Peo in Interest of PR

25CA0620 Peo in Interest of PR 10-23-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0620
Delta County District Court No. 24JV30025
Honorable Steven L. Schultz, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of P.R., V.R., and A.R., Children,

and Concerning D.R.,

Appellant.

JUDGEMENT AND ORDER AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE
Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 23, 2025

John F. Baier, County Attorney, Jodie L. Behrmann, Assistant County
Attorney, Adriana Hartley, Assistant County Attorney, Delta, Colorado for
Appellee

Josie Burt, Guardian Ad Litem

Lindsey Parlin, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect action, D.R. (father) appeals

the judgment entered on a jury’s verdict adjudicating P.R., V.R.,

and A.R. (the children) dependent and neglected. Father also

appeals the dispositional order adopting a treatment plan. We

affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In the summer of 2024, the Delta County Department of

Human Services (the Department) received a series of referrals

raising concerns about domestic violence and substance

dependence. These referrals were closed with inconclusive findings.

However, in August 2024, the Department opened another

assessment after mother was charged with driving under the

influence while two of the children were in the car. The Department

determined that it was unable to create a safety plan with the

family and, in September 2024, filed a petition in dependency and

neglect, raising concerns about substance dependence and

domestic violence.

¶3 Father requested an adjudicatory jury trial. After a three-day

trial, the jury returned special verdicts finding that the children

were dependent or neglected because

1
• father mistreated or allowed another person to

mistreat or abuse them without taking lawful means to

stop the mistreatment and abuse and prevent it from

happening again, see § 19-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025;

• they lacked proper parental care due to the father’s

actions or failures to act, see § 19-3-102(1)(b);

• their environment was harmful to their welfare, see

§ 19-3-102(1)(c); and

• father failed or refused to provide the children with the

care necessary for their health, guidance, or

well-being, see § 19-3-102(d).

¶4 Based on the jury’s verdicts, the juvenile court adjudicated the

children dependent or neglected and adopted a treatment plan for

father that required him to complete mental health and domestic

violence evaluations; improve his parenting skills; participate in life

skills services; sign releases of information; and submit to regular

substance monitoring.

II. Adjudication

¶5 Father first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the jury’s verdict.

2
A. Preservation

¶6 The Department urges us not to address father’s claim

because it contends that father was required to move for post-trial

relief to preserve his claim. We are not aware of any such

requirement, and the Department does not provide us with any

legal support for its assertion that a motion for post-trial relief is

required. Rather, it is the Department that bears the sole burden of

proving at adjudication, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

the children are dependent or neglected. People in Interest of

D.M.F.D., 2021 COA 95, ¶ 32. Father consistently asserted that the

Department could not and did not meet that burden. Father’s

assertion is enough to preserve his sufficiency of the evidence claim.

B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶7 In reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient, we review the

record in the light most favorable to the Department, drawing every

inference “fairly deducible” from the evidence in favor of the jury’s

decision. People in Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. App.

2009). We cannot disturb the jury’s verdict if sufficient evidence

supports it, even if reasonable people could arrive at different

conclusions based on the same evidence. Id.

3
¶8 “The purpose of an adjudicatory hearing is to determine

whether the factual allegations in the dependency and neglect

petition are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and

whether the status of the subject child or children warrants

intrusive protective or corrective state intervention into the familial

relationship.” People in Interest of A.M., 786 P.2d 476, 479 (Colo.

App. 1989). “[A]n adjudication may be based not only on current or

past harm but also on prospective harm.” People in Interest of

G.E.S., 2016 COA 183, ¶ 15. In other words, a jury may consider

whether it is likely or expected that the child will lack proper

parental care or that the child’s environment will be injurious to his

welfare. People in Interest of S.N., 2014 COA 116, ¶¶ 15-16. Such

determination may be based on “the parent’s past conduct and

current circumstances.” Id. at ¶ 17.

C. Analysis

¶9 Section 19-3-102(1)(b) provides that a child is considered

dependent or neglected if the child does not receive proper parental

care due to the parent’s actions or omissions. Proper parental care

means “the minimum level of care or services and necessities that

4
are required to prevent any serious threat to the child’s health or

welfare.” CJI-Civ. 41:7 (2025).

¶ 10 The evidence was sufficient to establish subsection (1)(b)

based on father’s omissions. Father testified that he (1) was

concerned about the children being in mother’s care but felt his

only option was to ask the maternal grandfather to intervene;

(2) would not remove the children from mother’s care himself due to

fear of escalating mother and being charged with domestic violence;

and (3) had not seen the children for several months by the time of

the adjudicatory trial.

