Peo in Interest of ZV

25CA1187 Peo in Interest of ZV 12-24-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1187
Jefferson County District Court No. 23JV30307
Honorable Lindsay VanGilder, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of Z.V. and S.V., Children,

and Concerning L.V.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III
Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY
Dunn and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 24, 2025

Kimberly S. Sorrells, County Attorney, Sarah Oviatt, Assistant County
Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Appellee

Jeffrey C. Koy, Jordan Oates, Lauren Dingboom, Guardians Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Justin Twardowski,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 L.V. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her

parent-child legal relationships with Z.V. and S.V. (the children).

We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In December 2023, police responded to reports of screaming

and crying coming from the family’s camper trailer, in which they

found the children, then three and six years old, locked inside

alone. The trailer had no running water, heat, or electricity. One of

the children had started a fire because the interior of the trailer was

frigid. The children were only dressed in underwear, were using a

bucket as a toilet, and could not recall the last time they had eaten

or bathed.

¶3 When the parents returned to the trailer, police suspected that

mother was under the influence. The police found heroin on

mother and drug paraphernalia in the trailer. Mother was arrested,

charged with child abuse, and eventually sentenced to probation.

¶4 The Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth and Families

(the Division) filed a petition in dependency and neglect based on

this incident and prior reports of the parents’ substance use and

neglect. The children were placed in foster care, where they

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remained throughout the case. The court appointed a guardian ad

litem for them.

¶5 Mother admitted that the children were in an injurious

environment, and the juvenile court adjudicated the children

dependent. Mother agreed to participate in Jefferson County’s

Family Integrated Treatment Court program. The court adopted a

treatment plan for mother that, as relevant here, required her to (1)

complete a substance use component; (2) address her mental health

issues; and (3) meet the children’s needs for safety, well-being, and

permanency.

¶6 The guardian ad litem later moved to terminate mother’s

parental rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted

the motion and terminated the parent-child legal relationships

between mother and the children.

¶7 On appeal, mother contends that the court erred by

terminating her parental rights for three reasons: (1) it should have

afforded mother more time to become a fit parent; (2) the treatment

plan was inappropriate; and (3) the Division failed to make

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate her. We disagree.

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II. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶8 A juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the children were

adjudicated dependent and neglected; (2) the parent has not

reasonably complied with an appropriate, court-approved treatment

plan or the plan has not been successful; (3) the parent is unfit;

and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is unlikely to change

within a reasonable time. § 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶9 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15, 480 P.3d 682, 686. “We

review the juvenile court’s findings of evidentiary fact — the raw,

historical data underlying the controversy — for clear error and

accept them if they have record support.” People in Interest of

S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10, 486 P.3d 1201, 1204. We review de

novo the juvenile court’s legal conclusions, including its

determination as to whether the human services department

satisfied its reasonable efforts obligation. See id.; People in Interest

of A.S.L., 2022 COA 146, ¶ 8, 527 P.3d 404, 407.

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¶ 10 It is for the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, to determine the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence, and to

assess witness credibility. People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244,

249-50 (Colo. 2010).

III. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 11 Mother contends there was a less drastic alternative to

termination of her parental rights — granting her additional time to

work on her treatment plan. We disagree, however, that extending

the time for mother’s compliance with her treatment plan can be

characterized as a less drastic alternative to termination. The less

drastic alternative analysis turns on whether a permanent or

long-term placement arrangement — such as an allocation of

parental responsibilities — would conclude the dependency or

neglect proceeding without terminating the parent’s rights. See

People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 44, 310 P.3d 1007,

1017 (noting that the less drastic alternative analysis involves the

consideration of whether a placement alternative — such as an

allocation of parental responsibilities — would satisfy the child's

best interests).

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¶ 12 Rather than rejecting mother’s argument outright, however,

we construe it as a claim that the court erred by finding that her

conduct or condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable

time. See § 19-3-604(1)(c)(III).

A. Applicable Law

¶ 13 A parent is unfit if her conduct or condition renders her

unable or unwilling to give her child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting adequate to meet the child’s

physical, emotional, and mental health needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 14 When deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is

likely to change within a reasonable time, the juvenile court may

consider whether any change occurred during the proceeding, the

parent’s social history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the

parent’s conduct or condition. People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d

584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003). What constitutes a reasonable time

is fact specific and varies from case to case. People in Interest of

D.Y., 176 P.3d 874, 876 (Colo. App. 2007).

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¶ 15 Because one of the children was less than six years old when

the petition in dependency and neglect was filed, the expedited

permanency planning (EPP) guidelines applied. See

§§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, C.R.S. 2025. The EPP guidelines

require that such a child be placed in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123,

19-3-702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025; see People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022

COA 133, ¶ 25, 524 P.3d 1209, 1216.

