Peo in Interest of AR

23CA1311 Peo in Interest of AR 10-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1311
City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 22JD456
Honorable D. Brett Woods, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of A.R.,

Juvenile-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHOCK
Harris and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 23, 2025

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jacob R. Lofgren, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Madeline Dobkin, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant
¶1 A.R., a juvenile, appeals his adjudication of delinquency for

menacing by use of a firearm. He argues that (1) the evidence was

insufficient to support the adjudication; (2) the juvenile court

abused its discretion by denying his request for a jury trial; and

(3) the juvenile court improperly shifted the burden of proof with a

comment it made during closing argument. He also contends that

the cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 A.R. and his friend, D.B., were at the mall when they saw

D.B.’s ex-girlfriend, J.M., and her friend, S.S. D.B. had cut off

communication with J.M. about a month earlier, and seeing him

made J.M. feel uncomfortable. When J.M. and S.S. walked into

another store across the street, A.R. and D.B. — parked three

spaces from J.M.’s car — followed, prompting J.M. and S.S to leave.

¶3 According to J.M., as she was backing out of her parking

space, A.R. and D.B. sprinted back to their car and began following

her, with D.B. driving and A.R. in the passenger seat. D.B. was

driving “erratically” and pulled within “an inch” of her car.

¶4 After seven or eight blocks, the two cars stopped at a red light.

J.M. told S.S., who was in the passenger seat, to lay back her seat

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because A.R. and D.B. were “carrying.” J.M. then looked over her

shoulder and saw A.R.’s arm “out of the window holding a pistol.”

When the light turned green, J.M. “sped off to try to lose them.”

She then got into a turning lane and slammed on her brakes, and

D.B. and A.R. drove away. J.M. reported the incident to police, and

A.R. was charged with menacing by use of a firearm.

¶5 At trial, J.M. testified to this account. On cross-examination,

defense counsel highlighted several inconsistencies between J.M.’s

trial testimony and her prior statements to police. For example,

while J.M. testified that she saw the gun first and S.S. did not say

anything about it, she previously told police that S.S. first told her

A.R. had a gun and she only looked and saw the gun after that.

Defense counsel also pointed out inconsistencies in J.M.’s accounts

regarding, among other things, (1) the nature of her communication

with A.R. and D.B. in the parking lot; (2) whether A.R. had waved

the gun out the window as they were driving; (3) how A.R. was

positioned; (4) how long A.R. and D.B. followed her; and (5) the

speed D.B. was driving. Testifying officers also acknowledged

inconsistencies between J.M.’s and S.S.’s statements to police.

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¶6 S.S. testified at trial that when J.M. told her to “get down”

because A.R. and D.B. “mess with guns,” she “freaked out” and got

down on the floorboard. J.M. then “started screaming that she saw

a gun,” turned into a parking lot and started “screaming and crying

and throwing up and freaking out.” But S.S. never saw a gun and

did not see A.R. do anything threatening. D.B. likewise testified

that A.R. did not have a gun or threaten J.M. And aside from J.M.,

no one else reported seeing a gun or erratic driving.

¶7 After a bench trial, the juvenile court adjudicated A.R.

delinquent as charged. It noted the discrepancy between J.M.’s

testimony that she saw A.R. holding a gun and D.B.’s testimony

that he did not, but it found J.M. to be more credible based on her

demeanor and D.B.’s friendship with A.R. The court also found

that although S.S. did not see a gun (because her view was

“necessarily at least somewhat obstructed”), her testimony about

J.M.’s reaction to seeing the gun was persuasive and corroborative.

¶8 A.R. moved for a new trial on the ground that the evidence did

not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that A.R. had a gun. The

motion pointed to claimed weaknesses and inconsistencies in J.M.’s

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testimony and argued that the juvenile court’s credibility findings

were “unreasonable.” The juvenile court denied the motion.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶9 A.R. first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support

his adjudication because (1) J.M.’s testimony was incredible as a

matter of law; and (2) even if it was not, that testimony was not

alone sufficient to prove A.R.’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

when considered in light of the other testimony. We disagree.1

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile

delinquency case is the same as it is in a criminal case. People in

Interest of J.R., 216 P.3d 1220, 1221 (Colo. App. 2009). We review

the record de novo to determine “whether the relevant evidence,

both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a whole and in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient

both in quantity and quality to support a conclusion by a

1 A.R. points out that the juvenile court judge in this case later

resigned and was disciplined for misconduct that included being
under the influence of alcohol while at work. See In re Woods, 2024
CO 72, ¶¶ 5, 10. But although A.R. highlights various perceived
irregularities in the proceedings, he does not assert any claim of
error related to the juvenile court judge’s misconduct.

