Peo v. Williams

23CA0240 Peo v Williams 12-18-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0240
El Paso County District Court No. 20CR5373
Honorable Scott Bradford Epstein, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Chad Roshawn Williams,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced December 18, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Josiah Beamish, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Adrienne R. Teodorovic, Alternate Defense Counsel, Windsor, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Chad Roshawn Williams, appeals his convictions

for aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery,

theft, felony menacing, and conspiracy to commit felony menacing.

He also appeals his habitual criminal adjudication and sentencing.

We affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶2 In September 2020, two men entered a bank under the

pretense of opening an account. One of them, Williams, was

disguised as a woman, carrying a purse and wearing a wig.

Williams’s co-conspirator grabbed Williams’s purse and ordered the

bank manager to “[d]o exactly what [she was] told and nobody will

get hurt,” warning that there was “a gun in [Williams’s] purse.” The

two then robbed the bank and “rammed” their way out of the locked

entrance door, escaping with just under $35,000.

¶3 During their investigation, officers believed the female-

presenting robber was Williams due to a distinct bowlegged gait

that they knew Williams to have through other robbery

investigations in which he was involved. When officers searched

Williams’s mother’s home, they found a black wig and high-top

sneakers resembling those worn by the female-presenting robber.

1
¶4 The State charged Williams with four counts each of

aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and

theft; five counts each of felony menacing and conspiracy to commit

felony menacing; and two habitual criminal counts. Additionally,

Williams had a “host of cases” pending in the same jurisdiction.

II. Speedy Trial

¶5 Williams contends that his statutory right to a speedy trial

under section 18-1-405, C.R.S. 2025, was violated when the trial

court set all his cases for trial on the same date. He reasons that

the court’s setting practice, along with the prosecution’s

subsequent release of its witnesses, failed to comply with the

statute’s requirement that he be tried within the speedy trial

deadline. We disagree and conclude that defense counsel waived

Williams’s right to a speedy trial by agreeing to set all his cases for

trial on the same day.

A. Additional Facts

¶6 At the time of trial, Williams had nine pending felony cases.

Beginning on March 29, 2021, defense counsel asked to “set all the

matters for trial.” Counsel also agreed to the court’s suggestion to

2
set all cases for trial on the same day. The court then set the trials

for June 28 without objection.

¶7 On May 13, the parties met again and confirmed that all of

Williams’s cases were set for trial on June 28. When June 28

arrived, Williams announced that he was not ready for trial and

raised a potential conflict of interest with his counsel. Ultimately,

Williams chose to continue with his counsel and waived his right to

a speedy trial. The court then set a new trial date of December 13.

¶8 On September 16, the court called all nine cases and defense

counsel informed the court that Williams waived his right to a

preliminary hearing in three of the nine cases. The parties kept the

trial date and added a disposition date for October 21.

¶9 On October 21, the parties were unable to reach a disposition

in this case. The trial court confirmed that Williams had five cases

set for trial in December (including this case) and the remaining

four cases set for trial on March 21, 2022. The prosecution

expressed concern that so many of Williams’s cases set for trial

were “all bunched together” in December. Defense counsel

responded that she would accept a late February date even though

it would put her “right on the heels of a two-week homicide” trial.

3
The court moved the case with the longest speedy trial deadline (not

the case at issue here) to February 22 and scheduled a pretrial

readiness conference for February 3.

¶ 10 On December 9, the parties appeared for a pretrial readiness

conference for five of Williams’s cases, including this case.1 Both

parties announced they were ready and agreed to begin with the

oldest case. The court said that this case would not begin on

December 13 and that witnesses need not appear.

¶ 11 On December 13, trial began in Williams’s oldest case. The

parties discussed resetting the remaining cases since Williams

could only attend one trial that day. The court reset the other trials

for March 28 and asked defense counsel whether she “want[ed] to

reset all of them for the same date” or “reset one of them and have

the others trail.” Counsel asked the court to “reset all of them” and

confirmed that March 28 would be the trial date for “all the cases

not going on today.”

1 The record shows that Willimas resolved three of his cases at the

dispositional hearing in October and that one other case remained
set for trial in February 2022.

4
¶ 12 On February 10, 2022, the parties appeared for a status

conference. Defense counsel notified the court that she was having

coverage issues because her contract was expiring and that new

counsel would be taking over all of Williams’s cases. Counsel said

the new counsel would not be ready for the February 22 trial date.

¶ 13 On February 17, defense counsel informed the court that her

contract had been extended, and she would remain on Williams’s

oldest case, but she would not be ready for trial on February 22 due

to witness availability issues. The court granted the defense a

continuance and reset the trial for March 28.

