Peo in Interest of CT

25CA0475 Peo in Interest of CT 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0475
El Paso County District Court No. 21JV540
Honorable Robin Chittum, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of C.T., Child-Appellant,

and Concerning M.N.S.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VI
Opinion by JUDGE SULLIVAN
Welling and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 24, 2025

Kenneth R. Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Assistant County
Attorney, Adrianne A. Brambila, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs,
Colorado, for Appellee

Josie L. Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Robin Tieman, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant M.N.S.
¶1 In this dependency or neglect proceeding, M.N.S. (mother) and

the guardian ad litem (GAL) for C.T. (the child) appeal the judgment

terminating mother’s legal relationship with the child. We reverse

and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

¶2 In early 2021, C.J.T. (father) and the child relocated from New

Mexico to Colorado without mother’s consent. Mother was

subsequently incarcerated for ten months in Texas for a federal

drug offense.

¶3 In August 2021, after receiving reports that the then-three-

year-old child and father were living in hazardous conditions, the

El Paso County Department of Human Services (the Department)

filed a petition in dependency or neglect citing concerns of neglect

and substance abuse by father. The petition identified mother as

“N.T.” and described her relationship with the child as unknown.1

The court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on

1 The record is unclear whether N.T. was a nickname or alias for

mother, the identification of a separate individual, or simply a
misnomer.

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father’s admission and “N.T.’s” nonappearance. Father passed

away a short time later.

¶4 Nearly ten months after the Department filed the petition,

mother’s prison case manager in Texas reached out to the

Department seeking information about the child. The Department

amended the petition to reflect mother’s correct legal name and

mother entered a no-fault admission. The juvenile court then

adjudicated the child dependent or neglected and adopted a

treatment plan for mother. Mother’s treatment plan required her to

(1) engage in consistent visitation with the child; (2) cooperate with

the Department; (3) maintain a safe and stable environment;

(4) complete a substance abuse evaluation and follow all

recommendations; (5) address any mental health issues; (6) avoid

new criminal convictions and address any pending criminal

charges; and (7) work with a family therapist and complete a

parenting class.

¶5 Five months later, the Department moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. Following a six-day evidentiary hearing

spanning seven months, the juvenile court granted the

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Department’s motion and terminated mother’s legal relationship

with the child.

II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

¶6 As a preliminary matter, we address whether the juvenile

court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child-

custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), §§ 14-13-101

to -403, C.R.S. 2025, and, as a result, whether it had authority to

terminate mother’s legal relationship with the child. See People in

Interest of M.S., 2017 COA 60, ¶ 12 (concluding that the UCCJEA

applies to dependency or neglect proceedings).

¶7 Upon review of the record, we asked the parties to file

supplemental briefs addressing whether “the juvenile court had

jurisdiction to terminate mother’s parental rights under the

UCCJEA in light of mother’s testimony that she had previously filed

a child custody case in New Mexico.” The Department asserts that

the juvenile court had jurisdiction while mother and the GAL

dispute jurisdiction.

¶8 We review de novo whether the juvenile court had subject

matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Id. at ¶ 14. “The primary

aim of the UCCJEA is to prevent competing and conflicting custody

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orders by courts in different jurisdictions” and “to avoid

jurisdictional competition over child-custody matters in an

increasingly mobile society.” People in Interest of M.M.V., 2020 COA

94, ¶ 17. “To effectuate this purpose, [the UCCJEA] establishes a

comprehensive framework that a Colorado court must follow to

determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction in a child-custody

matter or whether it must defer to a court of another state.” Id.

¶9 Under the UCCJEA, a court has jurisdiction to make an initial

child-custody determination if, as relevant here, the state is the

home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the

proceeding. § 14-13-201(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025. “Home state” is

defined as the state in which the child lived with a parent for at

least 182 consecutive days immediately before the commencement

of the proceeding. § 14-13-102(7)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 10 The court that makes an initial child-custody determination

generally retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. § 14-13-202(1),

C.R.S. 2025; M.S., ¶ 15. And a court of this state may not modify a

child-custody determination made by a court of another state

unless it has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody

determination and (1) the court of the issuing state determines it no

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longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction; or (2) a court of this

state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person

acting as a parent don’t “presently reside” in the issuing state.