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reasonable mind that the [juvenile] is guilty of the charge beyond a

reasonable doubt.” People in Interest of B.D., 2020 CO 87, ¶ 8.

¶ 11 We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or resolve

conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. People in Interest of

K.D.W., 2020 COA 110, ¶ 38. Nor may we set aside an adjudication

“merely because we might have drawn a different conclusion had we

been the trier of fact.” Id. Instead, we ask only whether “any

rational trier of fact could accept the evidence . . . as sufficient to

support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.; see also

People v. Tomaske, 2022 COA 52, ¶ 32 (“[S]ufficiency challenges

after a bench trial are no different than those after a jury trial.”).

¶ 12 As relevant in this case, a person commits felony menacing if,

“by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly places or

attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily

injury . . . by the use of a firearm.” § 18-3-206, C.R.S. 2025.

B. Incredible as a Matter of Law

¶ 13 We first reject A.R.’s contention that we must disregard J.M’s

testimony because it is incredible as a matter of law.

¶ 14 Testimony is incredible as a matter of law when it “conflicts

with nature or fully established facts” — for example, when a

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witness “describes events she could not possibly have seen or that

are not possible under the laws of nature.” People v. Minjarez, 81

P.3d 348, 355 (Colo. 2003). But testimony that is “merely biased,

conflicting, or inconsistent is not incredible as a matter of law.” Id.

¶ 15 Seizing on a four-question exchange during J.M.’s cross-

examination, A.R. asserts that J.M.’s account of the car chase was

physically impossible because she told police that D.B. followed her

for seven blocks at a speed of 80 to 100 miles per hour while she

went the speed limit. But the thrust of J.M.’s testimony was that

D.B. was driving fast and erratically, not his precise speed. Cf.

People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588, 593 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting the

defendant’s argument of physical impossibility based on illustrative

diagram); State v. Hornsby, 858 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Tenn. 1993)

(noting that the “physical facts rule” does not apply to “assumptions

or calculations based upon estimates as to speed, distance, time,

and other such uncertain matters in the movement of vehicles”

(citation omitted)). Indeed, J.M. did not mention D.B.’s speed at all

on direct and, on cross, initially estimated the speed to be “[a]bout

65 miles an hour” before being impeached with her prior statement.

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¶ 16 Moreover, the speed of D.B.’s car was ancillary to the main

point — that A.R. had a gun. Even if J.M. was “grossly inaccurate

or confused” about the speed of the cars, it was not “physically

impossible” for A.R. to have threatened her with a gun as she

described. People v. Ramirez, 30 P.3d 807, 810 (Colo. App. 2001);

see also People v. Kessler, 2018 COA 60, ¶ 12 (“[A] fact finder is not

required to accept or reject a witness’s testimony in its entirety; it

may believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. . . .”).

¶ 17 A.R. also asserts that J.M.’s testimony on cross-examination

that S.S. saw the gun first was contrary to undisputed facts. But

again, J.M. acceded to this account only when confronted with her

prior statement. Her testimony on direct (and initially on cross) was

that she saw the gun first. To the extent J.M.’s statements were in

conflict on this point, the fact was not “fully established.” Minjarez,

81 P.3d at 355. And if anything, the parties’ agreement in closing

argument that S.S. did not see a gun was consistent with J.M.’s

original testimony. That testimony was not rendered incredible as a

matter of law just because J.M. later testified inconsistently with it.

See id.; see also People v. Dash, 104 P.3d 286, 289 (Colo. App.

2004) (“Inconsistencies in testimony and admitted lies will

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undoubtedly be considered by a jury in determining the credibility

and weight of the evidence” but do not make the testimony “so

palpably incredible and totally unbelievable that we must reject it

outright.”); Brassfield, 652 P.2d at 593 (“Internal inconsistencies

within a witness’[s] testimony . . . do not, by themselves, justify

usurping the traditional fact-finding function of the jury.”).

C. Evidence Supporting Adjudication

¶ 18 Our conclusion that J.M.’s testimony cannot be disregarded as

incredible as a matter of law leads us to conclude that the evidence

was sufficient to support the juvenile court’s adjudication.