¶ 11 This same testimony was sufficient to establish the basis for

adjudication pursuant to section 19-3-102(1)(d) (father failed or

refused to provide the children with care necessary for their health,

guidance, or wellbeing). See CJI-Civ. 41:7 n.3 (referring to

subsection (1)(d) as the “companion basis” to subsection (1)(b) and

noting that the definition for proper parental care applies to both

subsections (1)(b) and (1)(d)).

¶ 12 Based on this conclusion, we need not consider whether the

children were also dependent and neglected under subsections

(1)(a) and (c). See People in Interest of S.M-L., 2016 COA 173, ¶ 29

5
(explaining that “section 19-3-102 requires proof of only one

condition for an adjudication”), aff’d on other grounds sub nom.

People in Interest of R.S. v. G.S., 2018 CO 31.

III. Dispositional Order

¶ 13 Next, father contends that a treatment plan was not

necessary, and that the objectives in his treatment plan were

inappropriate. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 14 When a child is adjudicated dependent or neglected, the

juvenile court must develop a treatment plan designed to “preserve

the parent-child legal relationship by assisting the parent in

overcoming the problems that required intervention into the family.”

People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 11; see also

§ 19-3-508(1)(e)(I), C.R.S. 2025 (providing that unless the proposed

disposition of a dependency and neglect action is termination of the

parent-child legal relationship, the court “shall approve an

appropriate treatment plan”).

¶ 15 An appropriate treatment plan must relate to the child’s needs

and be reasonably calculated to render the parent fit within a

reasonable period of time. People in Interest of M.W., 2022 COA 72,

6
¶ 32. “In determining whether a treatment plan is appropriate, the

court must consider whether the plan’s objectives adequately

address the safety concerns identified during the assessment of the

family.” K.B., ¶ 14. Because the purpose of a treatment plan is to

address the material issues that are barriers to reunifying children

with their parents, it is appropriate for a treatment plan to address

those material issues even if the adjudication was not necessarily

predicated upon the particular problem the treatment plan seeks to

address. See, e.g., People in Interest of C.L.S., 934 P.2d 851, 856

(Colo. App. 1996) (“[T]he specific ground on which the jury [finds]

the child to be dependent and neglected [does] not restrict the

juvenile court’s discretion to formulate a treatment plan in the best

interests of the child.”).

¶ 16 We review a treatment plan adopted by the juvenile court for

an abuse of discretion. M.W., ¶ 32. A court abuses its discretion

when its actions are manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair,

or based on an erroneous understanding or application of the law.

Id. at ¶ 12.

7
B. Analysis

¶ 17 Father’s main objection appears to be the necessity of any

treatment plan to rehabilitate him.

¶ 18 Except in some limited scenarios not applicable here, a

juvenile court is required to adopt an appropriate treatment plan for

a parent following a dispositional hearing. § 19-3-508(1)(e)(I);

People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20, ¶ 15. Because the jury

found that each of the children was dependent or neglected, the

juvenile court was required to adopt a treatment plan for father that

was reasonably calculated to address the concerns raised at the

jury trial. M.W., ¶ 32. Therefore, the court’s adoption of a

treatment plan was not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 19 Nor do we discern an abuse of the juvenile court’s discretion in

adopting the specific elements of father’s treatment plan that he

contested. The court found that the treatment plan proposed by

the Department was appropriate. Specifically, the court found that:

• a mental health evaluation was appropriate to determine

if mental health services for father were warranted;

• substance dependence in the home was “clearly a

concern” that needed to be addressed;

8
• parenting education, life skills support, and a domestic

violence assessment were appropriate given father’s

history of involvement with the Department; and

• releases of information were necessary to effectuate the

purpose of the treatment plan to place the children back

in the home.

¶ 20 At the jury trial, the ongoing Department caseworker raised

concerns that the children were exposed to substance use and

domestic violence. The caseworker, an expert in child welfare and

child protection, opined that father failed to protect the children or

take accountability for the situation they were in. The family time

program coordinator testified that father attended only twelve of the

thirty-three scheduled visits with the children and reported that

father became upset at family time when the facilitator’s guidelines

were enforced. Father’s refusal to follow the guidelines resulted in

the suspension of his family time, which was not reinstated because

father failed to engage. Father testified that he had been seeking

employment for nine months without success and did not have a

driver’s license despite recently becoming eligible to get one.

9
IV. Disposition

¶ 21 The judgment and order are affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.

10