B. Analysis

¶ 16 Mother argues that allowing her additional time to comply

with her treatment plan would be in the children’s best interests

because she has made substantial progress on her treatment plan.

The court acknowledged that mother had completed some

components of her treatment plan. But it also noted that, during

the seventeen months this EPP case had been open, mother had yet

to acknowledge her role in causing the children’s trauma. The

court further found that mother could not meet the children’s

extensive behavioral and therapeutic needs. For these reasons, the

court concluded that mother was unfit and could not become fit

within a reasonable time.

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¶ 17 The record supports the court’s findings. The caseworker

testified that the children would likely require long-term therapeutic

support because they had “experienced so much trauma early on in

life” and had “insecurity about getting their needs met.” The

evidence showed that both children met the criteria for

post-traumatic stress disorder and that the older child was

participating in trauma-focused cognitive behavioral therapy.

¶ 18 In addition, mother had spent only limited family time with the

children. A criminal protection order prevented her from having

any contact with the children early in the case. During that time,

mother worked individually with a family-time supervisor to prepare

for therapeutic visits with the children. But after the protective

order was lifted, mother was not immediately approved for family

time due to her inconsistent engagement with the supervisor,

dysregulation in individual sessions, and unpredictability.

Although mother was eventually approved for family time, at the

time of the termination hearing, the supervisor still needed to

intervene and assist mother in recognizing when the children’s

trauma response was triggered. The supervisor opined at the

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termination hearing that mother would always need someone to

oversee and supervise her care of the children.

¶ 19 Further, the younger child’s therapist testified that mother

could not begin working with the child in child-parent

psychotherapy until mother completed her own foundational

sessions with the therapist. The therapist testified that mother

continued to minimize the impact of her behavior, including her

substance use, on the child, and that it would be detrimental to the

child to include a parent with such a “minimizing mindset” in

therapy sessions. Moreover, the therapist said that she expected

mother to be further along in her therapeutic work by the time of

the hearing.

¶ 20 The caseworker opined that mother’s conduct was unlikely to

change within a reasonable period of time because, even though the

case had been open for seventeen months, mother was still having

“therapeutic contact for only an hour and a half . . . once a week.”

The caseworker concluded that, although she had seen some

improvement in mother’s behavior, mother was still unable to

understand or meet the children’s needs. See People in Interest of

V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App. 1998) (noting that even

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“increased compliance” over the course of a case may not justify

more time).

¶ 21 Moreover, the therapeutic family-time supervisor, the younger

child’s therapist, and the caseworker agreed that mother had not

shown sufficient insight into the children’s trauma or her role in

causing it to be able to repair her relationship with the children

within a reasonable period of time.

¶ 22 Because this evidence supports the court’s determination that

mother was unlikely to become fit within a reasonable time, we will

not disturb the determination. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29, 524 P.3d at 1217

(explaining that an appellate court will not disturb the juvenile

court’s finding that a parent could not become fit within a

reasonable time when the record supports it).

IV. Appropriate Treatment Plan

A. Applicable Law

¶ 23 The purpose of a treatment plan is to preserve the parent-child

legal relationship by assisting the parent in overcoming the

problems that required intervention into the family. People in

Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 11, 369 P.3d 822, 826. An

appropriate treatment plan is one that is “reasonably calculated to

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render the [parent] fit to provide adequate parenting to the child

within a reasonable time and that relates to the child’s needs.”

§ 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025. We measure the appropriateness of a

treatment plan by its likelihood of success in reuniting the family,

which we assess in light of the facts existing at the time the court

approved the plan. People in Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071

(Colo. App. 2005).

B. Analysis

¶ 24 Mother argues that her treatment plan was inappropriate

because it neither included a domestic violence component nor

provided her with victim support and housing resources. Although

the court recognized that the parents’ relationship was unhealthy, it

found no clear evidence of “coercive control [or] domestic violence.”

The court concluded that the treatment plan was reasonable and

capable of being accomplished within a reasonable time, and that

no amendments to the treatment plan would have allowed mother

to be successful.

¶ 25 The record supports the court’s findings. The younger child’s

therapist and the family-time supervisor testified about the conflict

in the parents’ relationship and that mother often told professionals

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she wanted to separate from father. At the time of the termination

hearing, mother and father were living apart. The caseworker

testified that, shortly before the termination hearing, mother said

that “she didn’t need additional supports” to separate from father.

¶ 26 Even though the case had been open for seventeen months,

mother waited until less than two weeks before the termination

hearing to request a modification of her treatment plan to include a

domestic violence component. Mother does not cite any evidence in

the record showing that, before that time, the Division or the court

was on notice of domestic violence concerns requiring additional

interventions.