¶ 19 J.M. testified that she saw A.R. holding a black pistol out of

the window of D.B.’s car with an “intimidating” demeanor. She

testified that she was “very scared . . . major fight or flight” and “felt

that [she] had to save [herself] and [S.S.]” Moreover, S.S. testified

that J.M. screamed that she saw a gun and then sped off, pulled

into a parking lot, and started “freaking out.” Viewed in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence — eyewitness

testimony from the victim, corroborated by a contemporaneous

outburst — was sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable

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doubt that A.R. had a gun and knowingly placed J.M. in fear of

imminent serious bodily injury with it. See B.D., ¶ 8; § 18-3-206.

¶ 20 A.R.’s arguments to the contrary are little more than a request

that we reweigh the evidence and make our own credibility

determinations. He argues that the juvenile court unreasonably

overlooked inconsistencies in J.M.’s testimony, misjudged D.B.’s

and J.M.’s credibility, and dismissed S.S.’s testimony that she did

not see a gun because her view was obstructed. But we may not

second-guess the juvenile court’s assessment of the evidence or “set

aside a verdict merely because we might have drawn a different

conclusion had we been the trier of fact.” K.D.W., ¶ 38.

¶ 21 It is true that defense counsel’s cross-examination was

effective in eliciting some inconsistencies between J.M.’s testimony

and her prior statements (though not on the critical point that she

saw A.R. with a gun). It is also true that D.B.’s friendship with A.R.

did not necessarily mean he was not credible (though it could have).

See Merritt v. People, 842 P.2d 162, 167 (Colo. 1992) (defining “bias”

as a “relationship between a party and a witness which might lead

the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in

favor of or against a party” (citation omitted)). And it is possible

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that S.S. could have seen the gun from the floorboard (though she

said all she could see were trees, streetlights, and the sky).2 But

these were all questions for the juvenile court, which resolved them

in favor of J.M.’s account. We may not substitute our judgment.

See People v. Sharp, 104 P.3d 252, 256 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 22 A.R. also contends that J.M.’s testimony was insufficient

because it was not corroborated by other evidence. But the victim’s

eyewitness testimony does not require independent corroboration to

sustain an adjudication. J.M.’s testimony alone was sufficient,

even if there was also evidence pointing in the other direction. See

Ramirez, 30 P.3d at 809-10; see also People v. LaRosa, 2013 CO 2,

¶ 2 (“[T]he sufficiency of the evidence test . . . requires no

corroborating evidence.”). A.R.’s citations to the rules regarding the

sufficiency of a defendant’s confession, see LaRosa, ¶ 41, and the

admission of child hearsay, see § 13-25-129, C.R.S. 2025, are

inapposite. In any event, there was corroboration for J.M.’s

testimony — S.S.’s report of J.M.’s contemporaneous reaction.

2 S.S.’s testimony that she saw A.R. doing “nothing” referred to

when she was in the seat before she got onto the floorboard.

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¶ 23 We acknowledge that, in denying A.R.’s motion for a new trial,

the juvenile court gave a confusing explanation that seemed to

contradict its prior finding that J.M. saw the gun. It said:

I understand that this was kind of a
circumstantial evidence case where . . . the
victim didn’t see the person pointing the gun
at them.

But the law makes no difference between
direct and circumstantial evidence. . . . And
. . . I thought that the testimony fell under the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule.

It is unclear whether the court misspoke or misremembered the

evidence and its prior findings. But regardless, we are reviewing

the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, not the juvenile

court’s explanation for denying the motion for a new trial. And

whatever the court meant in denying the motion for new trial, J.M.

did testify that she saw A.R. holding a gun and, in its original ruling

at trial, the juvenile court credited that testimony.

III. Denial of Request for Jury Trial

¶ 24 A.R. next argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by denying his request for a jury trial. We are not persuaded.

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A. Additional Background

¶ 25 A.R. requested a jury trial on the menacing charge under

section 19-2.5-610(1), C.R.S. 2025. He acknowledged that a jury

trial was not mandatory, but he argued that the court should

exercise its discretion to grant one because he was “facing serious

charges which carry potentially life-altering consequences.” He also

asserted that the court’s pretrial exposure to certain evidence in the

case risked influencing its assessment of the facts at trial. The

prosecution did not object, saying it would “defer to the [c]ourt.”

¶ 26 The court denied A.R.’s request. It first noted that “in the

statute[,] there is no standard for the [c]ourt to apply when a

discretionary trial should be granted.” It then explained:

[W]hat I have said in the past is — and it’s not
the greatest legal analysis, but when the case
sort of seems like to be more of an old case,
let’s say the juvenile is 17 or 17 and a half,
about to be 18, the crime is serious like sex
assault, which is not to say that felony
menacing isn’t serious, it’s serious; but when
it has those indicia of what would be, but for a
few months, an adult case, then I would grant
a discretionary jury trial. I don’t have that
here.