¶ 14 On February 24, the court called all of Williams’s remaining

cases and new counsel appeared with Williams. Counsel declined

to waive Williams’s speedy trial rights in any of the cases and asked

for additional dates that would work for the court. The court asked

defense counsel whether the previously set March 28 date worked

for the remaining cases and counsel responded, “That’s actually

perfect.” At the March 10 pretrial readiness conference, the parties

announced that they were ready to proceed on all cases. The

prosecution requested an additional status conference, which the

court set for March 24.

5
¶ 15 On March 24, the parties again announced that they were

ready for the March 28 trial date. The court noted that only one

case could proceed to trial on March 28, and the remaining cases

would need to be reset. The parties agreed to resolve any speedy

trial scheduling issues on March 28.

¶ 16 On March 28, the prosecution announced it was not ready to

proceed because one of the witnesses failed to appear. The court

explained that when defense counsel “request[s] for all the trials to

be set on a certain date, it is not incumbent on the [c]ourt or upon

the district attorney to insist that they be set on different dates so

that way potentially speedy [trial deadlines do] not run on one

particular [day].” The court then informed the parties that a new

speedy trial deadline for all cases would run from March 28 to

accommodate the missing witness. The trial court offered

numerous different dates to accommodate counsel’s schedule, but

counsel replied, “Your Honor, unfortunately, I think I have to set all

the cases on [September] 18th.” The court set all cases for trial in

September without objection.

¶ 17 On August 4, the court clarified its earlier ruling on the speedy

trial deadlines, explaining that Williams could not have appeared

6
for trial in all cases on March 28, thereby triggering a speedy trial

waiver. As a result, according to the court, the new speedy deadline

for all cases was September 28.

¶ 18 The jury trial in this case began on September 22, and the

jury convicted Williams of all charges. The court adjudicated him

as a habitual offender and sentenced him to forty-eight years in the

custody of the Department of Corrections.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 We review a district court’s grant of a continuance under

subsection (6)(g)(I) of section 18-1-405 (the speedy trial statute) for

an abuse of discretion. People v. Trujillo, 2014 COA 72, ¶ 18. A

court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair, or it misunderstands or misapplies the

law. People v. Knapp, 2020 COA 107, ¶ 31.

¶ 20 Colorado’s speedy trial statute requires that a defendant be

brought to trial within six months of entering a plea of not guilty.

§ 18-1-405(1). The remedy for a violation of a defendant’s statutory

speedy trial rights is dismissal of the charges with prejudice. People

v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶ 18. But to obtain relief based on a

violation of this statute, a defendant must move for dismissal before

7
trial. § 18-1-405(5); see People v. Desantiago, 2014 COA 66M, ¶ 14.

“Failure to so move is a waiver of the defendant’s rights under [the

speedy trial statute].” § 18-1-405(5); see People v. Abdu, 215 P.3d

1265, 1269 (Colo. App. 2009) (noting the defendant’s statutory

speedy trial challenge “is barred because [the] defendant never

moved to dismiss the case on speedy trial grounds”).

¶ 21 The burden of compliance with the speedy trial statute is on

the district attorney and the trial court. People v. Chavez, 779 P.2d

375, 376 (Colo. 1989); Marquez v. Dist. Ct., 613 P.2d 1302, 1303-04

(Colo. 1980); Harrington v. Dist. Ct., 559 P.2d 225, 228 (Colo. 1977)

(finding that a defendant’s only obligation under the speedy trial

statute is to move to dismiss prior to trial). But in “computing the

time within which a defendant is brought to trial,” certain “periods

of time are excluded,” including “[t]he period of any delay caused at

the instance of the defendant.” § 18-1-405(6)(f).2

2 The General Assembly made minor amendments to the relevant

language of subsection (6) effective June 21, 2021. Ch. 277, sec. 1,
§ 18-1-405(6), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 1600. Because the majority
of the events at issue here occurred after the amendments went into
effect, the current version of section 18-1-405(6) is quoted here.

8
¶ 22 A defendant may waive a statutory right, and such a waiver

need only be voluntary to be valid. See People v. Wiedemer, 852

P.2d 424, 438 (Colo. 1993) (distinguishing between waiver

requirements for rule-based rights and fundamental constitutional

rights). A defendant’s waiver is voluntary when it is not coerced

“either physically or psychologically.” People v. Walker, 2014 CO 6,

¶ 16 (quoting People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117, 121 n.4 (Colo. 1986)).

