Parental Resp Conc AMR

25CA0320 Parental Resp Conc AMR 10-02-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0320
Delta County District Court No. 24DR87
Honorable Steven L. Schultz, Judge

In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning A.M.R. and R.L.A., Children,

and Concerning Stacia Marie Meyers,

Appellant,

and

Michael Andre Romero,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART,
AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE
Tow and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced October 2, 2025

Catherine C. Burkey, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellant

Law Office of J.M. Distefano, Jacqueline M. Distefano, Crawford, Colorado, for
Appellee
¶1 Stacia Mari Meyers (mother) appeals the district court’s

permanent orders allocating parental responsibilities between her

and Michael Andre Romero (father). We reverse the parenting time

order and remand for the district court to enter a new parenting

time order based on mother’s stated intention to relocate to

Alabama. In all other respects, we affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Three months before the permanent orders hearing, mother

notified the district court of her intent to move with the parties’

children to Alabama. She sought orders that would name her the

children’s primary residential parent and sole decision-maker.

¶3 After an evidentiary hearing, the district court ordered that the

children remain enrolled in school in Colorado and found that their

best interests would be served if the parents exercised equal

parenting time, with mutual decision-making.

II. Discussion

¶4 Mother contends that the district court failed to follow

Spahmer v. Gullette, 113 P.3d 158 (Colo. 2005), and In re Marriage

of Morgan, 2018 COA 116M, when it issued a parenting plan that

was not feasible for two parents living in different states, Alabama

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and Colorado, and asks us to reverse the permanent orders. Father

concedes that the court erred by issuing a parenting plan that

didn’t account for mother living in Alabama but asks us not to

disturb the court’s best interests findings or its judgment awarding

joint decision-making.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶5 When, as here, a parent notifies the court before permanent

orders are entered of the parent’s plan to relocate, the district court

must resolve the allocation of parental responsibilities under

section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2025. See Spahmer, 113 P.3d at

161. In this context, neither party has vested parenting time rights,

and each party may become the child’s primary residential parent

depending on the court’s best interests analysis. Id. In conducting

a best interests analysis, the court must consider the factors

identified in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) that are relevant to its

determination. In re Custody of C.J.S., 37 P.3d 479, 482 (Colo. App.

2001).

¶6 The court has no statutory authority to order a parent to live

in a specific location and must make its initial determination of

parental responsibilities, including parenting time, based on the

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location in which a parent intends to live. Morgan, ¶ 6; see also

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(VIII) (requiring the court to consider “[t]he

physical proximity of the parties to each other as this relates to the

practical considerations of parenting time”).

¶7 A district court has broad discretion in deciding what

allocation of parenting time is in the children’s best interests, and

we may not disturb its decision absent an abuse of that discretion.

In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶ 9. The court abuses

its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. Id. However, we review de novo whether

the district court applied the proper legal standard. Id. at ¶ 10.

B. Analysis

¶8 The district court issued a year-round week-on, week-off

parenting time schedule, the terms of which required the parties to

exchange the children on “Monday afternoons after school during

the academic year and at 5:00 p.m. at all other times.” The court

also ordered that the children “will continue to attend” school in

Colorado. This order is “impractical to implement” if mother lives in

Alabama, and thus “implicitly requires mother to live in a specific

location (Colorado).” See Morgan, ¶¶ 9-10.

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¶9 In Morgan, a division of this court reversed a year-round

5-2-2-5 parenting time schedule that implicitly required mother to

remain in Colorado, over her stated intent to relocate to California.

Id. at ¶ 15. Relying on Spahmer, the division concluded that

mother’s wish to move to California was the premise from which the

court’s legal analysis had to begin. Id. at ¶ 14 (citing Spahmer, 113

P.3d at 164). By failing to consider mother’s intent to relocate, the

magistrate in Morgan, like the district court in Spahmer, “did not

properly take into account the parties’ physical proximity to each

other, thereby abusing its discretion and exceeding its statutory

authority.” Id. at ¶ 10.

¶ 10 Similarly here, mother never wavered in her stated intent to

move to Alabama with the children. Three months before the

permanent orders hearing, she filed a proposed parenting plan

premised on her relocation. At the hearing, mother reaffirmed that

desire in her opening statement, in her testimony, and in closing

argument. Mother testified that she wanted to move to Alabama to

be close to her sister, to have access to a trade school and medical

facilities for her oldest daughter (not of this relationship), and to

take advantage of the lower cost of living. Mother had her home

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appraised and had been exploring career options in Alabama. And

she had obtained court permission to relocate with her other two

daughters in a separate case.

¶ 11 True, mother testified that whether she could “even go forward

with moving” depended on the outcome of the permanent orders

hearing. But mother’s admission that she would not move without

her children didn’t relieve the district court of its “obligation to

make the difficult decision to allocate parenting time” with mother

in Alabama and father in Colorado. See id. at ¶ 14.

¶ 12 Accordingly, we reverse the parenting time order. On remand,

the district court must accept the location in which each party

intends to live (father in Colorado, mother in Alabama) and allocate

parenting time accordingly. The district court “has no authority on

remand to issue an order that effectively coerces mother into

abandoning her plans to relocate” to Alabama. Id. at ¶ 15.

However, the court may exercise its discretion “to fashion an

alternative plan” that allows mother to remain in Colorado if she

decides against relocation in the event that the court names father

as the primary residential parent in Colorado. Id.

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¶ 13 To the extent mother argues that the district court erred when

it ordered that the parties share all major decisions, we discern no

abuse of discretion in that order. The court’s findings, which enjoy

record support, reflect its consideration of the children’s best

interests after having considered any conflicting evidence. See

§ 14-10-124(1.5)(a); see also In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326,

335 (Colo. App. 2007) (noting that we will disturb the district

court’s factual findings only if they lack record support); See In re

Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Colo. App. 1998)

(noting that it’s district court’s responsibility to judge the credibility

of witnesses and resolve conflicting evidence).

III. Disposition

¶ 14 The portion of the judgment concerning decision-making

responsibility is affirmed. The portion of the judgment allocating

parenting time is reversed, and the case is remanded with

directions to enter a new parenting time plan in accordance with

Spahmer and Morgan. Although we don’t disturb the court’s factual

findings, we recognize that the children’s circumstances may have

changed since the district court entered its judgment. See In re

Parental Responsibilities Concerning M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 27.

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Thus, although on remand the court may rely on the existing record

in determining the children’s best interests, it must also provide the

parties with the opportunity to present additional evidence

concerning the children’s current circumstances. Id. The existing

allocation of parental responsibilities shall remain in place pending

new orders on remand. See id.

¶ 15 Those portions of the judgment not challenged on appeal

remain undisturbed.

JUDGE TOW and JUDGE LUM concur.

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