§ 14-13-203(1), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 During the termination hearing, mother testified that a New

Mexico court granted her temporary emergency custody of the child

approximately eight months before the Department filed the petition

in dependency and neglect.2 No other information was provided

regarding the status of the New Mexico case, and the juvenile court

never conferred with any New Mexico court. Following the close of

evidence, the juvenile court found that the child was born in New

Mexico and had moved to Colorado with father about seven months

2 We aren’t persuaded by the Department’s contention that mother

failed to provide sufficient evidence proving the existence of an out-
of-state order. The Department, not mother, bore the burden of
establishing the juvenile court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See
Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 33. And once mother notified the
juvenile court of the prior order, the court had statutory procedures
available to it to obtain further information about the out-of-state
child-custody proceeding. See People in Interest of C.L.T., 2017 COA
119, ¶ 42 (acknowledging that the statute places the burden on trial
courts even when parties provide only “skeletal information”
suggesting the existence of an out-of-state child-custody
proceeding).

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before the Department filed the petition. The court then concluded

that it had subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 12 We turn first to whether the New Mexico order constituted a

“[c]hild-custody determination” under section 14-13-102(3) and

conclude that it didn’t. The GAL correctly notes that a temporary

order qualifies as a child-custody determination and is sufficient to

confer exclusive, continuing jurisdiction on the issuing state. See

§ 14-13-102(3). But the out-of-state order in question wasn’t only a

temporary order, it was also an ex parte order. Mother testified that

father needed to be served for the out-of-state order “to go into

effect.” And the parties agree that father was never served.

¶ 13 Section 14-13-205(1), C.R.S. 2025, requires that any parent

whose parental rights have not been terminated be given notice

through service of process “[b]efore a child-custody determination is

made.” See also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-10A-205(a) (2025) (containing

identical notice requirement under New Mexico’s version of the

UCCJEA). Moreover, a division of this court has recognized that

Colorado courts must recognize and enforce a foreign child-custody

order “if it was made under factual circumstances that

substantially comply with the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional standards,”

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including giving the parents notice and the opportunity to be heard.

People in Interest of A.B-A., 2019 COA 125, ¶ 20 (emphasis added)

(citing § 14-13-104(2), C.R.S. 2025).

¶ 14 By extension, to confer exclusive, continuing jurisdiction on

an issuing state, a child-custody determination must meet the

UCCJEA’s jurisdictional standards. Cf. § 14-13-105, C.R.S. 2025

(“A child-custody determination made by a court of this state that

had jurisdiction under this article binds all persons who have been

served in accordance with the laws of this state or notified in

accordance with section 14-13-108[, C.R.S. 2025,] or who have

submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given

an opportunity to be heard.” (emphasis added)); § 14-13-205 cmt.

(“An order is entitled to interstate enforcement and nonmodification

under this Act only if there has been notice and an opportunity to

be heard.”). Because the New Mexico order was an ex parte order

that was never served on father, it didn’t meet those requirements

and therefore didn’t constitute a “child-custody determination” as

defined by section 14-13-205(1). As a result, the New Mexico court

never acquired exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under the

UCCJEA.

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¶ 15 We next consider whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction

to make an initial child-custody determination under section

14-13-201(1)(a) and conclude that it did. The juvenile court found

that Colorado was the child’s home state. The record supports this

finding. Specifically, father and the child arrived in Colorado seven

months (more than 182 days) before the Department filed the

petition, and father was employed, renting an apartment, and

saving for a down payment on a house.

¶ 16 Even so, the GAL contends that the record compels the

opposite conclusion — that father and the child were only in

Colorado temporarily — pointing out times when father mentioned

his goal of returning to New Mexico. But this argument effectively

asks us to reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for

that of the juvenile court, which we can’t do. See People in Interest

of S.Z.S., 2022 COA 133, ¶ 29. And because the record supports

the juvenile court’s home state finding, we won’t disturb it. See

People in Interest of S.A.G., 2021 CO 38, ¶ 21.