¶ 27 After clarifying that A.R. was fifteen years old at the time of the

alleged offense, the court said that “for those reasons, [it was] not

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going to grant a discretionary jury trial.” The court also reasoned

that a jury trial was not warranted because it had not “heard a lot

of the facts of this case,” and “in that sense [it was] a blank slate.”

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 28 There is no constitutional right to a jury trial in a juvenile

delinquency proceeding. A.C. v. People, 16 P.3d 240, 243 (Colo.

2001). A juvenile has a statutory right to a jury trial in only two

circumstances — when the juvenile is charged as an aggravated

juvenile offender or with a crime of violence — neither of which

applies in this case. See § 19-2.5-610(1); A.C., 16 P.3d at 243.

¶ 29 For other felonies, the juvenile court “has discretion to grant a

jury trial,” and its refusal to do so “does not constitute error.” A.C.,

16 P.3d at 243; see People in Interest of A.B.-B., 215 P.3d 1205,

1207 (Colo. App. 2009). This discretion allows the court to “balance

the benefits of informal, speedy and rehabilitative proceedings

against the severity of the offense, the nature of the consequences

and the particular facts of the case.” A.C., 16 P.3d at 244.

¶ 30 We review a ruling on a juvenile’s request for a jury trial in a

delinquency proceeding for an abuse of discretion. A-B.B., 215 P.3d

at 1209. We will not disturb the juvenile court’s decision unless it

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was “manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.” Id. (citation

omitted). The question is not “whether we would have reached a

different result but, rather, whether the [juvenile] court’s decision

fell within a range of reasonable options.” People in Interest of T.B.,

2016 COA 151M, ¶ 60 (citation omitted), aff’d, 2019 CO 53.

C. Analysis

¶ 31 A.R. contends that the juvenile court misunderstood the law

by (1) saying that section 19-2.5-610(1) does not set forth a legal

standard and (2) applying a “one-size-fits-all approach” that did not

take into account the relevant factors. We disagree on both points.

¶ 32 First, the juvenile court was correct that there is no legal

standard for granting a discretionary jury trial in section 19-2.5-

610(1). That statute says only that the court “may order” a jury

trial. Id. And while A.C. specified that the statute gives the court

discretion to “balance the benefits of informal, speedy and

rehabilitative proceedings against the severity of the offense, the

nature of the consequences and the particular facts of the case,”

nothing requires the court to expressly address each of those

considerations. 16 P.3d at 244; see T.B., ¶ 61 (affirming juvenile

court’s denial of motion for jury trial without factual findings).

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¶ 33 Second, the court explained its decision by reference to the

circumstances of this case: (1) the charge was not the most serious

offense; (2) the juvenile was only fifteen years old; and (3) it had not

yet heard substantial evidence. Those were reasonable factors for

the court to consider. See A.C. 16 P.3d at 241-43; cf. Bostelman v.

People, 162 P.3d 686, 693 (Colo. 2007) (noting that “the age at

which a juvenile commits the delinquent act is the determinative

statutory factor” in whether the juvenile can be charged as an

adult). The court’s general practice of granting a jury trial when the

crime is serious and the juvenile is close to adulthood — and its

jury trial guarantee — did not make those reasons manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See A-B.B., 215 P.3d at 1209.

¶ 34 A.R. takes issue with how the court balanced the relevant

factors. In particular, he asserts that a jury trial would not have

caused significant delay, that the allegations were serious, and that

the consequences of the adjudication were severe. But our role is

limited to determining whether the juvenile court’s decision “fell

within a range of reasonable options.” T.B., ¶ 60 (citation omitted).

And the denial of a jury trial may be a reasonable option, even when

the charge is serious and the consequences are severe. Id. at ¶ 63

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(affirming denial of jury trial on two counts of sexual exploitation of

a child despite the requirement that the juvenile register as a sex

offender and the social stigma associated with the adjudication).

¶ 35 A.R. also argues that a jury was necessary because the

juvenile court (1) prejudged J.M.’s credibility by denying the motion

to suppress her out-of-court photograph identification of A.R. and

(2) heard inadmissible evidence about A.R.’s firearm charges in

another case. But as the court noted, J.M. did not testify at the

pretrial hearing, so the court had no opportunity to judge her

credibility. The court’s conclusion that J.M.’s identification of

A.R. — someone she knew — was sufficiently reliable does not

mean it had credited her account of what A.R. did. See Bernal v.