C. Analysis

¶ 23 We conclude that the trial court did not violate Williams’s right

to a speedy trial because Williams waived his right by inviting the

multiple continuances granted by the court.

¶ 24 The record shows that Williams pleaded not guilty in this case

on March 29, 2021. On June 28, Williams waived his right to a

speedy trial because defense counsel remarked that she was not

ready: “We would like to waive speedy and reset the trials.” This

waiver extended the speedy trial deadline to December 28, and

counsel agreed to set this case and the remaining cases for

December 13, knowing that only one case could proceed to trial on

that date.

9
¶ 25 The record further shows that on December 13, the defense

agreed to reset this case (and all remaining cases) to March 28,

2022, and made no speedy trial objection. Indeed, when the

original speedy trial deadline of December 28 expired, defense

counsel did not move to dismiss this case for a speedy trial

violation, as required by section 18-1-405(5). As a result, the

speedy trial period began anew on December 13, 2021. Abdu, 215

P.3d at 1269.

¶ 26 Additionally, we conclude that defense counsel’s agreement to

set all cases for trial on March 28, 2022, knowing that Williams

could only be present for one, is tantamount to a continuance

request attributable to the defense and thus set a new speedy trial

deadline of September 28. See People v. Arledge, 938 P.2d 160, 166

(Colo. 1997) (“A defendant should not profit from a delay for which

he or she is responsible, and active participation by the defendant

in such delay constitutes waiver.” (citing People v. Fleming, 900 P.2d

19, 20 (Colo. 1995))). Counsel could have instead requested back-

to-back trial dates to try all cases in a timely manner. See id. (“In

this sense, similar to waivers of other rights, the waiver of the right

to a speedy trial can be inferred from the behavior of the

10
defendant.” (quoting People ex rel. Gallagher v. Dist. Ct., 933 P.2d

583, 588 (Colo. 1997))). Counsel also had the opportunity to object

but did not. See Chambers v. Dist. Ct., 504 P.2d 340, 342 (Colo.

1972) (“Failure to object is a factor which may be considered in

determining whether a waiver took place.”). Because Williams

proceeded to trial in this case on September 22 without moving to

dismiss, there was no speedy trial violation.

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 27 Williams contends that the prosecution presented insufficient

evidence to prove the deadly weapon elements of the aggravated

robbery and menacing counts. He reasons that insufficient

evidence shows that he was a complicitor in the use of the weapon.

We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 28 “[W]e review the record de novo to determine whether the

evidence before the jury was sufficient both in quantity and quality

to sustain the convictions.” People v. Gray, 2025 COA 23, ¶ 21

(quoting People v. Harrison, 2020 CO 57, ¶ 31).

¶ 29 “At trial, the prosecution has the burden of establishing a

prima facie case of guilt through introduction of sufficient

11
evidence.” Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 2010). “We

employ a substantial evidence test to determine if the evidence

presented to the jury is sufficient to sustain a defendant’s

conviction.” Id. The substantial evidence test considers “whether

the relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed

as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is

substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable

mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Id. (quoting People v. Bennett, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (Colo.

1973)).

¶ 30 The gist of the crime of conspiracy is an agreement, between

two or more persons, to commit or attempt to commit a crime. See

§ 18-2-201(1), C.R.S. 2025. “Conspiracy requires proof of a ‘real

agreement, combination, or confederation with a common design.

(Mere passive cognizance of the crime to be committed or mere

negative acquiescence is not sufficient.)’” People v. Lucero, 2016

COA 105, ¶ 13 (quoting Bates v. People, 498 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Colo.

1972)). But the agreement “need not be formal or susceptible to

direct proof, and may be, and indeed must generally be proved

circumstantially.” People v. Nelson, 539 P.2d 477, 479 (Colo. 1975)

12
(citation omitted); see also United States v. Loveland, 825 F.3d 555,

561-62 (9th Cir. 2016) (the agreement “can be explicit or tacit”).

¶ 31 Complicity “is not a separate and distinct crime or offense.

Rather, it is ‘a theory by which a defendant becomes accountable

for a criminal offense committed by another.’” Grissom v. People,

115 P.3d 1280, 1283 (Colo. 2005) (citation omitted). “The requisite

knowledge is minimal” and a complicitor-defendant is not required

to “have advance knowledge of the principal’s intent to commit a

crime.” People v. Alvarado, 284 P.3d 99, 103 (Colo. App. 2011).

Indeed, merely “roughly contemporaneous knowledge by the

complicitor of the principal’s intent” suffices. Id. (citing People v.

Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101, 104 (Colo. 1989)). But “[i]t is not sufficient

that the defendant intentionally engaged in acts which ultimately

assisted or encouraged the principal. Rather, the complicitor must

intend that his conduct have the effect of assisting or encouraging

the principal in committing or planning the crime committed by the

principal.” Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247, 251 (Colo. 1997),

overruled in part on other grounds by, Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1, 8

(Colo. 2001).

13
¶ 32 “[I]t is for the fact finder to determine the difficult questions of

witness credibility and the weight to be given to conflicting items of

evidence . . . .” People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶ 12. “[T]he

prosecution must be given the benefit of every inference that may

fairly be drawn from the evidence . . . .” Id. “[I]f there is evidence

upon which one may reasonably infer an element of the crime, the

evidence is sufficient to sustain that element . . . .” Id. (quoting

People v. Chase, 2013 COA 27, ¶ 50). Further, “[a] court must not

invade the province of the jury by second-guessing its conclusion

when the record supports the jury’s findings.” People v. Perez, 2016

CO 12, ¶ 31.

B. Analysis

¶ 33 We conclude that the following record evidence, when viewed

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supports the deadly

weapon element of Williams’s convictions for conspiracy to commit

aggravated robbery and felony menacing:

• Williams and his co-conspirator entered the bank

together just before closing, claiming that they wanted to

open an account. Williams was disguised as a woman.

14
• The manager asked them to have a seat, and the female-

presenting individual set down her purse and walked

toward the drive-up area. When the manager told her

not to go back there, the individual responded, “I got

this,” in a deep voice. Hearing the deep voice, the

manager realized the person was not a woman and

suspected a robbery was imminent.

• As the female-presenting individual walked toward the

drive-up, the co-conspirator told the manager, “Don’t

move,” picked up the purse, and threatened, “Do exactly

what you’re told and nobody will get hurt. I do have a

gun in this purse.”

• A bank teller and assistant manager working in the drive-

up area confirmed that the female-presenting robber told

them not to move and that everything would be okay if

they stayed still. Both witnesses noted that the

individual had a deep voice and did not sound like a

woman.

• The electronic banker observed that the manager let the

robbers into the bank and heard her tell the female-

15
presenting robber not to go back to the drive-up area.

Upon hearing the deep voice, the electronic banker

sensed something was wrong. When the taller robber

walked by her office, he told her not to move, or he would

shoot her. She could hear both robbers ordering the

tellers to empty the drawers and to hurry.

¶ 34 We are not persuaded otherwise by Williams’s argument that a

bank employee testified she doubted anyone in the back room could

hear what was happening in the lobby, and therefore Williams did

not know his co-conspirator had said there was a gun in the purse.

We reject this argument for three reasons.

¶ 35 First, the jury heard contradictory testimony from the

electronic bank manager, who heard the female-presenting robber

in the drive-up instruct the tellers to hurry up and empty the

drawers at the same time she heard the co-conspirator threaten to

shoot her if she moved. And we must resolve evidentiary conflicts

in favor of the prosecution. See Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291 (citing

Bennett, 515 P.2d at 469). We conclude that this evidence alone

satisfied the prosecution’s burden of establishing Williams’s

complicity in the threatened use of a gun.

16
¶ 36 Second, the record shows that Williams intentionally left the

purse with his co-conspirator as he walked toward the drive-up

area. A reasonable inference from this action is that the robbers

intended the co-conspirator to use the purse to threaten the

existence of a gun without having to reveal one. Kessler, ¶ 12.

¶ 37 Third, by deciding to enter the bank together with the intent to

commit a robbery, Williams and his co-conspirator agreed to carry

out the crime together. People v. Martinez, 600 P.2d 82, 83 (Colo.

App. 1979) (“As long as a defendant commits robbery with the

requisite intent, he may be convicted of aggravated robbery

regardless of whether it is he or [his codefendant] who possesses

the deadly weapon.”). As described above, the record contains

ample evidence that Williams and the co-conspirator acted in

concert to rob the bank, and Williams does not directly challenge

the sufficiency of the conspiracy evidence. People v. Venzor, 121

P.3d 260, 264 (Colo. App. 2005) (declining to review issues

presented “only in a perfunctory or conclusory manner”). Indeed,

Williams carried the purse into the bank, and the co-conspirator

used that same purse to threaten the presence of a weapon.

Nothing more was required to show a conspiracy or complicity.