¶ 17 Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court had subject

matter jurisdiction to enter the termination judgment.

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III. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶ 18 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child has been

adjudicated dependent or neglected; (2) the parent hasn’t

reasonably complied with an appropriate treatment plan or the plan

hasn’t been successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s

conduct or condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

§ 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 19 When, as here, a child is under six years old at the time a

petition in dependency or neglect is filed, the juvenile court must

consider the statutory expedited permanency planning provisions,

which require that the child be placed in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see S.Z.S., ¶ 25.

¶ 20 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of L.M., 2018 COA 57M, ¶ 17. We review the court’s factual

findings for clear error, People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA

12, ¶ 10, and won’t disturb them unless the record doesn’t support

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them. People in Interest of J.G., 2021 COA 47, ¶ 17. We review the

juvenile court’s legal conclusions, including its ultimate

determination of whether the Department satisfied its reasonable

efforts obligation, de novo. See S.R.N.J-S., ¶ 10; People in Interest of

A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8. The credibility of the witnesses;

sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the

inferences and conclusions drawn from the evidence are within the

juvenile court’s discretion. People in Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021

CO 14, ¶ 15.

IV. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 21 The GAL and mother assert that the juvenile court erred by

finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate

mother and reunify the family. Specifically, they contend that the

Department failed to make reasonable efforts to (1) locate mother

and engage her in the case; (2) provide adequate case management,

including the timely provision of referrals and services; and

(3) provide adequate family time. We agree.

A. Applicable Law

¶ 22 “One of the goals of the Children’s Code is to preserve the

parent-child relationship whenever possible.” People in Interest of

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A.A., 2020 COA 154, ¶ 5. To that end, before a juvenile court may

terminate parental rights under section 19-3-604(1)(c), a

department must make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent

and reunify the family. See §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S.

2025; People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App.

2011). As relevant here, “reasonable efforts” means the “exercise of

diligence and care” for children who are in out-of-home placement.

§ 19-1-103(114), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 23 Services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208, C.R.S.

2025, are generally deemed sufficient to meet the reasonable efforts

standard. § 19-1-103(114). Under that statute, services that “must

be available and provided” as determined by individual case

planning include, among others, screenings, assessments, home-

based family and crisis counseling, information and referral services

to assistance resources, family time services, and placement

services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). Additional services may be required if

funding is available, including transportation, childcare, diagnostic

and mental health services, drug and alcohol treatment services,

and family support services. § 19-3-208(2)(d).

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¶ 24 In assessing a department’s efforts, the juvenile court should

consider whether the services provided were sufficient to support

the parent’s treatment plan, S.N-V., 300 P.3d at 915, by

“considering the totality of the circumstances and accounting for all

services and resources provided to a parent to ensure the

completion of the entire treatment plan,” People in Interest of

My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35, ¶ 33. After a treatment plan is

adopted, a department “is obligated to provide the services

envisioned in the plan.” S.Z.S., ¶ 37.

¶ 25 A department must provide family time services for parents

and children when such services are determined to be necessary

and appropriate by individual case plans. § 19-3-208(1), (2)(b)(IV);

People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1070 (Colo. App. 2005). In

determining whether and what family time services are necessary

and appropriate, the health and safety of the child is paramount.

See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070. Services, including family time

services, should further the purposes of the Children’s Code,

including the preservation of familial ties whenever possible.

§ 19-1-102(1)(b).

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B. Additional Background

¶ 26 After receiving the referral, the Department spoke to father,

who identified mother as “N.T.” Six days after filing the petition, the

Department ran a search for the name “N.T.” and discovered a

possible out-of-state address but no “recent [i]nformation.”3 The

Department mailed notifications and a summons to that address.

But no responses were received, and the summons was returned as

“non-deliverable.” The Department also ran an out-of-state “inmate

locator” search for “N.T.” about two months into the case. A month

later, the Department requested authorization to serve “N.T.” by

publication. In support, the Department asserted that it had

exercised due diligence to locate N.T., citing the search it completed

three months prior.

¶ 27 After the Department’s search efforts, father’s counsel notified

the Department that his paralegal had found out-of-state criminal

cases pending for mother. And at one point father “gave [the

caseworker] a different name” — other than “N.T.” — for mother.

