conviction and

granting him a new trial. The postconviction court issued a written

order summarily denying Gwaltney’s postconviction motion without

a hearing.

¶7 Gwaltney now appeals, contending that the postconviction

court erred by denying his postconviction motion without a hearing

because he set forth facts showing that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to (1) endorse an

alternate suspect theory of defense and (2) argue that the side

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effects of Gwaltney’s medications negatively impacted his

competency3 during trial. We reject both contentions.

II. Applicable Legal Principles

¶8 A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Ardolino v.

People, 69 P.3d 73, 76 (Colo. 2003). To succeed on a Crim. P. 35(c)

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that

(1) counsel performed deficiently and (2) the deficient performance

prejudiced the defendant. People v. Chalchi-Sevilla, 2019 COA 75,

¶ 6 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). It is the defendant’s burden

to prove both Strickland prongs by a preponderance of the evidence.

3 Throughout his briefing, Gwaltney articulates this argument by

stating that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to “raise the
issue” that Gwaltney’s mental health and “daily psychiatric
medications interfered with his ability to follow the trial proceedings
and assist in his defense.” Thus — despite not using the term
“competency” anywhere in his briefing — Gwaltney’s argument is in
essence an assertion that his trial counsel should have raised the
issue of his legal competence under section 16-8.5-102(2)(b), C.R.S.
2025. See also § 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. 2025 (“‘Incompetent to
proceed’ means that, as a result of a mental disability . . . , the
defendant does not have sufficient present ability to consult with
the defendant’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding in order to assist in the defense . . . .”).

4
People v. Corson, 2016 CO 33, ¶ 34; People v. McDowell, 219 P.3d

332, 339 (Colo. App. 2009).

¶9 To satisfy the first prong of Strickland, the defendant must

prove that counsel’s acts or omissions “fell outside the range of

professionally competent assistance.” People v. Luong, 2016 COA

13M, ¶ 9 (quoting People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 294 (Colo.

1996)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To satisfy the second prong of

Strickland, a defendant must prove that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s deficient performance; said differently, the defendant

must show there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Luong, ¶ 9 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

¶ 10 We review de novo a postconviction court’s decision to

summarily deny a Crim. P. 35(c) motion. People v. Cali, 2020 CO

20, ¶ 14. To warrant a hearing, a defendant must assert facts that,

if true, would provide a basis for relief. People v. Simpson, 69 P.3d

79, 81 (Colo. 2003). A court may deny a Crim P. 35 motion

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel without a hearing if “the

existing record establishes that the defendant’s allegations, even if

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proven true, would fail to establish one or the other prong of the

Strickland test.” Ardolino, 69 P.3d at 77.

III. Failure to Endorse an Alternate Suspect Theory of Defense

A. Additional Facts

1. First Jury Trial

¶ 11 Before his first trial, Gwaltney discussed with his defense

counsel4 whether to present an alternate suspect defense. His

counsel decided to proceed with a general denial defense, arguing

that the prosecution could not meet its evidentiary burden.

¶ 12 During the trial, Ormsby — a friend of Gwaltney’s with whom

Gwaltney had lived — testified as a witness for the prosecution.

During direct examination, Ormsby acknowledged lying to the

police during the investigation and made several conflicting

statements — including some suggesting he had more knowledge of

the facts surrounding the crime than he had acknowledged before

trial. The trial court raised a concern about Ormsby possibly

incriminating himself and stopped Ormsby’s testimony until he had

the opportunity to consult with court-appointed counsel.

4 The same two-attorney team represented Gwaltney at each trial.

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¶ 13 During the break in Ormsby’s testimony, the parties and the

court discussed the possibility of prosecutorial immunity for

Ormsby. During that conversation, defense counsel said, “[I]t’s our

position that all along [Ormsby] has been an alternate suspect.”

Defense counsel also said that she had “recently” received discovery

statements that placed Ormsby at the scene of the crime, and that

she intended to cross-examine Ormsby about these statements and

other evidence indicating Ormsby was involved in the crime.

¶ 14 After being advised by counsel, Ormsby asserted his Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent, and the court declared a mistrial

because of defense counsel’s resulting inability to cross-examine

Ormsby.

2. Second Jury Trial

¶ 15 Before Gwaltney’s second trial, the prosecution filed a motion

seeking to exclude Gwaltney from presenting evidence that Ormsby

was an alternate suspect. In response, the defense said that they

didn’t intend to endorse an alternate suspect defense or present

specific evidence of Ormsby as an alternate suspect but would raise

issues about the sufficiency of the investigation and evidence.

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¶ 16 The prosecution called Ormsby as a witness in Gwaltney’s

second trial, and Ormsby again asserted his Fifth Amendment right

to remain silent.