17
IV. Habitual Criminal Counts

¶ 38 Williams last contends that the trial court erred when it

adjudicated the habitual criminal counts rather than submitting

them to a jury. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 39 Typically, we review constitutional challenges to a trial court’s

sentencing determinations de novo. People v. Kirby, 2024 COA 20,

¶ 55. However, because Williams did not preserve his

constitutional challenge, “we will vacate his sentence[] only if we

conclude that the court’s error was plain and so undermined the

fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the

reliability of the sentence[].” Id.

¶ 40 For a defendant to be viewed as a habitual criminal under

section 18-1.3-801(2)(a)(I), C.R.S. 2025, the prosecution must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, having been

convicted of a felony, “has been three times previously convicted,

upon charges separately brought and tried, and arising out of

separate and distinct criminal episodes.” People v. Fields, 2025

COA 84, ¶ 14 (quoting People v. Williams, 2019 COA 32, ¶ 37).

“Charges are separately brought where they are ‘in separate

18
informations, with separate docket numbers, arising out of separate

criminal incidents.’” Id. (quoting Williams, ¶ 38). “[A] predicate

conviction can result from either a conviction following trial or a

guilty plea.” Id. (quoting Williams, ¶ 38). Convictions arising from

guilty pleas satisfy the requirement of “separately brought and

tried” when the underlying charges “would have been tried

separately” if not for the guilty plea. Id. (quoting Williams, ¶ 38).

Prior crimes arise from distinct criminal episodes where they are

separated by enough time and have different victims and locations,

such that “proof of neither could have formed a substantial portion

of the proof of the other.” Id. (quoting Marquez v. People, 2013 CO

58, ¶ 20). The question of separate and distinct criminal episodes

demands a jury finding. People v. Gregg, 2025 CO 57, ¶ 24

(applying Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 838 (2024)).

B. Analysis

¶ 41 Initially, we agree with Williams that a jury should have

determined whether Williams’s prior convictions were separately

brought and tried and whether they arose out of distinct criminal

episodes. Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 859; Gregg, ¶ 24 (there are no

material differences between the separate-offenses inquiry at issue

19
in Erlinger and Colorado’s habitual criminal sentencing statute).

But, reviewing for plain error, we conclude that any error does not

warrant reversal.

¶ 42 An error is plain if it is “obvious and substantial.” Hagos v.

People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. For an error to be obvious, it “must

[have] contravene[d] (1) a clear statutory command; (2) a well-

settled legal principle; or (3) Colorado case law” at the time of trial.

Scott v. People, 2017 CO 16, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Pollard, 2013

COA 31M, ¶ 40); see People v. Crabtree, 2024 CO 40M, ¶ 72. At the

time Williams was tried, the trial court was authorized to make

determinations in habitual offender proceedings. See Crabtree,

¶ 72 (“[R]elief under Crim. P. 52(b) is only available if the error is

plain at the time it is made . . . .”).

¶ 43 Since Erlinger, the Colorado Supreme Court decided Gregg.

The supreme court held in Gregg that Colorado’s former habitual

criminal sentencing statute is not facially unconstitutional and can

operate within the additional limits set forth in Erlinger. Gregg, ¶ 3.

The court also held that Erlinger applies to Colorado’s habitual

criminal sentencing statute and “the question of separate and

distinct criminal episodes demands a jury finding.” Id. at ¶ 24.

20
¶ 44 Applying Gregg, we conclude there is no reasonable possibility

that the trial court’s error in deciding the prior conviction elements

contributed to Williams’s habitual criminal convictions. See Fields,

¶ 16 (citing United States v. Butler, 122 F.4th 584, 590 (5th Cir.

2024), which held that Erlinger error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt where the record clearly showed that the prior

offenses spanned a range of months to years and involved different

parties). The record shows that the court relied on (1) fingerprint

cards from separate cases; (2) testimony that the fingerprints from

all cases matched; (3) court documents from separate cases;

(4) Williams’s guilty pleas in separate cases; (5) photographs from

separate cases showing the same person; and (6) same names and

dates of birth from separate cases. Under the authority available to

the court at the time of trial, the prosecution presented proper and

sufficient evidence to prove the habitual criminal counts, and the

trial court properly found Williams guilty of both counts. Given the

strength of this evidence, a jury would not have concluded

differently. See Fields, ¶ 16 (Concluding that it was harmless error

for the trial court to find the defendant guilty of habitual criminal

counts where the court “[could not] imagine a scenario in which a

21
jury could have found that [the defendant’s] prior offenses occurred

as the same criminal episode” so as not to meet habitual offender

requirements.) Accordingly, any error does not rise to the level of

plain error.

V. Disposition

¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

22