3 To complete the search, the Department searched several websites

for the name “N.T.,” including the Colorado Department of
Corrections, Colorado state courts, the county assessor, a social
media site, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and a search engine.

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¶ 28 Mother was incarcerated in Texas shortly after the Department

filed the petition. Several months later, mother received a letter

from paternal grandmother, who claimed to have custody of the

child. After mother continued to ask questions and request contact

with the child, paternal grandmother admitted that the Department

had custody of the child. Mother and her prison case manager

began researching, writing letters, conducting online searches, and

making phone calls to try to find the child.

¶ 29 Almost ten months after the Department filed the petition, the

caseworker received a message that a prison case manager had

reached out on mother’s behalf, seeking information about the

child. The caseworker attempted to contact the prison case

manager three times over the course of three months and also sent

mother a letter. In early September 2022, one year after the case

began, the caseworker spoke to mother for the first time.

¶ 30 Mother appeared at the permanency planning hearing eight

days later and requested video visits with the child. The juvenile

court ordered that the Department, “with GAL approval, ha[d]

discretion to set up visitation for [m]other.” The Department

decided mother’s initial contact with the child should occur through

14
reintegration therapy, but the therapy didn’t begin until four

months later. At that time, the juvenile court granted mother two

therapeutic visits per week. But her second weekly visit didn’t

begin for another five or six months.

¶ 31 Two years after the case began, mother moved to Colorado and

transitioned to supervised in-person family time. In-person family

time started at one hour per week for the first two weeks and then

increased to two hours per week. Four months later, mother’s in-

person family time increased to four hours per week, where it

stayed for the remainder of the case.

C. Analysis

¶ 32 The juvenile court concluded that the Department made

reasonable efforts, including (1) attempting to locate mother;

(2) arranging family time for mother; and (3) providing numerous

referrals for services.

¶ 33 Our review of the record leads us to conclude that several of

the court’s findings lack record support. See J.G., ¶ 17. And even

accepting the court’s findings that do enjoy record support, we

agree with the GAL and mother that the court erred in its legal

15
determination that the Department made reasonable efforts to

rehabilitate mother and reunify her with the child. See A.S.L., ¶ 8.

1. Efforts to Locate Mother

¶ 34 As detailed above, the caseworker ran two searches for “N.T.”

early in the case. But the Department didn’t conduct additional

searches or engage in other efforts to locate mother once father and

his counsel provided a different name for mother and information

about her pending out-of-state criminal cases.

¶ 35 Even so, the Department on appeal contends that it took “all

of the necessary steps to locate [m]other,” pointing to the search it

conducted for “N.T.” one week after it filed the petition. We

recognize that the Department’s initial efforts to locate mother were

hindered because it had an incorrect name. But the Department

doesn’t explain why it undertook no additional efforts to locate

mother once it received new information from father and his

counsel. Ultimately, it was mother’s own efforts that led her to the

Department and commenced her involvement in the case.

2. Case Management

¶ 36 The juvenile court found that the caseworker “stayed in good

contact with [mother’s] treatment providers,” attempted visits to

16
observe family time, and set up a referral for “co-parenting.” But

the record reflects that, outside of staffing meetings, the caseworker

spoke to mother’s mental health provider only once in over five

months despite expressing concerns about the length and

modalities of mother’s treatment. Moreover, the caseworker

observed just three visits between mother and the child, totaling

less than two hours of observation time, in her nineteen months on

the case.

¶ 37 The record also reveals that the Department didn’t submit a

timely referral for mother’s co-parenting therapy with the foster

family despite the reintegration therapist’s recommendation. The

reintegration therapist testified that co-parenting therapy between

mother and the foster family was important for the child. She noted

that, while she observed “positive qualities” of attachment between

mother and the child, “co-parenting concerns” and the potential for

the child to experience a distressing “loyalty bind” hindered

progress. According to the therapist, “the child [was] being put in

the middle.” For example, both the reintegration therapist and the

family time supervisor observed the child commenting that he

couldn’t do certain things, such as go on trips, jump on the

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trampoline, or have a sleepover with the foster grandparents, until

he was adopted. The reunification therapist also heard the child

tell mother that he couldn’t eat the snacks she brought because his

foster mother had told him that mother was “poisoning” him.