People, 44 P.3d 184, 192 (Colo. 2002) (holding that an out-of-court

identification is admissible if “the totality of the circumstances does

not indicate a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification”). And to the extent the court heard inadmissible

evidence, it is presumed to have disregarded it, as the court

explicitly said it would do. See People v. Hall, 2021 CO 71M, ¶ 36.

¶ 36 Beyond that, A.R. asserts that the juvenile court could not be

impartial because it asked the parties at the pretrial hearing if a

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plea agreement was still on the table. But the court did not

participate in the plea discussions, see § 16-7-302(1), C.R.S. 2025;

order the parties to engage in such discussions, see People v.

Justice, 2023 CO 9, ¶ 21; or “indicate a preference for a plea

disposition rather than a trial,” Crumb v. People, 230 P.3d 726, 732

(Colo. 2010). It simply asked about the plea status and directed the

parties to apprise the court of any resolution. See id. at 731 (“A

judge may make observations about the evolving legal posture of a

case and may inquire as to whether parties wish to consummate a

plea agreement.”). Read in context, the court’s comment that a

resolution would give it a day to “maybe get back and do something

else” was just making the point that prompt notification would

allow it to adjust its schedule accordingly. That exchange did not

undermine the court’s impartiality so as to mandate a jury trial.

¶ 37 Thus, because the denial of A.R.’s request for a jury trial “fell

within a range of reasonable options” under the circumstances of

this case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion. T.B., ¶ 61.

IV. Question During Closing Argument

¶ 38 A.R. finally contends that the juvenile court shifted the burden

of proof to him when it asked his counsel during closing argument

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how it could “get around” S.S.’s testimony that J.M. “freaked out”

and “started screaming that she saw a gun.” We again disagree.

¶ 39 The question at issue came as defense counsel highlighted

S.S.’s testimony that she did not see a gun. The court interjected:

Well, I guess what I’m stuck on, and I — is
[S.S.] testified just a few minutes ago that
[J.M.] freaked out while she was on the
floorboard, started screaming that she saw a
gun, and that she was throwing up and crying.

....

How do I get around that for your client?

¶ 40 Defense counsel responded: “[W]e’re not getting around

anything. This is a reasonable doubt . . . standard, and there’s

plenty of reasonable doubt here.” He went on to argue that, when

S.S. was on the floorboard, she could still see A.R. not “doing

anything,” and he attributed J.M.’s outburst to a panic attack.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 41 The prosecution bears the burden of proving the guilt of the

accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1,

¶¶ 23-24. That burden never shifts: The accused must never be

required to prove anything. People v. Santana, 255 P.3d 1126,

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1130 (Colo. 2011). Thus, comments that shift or lower the

prosecution’s burden of proof require reversal. Tibbels, ¶ 22.

¶ 42 But subject to this and other constitutional limitations, the

court has broad discretion in a bench trial to ask questions it

deems necessary to “assess the evidence and discover the truth.”

Hall, ¶ 23. In performing this function, the court may solicit

argument from the parties regarding admitted evidence. Id. at ¶ 29.

¶ 43 We review de novo whether the juvenile court shifted the

prosecution’s burden of proof. Tibbels, ¶ 22. We otherwise review

the court’s comments for an abuse of discretion. Hall, ¶ 16.

B. Analysis

¶ 44 The juvenile court’s comment did not shift the burden of proof,

much less indicate that the court failed to hold the prosecution to

its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Abu-

Nantambu-El, 2017 COA 154, ¶ 30 (“[T]he trial court is presumed to

know and follow the law.” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 2019 CO 106.

¶ 45 Contrary to A.R.’s characterization, the juvenile court did not

require A.R. to prove anything. Instead, it highlighted what it

apparently believed to be strong evidence of A.R.’s guilt and gave

defense counsel an “opportunity to advance argument” about why

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that evidence did not satisfy the prosecution’s burden. Hall, ¶ 31.

In other words, before finding A.R. delinquent, the court gave

defense counsel a “meaningful opportunity to respond” to its

assessment of the evidence. Id. at ¶ 32. The court could have just

ruled as its question foreshadowed it would. By giving defense

counsel one last chance to dissuade it of that result, the court did

not shift the burden or otherwise abuse its discretion. See id. Nor

did it violate the presumption of innocence. See id. at ¶ 38.

V. Cumulative Error

¶ 46 Because we have not identified any error, A.R.’s cumulative

error argument fails as well. See Howard-Walker v. People, 2019

CO 69, ¶ 25 (“For reversal to occur based on cumulative error, a

reviewing court must identify multiple errors that collectively

prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant . . . .”).

VI. Disposition

¶ 47 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.

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