Peo v. Brooks

24CA0759 Peo v Brooks 11-06-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0759
El Paso County District Court No. 09CR2378
Honorable Jill M. Brady, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Bill Joe Brooks,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced November 6, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Bill Joe Brooks, Pro Se
¶1 Bill Joe Brooks appeals the order denying his March 2024

Crim. P. 35(c) motion without a hearing. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 A jury convicted Brooks of three counts of sexual assault and

one count each of criminal trespass and third degree assault. The

convictions were based on evidence that Brooks entered a

neighbor’s apartment and sexually assaulted her. People v. Brooks,

(Colo. App. No. 10CA1281, Oct. 20, 2014) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(f)). A division of this court affirmed the judgment of

conviction, and the mandate in the direct appeal was issued in

2015. Id.

¶3 Brooks then filed a timely, pro se Crim. P. 35(c) motion

asserting several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The postconviction court denied the motion without a hearing, and,

in 2019, a division of this court affirmed the order denying relief.

People v. Brooks, (Colo. App. No. 16CA2197, Apr. 18, 2019) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶4 In March 2024, Brooks filed another pro se Crim. P. 35(c)

motion, the denial of which is at issue in this appeal. As we

understand it, the motion asserted claims of trial error — including

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a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence — and ineffective

assistance of trial and direct appeal counsel related to Brooks’s

mental health and competency to stand trial.

¶5 Brooks recognized that his claims were untimely, but he

asserted that his failure to seek relief within the applicable time

limits was the result of circumstances amounting to justifiable

excuse or excusable neglect. In particular, he alleged that:

• He “suffered from a mental illness,” which “re[n]der[ed] h[im]

incompetent (not continuously but consistently) for periods of

time bet[w]een the time of sentencing and the filing of [his]

f[ir]st 35(c).” “[T]his lost time,” he asserted, “put [him] at a

substantial disadvantage” because he was “force[d] to rush the

filing of his [first Crim. P. 35(c)] motion” and he was thus left

with “little to no time to r[a]ise all the needed claims.”

• “Once [his first] Crim. P. 35(c) motion was filed,” he “f[e]ll

under duress and remain[ed] constrain[ed] by fear” of threats

and intimidation in prison. This fear of imminent “mob

violence” forced him to follow through with his first Rule 35(c)

motion, thereby “obstructing him from filing a second 35(c).”

This was because he was afraid of “what other inmates would

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[do] to him for wasting the jail house lawyer[’]s time” if he

“abandon[ed] his first 35(c) to file[] a second.”

• He would have filed the 2024 motion “sooner,” but did not

because (1) even when “he felt he was doing ok,” he was

“mentally stuck”; (2) he “squandered a con[s]iderable amount

of time” on other unnecessary or meritless filings, which

caused him to “spiral[]” out mentally; and (3) he “ended up in

the infirmary due to a life-threatening hunger strike,” which

he undertook to “prove his innocence.”

¶6 For similar reasons, Brooks also asserted that his 2024

motion should not be denied as successive.

¶7 The postconviction court denied the motion without a hearing,

concluding that it was both untimely and successive.

II. Standard of Review

¶8 We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny a Crim. P.

35(c) motion without a hearing. People v. Cali, 2020 CO 20, ¶ 14.

We also review de novo whether a Crim. P. 35(c) claim is time

barred or successive. People v. Bonan, 2014 COA 156, ¶ 16; People

v. Thompson, 2020 COA 117, ¶ 42.

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III. The 2024 Motion Was Time Barred

¶9 As an initial matter, we agree with the district court’s

conclusion that the 2024 motion was successive. We need not

reach whether an exception to successiveness applies, however,

because we also agree that the motion was untimely, and that

Brooks failed to adequately assert circumstances amounting to

justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.

¶ 10 As noted, Brooks conceded that his 2024 motion was untimely

because it was not filed within the limitations periods applicable to

collateral attacks on the offenses of which he was convicted (four of

which were non-class 1 felonies, and one of which was a

misdemeanor). See § 16-5-402(1), C.R.S. 2025 (setting forth a

three-year time limitation for collateral attacks on non-class 1

felonies and an eighteen-month limitation for collateral attacks on

misdemeanors).

¶ 11 When a defendant files an untimely Crim. P. 35(c) motion, the

motion must allege “facts that, if true, would establish justifiable

excuse or excusable neglect for a belated filing.” People v. Clouse,

74 P.3d 336, 340 (Colo. App. 2002). Courts, in turn, “consider the

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circumstances existing throughout the entire period” of delay.

People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424, 441 (Colo. 1993).

¶ 12 Here, Brooks asserted that some circumstances — mental

health concerns and fears of violence — prevented him from filing

his second Crim. P. 35(c) motion until the conclusion of his first

Crim. P. 35(c) proceedings in 2019. Even if we assume, for the sake

of argument, that those circumstances excused his delay until that

point, his remaining assertions of being “mentally stuck,”

“squander[ing]” time, and participating in a hunger strike are in the

nature of carelessness rather than justifiable excuse or excusable

neglect. See People v. Baker, 104 P.3d 893, 896 (Colo. 2005) (To

establish excusable neglect, the circumstances must show that

“there has been a failure to take proper steps at the proper time,

not in consequence of carelessness, but as the result of some

unavoidable hindrance or accident.” (citation omitted)); see also

People v. Vigil, 955 P.2d 589 (Colo. App. 1997) (a defendant’s

indigence, ignorance of the law, or lack of legal counsel do not

amount to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect for an untimely

filed collateral attack).

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¶ 13 Thus, we perceive no error in the district court’s conclusion

that Brooks’s 2024 motion was untimely. And to the extent Brooks

asserts new claims on appeal in support of his allegations of

justifiable excuse or excusable neglect, we decline to address them.

See People v. Goldman, 923 P.2d 374, 375 (Colo. App. 1996)

(“Allegations not raised in a Crim. P. 35(c) motion . . . and thus not

ruled on by the trial court are not properly before this court for

review.”); see also People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 251 (Colo.

1996) (rejecting a defendant’s “attempts to use his brief on . . .

appeal to fortify a number of issues inadequately raised or

supported by his [postconviction] motion”).

IV. Disposition

¶ 14 The order is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

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