Similarly, during two different visits the family time supervisor

overheard the child tell mother that his foster mother had told him

he “should say [he] [didn’t] want to see [mother].” The reintegration

therapist opined that the child needed “stability within the co-

parenting unit” to progress in the reunification process.

¶ 38 Given these concerns, the reintegration therapist discussed

the need for co-parenting therapy with the caseworker. But the

caseworker didn’t submit the referral until four months later — just

one week before the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental

rights. The caseworker justified this delay by explaining that she

thought the reintegration therapist would provide the service and

that she wasn’t aware that a referral needed to be submitted. But

the caseworker acknowledged that she had been present when the

reintegration therapist testified, over two months prior, that the

therapist couldn’t provide co-parenting therapy and that a referral

needed to be submitted.

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¶ 39 Due to the Department’s delay, co-parenting therapy didn’t

commence before the juvenile court terminated mother’s parental

rights. See § 19-3-208(2)(a) (“‘Services’ shall be designed

to . . . [p]romote the immediate health, safety, and well-being of

children eligible for these services . . . [and] [f]acilitate, if

appropriate, the speedy reunification of parents with any of their

children who have been placed in out-of-home placement . . . .”

(emphasis added)).

¶ 40 The Department, without citing any record support, asserts

that it “consistently . . . maintain[ed] contact with [m]other’s

providers” and that “[i]f reasonable efforts had not been made,

[m]other would not be in all of the services that she was in.” True,

the Department made referrals for mother’s substance abuse and

mental health treatment. But based on our review of the

Department’s comprehensive case management efforts, we agree

with the GAL and mother that the juvenile court erred by

concluding that the Department made reasonable efforts. See

My.K.M., ¶ 33.

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3. Family Time

¶ 41 Last, in support of its conclusion that the Department made

reasonable efforts, the juvenile court found that the Department

arranged virtual family time while mother resided out-of-state and

then in-person family time once mother moved to Colorado. While

we agree that the record supports this finding, the court’s order

doesn’t account for the Department’s (1) delay in starting

reintegration therapy; (2) delay in providing family time as ordered;

and (3) refusal to expand mother’s family time as recommended.

¶ 42 During mother’s first appearance, the juvenile court

improperly ordered that the Department would have “discretion to

set up visitation for [m]other.” See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070

(“[D]ecisions concerning visitation may not be unconditionally

delegated to third persons . . . .”). The court didn’t enter any other

family time orders at that time, including orders governing the

frequency or duration of family time visits. Due to a delay in the

Department’s submission and implementation of the referral for

reintegration therapy, the child’s first visit with mother didn’t occur

until four months later. The caseworker admitted that this delay

wasn’t reasonable. And mother’s expert expressed concern that

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this delay could have impeded progress toward reunification of the

family.

¶ 43 Recall that once reintegration therapy began, the juvenile

court ordered that mother have two therapeutic visits per week. At

the permanency planning hearing six weeks later, the GAL

expressed concern that mother was still receiving only one visit per

week. In response, the court ordered the second visit to commence

within two weeks. But over three months later, mother still hadn’t

received the second weekly visit as ordered. The caseworker

explained that she had submitted a new referral allowing up to

three visits per week, but she said that the foster mother was

“having a little bit of difficulty getting it to fit into her schedule.”

Mother’s second weekly visit with the child didn’t begin until five or

six months after the court initially ordered it.

¶ 44 In September 2023, about three months later, mother moved

to Colorado and began exercising in-person family time once per

week, increasing to twice per week five months later. Despite

continued positive reports and recommendations for increased

family time from the reintegration therapist and family time

supervisor, mother’s family time remained at four hours per week

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for the last year of the case. The reintegration therapist testified

that, typically, the reunification process is “experience based” and

needs to “continue to build.” But here, “hindrances and

roadblocks” from the Department, including a lack of

communication and hesitancy to follow the therapist’s

recommendations based on reported statements from the child,

delayed progress. The reintegration therapist explained that it

would be “atypical” for a parent to have supervised family time for

as long as mother unless “major” safety concerns existed. And

neither she nor the family time supervisor had any concerns with

mother or her interactions with the child. The reintegration

therapist opined that, if not for the Department’s

roadblocks — such as its lack of communication and hesitancy to

implement recommended family time expansion — the case would

have been “at a different stage.”