¶ 17 In closing argument, defense counsel argued that the jury

didn’t hear from Ormsby, that Ormsby knew where evidence was

located, and that the police didn’t reliably investigate Ormsby.

Defense counsel also suggested that more than one person was

involved in the murder, with the “best person” being Ormsby.

B. Analysis

¶ 18 Gwaltney argues that his trial counsel were ineffective because

they failed to pursue an alternate suspect defense alleging that

Ormsby was primarily responsible for the victim’s death. Gwaltney

alleges that he was prejudiced by counsel’s performance because

had his counsel endorsed an alternate suspect defense, the jury

would have reasonably doubted his responsibility for the victim’s

death. We conclude that Gwaltney has failed to prove the second

Strickland prong.5

5 Because we conclude that trial counsel’s conduct didn’t prejudice

Gwaltney, we need not address whether counsel’s performance was
deficient. See Ardolino v. People, 69 P.3d 73, 77 (Colo. 2003).

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¶ 19 Gwaltney essentially argues that had his trial counsel

endorsed an alternate suspect defense, the jury would have been

able to receive and consider additional evidence implicating

Ormsby. But he doesn’t explain how merely endorsing an alternate

suspect defense would have made certain evidence admissible.

Here, much of the evidence that Gwaltney asserts should have been

admitted consisted of statements Ormsby allegedly made related to

the crime. But Ormsby asserted his right not to testify, and his

alleged statements still needed to meet an applicable hearsay

exception to be admissible. People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 32.

The trial court found much of this evidence was inadmissible

hearsay and expressed that some of this evidence appeared to be

inadmissible because it wasn’t relevant. And because Gwaltney

doesn’t explain how his trial counsel’s endorsement of an alternate

suspect theory would have resulted in a different trial court ruling

or in any way have made this evidence or any other evidence in his

defense admissible, he hasn’t established that his trial counsel’s

performance prejudiced him. To the extent that Gwaltney argues

that endorsing an alternate suspect theory would have resulted in

an evidentiary hearing and entitled him to a jury instruction, he

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hasn’t explained how this would have resulted in the admission of

additional evidence or otherwise developed this argument.

IV. Failure to Raise Gwaltney’s Competency During Trial

¶ 20 Gwaltney’s postconviction motion asserts that he “was

incompetent to proceed” and that the side effects of his prescribed

medications “significantly impaired his ability to participate or even

follow the trial proceedings.” Gwaltney says his counsel were aware

that he was falling asleep during trial, and he asserts that he had

disclosed the side effects of his medications to his counsel who

failed to raise these issues with the court. He contends that in an

evidentiary hearing, he would have testified that one of his

medications — which his mental health provider discontinued in

the middle of the second trial — made him “groggy and sleepy” and

amplified his inability to focus and retain information.

¶ 21 Gwaltney asserts that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s

deficient performance because the jury would have acquitted him

due to the “abundant evidence of [his] [i]nsanity,” or that, at a

minimum, the trial would have been delayed until his competency

was restored. Gwaltney further asserts that if his medications had

been modified, he would have been able to focus on trial and better

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assist in his defense. He attached to his postconviction motion

exhibits detailing his prescribed medications and notes from his

mental health provider in support of these arguments.

¶ 22 Accepting Gwaltney’s allegations as true, Gwaltney hasn’t

demonstrated that his mental health issues amounted to legal

incompetence. A defendant is incompetent to proceed only if, “as a

result of a mental disability,” he lacks either “sufficient present

ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding in order to assist in the defense” or “a

rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings.”

§ 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. 2025; People v. Anderson, 2020 COA 56

¶ 14. Thus, Gwaltney’s allegation that he was incompetent is

conclusory, and a “conclusory allegation is insufficient to establish

prejudice under Strickland.” People v. Villanueva, 2016 COA 70,

¶ 68.

¶ 23 Gwaltney also hasn’t shown that being sleepy and groggy

during trial impacted his ability to rationally consult with his

lawyers or impaired his ability to understand the proceedings. To

the contrary, Gwaltney’s pro se motion demonstrates he understood

the nature of the case and the severity of the charges.

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Furthermore, Gwaltney doesn’t explain how he would have

additionally assisted his trial counsel or how his assistance to trial

counsel would have otherwise affected the outcome of his trial.

¶ 24 Thus, Gwaltney hasn’t shown that his counsel’s failure to

raise his competency with the court prejudiced him. And because

Gwaltney failed to prove the second Strickland prong with respect to

this claim, the postconviction court didn’t err by denying this claim

without a hearing.

V. Disposition

¶ 25 The postconviction court’s order is affirmed.

JUDGE KUHN and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.

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