¶ 27 The younger child’s therapist testified that mother said she

“did not feel physically unsafe” with father, and the family-time

supervisor said that she was unaware of any safety concerns in the

relationship. The caseworker testified that mother said she did not

feel physically unsafe in her relationship with father. The

caseworker further testified that, although both parents’ individual

therapists told her they would not recommend couples counseling if

“it would pose a safety concern for either parent,” neither said that

such counseling would “pose[] a safety concern for either parent.”

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¶ 28 To address concerns regarding parental conflict, mother’s

treatment plan required her to complete an anger management

evaluation. A representative of the agency that conducted the

evaluation told the caseworker that an anger management

evaluation was appropriate in the absence of a “domestic violence

charge or conviction.” The evaluation recommended that mother

continue with her existing therapies and participate in a group that,

among other things, helps participants establish “relationship

boundaries” and “safety within relationships.” The caseworker

testified that the agency would have made a different treatment

recommendation if it had noted concerns that mother “was not

receiving adequate services, including for domestic violence

treatment.”

¶ 29 Furthermore, the caseworker testified that she would not have

offered different “treatment groups and services” even if she had

known about domestic violence in mother and father’s relationship.

The caseworker opined that nothing, including a domestic violence

evaluation, would have made the treatment plan more successful.

¶ 30 In sum, in the absence of evidence of domestic violence and

because the treatment plan included services to address

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relationship conflict, the court did not err by finding that the

treatment plan was appropriate.

V. Reasonable Efforts

A. Applicable Law

¶ 31 Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights under

section 19-3-604(1)(c), a county human services department must

make reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent and reunify the

family whenever appropriate. §§ 19-3-100.5(1), 19-3-208(1),

19-3-604(2)(h), C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” means “the

exercise of diligence and care” to reunify parents with their

children, and services provided in accordance with section 19-3-208

satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement. § 19-1-103(114); see

People in Interest of E.D., 2025 COA 11, ¶ 10, 566 P.3d 1011, 1017.

Those services include screenings, assessments, and individual

case plans; home-based family and crisis counseling; information

and referral services; family time services; and placement services.

§ 19-3-208(2)(b)(I)-(V).

¶ 32 When evaluating a human services department’s efforts, the

juvenile court should consider whether the services provided were

appropriate to support the parent’s treatment plan. E.D., ¶ 11, 566

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P.3d at 1017. But the parent is ultimately responsible for using

those services to obtain the assistance needed to comply with the

treatment plan. Id. at ¶ 12, 566 P.3d at 1017.

B. Analysis

¶ 33 Mother asserts that the court erred by finding that the

Division made reasonable efforts because, even though it knew of

codependency and conflict in the parents’ relationship, it did not

provide services to address those issues until late in the case. The

court acknowledged the evidence of codependency, showing that the

parents’ relationship was not healthy, but it found that various

services were offered to mother to address these issues. The court

noted that mother did not take advantage of many of those services

and concluded that the Division made reasonable efforts. The

record supports the court’s findings.

¶ 34 As an initial matter, the record calls into question mother’s

claim that conflict with father was a barrier to her success. The

family-time supervisor testified that father helped “keep [mother]

focused and more regulated” and that mother became more stable

and engaged because father was involved. The caseworker testified

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that, throughout the case, the parents seemed to rely on each other

as their primary support.

¶ 35 Nonetheless, the Division offered mother numerous services

throughout the case to address the conflict in the parents’

relationship:

• As part of treatment court, mother was ordered to attend

“Codependency Anonymous” and to “talk through the

relationship with her individual therapist.”

• As noted above, mother completed an anger management

evaluation to assess the conflict in the relationship and

to determine “if any specific treatment was needed to

help address it.”

• The caseworker testified that, five months before the

termination hearing, she made a referral for Family Tree,

an agency that helps parents “develop a safety plan . . . if

they are not feeling safe” in their relationship, assists

with “relationship boundaries,” and “help[s] [them] get

out of unsafe situations.”

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• The caseworker testified that mother also “had the option

to walk into Porch Light,” which also offers these types of

services.

• As discussed above, the family-time supervisor and both

parents’ individual therapists recommended couples

counseling.

¶ 36 The caseworker testified that mother did not “follow through”

with Family Tree or Porch Light and had not started couples

counseling because she wanted “to work on her own individual

counseling first.” And as noted above, the caseworker opined that

no other services could have been offered to address the

relationship conflict.

¶ 37 In sum, the record supports the court’s finding that the

Division provided mother with the necessary resources to engage

with her treatment plan but that she did not take advantage of

those resources.

VI. Disposition

¶ 38 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE KUHN concur.

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