¶ 45 On appeal, the Department doesn’t address the concerns

raised by the GAL and mother regarding family time. To the extent

the Department argues that its other efforts — including referrals

for treatment, financial assistance, and consistent

communication — sufficiently supported the juvenile court’s

22
reasonable efforts determination, regardless of the delays in family

time, we disagree.

¶ 46 Family time is a required service, if deemed appropriate by an

individual case plan, for parents of children in out-of-home

placement. § 19-3-208(2)(b)(IV). In this case, mother’s first

treatment plan objective required that she “have consistent

visitation with [the] child in order to maintain and strengthen their

bond.” But, as discussed above, the Department didn’t provide

family time as ordered until almost a year after mother’s prison

case manager first reached out on mother’s behalf. The provision of

family time services uniquely impacts the ability of parents and

children to successfully reunify. See § 19-1-103(64.5) (defining

“[f]amily time” as “any form of contact or engagement between

parents . . . and children or youth for the purposes of preserving

and strengthening family ties”); § 19-3-208(2)(a) (family time shall

be designed to facilitate the “speedy reunification” of parents and

children). The Department’s failure to provide adequate family time

services throughout this case substantially restricted mother’s

statutory right to family time and reunification with the child.

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4. Conclusion

¶ 47 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court

erred by finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to

reunify mother and the child.

¶ 48 We also conclude that the error wasn’t harmless. See People

in Interest of M.V., 2018 COA 163, ¶ 66 (explaining that an error

isn’t harmless if “it can be said with fair assurance that [the error]

substantially influenced the outcome of the case or impaired the

basic fairness of the trial itself”), overruled on other grounds by,

People in Interest of E.A.M. v. D.R.M., 2022 CO 42. The court’s

termination order focused, in part, on the lack of a “secure”

attachment between mother and the child as well as the lack of

progress during the last year and a half of the case. But mother’s

ability to rebuild an attachment with the child was delayed by

nearly two years — first, by the Department’s lack of effort to locate

her and, second, by the Department’s delay in setting up family

time as ordered. In addition, the case stagnated, at least in part,

due to the Department’s delay in (1) approving recommended

expansions of, and increases to, mother’s family time and

(2) submitting the recommended referral for co-parenting therapy.

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Under these circumstances, we can’t say that the Department’s lack

of reasonable efforts was harmless.

¶ 49 Accordingly, based on the Department’s lack of reasonable

efforts, we reverse the juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s

legal relationship with the child and remand the case for further

proceedings.

V. Other Contentions

¶ 50 Because we have concluded that the juvenile court erred with

respect to its reasonable efforts determination, we need not address

the other contentions raised by mother and the GAL.

VI. Indian Child Welfare Act

¶ 51 While not raised as an issue on appeal, our review of the

record reveals that the juvenile court didn’t comply with the

provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C.

§§ 1901-1963, because it didn’t ask mother on the record whether

she had reason to know that the child was an Indian child at either

the dispositional or termination hearing. See § 19-1.2-107(2)(a),

C.R.S. 2025 (requiring the juvenile court to ask the parties on the

record whether they know or have reason to know that the child is

an Indian child at any emergency, voluntary, or involuntary child-

25
custody proceeding); M.V., ¶ 42 (identifying the dispositional

hearing as a child-custody proceeding under ICWA); see also People

in Interest of C.A., 2017 COA 135, ¶ 2 (holding that even if the

juvenile court conducted an ICWA inquiry at an initial temporary

custody hearing, it must still make another inquiry when

termination is sought).

¶ 52 Because we are remanding for further proceedings, the

juvenile court on remand should conduct the proper ICWA inquiry

and make findings as to whether ICWA applies before entering any

future judgment.

VII. Disposition

¶ 53 We reverse the termination judgment and remand the case to

the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.

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